In re L.D.M.
The Lampe Law Office, LLC, Lynn M. Lampe, 9277 Centre Pointe Drive, Suite 100, West Chester, Ohio 45069, for appellant
Lyons & Lyons Co., LPA, Kathleen W. Adams, 8310 Princeton-Glendale Road, West Chester, Ohio 45069, for appellee
M. POWELL, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant (“Mother“) appeals a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court“), denying her
{¶ 3} On July 13, 2015, the parties resolved their parenting time and child support issues in a Compromise and Settlement Agreement (the “Agreement“). Pursuant to the Agreement, Father‘s child support obligation was set at $123.07 per month per child, effective August 1, 2015; collection of child support arrears was stayed subject to the Agreement; Father would transfer two brokerage accounts to Mother for the children‘s benefit; Father was to have no contact with the children prior to their emancipation; if Father abided by the no-contact provision, his child support obligation for L.M. would terminate on L.M.‘s 18th birthday and Father‘s child support arrearages would be reduced to $0 upon both children‘s emancipation; and if Father violated the no-contact provision, his child support arrearages would be fully reinstated and subject to collection and he would have to pay Mother $500,000 as liquidated damages.
{¶ 4} The Agreement further provided, “The parties to this Agreement understand it must be accepted by both the Butler County Domestic Relations Court and Juvenile Court. Should either or both courts reject this Agreement, or any terms contained herein, the entire Agreement shall become null and void in its entirety.” The juvenile court adopted the Agreement as an order of the court on July 13, 2015. However, the Agreement was never presented to the domestic relations court.
{¶ 5} In 2019, the Butler County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA“) conducted an administrative review of Father‘s child support obligation for L.M. On August
{¶ 6} On September 17, 2019, two days before L.M.‘s 18th birthday and while the CSEA‘s foregoing recommendations were pending before the juvenile court, Mother filed a motion for legal custody/parenting provision, asking the juvenile court to find that L.M. would not become emancipated on his 18th birthday due to his serious disabilities and requesting that she remain his legal custodian beyond his 18th birthday. The motion made no mention of Father‘s child support obligation or outstanding child support arrearages regarding L.M. Mother also filed a contempt motion, alleging that Father had breached the Agreement by contacting her and requesting contact with L.M. Mother‘s motions were accompanied by an Application for Child Support Services Non-Public Assistance Applicant (“Title IV-D application“) which listed the Hopewell Road address as Mother‘s address.
{¶ 7} On October 7, 2019, a magistrate of the juvenile court issued a “magistrate‘s decision/order” adopting the CSEA‘s August 2019 recommendation to terminate Father‘s
{¶ 8} A hearing on Mother‘s legal custody and contempt motions was held before the magistrate on March 10, 2020. Although the parties’ respective attorneys argued the motions, neither party testified nor presented evidence. On March 12, 2020, the magistrate recommended that Mother‘s motions be denied and the juvenile court adopted the magistrate‘s recommendation. The juvenile court denied Mother‘s motion for legal custody based on res judicata. Specifically, the court found that L.M.‘s emancipation on his 18th birthday was res judicata based upon the court‘s October 7, 2019 judgment entry finding that L.M. was emancipated and terminating Father‘s child support obligation for L.M. The juvenile court further found there was no legal authority for the court to determine the custody of a person over the age of 18 years. The juvenile court also denied Mother‘s contempt motion, finding that the Agreement was “null and void” because it had never been submitted to the domestic relations court for approval. The court, therefore, held that Father could not be found in contempt because “there is not a valid court order upon which to base
{¶ 9} On March 26, 2020, Mother filed a
{¶ 10} Mother also argued she was entitled to relief under
{¶ 11} On June 8, 2020, the magistrate denied Mother‘s
{¶ 12} Mother now appeals the denial of her
{¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ELIMINATED FATHER‘S SUBSTANTIAL CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGE RELATED TO [L.M.].
