In re M.D.
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
IN RE: M.D. C.A. No. 28087
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
CASE No. DL 15-04-0908
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 17, 2016
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} M.D. аppeals a judgment entry of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that adjudicated her delinquent of involuntary manslaughter, corrupting another with drugs, and trafficking in heroin. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} The facts of this case are largely undisputed. On the morning of January 13, 2015, Brandy Amaro sent a text message to M.D., her cousin, asking for help finding heroin. After agreeing to help her, M.D. sent a text message to Brandon Barton. Although Mr. Barton did not have any heroin, he got in touch with his friend Tydon Beaver, whо knew someone who would sell it to Ms. Amaro. Through a series of messages passed along that communication chain, Ms. Amaro arranged to buy $40.00 of heroin from Mr. Beaver’s contact.
{¶3} Around 6:00 p.m. that same day, Mr. Barton picked M.D. and Ms. Amaro uр in his car. Mr. Barton was in the driver’s seat, Mr. Beaver was in the front passenger seat, Ms.
{¶4} The house where Ms. Amaro lived belonged to Ms. Amaro’s cousin, Amy. D. Ms. D.’s son saw Ms. Amaro arrive home and go up to her room, explaining that she had taken Xanax. Around 5:00 a.m. the next mоrning, Ms. D. was awake adjusting the temperature of the house when she noticed that the television in Ms. Amaro’s room was still on. She knocked on the door, but received no answer. After going downstairs to adjust the heat and pour herself some juicе, Ms. D. returned upstairs and knocked on Ms. Amaro’s door again. When there no answer, Ms. D. unlocked the door and opened it, discovering that Ms. Amaro had died. An autopsy revealed that Ms. Amaro died from recent heroin use.
{¶5} Following an investigation into Ms. Amaro’s death, Detective Timothy Harvey filed three complaints against M.D., alleging that she was delinquent because she had committed acts that would constitute involuntary manslaughter, trafficking in heroin, and corrupting another with drugs if committed by аn adult. Before trial, the State amended two of the complaints to
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE JUVENILE DELINQUENT OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER BY MEANS OF “TRAFFICKING IN HEROIN” BECAUSE SUCH CHARGE IS A LEGAL FICTION.
{¶6} M.D. argues that she could not have committed complicity to commit trafficking in heroin because she was only helping her cousin buy the drug. She notes that the legislature did not include the buyer of a drug as someone who commits trafficking. She, therefore, argues that, because she was simply her cousin’s assistant, she could not be complicit with the seller.
{¶7} The trafficking statute,
{¶8} It was solely through M.D.’s assistance that Ms. Amaro was able to obtain heroin from Mr. Beaver’s contact. Although she was merely one link in the communications between Ms. Amaro and the seller and sat still during the actual transaction, we conclude that M.D. aided and abetted the seller under
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING THE JUVENILE DELINQUENT OF TRAFFICKING IN HEROIN AND INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER BECAUSE THE STATE’S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR COMPLICITY TO COMMIT TRAFFICKING IN HEROIN.
{¶9} M.D. next argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence for the court to find that she committed trafficking in heroin and involuntary manslaughter. She argues that there was no evidence that she acted with the same mental state as the seller, noting that it was undisputed that she did not even know the identity of the seller. She also argues that there was no evidence that Mr. Beaver’s contact sold heroin to Ms. Amaro, noting that Mr. Barton testified that he was focused on his cell phone and not really paying attention during the alleged drug deal.
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if beliеved, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶11} To be complicit in an offense, the defendant must have acted “with the kind of culpability required for the commission of [the] offense[.]”
{¶12} The text messages that M.D. exchanged with Ms. Amaro and Mr. Barton establish that she knowingly helped Mr. Beaver’s contact arrange to sell heroin to her cousin. When Ms. Amaro told M.D. that she needed $40.00 of heroin, M.D. checked with Mr. Barton and then told Ms. Amaro that “my dude can get it[.]” She also rode with Mr. Barton so that she could tell him where to go to pick up Ms. Amaro. Regarding whether a sale actually occurred, even though Mr. Barton did not see heroin pass between Ms. Amaro and the contact in exchange for money, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that a drug transaction occurred. See Jenks, 61
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING THE JUVENILE DELINQUENT OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT BRANDY AMARO’S DEATH WAS THE PROXIMATE RESULT OF ANY DRUG ACTIVITY INVOLVING THE JUVENILE.
{¶13} M.D. also argues that there was insufficient evidence to adjudicate her delinquent of involuntary manslaughter because there was no evidence that established that it was heroin Ms. Amaro bought from Mr. Beaver’s contact that resulted in her death. Initially, she repeats her argument that the State failed to prove that a heroin transaction occurred. She also argues that, because the sale occurred approximately 12 hours before Ms. Amaro’s deаth, which was also 10 hours since M.D. last saw Ms. Amaro, it is speculative that the alleged sale proximately caused Ms. Amaro’s death.
{¶14} The involuntary manslaughter statute,
{¶15} Mr. Barton testified that M.D. got in touch with him because Ms. Amaro needed to get “unsick,” which meant that she needed heroin. Dеtective Harvey found instruments used to shoot heroin intravenously near Ms. Amaro’s body, and the medical examiner found a fresh puncture mark on the inside of Ms. Amaro’s left elbow. Ms. D.’s son testified that Ms. Amaro went straight up to her room after returning home from her outing with M.D., which is where Ms. D. found her body several hours later. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that it was the heroin Ms. Amaro purchased frоm Mr. Beaver’s contact that caused her death. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the court to conclude that M.D. was delinquent of involuntary manslaughter. M.D.’s third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDICATING THE JUVENILE DELINQUENT OF CORRUPTING ANOTHER WITH DRUGS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE JUVENILE FURNISHED HEROIN TO ANOTHER.
{¶16} M.D.’s final argument is that the trial сourt should not have found her delinquent of corrupting another with drugs because there was insufficient evidence to prove that she furnished Ms. Amaro with drugs.
{¶17} Upon review of the record, we conclude that, viewing the evidence in a light most favorаble to the prosecution, M.D.’s actions in providing Ms. Amaro with a source for heroin, her assistance in getting Ms. Amaro a ride to the location of the heroin transaction, and Ms. Amaro’s subsequent death from that heroin is sufficient to support thе trial court’s conclusion that M.D. furnished drugs to Ms. Amaro. M.D.’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶18} M.D.’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, dirеcting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the jоurnal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
WHITMORE, J.
CONCURS.
MOORE, P. J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
APPEARANCES:
CEDRIC B. COLVIN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.