In rе MARRIAGE OF STACY GOODMAN, Petitioner-Appellee, and DRU GOODMAN, Respondent-Appellant.
No. 2-20-0289
Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District
Order filed September 24, 2020
2020 IL App (2d) 200289-U
JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Zenoff and Schostok concurred in the judgment.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. Nos. 13-D-2139, 17-OP-486. Honorable Janelle K. Christensen, Judge, Presiding.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: Petitioner failed to establish “good cause” for the extension of a plenary order of protection which prohibited respondent, either personally or through his agents, assigns, or any other person or company on his behalf, from engaging in surveillance of petitioner because surveillance, in and of itself, is not prohibited and the only new evidence petitioner elicited at the hearing on her motion to extend the order of protection was respondent‘s testimony that he would surveil petitioner again to investigate cohabitation based on the advice of legal counsel and petitioner‘s testimony that she was fearful of the resumption of surveillance.
¶ 2 On September 6, 2017, the circuit court of Lake County entered a plenary order of protection in favor of petitioner, Stacy Goodman, and against respondent, Dru Goodman. The plenary order of protection enjoined respondent from “engaging in surveillance of the Petitioner,
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 ¶ 4 The following facts are taken from the supporting record filed in this appeal as well as the
¶ 5 During the pendency of the dissolution proceedings, the parties engaged in extensive motion practice on a range of matters. For instance, on December 4, 2013, petitioner presented an emergency motion to compel respondent to fund the purchase of a residence for her, the cost of which exceeded $1 million. The trial court denied the emergency motion. On December 11, 2013, petitioner filed an emergency petition for an order of protection. On December 20, 2013, the trial court entered an agreed order which required respondent to cooperate and transfer funds for petitioner‘s purchase of a new residence. The December 20, 2013, order also provided that petitioner‘s emergency petition for an order of protection had been withdrawn and “shall be purged from the court file.” A separate order entered on December 20, 2013, restrained each party from harassing, intimidating, or interfering with the other‘s liberty.
¶ 6 On March 22, 2017, petitioner filed a verified petition for an order of protection against respondent pursuant to the
¶ 7 In his response to the petition, respondent alleged that petitioner‘s claim of distress was pretextual because she withdrew the December 2013 emergency petition for an order of protection in exchange for “a financial payoff” in which respondent agreed to advance her money to purchase a home. Respondent further explained that petitioner was seeking maintenance, but he believed that petitioner and Kornick were cohabiting. Thus, respondent asserted, the surveillance was “in pursuit of relevant information or information that may lead to relevant information” regarding cohabitation and that the discovery methods employed “do not fall within the definition of ‘harassment’ as defined by the [
¶ 9 Scigalski testified that he is a retired Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent who works as a private investigator. Scigalski was hired by respondent‘s attorney to investigate whether petitioner and Kоrnick were cohabiting. Scigalski‘s investigation lasted from February 15, 2017, through March 25, 2017. Surveillance would often start at petitioner‘s home, and the agents would follow her and the children to see if Kornick was there. All surveillance was within the law after advising the local police. Scigalski described how the surveillance revealed individuals associated with Kornick, petitioner shopping and eating at restaurants with the children and Kornick, and petitioner and Kornick together at a school event for the parties’ son. At times, the surveillance was for 18 hours a day. Scigalski also testified as to his understanding of “cohabitation.” Scigalski defined the term as “when two people live together and conduct their life together *** [a]s if they were married.” Scigalski acknowledged that petitioner and Kornick do not live together and reside in separate abodes. Scigalski charged over $100,000 for his work.
¶ 10 Vogt testified that he is employed by DDG, Inc., the corporation of which respondent is president. In 2013, respondent confided that he was having family problems, was receiving
¶ 11 Respondent testified that he did not learn that Vogt hired an investigator until December 2013 or January 2014. He understood Vogt did so initially for the safety of respondent and his children because petitioner was bringing the children around Kornick. The investigation continued so as “to prove adultery” and subsequently conjugal cohabitation. Respondent testified that the investigation lasted until August 2016, but his divorce counsel hired another investigator and that investigation lasted until around March 2017. Respondent also testified regarding the cameras and other surveillance equipment installed at the former marital residence.
