In re Logan B.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Lui, Rothschild, Johnson
BACKGROUND
1. The Juvenile Court Proceedings and Mother‘s Relationship with Logan
a. The basis for juvenile court jurisdiction
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a juvenile dependency petition on September 16, 2011, after receiving
The petition alleged that Logan‘s parents had engaged in domestic violence in his presence. The petition also referred to a prior dependency proceeding in 2007 resulting from alleged domestic violence, drug use, and sexual abuse by an acquaintance of the parents. Juvenile court jurisdiction was terminated in that earlier proceeding in 2009 following an order from the family law court granting Mother sole physical and legal custody of Logan.
The Department filed its jurisdiction and disposition report on October 27, 2011. The report summarized an interview with Logan during which he confirmed that he had witnessed domestic violence, including seeing Father injuring Mother by pushing her onto a bed and turning over a table that hit Logan. Logan reported that his parents got into fights and argued a lot. The report stated that Mother had a prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance and Father had prior convictions for burglary, possession of a controlled substance, and resisting an officer.
On November 23, 2011, Mother and Father pleaded no contest to an amended petition. The court ordered Logan placed with Mother under the Department‘s supervision and permitted monitored visits by Father. The court also ordered Father to complete a domestic violence program and ordered Mother to participate in counseling, including conjoint counseling with Logan.
b. Events leading to termination of Mother‘s reunification services and limited visitation rights
On February 22, 2012, the Department reported to the court that Father had not provided any proof of participating in the court-ordered programs, but Mother was complying with the case plan and Logan was doing well. However, on May 21, 2012, the Department filed a supplemental petition pursuant to
On May 21, 2012, the court ordered Logan detained with Andre and permitted Mother unmonitored day visitation. At a continued hearing on the Department‘s
Although the Department provided Mother with various housing assistance referrals, by February 4, 2013, Mother was still homeless and unemployed. She was not enrolled in any of the court-ordered individual counseling programs. Logan was still living with Andre. The court found that Mother was not in compliance with the case plan, and on March 8 appointed Andre as Logan‘s educational representative.
By August 20, 2013, Mother was still not enrolled in any of the court-ordered individual counseling programs and only occasionally participated in conjoint counseling with Logan. She was visiting Logan weekly. Andre reported that the visits appeared to go well. A Department social worker observed that Mother and Logan appeared to have a strong bond. Father had been in prison and his whereabouts were unknown.3 The court terminated Father‘s reunification services and permitted Mother‘s unmonitored visits to continue.
In December 2013 Mother failed to return Logan to Andre after a church event. Logan remained with Mother from Sunday, December 15, 2013, until she returned him to school the next Tuesday, December 17. The visit violated the court‘s order permitting
Mother visited Logan in mid-January, but then did not visit again until April 18, 2014. At a review hearing on March 20, 2014, the Department reported that Mother had provided no proof of participation in individual counseling and had not engaged in conjoint counseling with Logan. Mother‘s participation in family preservation services had been erratic. The court found that Mother was not in compliance with the case plan and terminated her reunification services. The court continued the case for a permanency hearing under
Mother had several more visits with Logan over the next few months that went well and that Logan seemed to enjoy. Mother then failed to appear for a visit on June 4, 2014. On July 2, 2014, Mother had another scheduled visit. Andre and Logan arrived on time. When Mother failed to appear 45 minutes after the starting time, Logan had an emotional breakdown. Mother told the social worker that she had car problems and then did not get a cab because she thought the visit was to be canceled.
In October 2014 both Mother and Father filed petitions under
In its report prior to the hearing, the Department stated that Mother had made only minimal efforts to address the issues that had led to the intervention of the Department and her involvement in the juvenile system. Despite the services that she had received, Mother had not gained any significant insight into how her behavior had harmed Logan and had put him at risk of further abuse and neglect. She remained in contact with Father
In March 2015 Logan‘s court-appointed special advocate (CASA) reported to the court that Logan had come to a full understanding that it was in his best interest to live with Andre. He realized his behavior deteriorated drastically after visits with Mother. Logan said that Mother pressured him constantly to come home and told him she was sad without him. Logan was exhausted after visits and did not want to see Mother frequently.
Prior to a hearing on June 5, 2015, the Department reported that Logan had said he had become ” ‘fed up’ ” with Mother‘s failure to ” ‘do what she was supposed to do after three years.’ ” He thought that Mother was ” ‘putting lies into my head,’ ” which made him feel uncomfortable. He did not want Mother calling him every night, and he said he was okay with just two visits a month. He thought Mother was ” ‘selfish’ ” to want more visits.
