In rе the Marriage of DONNA and MARK OLIVEREZ. DONNA OLIVEREZ, Appellant, v. MARK OLIVEREZ, Respondent.
No. H040955
Sixth Dist.
July 24, 2015
238 Cal. App. 4th 1242
Law Office of Howard L. Hibbard and Howard L. Hibbard for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
OPINION
RUSHING, P. J.—
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Donna Oliverez (wife) petitioned to dissolve her marriage to respondent Mark Oliverez (husband). The parties purportedly entered а
On appeal, wife contends that the second trial judge erred in reconsidering and vacating the prior ruling of another trial judgе. For the reasons stated below, we will reverse and remand.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties were married in 1993 and separated in January 2007. Wife filed the petition for dissolution of marriage on January 19, 2007, and since then, the divorce proceedings have been “contentious” and “highly litigаted” by the parties. At least five different judicial officers have made rulings in the underlying proceedings. Each party has been self-represented at various times. Additionally, wife has been represented by two different attorneys and husband has been represented by six diffеrent attorneys.
In April 2008, both parties signed the purported marital settlement agreement, which set forth terms determining child custody and spousal and child support. It also stated terms dividing the community assets, obligations, property rights, and other financial rights, interest, and claims. By its tеrms, the Agreement was intended to achieve a global settlement between the parties and was to be incorporated into the judgment of dissolution of marriage.
On March 26, 2009, husband filed a motion to enter judgment based on the Agreement (
At some point after the denial of husband‘s motion for judgment, and for reasons unknown from the record before us, the case was transferred to the Honorable Stephen S. Siegel. After several continuances, the case proceeded to trial, beginning on August 6, 2012. The court trial took 15 days over a
On October 28, 2013, Judge Siegel issued a “Tentative Ruling on Court Trial.” In the tentative ruling, Judge Siegel stated that he was going to reconsider Judge Morse‘s ruling that the Agreement was unenforceable. On December 19, 2013, the court issued a formal notice of its intention to reconsider the December 1, 2010 ruling on its own motion, and it afforded the parties an opportunity to brief the issue. Both parties filed additional briefing.
On March 4, 2014, the trial court issued a stаtement of decision and final judgment, in which the court discussed the prior ruling on husband‘s motion to enter judgment pursuant to
The notice of entry of judgment was served on April 30, 2014. Wife timely appealed the judgment of dissolution.
DISCUSSION
On аppeal, wife asserts that the trial court erred in granting reconsideration of the prior ruling, after three years had elapsed, and after the parties
A trial court‘s discretion to reconsider another judge‘s prior ruling is nеcessarily narrow and usually only appropriate when the prior judge is unavailable. (Curtin v. Koskey (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 873, 876-878 [282 Cal.Rptr. 706] (Curtin).)
In Le Francois, our Supreme Court сonsidered whether, notwithstanding the provisions of
However, Le Francois did not resolve the question of whether one trial judge may reverse the ruling of another trial judge. In Le Francois, the Supreme Court noted that the “Court of Appeal held that because the motion was transferred [to another judge] without objection, plaintiffs could not challenge the propriety of that transfer on appeal.” (Le Francois, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1097, fn. 2, italics added.) The question of “when and under what circumstances one judge may revisit a ruling of another judge” was thus not on review, and the Supreme Court specifically left open that question. (Ibid.)
Generally, one trial court judge may not reconsider and overrule an interim ruling of another trial judge. (Morite of California v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 485, 493 [23 Cal.Rptr.2d 666]; Curtin, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d 873; Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232 [254 Cal.Rptr. 410] (Ziller).) “This principle is founded on the inherent difference between a judge and a court and is designed to ensure the orderly administration оf justice. ‘If the rule were otherwise, it would be only a matter of days until we would have a rule of man rather than a rule of law. To affirm the action taken in this case would lead directly to forum shopping, since if one judge should deny relief, defendants would try another and another judge until finally they found one who would grant what they were seeking. Such a procedure would instantly breed lack of confidence in the integrity of the courts.’ [Citation.]” (In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 427 [125 Cal.Rptr.2d 526].) “For one superior court judge, no matter how well intended, even if correct as a matter of law, to nullify a duly made, erroneous ruling of another superior court judge places the second judge in the role of a one-judge appellate court.” (Ibid.)
However, there are narrow exceptions to this general rule. (See In re Alberto, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 430.) “[W]here the judge who made the initial ruling is unavailable to reconsider the motion, a different judge may entertain the reconsideration motion.” (Ziller, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1232.) Another exception is when the facts have changed or when the judge has considered further evidence and law. (People v. Riva (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 981, 992-993 [5 Cal.Rptr.3d 649] (Riva); Tilem v. City of Los Angeles (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 694, 706 [191 Cal.Rptr. 229].) Additionally, a second judgе may reverse a prior ruling of another judge if the record
We first note that the record before us does not cоntain Judge Morse‘s original ruling on the Agreement or the hearing transcript or minute order on that ruling. Nor do we have a full record of the parties’ moving papers.3 It is unclear whether the documents in our record contain all the evidence and declarations considered by Judge Morse to make her ruling. Thus, we are unable to fully ascertain the reasons for Judge Morse‘s finding that the Agreement was unenforceable.
In any event, Judge Siegel explained that he decided to reconsider Judge Morse‘s ruling because there wаs insufficient evidence to find the Agreement unenforceable. Thus, Judge Siegel‘s reconsideration was not based on new facts, evidence, or law (see Riva, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at pp. 992-993), nor was there a showing that the original ruling was a result of inadvertence, mistake, or fraud (Armstrong, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1069). Furthermore, there wаs nothing to suggest that Judge Morse was unavailable at the time of the hearing.4 Accordingly, none of the recognized exceptions to the general rule that one trial judge cannot overrule another trial judge are applicable in this instance. Rather, it аppears that Judge Siegel merely disagreed with Judge Morse‘s prior decision. Indeed, after conducting his own review of the evidence relating to the motion to enter judgment on the Agreement, Judge Siegel found the prior ruling “clearly erroneous,” because there was “no evidence, testimony, exhibit or declaration before the court that might support [Judge Morse‘s] finding that ‘there was never a “meeting of the minds.“‘” Furthermore, he found insufficient evidence of wife‘s claim that she was under duress, coercion, fraud, and undue influencе at the time she signed the Agreement. Though Judge Siegel came to a different conclusion based on his review of the evidence, his disagreement with Judge Morse‘s finding is not enough to overrule the prior decision. (Riva, supra, at p. 992; In re Alberto, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 427.) Accordingly, we conclude that Judge Siegel erred in vaсating the prior ruling on the Agreement.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and remanded.
Elia, J., and Walsh, J.,* concurred.