¶ 12 Purdy testified that he has been a licensed attorney since 1966. Vogt engaged him on behalf of Vogt‘s employer to review investigator Arden‘s reports “to make sure that there were no problems for [DDG] and its officers.” Once Purdy reviewed the reports, he would send them to Vogt. Purdy charged $375 per hour for his services. Purdy did not find anything improper about the way the reports were prepared.
¶ 13 Petitioner initially testified regarding the surveillance system in the fоrmer marital home. Petitioner then testified that she first believed she was under surveillance following the filing of her petition for dissolution of marriage late in 2013, when she was visiting Kornick at a friend‘s house in Wheeling. At that time, her friend‘s neighbor saw someone take pictures and look into
¶ 14 Petitioner acknowledged on cross-examination that she began seeing a therapist long before the divorce proceedings commenced. With respect to the incident on December 31, 2015, she also acknowledged that the private investigator did not come onto her property.
¶ 15 At the conclusion of the evidence on September 6, 2017, the trial court entered a two-year plenary order of protection against respondent. The court made the following remarks in support of its ruling:
“Counsel, the forthcoming [sic] about her relationship with Matt Kornick, what business is it of any of ours other than as it relates to the issue of cohabitation? We are not the moral police. We are not the judgment police. We are—the only—I had already ruled on the issue of cohabitation. That wasn‘t even close.
And what I have here is I have an obsessive pattern of surveillance of his wife that was precipitated, not by the trying [sic] to draw a legal conclusion as to whether she was
cohabitating, but initially to show that she was having an affair, which is not something *** of concern to me certainly now. And that was his—and I get it, but that was his personal concern. If he were the one surveilling, if he were the one outside the house, if he were the one following her to her boyfriend‘s apartment, if he were the one taking 2,000 pictures, this wouldn‘t even be a question. But because he has the means, the means to hire a high-end private investigator, all of a sudden it is, oh, it is okay. He has the ability to—in which actually makes it worse because she knows he has the ability. She knows that he is a guy who puts cameras in his house and moves them around during the midday to watch what is going on. He—I mean, this is a—this became obsessive.
Anybody who would spend $1.5 million over a period of little over three years in private investigators is somebody with too much money and who is obsessed. And that in and of itself causes—would cause any reasonable person anxiousness, all the terms she used, to be afraid, angry, upset. I would be—any of us would be furious if somebody surveilled us like that. We would all feel violated, that‘s the perfect word, violated. This is beyond any means, and I will take it beyond necessary to accomplish a purpose.
This is—this is—you know, you did great research on your cases. But I don‘t know what those other—the rules of the definitions given by the statute in those other states. But for me to just like totally disregard what the definition of harassment is as defined by the statute, harassment means knowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose. This was not necessary to accomplish a purpose. This was not necessary to accomplish any purpose. The initial purpose was to find out if she was having an affair. It ultimately transformed into whether or not she is cohabitаting. But
that would mean that only people of means of Dru Goodman could prove cohabitation, which is not the case. Would cause a reasonable person emotional distress and does not cause—and does cause. Unless the presumption is rebutted, this hits two things, repeatedly follow Petitioner about in a public place or places. Now, trust me, when they wrote this, they had no idea that somebody would be surveilled like she was surveilled. I mean, some of these time sheets that I saw that are in evidence are 18 hours a day. She is sleeping, and they are outside her house.
How would you like a van outside your home with your children surveilling you? How would you like it? We would feel violated.
The other thing is repeatedly keeping Petitioner under surveillance by remaining present outside his or her home or in other places. I mean, this fits it perfectly. And I could go like this and say, oh, it is some wealthy guy who has the means to hire a fancy former FBI agent, and he won‘t violate the law because he knows what the law is or he is clever enough to not be seen all the time. But this is it. We would all be violated. This is a perfect—this is—this I don‘t care what the Appellate Court does with this if you appeal because I am following the law. How they manipulate it, I don‘t care because this is—these facts fit the statute perfectly.
