In re Lorenzo C. Fitzgerald, Jr.
109 A.3d 619
D.C.
2014
Check Treatment

In re Lorenzo C. FITZGERALD, Jr., Respondent.

No. 13-BG-1502

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Decided Dec. 4, 2014.

109 A.3d 619

A Suspended Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Bar Registration No. 390603). Submitted Oct. 14, 2014.

in coordination with each other and thus were not contained by any “rim” within a single conspiracy. He emphasizes that the evidence did not “show that the co-conspirators depended on or coordinated with one another in any substantial way to complete their respective tasks[.]” However, as the court recognized, “[a] single conspiracy is proven if the evidence establishes that each conspirator had the specific intent to further the common unlawful objective” and may be established even if some conspirators are ignorant of the identities of other participants and even when the various contributions to the enterprise are distinct in time. . More to the point, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Cheadle killed Atkins, Israel killed Johnson, and both appellants intimidated Matthews pursuant to a conspiratorial agreement between the two of them, the objective of which was to obtain Cheadle‘s acquittal of the murders with which Cheadle was charged.

Cheadle contends that the government‘s evidence suggested only that he “had inquired about who might appear at trial, not that he was trying to prevent them from doing so[.]” However, there was evidence from which the jury could infer appellants’ participation in an unlawful agreement to obstruct justice. “A conspiratorial agreement may be inferred from circumstances that include the conduct of defendants in mutually carrying out a common illegal purpose, the nature of the act done, the relationship of the parties and the interests of the alleged conspirators.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The jury heard, inter alia, a recorded phone call in which Cheadle and others discussed the possibility that Matthews might testify and how to handle the situation; Haynes‘s testimony that Cheadle and Israel had grown concerned about Matthews cooperating with the government; Haynes‘s testimony that, although Cheadle wanted to kill Matthews, Israel argued that he should be allowed to live but kept out of the prosecution‘s reach, and then arranged for Matthews to hide out with Israel‘s aunt; testimony that Latoya Villines, a friend of Cheadle, visited Matthews in jail at Cheadle‘s direction to discuss Matthews‘s anticipated trial testimony; and Haynes‘s testimony that, when Cheadle told Israel of his suspicions about Johnson, Israel replied that “he was going to take care of [Cheadle] because he kn[e]w if he was in a situation like that, [Cheadle] would take care of it for him[.]” Taken together, the foregoing evidence supported an inference that both Cheadle and Israel were participants in an agreement to prevent witnesses from testifying against Cheadle.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of conviction and the rulings of the trial court denying appellants’ new-trial motions are

Affirmed.

Before THOMPSON and BECKWITH, Associate Judges, and NEBEKER, Senior Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Having found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent, Lorenzo C. Fitzgerald, Jr., violated District of Columbia Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16(d), 8.1(a), 8.1(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d), the Board on Professional Responsibility (“the Board“) recommended that respondent be suspended for the period of one year, and demonstrate fitness prior to reinstatement. The Board found that respondent failed to deliver a client‘s file to client‘s successor counsel, did not respond to Bar Counsel in a timely manner, falsely asserted to Bar Counsel that he properly delivered client‘s file, and falsely asserted to Bar Counsel that he did not receive Bar Counsel‘s requests for information. Neither respondent nor Bar Counsel filed an exception to the Board‘s recommendation.

Pursuant to District of Columbia Bar Rule XI, § 9(h)(2), “[I]f no exceptions are filed to the Board‘s report, the Court will enter an order imposing the discipline recommended by the Board upon the expiration of the time permitted for filing exceptions.” Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that Lorenzo C. Fitzgerald, Jr., be suspended from the District of Columbia Bar for a period of one year.1 For purposes of reinstatement, the period of respondent‘s suspension shall run from the date on which he filed the affidavit required by District of Columbia Bar Rule XI, § 14(g). Respondent must demonstrate fitness to practice law prior to reinstatement. We direct respondent‘s attention to the responsibilities of disbarred attorneys set forth in District of Columbia Bar Rule XI, §§ 14 and 16.

So ordered.

Notes

1
This court suspended respondent from practicing law on March 25, 2014, after respondent failed to show cause why he should not be suspended pending final action on the Board‘s report. .