{¶ 2} The minor child was born at least two months early to appellant on July 15, 2006, weighed less than two pounds, and remained in the hospital for three months after her birth. At the time of the minor child's birth, both the minor child and appellant produced positive tests for cocaine. As a result, FCCS filed a complaint for temporary custody on July 17, 2006, alleging the minor child was an abused, neglected, and dependent child. The next day, the magistrate issued a decision granting FCCS a temporary order of custody, and the matter was scheduled for a hearing. The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to serve in the dual capacity as the minor child's guardian ad litem and attorney.
{¶ 3} On September 28, 2006, a magistrate in the trial court held a hearing on FCCS's motion, where the facts alleged in the complaint were not contested. On November 1, 2006, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision, issued the same day, and found the minor child to be abused under the provisions of R.C.
{¶ 4} On April 10, 2007, FCCS filed a motion for permanent custody pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 5} A series of subsequent continuances at appellant's request delayed hearing on FCCS's motion for permanent custody until January 30, 2008. In the meantime, the guardian ad litem filed a report recommending FCCS's motion for permanent custody be granted. As a result of the hearing conducted on January 30, 2008, the trial court issued a February 6, 2008 Judgment Entry that concluded (a) the minor child could not be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child's parents, and (b) the minor child was abandoned. In determining the best interests of the minor child, the court examined the relevant factors under R.C.
{¶ 6} Appellant appeals, assigning two errors:
First Assignment of Error
The Juvenile Court erred in overruling Appellant's motion for a continuance.
Second Assignment of Error
The trial court erred in finding that an award of permanent custody was in the best interests of the children, pursuant to R.C.
2151.414 (D).
For ease of discussion, we first address appellant's second assignment of error.
I. Second Assignment of Error — Best interests of the child
{¶ 7} Appellant's second assignment of error asserts the trial court wrongly concluded the minor child's best interest is served in granting FCCS's motion for *4 permanent custody. As appellant correctly asserts, the right to rear a child is a basic and essential civil right. In re Hayes (1997), {¶ 8} In order to terminate appellant's rights, FCCS was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that (1) one of the four factors enumerated in R.C.
{¶ 9} On appellate review, permanent custody motions supported by the requisite evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence. In reBrown, Franklin App. No. 03AP-969,
{¶ 10} R.C.
A. R.C.
{¶ 11} In determining whether a child cannot or should not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time, the court must consider all relevant evidence, including the factors listed in R.C.
{¶ 12} R.C.
{¶ 13} Here, the case plan required appellant to complete random urine screens, to complete drug treatment, to attend two 12-step meetings per week, to meet the minor child's basic needs, to show she is able to provide safe, appropriate housing for the minor child, and to show she is current on all utilities. The trial court determined that although FCCS diligently attempted to assist appellant, appellant failed to remedy the problems that initially caused the child to be taken from her custody. The evidence supports the trial court's conclusion.
{¶ 14} Appellant admitted during trial that she saw the child only once, shortly after her birth, in August 2006. She further acknowledged she did not submit the required urine screens and attended no 12-step meetings until she was furloughed to Maryhaven. Moreover, from the time of the minor child's birth until appellant's incarceration in September 2007, appellant lived on the street. During that time period, she was cited with numerous misdemeanor violations, including a drug paraphernalia charge that was *7 reduced to disorderly conduct and multiple charges of solicitation, one issued three days after the minor child's birth.
{¶ 15} Due to appellant's repeated incarceration as a result of convictions on the misdemeanor charges, appellant continued to be unable to provide for the minor child, including food, clothing, shelter, or basic necessities. Moreover, the evidence indicated the minor child is developmentally delayed and requires both physical and occupational therapy. Appellant's inability to meet the minor child's basic needs strongly suggests a greater inability to meet the minor child's heightened needs.
{¶ 16} In the final analysis, appellant failed to comply with any aspect of the case plan and only began working on the chemical dependency aspect of the plan just prior to trial. Appellant's failure to even address the case plan supports the trial court's determination that appellant failed to remedy the conditions that led to the minor child's removal from appellant's custody.
B. R.C.
{¶ 17} Appellant's failure to maintain contact with the child also is relevant to R.C.
C. Best Interests of the Minor Child.
{¶ 18} Because the trial court's decision is supported under R.C.
{¶ 19} Under R.C.
{¶ 20} Under R.C.
{¶ 21} The remaining factors, as well as the evidence supporting them, similarly buttress the trial court's determination. Under R.C.
{¶ 22} With those findings, supported through the evidence in the record, the trial court's determination that the best interests of the minor child are served through a grant of permanent custody to FCCS is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.
II. First Assignment of Error — Continuance
{¶ 23} Appellant's first assignment of error contends the trial court erred in failing to grant appellant's motion for continuance presented to the trial court on the day of trial, January 30, 2008. The parties agree that an appellate court will not reverse a trial court's decision denying a motion for continuance unless the trial court abuses its discretion. See In re Nevaeh J., Lucas App. No. L-06-1093,{¶ 24} Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance. While the length of the requested delay was less than specific, counsel for appellant appeared to request a continuance of anywhere from a week or two up to a month to two months. The reasons for the requested continuance were apparent. *10
Incarcerated from September 2007 until her furlough to Maryhaven for drug treatment shortly before the January 30, 2008 hearing, appellant hoped delaying the hearing date would allow her the opportunity to gather positive evidence from her stay at Maryhaven to suggest a serious attempt to complete the case plan and retain custody of the minor child.
{¶ 25} Nevaeh J. is instructive here. There, the father sought a continuance "to demonstrate, through his participation in case plan services, his willingness and ability to provide a home for Nevaeh." Id. at ¶ 47. In reviewing the trial court's decision to deny the father's request for a continuance, the appellate court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the father's "actions of choosing not to establish paternity, visit, or receive services for over seven months were dilatory." Id. As the court explained, the father's "delay in taking these basic, necessary steps toward reunification with Nevaeh demonstrates a lack of commitment and an unwillingness to provide a permanent home. The trial court's refusal to continue the hearing was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable." Id.
{¶ 26} Here, appellant delayed approximately 18 months in availing herself of the services that would have assisted her in meeting the objectives of the case plan designed to reunify her with the minor child. While the reasons for appellant's delay may be apparent from the record, the trial court properly could regard her failure to pursue the available services as dilatory. Not only did appellant delay in seeking services to assist her in completing the case plan, but she requested multiple continuances prior to the January 30, 2008 hearing and inconvenienced the court, witnesses, and attorneys by apparently making the motion on the day of the hearing. The trial court did not abuse its *11
discretion in refusing to grant the continuance. See In re A.L., Franklin App. No. 07AP-638,
{¶ 27} Moreover, a continuance likely would not have changed the outcome of the case. Appellant's request for a continuance of up to two months may have allowed appellant to demonstrate some progress toward dealing with her drug addiction, but it would not have remedied the multiple other ways in which appellant failed to comply with the basics of the case plan the trial court approved and adopted. Even if she could complete the case plan, the evidence before the trial court allowed it to conclude that because appellant failed to maintain contact with the minor child since August 2006, she abandoned the child, itself a separate basis for FCCS's motion. Lastly, the minor child's best interests, a factor the trial court could consider under theUnger factors, supports the trial court's decision to deny a continuance, as the child had been in foster care for 18 months and potentially had the opportunity for adoptive placement.
{¶ 28} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 29} Having overruled both of appellant's assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
*1McGRATH, P.J., and KLATT, J., concur.