Logan‘s CASA also filed a report on June 5, 2015. The report reiterated that Logan‘s behavior deteriorated after his visits with Mother and stated that Logan wanted to see Mother only once or twice a month. At the request of Logan‘s counsel, following the June 5th hearing the court ordered that Mother‘s visits be reduced to every other week with two telephone calls per week. The court again continued the
c. Logan‘s decision to request adoption
In July 2014 Andre told the Department that she wanted to be Logan‘s legal guardian but was open to the possibility of adoption as an alternative plan. The Department requested time to arrange a home adoption study for Andre. That study was approved in October 2014.
Various reports filed by the Department and by Logan‘s CASA over the next year indicated that Logan wanted legal guardianship rather than adoption. Prior to the
At the hearing on January 14, 2015, Mother‘s and Logan‘s counsel requested a legal guardianship by Andre. They pointed out that Logan would be 12 years old by the time the adoption could be completed and at that time could legally object to the adoption.6
Prior to the June 5, 2015 hearing, the Department reported that Logan wanted to live with Andre under a legal guardianship. The report from Logan‘s CASA stated that Logan wanted “long term guardianship at this time with option for adoption open in the future.” However, Logan wanted his “case to be closed to [the Department],” and if this cannot happen, Logan “is willing to be adopted.”
However, by July 2015, Logan had changed his mind and wanted adoption. The Department submitted a report on July 21, 2015, stating that Andre informed a social worker on June 5 that Logan had told his attorney he wanted to proceed with adoption rather than legal guardianship. The social worker interviewed Logan on July 8, 2015, and Logan confirmed that he wanted to be adopted. He said that he understood that would mean his mother‘s parental rights would be terminated and Andre would be his parent. He indicated that he “is no longer worried about what his mother wants and wants to move forward with an adoption.” Logan‘s CASA also filed a report dated July 21, 2015, confirming that Logan now wanted adoption and stating that the CASA had “no doubt” that adoption by Andre was in Logan‘s best interests.
2. The Section 366.26 Hearing
The contested
Logan testified that he understood there could be a type of legal guardianship that would not require court intervention. Nevertheless, he “just want[s] to be adopted.” He also understood that adoption would terminate Mother‘s parental rights and that if that occurred there would be nothing he could do to see Mother until he was 18 if Andre said that he could not. But his “mind is set.” “For the past few years I have been saying legal guardianship, adoption, or living with my mom, and now I am set on adoption.” He testified that he would feel that way even if there were an option to live with Andre and still have a relationship with Mother and not have to deal with the courts.
Logan recalled the time when he was very upset after Mother did not show up for a visit, and then on the telephone Mother was able to calm him down. He acknowledged that Mother makes him “feel calmer sometimes,” although Andre can calm him down also.
Logan testified that he would be disappointed and sad if he could not see Mother until he was 18. He said that he likes to see Mother and feels close to her. He enjoys their visits. They sculpt with clay, talk about school, eat snacks and draw. On a scale of one to ten for how upset he would be if he could not see Mother until he was 18, he would feel about “7.5.”
On examination by his counsel, Logan testified that Andre and Chris (her fiancé) are the ones who go to parent-teacher conferences, take care of him when he is sick, take him to the doctor and dentist, and arrange his extracurricular activities. Logan confirmed that, despite all the questions he had been asked, he had not changed his mind and “still want[s] adoption.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Department argued for termination of parental rights and adoption by Andre. Logan‘s counsel joined in the Department‘s request, arguing that the record is clear that Logan loves his mother but it is equally clear that he wants to be adopted and wants a stable home.
3. The Trial Court‘s Findings
The court observed that it was “obvious Logan loves his parents” and that “the parents love Logan.” However, the court concluded that parental rights should be terminated.
The court found that Father failed to satisfy the first element of
With respect to Mother, the trial court noted that
The court observed that Logan is very articulate and seemed like a young man who had “weighed his options.” Logan had considered adoption and legal guardianship and “now is set on adoption.” The court found that Logan wanted stability and that a legal guardianship “does not foreclose possible future court involvement.”
The court also found that Mother was not “fulfilling a parental role” with the two hours of monitored visitation that she had every other week. The court concluded that “she does the best she can with what she‘s been given,” but noted that “her time has been restricted by her own actions.” “One time or a few times” that Logan asked to be “soothed by her” during her visits was not sufficient to show a parental role.
DISCUSSION
1. The Trial Court Correctly Decided that Mother Was Required to Prove a Compelling Reason Why Termination of Parental Rights Would Be Detrimental to Logan
This procedure recognizes that “[b]y the time of a
Mother relies on the exception set forth in
Mother argues that this exception requires a showing of only two factors: (1) regular visitation, and (2) that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. She claims that the trial court impermissibly added a third factor by requiring her to prove that there was a “compelling reason” to find that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to Logan. Because this argument raises an issue of statutory interpretation, we review it de novo. (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562 (Snowden).)