I am going to enter the order. It is going to be a two-yeаr order. The order is just going to prevent him or agents of him from surveilling her outside her home. She is not working, right? So her home, her social, like a health club or whatever known social locations we can name within the petition for two years.
I think from the way I am expressing myself, I think I am making my point that
this was completely and utterly inappropriate and warrants a plenary order of protection.”
In the written order of protection, the trial court did not check any of the boxes with respect to caution indicators, firearms, or police enforced remedies, but specifically enjoined respondent “from engaging in surveillance of the petitioner, either personally or through his agents, assigns, or any other person or company on his behalf.” In conjunction with the plenary order of protection, the trial court, at respondent‘s request, entered an order providing that “[Respondent‘s] FOID card shall be reinstated and returned to [respondent] with no restrictions.”
¶ 16 On January 12, 2018, the Department filed in the trial court a “Non-Party *** Petition to Intervene as a Matter of Right.” The Department sought leave to intervene pursuant to
¶ 17 In the direct appeal from the dissolution proceeding, respondent argued, inter alia, that the plenary order of protection entered by the trial court was against the manifest weight of the evidence and should be reversed because it was necessary to accomplish a purpose which is reasonable under the circumstances, i.e., gathering evidence of cohabitation in a divorce case. Goodman, 2019 IL App (2d) 170621-U, ¶ 146. Following oral argument, this court, in an order entered on July 31, 2019, concluded that while a party to a divorce action is not prohibited from engaging a private investigator to gather relevant evidence, the duration and scope of the surveillance at issue exceeded what was reasonably necessary to gather evidence of cohabitation.
¶ 18 The plenary order of protection was set to expire on September 6, 2019. However, it was continued for six months after petitioner filed, on August 29, 2019, a motion to extend the plenary order of protection pursuant to
¶ 19 In his response to the motion to extend, respondent asserted that during the entire term of the plenary order of protection, he had been fully compliant and did not engage in any activity to surveil petitioner. He also asserted that
¶ 20 In her reply to respondent‘s response, petitioner asserted that there is scant case law describing “good cause shown” under
¶ 21 Respondent filed two motions in limine with respect to petitioner‘s purported good cause evidence. The first motion sought to exclude Dr. Kraus as a witness. The second motion in limine sought to bar petitioner from recycling evidence from the hearing on the plenary order of protection to establish good cause for an extension. A hearing on respondent‘s motions in limine was held on February 18, 2020, before the Honorable Janelle Christensen. Regarding the first motion in limine, the court did not foreclosе petitioner from calling Dr. Kraus, but petitioner never called him at the
¶ 22 The hearing on the motion to extend commenced on March 4, 2020, before Judge Christensen. As a preliminary matter, the court heard petitioner‘s counsel on the statements made by respondent‘s attorney at the oral argument in the underlying appeal concerning the right to conduct surveillance in Illinois. The court found that the statements constituted legal argument and would not be considered. The court then noted that it was in possession of the underlying record, which it would incorporate into the proceeding.
¶ 23 Petitioner called respondent as her first witness. Initially, respondent confirmed that his income has not changed since the entry of the 2017 plenary order of protection and that he has not surveilled or had anybody surveil petitioner since the entry of the 2017 plenary order of protection. Respondent denied that the main reason he was objecting to the extension of the order of protection was to have his FOID card returned. However, he admitted that when asked at his deposition why he was objecting to the extension, he responded, “I would like to get my FOID license back.” Respondent clarified that while the return of his FOID card is one of the reasons he is objecting to the extension of the order of protection, it is not the “pressing reason.”
¶ 24 Respondent further testified that on April 22, 2019, he told Dr. Sol Rappaport (a mental
¶ 25 Respondent testified that he told Dr. Kraus that he was not allowed to hire a private investigator, but it was possible that a court could lift that restriction. The following exchange then occurred between petitioner‘s attorney and respondent:
“Q. So I take that to mean, and I may be wrong, that if the judge lifts the Order of Protection, that means that it is no longer in effect, you will then hire private detectives to follow [petitioner] for reasons that she is cohabiting; correct?
