IN RE: L.R.F., A Minor Child
No. 97905
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
September 20, 2012
[Cite as In re L.R.F., 2012-Ohio-4284.]
BEFORE: Celebrezze, P.J., Jones, J., and Cooney, J.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION; JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED; Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. DL-11111626
Timothy Young
Ohio Public Defender
By: Sheryl A. Trzaska
Assistant State Public Defender
250 East Broad Street
Suite 1400
Columbus, Ohio 43215
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: John D. Toth
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
{¶1} Appellant, L.R.F. (hereinafter, “appellant“), appeals the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, adjudicating him delinquent for having committed the offense of rape. After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and vacate the adjudication of delinquency in this case.
{¶2} On June 28, 2011, a complaint was filed in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court alleging that on October 9, 2007, appellant committed one count of rаpe by engaging in sexual conduct with minor child T.H. by force or threat of force, in violation of
{¶3} Appellant proceeded to trial on September 21, 2011. At trial, the state produced victim T.H. as its sole witness. T.H. testified that at the time of trial, she was nine years old and in the fourth grade. She identified appellant as her maternal cousin. T.H. testified that when she was six years old, then-10-year-old appellant and his then-14-year-old brother witnessed her kiss another boy as part of a dare. She believed that she would get in trouble for kissing the boy.
{¶4} Approximately three weeks later, T.H. and appellant were at their grandmother‘s hоme in Cleveland, Ohio, when her grandmother asked her to turn off the television in the basement. T.H. testified that she asked appellant to come with her
{¶5} When questioned specifically about her interaction with appellant, T.H. testified that “it was like blackmailing.” She explained that the blackmailing was that appellant “asked [her] to go down on him” or he would tell on her.
{¶6} T.H. stated that she initially did not tell anyone about the incident. However, approximately three years later, T.H told her mother about performing oral sex on appellant after her mother discovered a sexual text message on T.H.‘s personal cell phone.
{¶7} At the close of the state‘s case, appellant unsuccessfully moved for dismissal under
{¶8} Appellant testified on his own behalf. He testified that T.H. has a reputation for not telling the truth. He testified that he played with T.H. at their grandmother‘s house. He, however, was adamant that he did not assault T.H. at anytime.
{¶9} At the close of trial, the juvenile court adjudicated appellant delinquent of rape as charged. For disposition, the juvenile court committed appellant to the Department of Youth Services for a minimum period of one year.
{¶10} Appellant now brings this timely appeal, raising three assignments of error for review:
I. Insufficient evidence supported appellant‘s adjudication, and the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss charge.
II. Appellant‘s adjudication was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
III. The juvenile court abusеd its discretion when it ordered appellant committed to the Department of Youth Services.
Law and Analysis
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶11} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that his adjudication was not supported by sufficient evidence and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge pursuant to
{¶12} When reviewing the sufficiency of thе evidence in a juvenile context, we apply the same standard of review applicable to criminal convictions. See In re Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 86, 91, 548 N.E.2d 210 (1989). Our function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is to examine the evidence admitted at trial and determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
{¶13} In this case, appellant was found delinquent by reason of having committed rape, in violation of
{¶14} In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his delinquency adjudication, appellant contends that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that he purposefully compelled T.H. to submit by force or threat of force.
{¶15} “Force” is generally defined by statute as “any viоlence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.”