The objective of statutory interpretation is “to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.” (Snowden, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 562.) Mother correctly points out that the plain meaning of a statute is the best guide to determining legislative intent, and that the court may not vary the plain meaning to accomplish some other purpose. (Ibid.) However, Mother is wrong in claiming that proof of a “compelling reason” why termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child is not within the plain meaning of the statute. To the contrary: That express statement appears in subdivision (c)(1)(B).
Mother argues that the Legislature‘s explanation that the “compelling reason” must be “due to” one of the circumstances identified in the specific subdivisions means that the presence of one of those circumstances automatically qualifies as a “compelling reason.” But the statute does not say that, and her suggested interpretation is itself a gloss on the statutory language that is inconsistent with its plain meaning.
Mother‘s interpretation would make the phrase “compelling reason” surplusage. If the Legislature had intended that the presence of any of the enumerated circumstances would automatically be sufficient to preclude termination of parental rights, it had no reason to include the requirement of a “compelling reason” in the subdivision. It could have written subdivision (c)(1)(B) more simply to say that an exception precludes termination of parental rights when “[t]he court finds . . . one or more of the following circumstances.” A statutory construction that makes some words surplusage is to be
Mother‘s interpretation also would be inconsistent with subdivision (c)(1)(D), which requires that “[i]f the court finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child” pursuant to the exceptions identified in subdivision (c)(1)(B), “it shall state its reasons in writing or on the record.” (
In addition to its inconsistency with the plain language of subdivision (c)(1)(B), Mother‘s interpretation would frustrate the purpose of the legislative scheme. Under Mother‘s interpretation of
The court in Jasmine D. reached the same conclusion. (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 1339.) In that case, the court held that a parent must do more to establish the parental relationship exception than just show the existence of some benefit to continuing the parental relationship. The court rejected the appellant‘s argument that
In analysis that directly contradicts Mother‘s statutory interpretation argument here, the court in Jasmine D. reasoned that the balancing test it endorsed was confirmed by the Legislature‘s decision to amend
The court in Jasmine D. also explained that its interpretation of the parental relationship exception was consistent with a long line of cases construing that exception, beginning with In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567 (Autumn H.). (See Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1348–1349.) Those cases all require the benefit from continuing a parental relationship to be weighed against the child‘s interest in adoption. (Ibid.) The court in Jasmine D. recognized that this standard ” ‘reflects the legislative intent that adoption should be ordered unless exceptional circumstances exist, one of those exceptional circumstances being the existence of such a strong and beneficial parent-child relationship that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child and outweighs the child‘s need for a stable and permanent home that would come with adoption.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1348–1349, quoting In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51.)9
The plain language of
Mother acknowledges that she had the burden to prove that the parental relationship exception applied. (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) Different courts have applied slightly different standards of review in deciding appeals from trial court orders rejecting the applicability of the parental relationship exception. Some courts have reviewed the trial court‘s findings under the substantial evidence standard; some courts have applied an abuse of discretion standard; and some courts have used a mixed standard, reviewing the trial court‘s factual findings on the issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship for substantial evidence and reviewing the trial court‘s weighing of the benefits of continuing the parental relationship under the abuse of discretion standard. (See In re Noah G. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1300–1301 (Noah G.) [summarizing cases].) We need not decide which specific standard to apply here, as Mother has failed to show error under any of those deferential standards.
a. The trial court properly assessed Logan‘s expressed desire for adoption.
As it was required to do, the trial court weighed Logan‘s testimony as to whether he preferred adoption by Andre or a permanent guardianship relationship. (
Mother argues that the trial court should have discounted Logan‘s testimony because it was based on mistaken factual assumptions. She claims that Logan was mistaken in thinking that (1) he could achieve stability and get the Department “out of his life” only through adoption and not through a permanent guardianship and (2) his visits with Mother would continue after adoption. The argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, the argument disregards the trial court‘s role in assessing Logan‘s state of mind. We defer to the trial court‘s assessment of Logan‘s understanding and desires based upon his testimony and the trial record. (In re Christopher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1335 (Christopher L.).) In Christopher L., the court upheld the trial court‘s finding that the 14-year-old child in that case did not object to adoption despite his testimony that he would not want to be adopted if he could never see his mother again. The trial court was entitled to consider that testimony along with the child‘s other testimony and statements that he wished to be adopted and that he was happy living with his prospective adoptive parents. “It was the juvenile court‘s task to determine the testimony that accurately represented Christopher‘s state of mind with respect to adoption.” (Id. at p. 1335.) Similarly, here, we defer to the trial court‘s assessment of Logan‘s wishes from the totality of his testimony and statements.
