In re N.C.
{¶ 1} Appellant D.T. (“father“) appeals from the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court“), that awarded permanent custody of his minor child N.C. (“N.C.” or “the child“) to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency“) and
{¶ 2} The child originally was placed in the emergency custody of CCDCFS on November 9, 2022, when the child was less than two weeks old. After an initial complaint could not be resolved within the statutory time frame, CCDCFS refiled a complaint on February 13, 2023, alleging the child to be dependent and requesting temporary custody to the agency. Following a hearing, the child was committed to the predispositional temporary custody of CCDCFS.
{¶ 3} In May 2023, the child was adjudicated to be dependent; thereafter, the child was committed to the temporary custody of CCDCFS. Though mother and father engaged in case-plan services, the agency had significant concerns that remained. On September 25, 2023, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary custody to permanent custody. In May 2024, father filed a motion for an extension of temporary custody. In November 2024, mother filed a motion for legal custody to herself.
{¶ 4} Trial was held in November 2024. At that time, the child was two years old and was in the care of the maternal grandfather. The juvenile court heard testimony from multiple witnesses and accepted evidence in the case. The child‘s guardian ad litem recommended permanent custody to CCDCFS. On December 9, 2024, the juvenile court journalized a judgment entry in which it made requisite
{¶ 5} Under his first assignment of error, father claims the juvenile court erred and abused its discretion in finding it would be in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to CCDCFS. Though father refers to an abuse-of-discretion standard, the Supreme Court of Ohio has found that the abuse-of-discretion standard does not apply when reviewing a permanent-custody decision and that “the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards of review” are the proper appellate standards of review, depending on the argument presented. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 11. Here, the substance of father‘s argument challenges the juvenile court‘s decision as being against the manifest-weight of the evidence. “When reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20.
{¶ 6} “Under
{¶ 7} “[T]he best interests of the child are paramount in any custody case[,]” and courts are to liberally interpret the statutes under R.C. Chapter 2151 “to provide for the care and protection of the child . . . .” In re A.B., 2006-Ohio-4359, ¶ 32, citing
{¶ 8} In this case, even though the juvenile court determined that the factor under
{¶ 9} Father‘s challenge focuses on the juvenile court‘s best-interest determination. The record shows that the juvenile court considered all relevant best-interest factors, including the enumerated factors under
{¶ 10} While father points to certain testimony favorable to him, the juvenile court weighed all relevant factors in rendering its decision. The testimony and evidence show that that there were anger-management and substance-abuse concerns with father. Also, the alleged domestically violent relationship between mother and father was a concern throughout the pendency of the proceedings, and there was circumstantial evidence of their suspected ongoing relationship. Though father engaged in treatment to address his substance-abuse issues, he was inconsistent with completing his drug screens, he tested positive for cocaine in May 2024, and his sobriety date was July 12, 2024. Father was not always consistent with visitation, and his visits were suspended after he put the child at risk while engaging in aggressive behavior toward an agency worker. Though supervised visitation was reinstated in October 2024, there was testimony that during a visit, father became visibly frustrated and angered when the child was having a temper tantrum. The caseworker testified that the child did not view father as an authoritative figure and that father hit the child and stated he “can whoop [his child.]” At the time of trial, father was living with his grandfather and was looking for his own home.
{¶ 11} Other testimony and evidence were provided demonstrating valid concerns as to both father and mother, including as to mother‘s ability to protect herself and N.C. There was testimony showing that the child was doing well in the
{¶ 12} Despite father‘s arguments otherwise, the record supports the juvenile court‘s best-interest determination. Even though father completed certain case-plan services, as the juvenile court determined, he failed to demonstrate significant progress or a benefit from those services. Indeed, a parent‘s successful completion of a case plan does not preclude a grant of permanent custody to a social services agency. See In re C.C., 2010-Ohio-780, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.), citing In re J.L., 2004-Ohio-6024 (8th Dist.). The juvenile court properly determined in accordance with
{¶ 13} After carefully reviewing the entire record, we do not find the juvenile court clearly lost its way or committed a manifest miscarriage of justice by terminating the parents’ parental rights and awarding permanent custody of the child to CCDCFS. We are not persuaded by father‘s arguments otherwise. We
{¶ 14} Under his second assignment of error, father challenges the juvenile court‘s “reasonable-efforts” determination under
{¶ 15} “Overall, Ohio‘s child-welfare laws are designed to care for and protect children, ‘whenever possible, in a family environment, separating the child from the child‘s parents only when necessary for the child‘s welfare or in the interests of public safety.‘” In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 29, quoting
{¶ 16} In this case, the juvenile court made a reasonable-efforts finding at numerous stages of the proceedings. In the decision granting permanent custody to CCDCFS, the juvenile court again made a reasonable-efforts finding, stating as follows:
The Court further finds that reasonable efforts were made to prevent the removal of the child from the home, or to return the child to the home and finalize a permanency plan, to wit: reunification. Relevant services provided to the family include: The mother was referred for parenting, mental health, and domestic violence. The father was referred for substance abuse, basic needs, and anger management.
{¶ 18} Under his third assignment of error, father claims the juvenile court‘s decision violated his due process rights. Though father claims the juvenile court violated his fundamental right to parent his child, it is well established that the government has broad authority to intervene to protect a child‘s health or safety. See In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 28, citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000);
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR