IN THE MATTER OF: L.J.S., A minor child.
CASE NO. 16CA8
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WASHINGTON COUNTY
11-30-16
2016-Ohio-8107
ABELE, J.
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Keri E. Farley, Beavercreek, Ohio, for appellant.
Paul R. Panico and Adam S. Eliot, Columbus, Ohio, for appellee.
CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED: 11-30-16
ABELE, J.
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Washington County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, judgment that modified a magistrate‘s decision entered in an action that involves the parental rights and responsibilities of two-year-old L.J.S.
{¶ 2} Appellant Christopher Starcher assigns the following errors for review:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT USED THE INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD IN AWARDING APPELLANT PARENTING TIME PURSUANT TO THE COURT‘S STANDARD PARENTING TIME POLICY.”
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT AWARDED APPELLANT PARENTING TIME PURSUANT TO THE COURT‘S STANDARD PARENTING TIME POLICY.”
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
“THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD TO APPELLEE.”
{¶ 3} Appellant and appellee, Ashley Lynch, are the child‘s unmarried, biological parents. Following the child‘s birth, they lived together first in Pennsylvania, next in West Virginia, and then in Marietta, Ohio. In January 2015, the relationship soured. Appellee and the child left the familial home and moved seven hours away to Pennsylvania, where they lived with appellee‘s mother.
{¶ 4} In February 2015, appellant filed a petition that requested the court to, among other things, designate him the child‘s residential parent and legal custodian, or alternatively, to grant the parties shared parenting.1
{¶ 5} The magistrate subsequently held a hearing to consider appellant‘s petition, and, on September 9, 2015, designated appellee the child‘s residential parent and legal custodian. The magistrate additionally granted appellant parenting time on a rotating, two-week basis, until the child reaches “school age.”
{¶ 6} Also on September 9, 2015, the magistrate established child support. The magistrate determined that until the child reaches “school age,” appellant is entitled to a fifty percent downward deviation from the child support worksheet-calculated amount. The magistrate
{¶ 7} On September 9, 2015, the trial court, in separate entries, adopted the magistrate‘s decisions. The court thus entered judgments that (1) designated appellee the child‘s residential parent and legal custodian; (2) granted appellant parenting time on a two-week, rotating basis until the child reaches school age; (3) granted appellant parenting time in accordance with the court‘s standard parenting time policy once the child reaches school age; and (4) ordered appellant to pay annual child support. On December 23, 2015, appellee objected to the part of the magistrate‘s decision that granted appellant parenting time on a rotating, two-week basis.2 She asked the court to modify the magistrate‘s decision and to (1) grant appellant parenting time in accordance with the court‘s standard parenting time policy, and (2) adjust the child support order.
{¶ 8} On March 11, 2016, the trial court sustained appellee‘s objection. The court determined that the magistrate‘s parenting time decision was “improper” when the magistrate awarded appellee “sole custody” and when “the parties live 7 hours apart.” The court further observed:
This Court, after much input from the local bar association, adopted a completely revised Standard Parenting Time Policy on May 1, 2013. The Court sees no reason to deviate from said policy in this case. If this were a shared parenting situation the court might consider a modification. However, given the great distance between the parties the Magistrate‘s order with respect to visitation would still be of concern to the Court even in a shared parenting situation given these facts.
{¶ 9} The court thus sustained appellee‘s objection and modified the magistrate‘s decision
{¶ 10} Before we may review the merits of appellant‘s assignments of error, we first must determine whether we have jurisdiction to do so. Courts of appeals have jurisdiction to “affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district.”
{¶ 11} Magistrate decisions in matters referred under
“‘The trial court must * * * enter its own independent judgment disposing of the matters at issue between the parties, such that the parties need not resort to any other document to ascertain the extent to which their rights and obligations have been determined. In other words, the judgment entry must be worded in such a manner that the parties can readily determine what is necessary to comply with the order of the court.‘”
Yahraus at *3, quoting Lavelle v. Cox, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 90–T–4396, 1991 WL 35642 (Mar. 15, 1991), *2 (Ford, J., concurring); Burns at ¶10.
{¶ 12} We recognize that a trial court need not issue an “encyclopedic” judgment entry, but the judgment entry must contain clear language to provide basic notice of the parties’ rights, duties, and obligations. Downard v. Gilliland, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 10CA2, 2011-Ohio-1783, 2011 WL 1378534, ¶11.
“‘[T]he content of the judgment must be definite enough to be susceptible to further enforcement and provide sufficient information to enable the parties to understand the outcome of the case. If the judgment fails to speak to an area which was disputed, uses ambiguous or confusing language, or is otherwise indefinite, the parties and subsequent courts will be unable to determine how the parties’ rights and obligations were fixed by the trial court.‘”
Harkai, 136 Ohio App.3d at 216, quoting Walker v. Walker, 9th Dist. Summit No. 12978, 1987 WL 15591 (Aug. 5, 1987), *2.
{¶ 13}
{¶ 14} In the case at bar, on September 9, 2015, the trial court entered two judgments that adopted the magistrate‘s decisions regarding all of the issues originally submitted to the court. The court‘s judgments adequately set forth the relief granted to the parties.4 When appellee filed her objection,5 however, the trial court‘s judgments were automatically stayed until the court
{¶ 15} On March 11, 2016, the trial court sustained appellee‘s objection to the magistrate‘s decision and modified the magistrate‘s decision. The court also “order[ed] into effect” certain modifications. However, the March 11, 2016 judgment does not indicate whether the court vacated, modified or adhered to its prior judgments, as opposed to the magistrate‘s decision. Thus, while the court ordered certain modifications “into effect,” the court did not unambiguously define whether it modified solely the magistrate‘s decision or if it also modified the court‘s September 9, 2015 judgments. Consequently, according to
{¶ 16} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal.6
{¶ 17} I disagree with the principal opinion‘s conclusion that the trial court‘s use of “into effect” creates a final appealable order problem. But I do agree with its finding concerning a single document deficiency.
It is ordered that the appeal be dismissed and that appellees recover of appellants costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Washington County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Hoover, J.: Concurs in Judgment & Opinion
Harsha, J.: Concurs with Concurring Opinion
For the Court
BY: _________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.