{¶ 15} Mother argues the juvenile court erred in eliminating Father‘s child support arrearages for L.M. Mother asserts that reducing Father‘s child support arrearages to $0 was an improper retroactive modification of child support under
{¶ 16} The record shows that the CSEA recommended that Father‘s child support obligation be terminated on L.M.‘s 18th birthday and further determined that Father‘s related child support arrearages were $0. By contrast, the juvenile court‘s October 7, 2019 judgment entry simply states that upon considering the CSEA‘s findings and recommendations to terminate the child support order, “this court hereby orders: terminate child and/or medical support effective 9/19/2019.” There is no mention of Father‘s child support arrearages in the judgment entry, let alone their elimination. Mother asserts that the juvenile court attached the CSEA‘s findings and recommendations order to its October 7, 2019 judgment entry. That is incorrect. There is no such attachment to the juvenile court‘s judgment entry. What the record shows instead is that the juvenile court included the CSEA‘s findings and recommendations in its mailing when it sent notice of its October
{¶ 17} It is well established that a court speaks only through its journal entries. Spillane v. Spillane, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-12-206, 2020-Ohio-5052, ¶ 38. Furthermore, “[t]he duty of this court, as of every judicial tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” State ex rel. Eliza Jennings, Inc. v. Noble, 49 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1990). Because the juvenile court‘s October 7, 2019 judgment entry only terminates Father‘s child support obligation for L.M. and does not eliminate Father‘s related child support arrearages, there is no actual controversy regarding Father‘s child support arrearages presented by Mother‘s appeal. In re Reeher, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 02 BE 68, 2004-Ohio-802, ¶ 21.
{¶ 18} Mother‘s third assignment of error is accordingly moot.
{¶ 19} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 20} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO SET ASIDE ITS PRIOR ORDER FINDING THAT [L.M.] WAS EMANCIPATED FOR CHILD SUPPORT PURPOSES AND THAT FATHER‘S LARGE CHILD SUPPORT ARREARAGE SHOULD BE SET TO $0.
{¶ 21} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 22} MOTHER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE CSEA AND THE TRIAL COURT REPEATEDLY SENT NOTICES TO AN INCORRECT ADDRESS EVEN THOUGH THE CLERK AND THE COURT HAD THE PROPER ADDRESS FOR MOTHER.
{¶ 23} In her first assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her
{¶ 24} In her second assignment of error, Mother argues that she was denied due process because the CSEA and juvenile court repeatedly sent notices to her former Mistymorn Lane address even though she notified the court of her Hopewell Road address as early as July 2016.
{¶ 25}
{¶ 26}
{¶ 27} The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother‘s
{¶ 28} To prevail on a motion brought under
{¶ 29} Mother‘s
{¶ 30} Mother filed a Motion for Legal Custody/Parenting Provision – 570, asking the juvenile court to find that L.M. would not become emancipated on his 18th birthday and requesting that she remain his legal custodian beyond his 18th birthday. The motion made no mention of Father‘s child support obligation regarding L.M. The juvenile court‘s local rules specifically provide that all motions “shall contain in the caption on the first page of any such motion, a clear indication of each form of relief sought and a numerical designation * * * regarding the nature of relief sought.” Loc.R. 15(C) of the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, Juvenile Division. “The information contained in the case caption and the relief identified, either by way of a code number or text within the caption, shall control how the action is identified and processed by the court.” Id. Mother‘s legal custody motion only sought a determination that L.M. could not become emancipated on his 18th birthday because of his disabilities and for Mother to remain his legal custodian beyond his 18th birthday. The motion did not explain why Mother was seeking such orders from the juvenile court, certainly did not explain such requests were for child support purposes, and in fact made no mention of Father‘s child support obligation. As stated above, neither party testified nor submitted evidence at the hearing on Mother‘s legal custody motion. In ruling
{¶ 31} Mother argues the juvenile court erred in denying her
{¶ 32} A child support enforcement agency may initiate an administrative review of a child support order, including child support arrearages, either sua sponte periodically or at the request of the obligor or obligee. Taube v. Boyle, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 19 CAF 02 0012, 2019-Ohio-3305, ¶ 8.