A. You may be wrong, that‘s correct.
Q. You may be wrong?
A. Yeah, you said you may be wrong and you may be wrong.
Q. Am I wrong?
A. I don‘t know yet.
Q. What do you mean you don‘t know?
A. I don‘t know.
Q. You don‘t know if you‘re going to follow her or not?
A. I don‘t know if—I want to reserve my right to hire a private investigator if the order is off, but I don‘t know if I‘m going to hire it [sic]. We are going to have to base that
on suspected cohabitation.”
Respondent clarified that he may or may not resume surveillance of petitioner if the court permits it. He would surveil petitioner again to investigate cohabitation based on the advice of legal counsel. Respondent suspects “a little bit” that petitioner and Kornick are living together. Respondent disagreed that it was “logical” that he would reinstitute surveillance since he suspects cohabitation, explaining that he does not know what he would do in the future. Respondent also denied being “obsessed” with petitioner. Respondent did not believe petitioner would suffer any distress by a resumption in surveillance sincе she is aware that surveillance took place in the past.
¶ 26 On cross-examination, respondent reiterated that he would like the order of protection lifted so that he would have the ability to hire a private detective to investigate the issue of cohabitation should he so elect. Respondent explained that during the pre-decree portion of the case he was concerned about adultery and the safety of his children being around Kornick. Respondent stated that he would not hire a private detective for any purpose other than to investigate the issue of cohabitation. Respondent stated that if the order of protection were lifted and he had the ability to hire a private detective, the investigation would be “more limited” and would be restricted to the issue of cohabitation. On redirect examination by petitioner‘s counsel, respondent testified that it was his understanding of the law that maintenance would terminate if the recipient is cohabitating.
¶ 27 Petitioner testified that when she initially learned that she had been surveilled she became “very anxious” and “nervous.” In addition, she could not sleep and had a recurring nightmare of somebody following her all the time. Petitioner talked to her therapist about it and took medication. Petitioner testified that she experienced “a little bit of relief” after the entry of the plenary order of protection, but she still looks around to see if she is being followed. When asked why she wants to extend the order of protection, petitioner responded, “I don‘t want to live my life in fear and
¶ 28 Petitioner described Kornick as her boyfriend. She sees Kornick every other weekend and “[o]nce a while” during the week. Kornick resides in an apartment in Wheeling. Petitioner did not cosign Kornick‘s lease, she does not support him, and she sees him “[a] lot less” than she has in the past. When petitioner and Kornick stay together overnight, it is usually at her house and the kids are nоt there. If the motion to extend were denied, petitioner would be scared that she would not be able to live her life freely without someone following her.
¶ 29 On cross-examination, petitioner testified that she started taking Xanax in 1996. Petitioner understood that if it were established that she cohabitated with Kornick, she would lose her maintenance.
¶ 30 In closing arguments, petitioner‘s counsel contended that respondent was obsessed with petitioner and would resume surveillance if permitted and that terminating maintenance was “not about the money” to respondent. Counsel further argued that petitioner is “still suffering” and that just the thought that surveillance would resume “is frightening to her.” Thus, petitioner‘s counsel asserted that the “presumption in the law” and the lack of “material changes” compelled granting the motion to extend.
¶ 32 The trial court acknowledged that, in the underlying appeal, this court had not barred respondent entirely from conducting surveillance but had only considered the previous scope and duration. It observed, however, that many litigants cannot afford surveillance so they file cohabitation petitions based on social media, gossip, or other sources and then start discovery. Respondent‘s counsel responded that under the decision of In re Marriage of Miller, 2015 IL App (2d) 140530, a limited investigation would at least be necessary to establish facts sufficient to file a good faith petition. Respondent testified that he did not know if petitioner was cohabitating now and the ability to conduct discovery should not be cut off. To do so would give petitioner a “free pass.” If respondent were to file for termination now, petitioner would move for sanctions, arguing that there was no basis for respondent to conduct financial discovery or take Kornick‘s deposition.
¶ 33 Respondent‘s attorney posited that if the court granted an indefinite extension, respondent could never engage a private detective to investigate the issue of cohabitation. The court stated it could only grant a two-yeаr extension, to which counsel responded that respondent would face the same situation in another two years regardless of continued compliance. Petitioner‘s counsel replied that respondent was still motivated by “obsession” and should therefore be limited to facts that cannot be gleaned through an investigation.
