Burns v. MorganBurns v. Morgan
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a Highland County Common Pleas Court “Entry Overruling Objections” following a motion by Michael L. Morgan, defendant below and appellee here, to modify the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities.
{¶ 2} Lisa K. Burns (formerly known as Morgan), plaintiff below and appellant here, raises the following assignment of error for review and determination:
The trial court erred in granting a modification of custody.
{¶ 3} In April 1997, the parties divorced. The trial court designated appellant the residential parent of the parties’ minor children, Liticia (now emancipated), Michael (born October 3,1989), and Mikaela (born June 17, 1994). On January 4, 2005, appellee filed his third motion to modify custody.
{¶ 4} On April 29, 2005, the magistrate recommended that appellee be designated Michael’s residential parent. The magistrate found that a change in circumstances had occurred: “Michael Morgan desires to reside with his father and the father has a new house and adequate room for the minor child to reside, and Michael is now 15 years old and feels that it is easier to discuss difficult issues with his father and stated numerous other reasons during the in-camera interview.” The magistrate further found that changing the designation of residential parent served Michael’s best interest.
{¶ 5} On May 10, 2005, appellant filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. She argued that a change in circumstances had not occurred and that a modification was not in the child’s best interests.
{¶ 6} On July 8, 2005, the trial court overruled appellant’s objections. The court found that “the Magistrate’s Decision contains sufficient Findings of Fact to justify that a change in circumstances has occurred since the prior Custody Orders herein. Moreover, upon review of all testimony and evidence submitted to the Magistrate, the Court does find that such a change is in the best interest of the minor child.” Nowhere in its entry, however, does the court state the relief granted. Appellant timely appealed the trial court’s judgment.
{¶ 7} Initially, we must address a threshold issue concerning the trial court’s entry. Ohio appellate courts have jurisdiction to review the final orders of inferior courts within their district. Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution;
{¶ 8} “[T]he primary function of a final order or judgment is the termination of a case or controversy that the parties have submitted to the trial court for resolution.”
Harkai v. Scherba Industries, Inc.
(2000),
{¶ 9} When a court refers a matter to a magistrate, the trial court judge must enter a judgment. “ ‘
{¶ 10} After the magistrate issues a recommendation, “ ‘[t]he trial court must * * * enter its own independent judgment disposing of the matters at issue between the parties, such that the parties need not resort to any other document to ascertain the extent to which their rights and obligations have been determined. In other words, the judgment entry must be worded in such a manner that the parties can readily determine what is necessary to comply with the order of the court.’ ”
Yahraus v. Circleville
(Dec. 15, 2000), Pickaway App. No. 00CA04,
{¶ 11} In the case at bar, the trial court’s July 8, 2005 entry does not constitute a final, appealable order. We note that the court did not separately state the judgment and the relief granted to the parties. Overruling objections to a magistrate’s decision without separately setting forth the court’s own
{¶ 12} Accordingly, we hereby dismiss this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.