Second, the record does not show that Logan‘s assumptions were mistaken. Logan‘s belief that only adoption would ensure that his status would be permanent and free of additional Department involvement was both understandable and reasonable. A permanent guardianship would not preclude the possibility of a future motion or motions
The record also does not show that Logan misunderstood the possible effect of adoption on his ability to see Mother again. Logan testified that he understood that adoption would mean that he would have no ability to see Mother before he was 18 years old if Andre decided he could not. His testimony that he wanted his visits with Mother to continue and that he had made plans with Andre to continue them did not show that he was mistaken about Andre‘s ability to terminate those visits after adoption if she chose to do so. (See Christopher L., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1335 [“We . . . do not construe Christopher‘s wish to continue to see [his mother] as undermining or being contrary to his wish to be adopted by his aunt and uncle“].)
b. The trial court‘s weighing of the evidence concerning the benefits that Logan received from Mother‘s visits is supported by the record.
The trial court stated that it “cannot find a detriment to Logan to terminate. I am looking at Logan‘s position here. And I must look at it through his eyes versus through the parents’ eyes.” That perspective was consistent with the focus on the child‘s best interest at a
While Logan testified that he valued his visits with Mother, there was evidence that the visits were not always beneficial. By June 2015 Logan‘s CASA was reporting that Logan recognized “his behavior deteriorates drastically after visits with [Mother]. His grades drop and he has frequent ‘meltdowns’ for several days. He expressed that he is exhausted after her visits; he wants to see her infrequently (maybe once or twice per month) and he only wants to speak with her infrequently as well.” Logan‘s therapist told
The trial court could reasonably weigh such evidence along with the beneficial aspects of Mother‘s visits in considering the value of the continued parental relationship. The court could also consider Logan‘s own insights into the difficulties of his relationship with Mother in weighing his testimony that he preferred adoption.
Much of the evidence on which Mother relies concerns the positive aspects of Mother‘s visits with Logan. The trial court heard that evidence and nevertheless concluded that the benefits that Logan received from those visits did not outweigh the interest of a permanent home through adoption.11 Mother cannot demonstrate error just by showing that Logan enjoyed some benefit from his relationship with her through their periodic visits. “The juvenile court may reject the parent‘s claim simply by finding that the relationship maintained during visitation does not benefit the child significantly enough to outweigh the strong preference for adoption.” (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) Because Mother had the burden to prove that the parental
Similarly, Mother‘s speculation about the possible emotional consequences for Logan if her visits were to cease does not provide a reason to reverse the trial court‘s decision. The record shows that Logan wanted the visits to continue and would be quite sad if they did not. But that is not the same as a serious emotional problem resulting from a termination of the relationship. Evidence that Logan was upset when Mother did not make it to a scheduled visit also does not necessarily mean that her visits were a requirement for Logan‘s mental health. Such evidence could as easily be interpreted as an indication that Logan was upset with Mother‘s failure to meet a commitment. Indeed, as discussed above, there was evidence that Mother‘s visits themselves sometimes had a negative effect.
The cases that Mother cites do not require reversal here. Analysis of the circumstances affecting the parental relationship exception is fact-intensive. “The exception must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575–576.) Circumstances in the cases that Mother cites differed in significant ways from the circumstances in this case.
In In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, the father immediately stopped his drug use when his five-year-old daughter was removed from his care and complied with every aspect of his case plan. His daughter stated that she wanted to live with him, and the trial court terminated the father‘s parental rights in part based on the adoptive parents’ unenforceable commitment to permit the father‘s visits to continue. Here, in contrast, 12-year-old Logan was consistent in expressing a desire to be adopted, Mother failed to
In In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, unlike here, the child repeatedly insisted that he wanted to live with his mother; his “CASA opined, and the record clearly show[ed],” that it would be detrimental to disrupt his relationship with his mother; and the trial court found that the mother filled a parental role. (Id. at pp. 468, 471–472.) And in In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, the seven-year-old child expressed conflicting wishes about where she wanted to live; the child‘s CASA and an expert psychologist testified about the importance of the bond between the child and her mother; and the appellate court had concerns about the “fragmented” hearing process and the basis for the trial court‘s ruling on the parental relationship exception. (Id. at pp. 687–691.) None of those factors is present here.
The trial court‘s ruling terminating parental rights in this case is solidly based on the record, and we therefore affirm.
The juvenile court‘s order terminating parental rights pursuant to
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.
LUI, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
JOHNSON, J.