¶ 35 The court next discussed that there are methods aside from surveillance to gather evidence of cohabitation, including observation by third persons and references in social media. Based on respondent‘s demeanor, tone of voice, and suspicions, the court did not find credible respondent‘s
“In the context of this case the Appellate Court has found that [respondent‘s] prior acts of surveillance constituted harassment as that term is defined by the Domestic Violence Act. The Appellate Court further found that past acts of surveillance caused [petitioner] to suffer emotional distress.
[Respondent] has shown in the past that his desire to satisfy his suspicion of cohabitation will cross the line to harassment. And based upon his testimony of the hearing this Court finds that it is more probable than not he will do so again if it lifts the restriction.
The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that [petitioner] has satisfied the elements of Section 219 and 214 of the Domestic Violence Act and that she has shown good cause for an extension. For this reason the Court extends thе Plenary Order of Protection by two years.”
A written order extending the order of protection was entered on March 5, 2020. Respondent filed a notice of interlocutory appeal on April 29, 2020.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 36 ¶ 37 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court‘s decision to extend the original order of protection for an additional two years “was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and an
¶ 38 The Domestic Violence Act is to be liberally construed and applied to advance its underlying purposes, which include “to promote safe and healthy families” by “prevent[ing] abuse and harassment between family or household members.”
¶ 39 The Domestic Violence Act provides for three types of orders of protection—emergency (
¶ 40 As noted above, in this case, Judge Salvi entered a two-year plenary order of protection against respondent on September 6, 2017, which prohibited him “from further acts/threats of
¶ 41 Section 214(a) of the Domestic Violence Act provides that the modification and extension of prior orders of protection “shall be in accordance with this Act.”
“Any emergenсy, interim or plenary order may be extended one or more times, as required, provided that the requirements of Section 217, 218 or 219, as appropriate, are satisfied. If the motion for extension is uncontested and petitioner seeks no modification of the order, the order may be extended on the basis of petitioner‘s motion or affidavit stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order and stating the reason for the requested extension. An extension of a plenary order of protection may be granted, upon good cause shown, to remain in effect until the order of protection is vacated or modified. Extensions may be granted only in open court and not under the provisions of subsection (c) of section 217, which applies only when the court is unavailable at the close of business or on a court holiday.”
750 ILCS 60/220(e) (West 2018) .
It is the language of section 220(e), notably whether petitioner established “good cause” for the extension, that is at the heart of the present appeal.
¶ 42 Respondent argues that the trial court‘s decision to extend the original order of protection for an additional two years “was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and an abuse of
¶ 43 Petitioner responds that the trial court‘s March 5, 2020, ruling extending the original plenary order of protection was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. According to petitioner, nothing in section 220(e) of the Domestic Violence Act requires a violation of an order of protection as the necessary predicate for the extension of an order of protection. Rather, petitionеr contends, a trial court can rely on the original plenary order of protection as the basis for the extension of an order of protection. Petitioner further posits that respondent‘s construction of the statute would lead to an absurd result where a petitioner who was threatened with a violation of an order of protection could not receive an extension of it because there was no actual violation of the order. Petitioner also argues that an extension is warranted because the evidence shows that respondent “continues to have the desire to harass [her] and feels he has ‘an absolute right’ to do so by again having her surveilled.” Thus, she reasons, “the trial court did not in any way run afoul of this Court‘s decision. Instead, the trial judge thoughtfully acted to prevent further abuse and harassment of [petitioner] based upon, among other things, [respondent‘s] testimony (and
¶ 44 To address the parties’ arguments, we must initially construe the language of section 220(e) of the Domestic Violence Act. The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 56. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. State Bank of Cherry, 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 56. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be applied as written, without resorting to further aids of statutory construction. State Bank of Cherry, 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 56. A court may not depart from the plain language of the statute and read into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that are not consistent with the express legislative intent. State Bank of Cherry, 2013 IL 113836, ¶ 56.