{¶ 33} Although Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her
{¶ 34} We note that the parties’ divorce decree required the parties to notify CSEA in writing of any change of address until further notice of the domestic relations court. The case was subsequently transferred to the juvenile court in 2013 and Mother moved to her Hopewell Road address in 2014. Pursuant to
{¶ 35} With neither party requesting a
{¶ 36} However, because the CSEA‘s recommendation was originally adopted by a magistrate‘s decision, Mother had the right to object to the magistrate‘s decision.
{¶ 37} Mother claims she notified the juvenile court of her 2014 change of address when she filed a motion in July 2016 that included a Face Sheet listing her Hopewell Road address. However, the record does not reveal a Face Sheet attached to or filed contemporaneously with the motion. Mother claims she once again notified the juvenile court of her change of address when she filed her motion for legal custody in September 2019 which included a Face Sheet listing her Hopewell Road address. While that motion was accompanied by a Title IV-D application, the record contains no Face Sheet attached
{¶ 38} It is well established that a party bears the burden of formally notifying and keeping the trial court informed of any change of address; the clerk is not charged with the duty of perusing the record to ensure that a party‘s mailing address has not changed. State ex rel. Halder v. Fuerst, 118 Ohio St.3d 142, 2008-Ohio-1968, ¶ 6. “‘Given that informing the trial court of a new address is relatively simple, it follows that the burden of satisfying this requirement cannot be shifted to the opposing party or the trial court.” Id., quoting Nalbach v. Cacioppo, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2001-T-0062, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 83, *16 (Jan. 11, 2002).
{¶ 39} The juvenile court‘s Loc.R. JR 18(G) provides that all notices of intent to relocate must be filed together with a fee, using the form set forth in Appendix E of the rules. If relocating outside Butler County, the notice “must be filed at least sixty (60) days in advance of the move.” There is no evidence in the record that Mother filed a notice of intent to relocate with the juvenile court when she moved to her Hopewell Road address.
{¶ 40} The juvenile court‘s Loc.R. JR 15(D) requires that motions be filed together with a fully completed Face Sheet. A completed Face Sheet provides the address of all persons who may seek, have, or claim custody of a child subject of the motion. The juvenile
{¶ 41} As grounds for her motion for relief, Mother asserts that any failure to provide her Hopewell Road address “is mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect” under
{¶ 42} Mother does not explain how her failure to notify the CSEA and juvenile court of her change of address constitutes mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect under
{¶ 43} In light of the foregoing, the juvenile court did not err in denying Mother‘s
{¶ 44} Mother further argues the juvenile court erred in denying her
{¶ 45} Pursuant to
{¶ 46} Mother asserts that the juvenile court relied upon the Agreement to terminate Father‘s child support obligation in its October 2019 judgment, subsequently sua sponte found that the Agreement was void in its March 12, 2020 judgment, and that “such circumstances might be described as newly discovered evidence.” Mother further asserts that the juvenile court‘s sua sponte ruling came as a surprise to both parties.
{¶ 47} The CSEA‘s 2019 recommendation and the October 7, 2019 magistrate‘s
{¶ 48} As stated above, “newly discovered evidence” refers to evidence that, although in existence at the time of an administrative hearing, was incapable of discovery by due diligence. Lewis v. Classic Auto Body, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97339, 2012-Ohio-1201, ¶ 21. Mother essentially asserts that the March 12, 2020 judgment is newly discovered evidence because it is inconsistent with the October 7, 2019 judgment that terminated Father‘s child support obligation based upon the Agreement. Although Mother‘s discovery of the October 2019 judgment may be a fact of which she was not previously aware, it is not “evidence,” newly discovered or otherwise. The March 12, 2020 judgment entry is a matter that postdated the proceedings from which the October 7, 2019 judgment entry arose and is not newly discovered evidence. The juvenile court did not err in denying Mother‘s
{¶ 50} Judgment affirmed.
PIPER, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.