{¶16} In 1921, the Ohio Supreme Court, in State v. Labus, interpreted the element of force in the rape statute when the victim was the offender‘s daughter, who was under the age of 12. 102 Ohio St. 26, 38-39, 130 N.E. 161 (1921). Section 12413 of the General Code then provided that “[w]hoever has carnal knowledge of his daughter, sister, or a female person under twelve years of age, forcibly and against her will, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary during life * * *.” Id. at 27. The Labus court recognized that “[t]he force and violence necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending upon the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other * * * ” Id. at 39. The court reasoned that, “[w]ith the filial obligation of obedience to the parent, the
{¶17} In 1988, the court in State v. Eskridge interpreted the element of force in the rape statute where the victim was the offender‘s four-year-old daughter. 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988). At that time,
{¶18} According to the court, “[t]he youth and vulnerability of children, coupled with the power inherent in a parent‘s position of authority, creates a unique situation of dominancе and control in which explicit threats and displays of force are not necessary to effect the abuser‘s purpose.” Id. at 59, citing State v. Etheridge, 319 N.C. 34, 47, 352 S.E.2d 673 (1987). The court thereafter stated that the forcible element of rape can be established “[a]s long as it can be shown that the rape victim‘s will was overcome by fear or duress.” Id., citing State v. Martin, 77 Ohio App. 553, 68 N.E.2d 807 (9th Dist.1946), and State v. Wolfenberger, 106 Ohio App. 322, 154 N.E.2d 774 (12th Dist.1958). The
{¶19} In 1992, the court in State v. Schaim again interpreted the еlement of force for purposes of rape in violation of
{¶20} On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the state, relying on Eskridge, argued that the father‘s pattern of sexually abusing his daughter was sufficient to demonstrate force. Id. at 54. The Ohio Supreme Court disagreed that Eskridge applied because Eskridge was “based solely on the recognition of the amount of control that parents hаve over their children, particularly young children.” Id. at 55. According to the court, a woman over the age of majority is not compelled to submit to her father in the same manner as is a four-year-old girl. She is no longer completely dependent on her parents
{¶21} In 1988, the court again interpreted the element of force in the rape statute where the victim was the nine-year-old son of the adult offender‘s female friend. State v. Dye, 82 Ohio St.3d 323, 1998-Ohio-234, 695 N.E.2d 763. The court determined that Eskridge applied even though the defendant was not the victim‘s father because Eskridge did not strictly depend on the parental relationship between the offender and the victim, but rather the offender‘s position of authority over the victim. Id. at 328. Therefore, the court in Dye held that “a person in a position of authority over a child under thirteen may be convicted of rape of that child with force pursuant to
{¶23} Accordingly, our analysis focuses on whether, as a general rule of law, the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, through the use of force or threat of force, caused the will of T.H. to be оvercome by fear or duress.
{¶24} Absent the coercive effect of filial obligation, a defendant purposely compels another to submit to sexual conduct by force or threat of force if the defendant (1) uses physical force against that person or (2) creates the belief that physiсal force will be used if the victim does not submit. Schaim, 65 Ohio St.3d at 54-55, 1992-Ohio-31, 600 N.E.2d 661. A threat of force can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the sexual conduct. Id.
{¶26} In light of T.H.‘s testimony, we find that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that appellant usеd physical force or threat of force to compel T.H. to submit to sexual conduct. This is not a case where the defendant forcefully compelled the victim to perform the act of fellatio by pushing her head down. See In re N.K., 8th Dist. No. 82332, 2003-Ohio-7059. Similarly, this is not a case where the defendant forcefully held down the victim as he engaged in sexual conduct. See In re D.L., 3d Dist. No. 3-11-08, 2012-Ohio-1796, ¶ 27. Rather, T.H. described appellant as “asking” her to “go down on him,” and there is no testimony that indicates that appellant physically forced or threatened to physically force T.H. to submit in any way. Without more, such evidence does not warrant a delinquency adjudication for rape.
{¶27} Furthermore, the state also failed to produce sufficient evidence that appellant created the belief that physical force would be used if T.H. did not submit to the sexual conduct. Significantly, there is nothing in T.H.‘s testimony to suggest that she feared appellant would exert рhysical force if she did not comply with his request. Based on T.H.‘s testimony, it is evident that she submitted to the sexual conduct based on what she considered to be a form of “blackmail.” While we recognize that the threat of
{¶28} Based on the foregoing, we find insufficient evidence to establish that appellant purposely comрelled T.H. to submit to the sexual conduct by force or threat of force.
{¶29} Appellant‘s first assignment of error is sustained. We further find appellant‘s remaining assignments of error to be moot.
{¶30} Judgment reversed and case remanded to the trial court to vacate the delinquency adjudication.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and
COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR
Notes
“‘Force’ is defined to include all kinds of force which may be exerted physically against a person or thing, but to exclude coercive acts sometimes loosely called force, such as the compulsion exerted by blackmail through fear of exposure.”