¶ 45 The relevant language of section 220(e) provides that:
“If the motion for extension is uncontested and petitioner seeks no modification of the order, the order may be extended on the basis of petitioner‘s motion or affidavit stating that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order and stating the reason for the requested extension. An extension of a plenary order of protection may be granted, upon good cause shown, to remain in effect until the order of protection is vacated or modified.”
750 ILCS 60/220(e) (West 2018) .
Thus, section 220(e) distinguishes a motion for extension that is uncontested and for which the petitioner does not seek a modification of the order of protection from any other motion for an extension. Section 220(e) permits the trial court to grant an extension of a plenary order of protection upon the showing of “good cause” and also provides that the findings in the original order can be the basis for extending the order, but only if the motion to extend is uncontested and the petitioner does not seek a modification of the order.
¶ 46 Here, the motion to extend the plenary order of protection was contested. Thus, petitioner was required to show more than just unchanged circumstances since the original order was granted.
¶ 47 The only relevant new evidence petitioner elicited was respondent‘s testimony that he would surveil petitioner again to investigate cohabitation based on the advice of legal counsel and petitioner‘s testimony that she was fearful of the resumption of surveillance. Neither of these established good cause for the extension. First, although we concluded in the first appeal that it was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence for Judge Salvi to find the duration and scope of the surveillance was unreasonable or that thе conduct at issue caused petitioner emotional distress, we did not hold that surveillance can never occur. Goodman, 2019 IL App (2d) 170621-U, ¶¶ 167, 169. Rather, we allowed that a party may engage a private investigator to gather evidence relevant to a divorce proceeding so long as the investigation serves a purpose that is reasonable under the circumstances. Goodman, 2019 IL App (2d) 170621-U, ¶ 169. Under Illinois law, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated if the party receiving maintenance “cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis.”
¶ 48 Although Judge Christensen found that “it is more probable than not” that respondent would “cross the line to harassment” if the order of protection were lifted, there was no evidence to substantiate this finding. In re Marriage of Healy, 263 Ill. App. 3d 596, 600-01 (1994) (holding that while the Domestic Violence Act is to be liberally construed to protect victims of domestic violence, there must be some evidence in the record to support the relief requested). Petitioner did not present any evidence to support the conclusion that if surveillance resumed, its scope and duration would be excessive or even at the same degree as the pretrial surveillance. Respondent said nothing at the extension hearing to support such a theory, and he did nothing following entry of the order of protection to support such an inference. To the contrary, respondent testified that if the order of protection were lifted and he had the ability to hire a private detective, the investigation would be “more limited,” restricted to the issue of cohabitation, and based on the advice of legal counsel. Moreover, respondent has demonstrated that he will follow court directives as evidenced by the fact that he has complied with the original order оf protection and he is on notice from this court as to how much surveillance is too much. Thus, the trial court‘s finding was based upon speculation as to what respondent might do in the future. But court decisions may not be based on speculation or conjecture. Wall v. McGavock, 132 Ill. App. 2d 231, 233 (1971).
¶ 49 Second, a petitioner‘s fear alone, with no other supporting facts, is not sufficient to warrant the extension of an order of protection. See Kennedy v. Morgan, 726 S.E. 2d 193, 197 (N.C. App. 2012) (quoting
¶ 50 Petitioner insists that such an interpretation of section 220(e) results in an “absurd construction” of the statute because it means “if a case presents ‘unchanged circumstances,’ there can be no extension of the order of protection.” Petitiоner cites Stapp, 2013 IL App (4th) 120513, in support of her position. In Stapp, the trial court issued a plenary order of protection against the respondent relating to allegations that he was harassing and stalking the petitioner. Prior to the expiration of the order, the petitioner filed a motion to extend the order. At the hearing on the motion, the petitioner testified that the respondent had contacted her numerous times on the internet while the plenary order of protection was in effect. The respondent denied the petitioner‘s allegations. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the petitioner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent had made multiple attempts to contact her while the plenary order of protection was in effect, that the respondent‘s attempts to contact the petitioner violated the restrictions in the plenary order of protection, and that the petitioner had shown good cause for an extension. The respondent appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he made multiple attempts to contact the petitioner. The appellate court disagreed. The Stapp court initially noted that an original order of protection can
¶ 51 Petitioner asserts that in Stapp, the “unchanged circumstances” were that the respondent continued to harass the petitioner. In other words, petitioner‘s interpretation of unchanged circumstances is that the offending conduct that gave rise to the expired order of protection has continued. But this is simply another way of saying that the petitioner in Stapp established “good cause” due to a violation of the original order of protection. In other words, the violation of the order оf protection in Stapp constituted “good cause” to extend the order. This factor clearly distinguishes Stapp from the present case.
¶ 52 Citing to Lutz v. Lutz, 313 Ill. App. 3d 286 (2000), petitioner also suggests that the trial court was entitled to rely solely on the record underlying the original order of protection in granting the extension. In Lutz, the parties agreed to a plenary order of protection for a period of one year. The agreement was memorialized in a docket entry in the court‘s file. Prior to the expiration of the order, the petitioner filed a motion to modify, which the trial court treated as a motion to extend. At the hearing on the motion, the petitioner testified that the respondent had violated the original
“We reject [the] respondent‘s interpretation of the initial order. Further, we find no abuse of discretion and presume, as did the trial court, the original order of protection was properly entered upon a sufficient factual basis. Here, the trial court relied on the original plenary order of protection as the basis for the extension. We acknowledge the written order did not contain express findings. However, the parties’ consent to the original order of protection essentially conceded the factual basis necessary to support that order. Moreover, evidence of [the] respondent‘s alleged violation of the original order lends further evidentiary support for the trial court‘s determination to extend that order. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court on this point.” Lutz, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 289.
¶ 53 According to petitioner, nothing in Lutz required a violation of the original order of protection. To the contrary, petitioner asserts that Lutz held that a “‘trial court [can] rel[y] on the original plenary order of protection as the basis for the extension.‘” (Emphasis added by
¶ 54 In so holding, we do not intend to imply that the record underlying the original order of protection is immaterial to a decision whether to extend an order of protection. To the contrary, the Domestic Violence Act instructs that the context and history of the parties’ relationship is a relevant factor to consider when issuing an order of protection. See
¶ 55 Noting that respondent “has the motivation to surveil in that he is paying $65,000 per month in maintenance,” the trial court expressed concern that once it “lifts the floodgates, it can‘t stop the flood.” This was apparently a reference to its belief that if it allowed the order of protection to lapse, respondent would resume surveillance. The court‘s remarks are problematic for various reasons. First, as notеd above, although we found that the trial court‘s determination that respondent‘s prior surveillance constituted harassment as that term is defined in the Domestic Violence Act was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we did not bar surveillance outright. Goodman, 2019 IL App (2d) 170621-U, ¶¶ 167, 169. We simply concluded that the prior acts of surveillance did not serve a purpose that is reasonable under the circumstances considering its duration and scope. Goodman, 2019 IL App (2d) 170621-U, ¶ 169. Second, there is nothing barring petitioner from seeking a new order of protection if surveillance resumes and she believes that the degree of surveillance exceeds the bounds of reasonableness.
¶ 56 In short, while we are not unsympathetic to petitioner‘s concerns, we are compelled to conclude that a plain reading of section 220(e) of the Domestic Violence Act requires something beyond recycling the facts underlying the original order of protection to establish “good cause” for an extension. In this case, petitioner‘s motion to extend, supported only by the record underlying the original order of protection, respondent‘s testimony that he would surveil petitioner again to investigate cohabitation based on the advice of legal counsel, and petitioner‘s testimony that she was fearful of the resumption of surveillance, did not rise to the level of “goоd cause” sufficient to extend the original order of protection. Indeed, as the trial court recognized, surveillance, in and of itself, is not improper. This is particularly true when the surveillance is related to lawfully
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 58 For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County granting petitioner‘s motion to extend and vacate the order extending the original order of protection for an additional two years. Nothing in our decision should be construed as barring petitioner from seeking a new order of protection if surveillance resumes and she believes that the degree of surveillance exceeds the bounds of reasonableness.
¶ 59 Reversed and vacated.