In re L.C.
Anita Barthol Staley
7327 Center Street
Mentor, Ohio 44060
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William D. Mason
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: James M. Price
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
C.C.C.D.F.S.
8111 Quincy Avenue, Room 341
Cleveland, Ohio 44104
N.B. This entry is an announcement of the court‘s decision. See
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, M.G. (“mother“), appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court finding that her son L.C. was a dependent child and its subsequent disposition granting Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS“) permanent custody of him.1 The mother contends the court‘s adjudication of her son as dependent and granting оf permanent custody to CCCDFS was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
For the reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶ 2} L.C. was born in 2006 with special needs. At birth, CCDCFS placed him in a foster home. Shortly thereafter, the agency was able to place L.C. back with his mother because they wеre going to live with the mother‘s sister, who was to help the mother care for L.C. After a few months, the sister contacted CCDCFS saying that she could no longer care for L.C. because the mother would not learn how to provide for L.C.‘s basic needs and would often leave the house and disappear without telling anyone.
{¶ 3} In January 2007, CCDCFS placed L.C. in a specialized foster home. CCDCFS filed a complaint in the juvenile court with a prayer for permanent custody, alleging that L.C. was a dependent child because of the mother‘s
{¶ 4} A trial was held on the prayer for permanent custody and the court granted CCDCFS permanent custody оf L.C. finding that “[t]he chronic mental issues of the mother are so severe that it makes the mother unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at this time and, as anticipated, within one year.”
{¶ 5} The mother appealed to this court, arguing that the trial court violated
{¶ 6} On remand, the trial court recused itself, and the case was assigned to a new judge. The newly assigned judge held numerous lengthy pre-trials at which the court participated, reestablished a visitation schedule, and finally held an adjudicatory hearing. At the hearing, the trial сourt found by clear and convincing evidence that L.C. was a dependent child.
{¶ 8} As to the mother‘s case plan, Narine testified that mother did not follow through with a referral to the court psychologist for another evaluation, even after the social worker tried several times to get the mother to the appointment. Narine testified that she tried to give the mother bus passes, wrote out a calendar for her, and even offered to give the mother a ride, even though that was against agency policy. Narine stated that she had visited the mother‘s house and the mother did not have any beds in the house, only a broken couch, did not have any food in the refrigerator, and did not have anything for the child in the house. A week prior to trial, Narine found out that the mother had moved in with a friend and tried to visit that apartment, but the mother refused to give Narine her new address. The social worker further testified that mother missed over half of her scheduled weekly visits with L.C. and did not have a working telephone.
{¶ 10} L.C.‘s guardian ad litem tеstified that the child continues to have special needs and developmental delays and, in her opinion, the mother cannot provide for the child due to her limited mental capabilities, difficulty in keeping a schedule, and the fact she is not earning a living.
{¶ 11} The trial court issued a journal entry granting permanent сustody of L.C. to CCDCFS.
Standard of Review
{¶ 12} A parent has a “fundamental liberty interest” in the care, custody, and management of his or her child and an “essential” and “basic civil right” to raise his or her children. In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 156, 556 N.E.2d 1169. However, a parent‘s right is not absolute. “The natural rights of a parent * * * are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polеstar or controlling principle to be observed.” In re Cunningham (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034. Consequently, the state may terminate parental rights when the child‘s best interest demands it.
{¶ 13} “If the record shows some competent, credible evidence supporting the trial court‘s grant of permanent custody to the county, we must affirm that
{¶ 14} The standard of proof to be used by the trial court when conducting permanent custody proceedings is clear and convincing evidence.
{¶ 15} It is well established that when some competent, credible evidence exists to support the judgment rendered by the trial court, an appellate court may not overturn that decision unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273.
{¶ 16} The discretion that a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be aсcorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court‘s determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned. In re Satterwhite, Cuyahoga App. No. 77071, 2001-Ohio-4137. The knowledge a trial court gains through observing the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding (i.e., observing their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and using these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony) cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed record. Id., citing Trickey v. Trickey (1952), 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 106 N.E.2d 772. As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated, “it is for the trial court to resolve disputes of fact and weigh the testimony and credibility of the witnesses.” Bechtol v. Bechtol (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 23, 550 N.E.2d 178.
{¶ 17} The standard оf review in permanent custody cases is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in reaching its judgment. To constitute an abuse of discretion, the ruling must be more than legal error; it must be unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140.
Adjudication
{¶ 18} In the first assignment of error, the mother argues that there was insufficient evidenсe to find that L.C. was dependant and the adjudication of dependent was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 19} As is pertinent to this case,
“(A) Who is homeless or destitute or without adequate parental care, through no fault of the child‘s parents, guardian, or custodian;
“(B) Who lacks adequate parental care by reason of the mental or physical condition of the child‘s parents, guardian, or custodian;
“(C) Whose condition or environment is such as to warrant the state, in the interests of the child, in assuming the child‘s guardianship;
“(1) The child is residing in a household in which a parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of the household committed an act thаt was the basis for an adjudication that a sibling of the child or any other child who resides in the household is an abused, neglected, or dependent child.
“(2) Because of the circumstances surrounding the abuse, neglect, or dependency of the sibling or other child and the other conditions in the household of the child, the child is in danger of being abused or neglected by that parent, guardian, custodian, or member of the household.
“(D) To whom both of the following apply:
“(1) The child is residing in a household in which a parent, guardian, custodian, or other member of the household committed an act that was the basis for an adjudication that a sibling of the child or any other child who resides in thе household is an abused, neglected, or dependent child.
“(2) Because of the circumstances surrounding the abuse, neglect, or dependency of the sibling or other child and the other conditions in the household of the child, the child is in danger of being abused or neglected by that parent, guardian, custodian, or member of the household.”
{¶ 20} It is the state that must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a child is dependent. See
{¶ 21} The mother argues that CCDCFS failed to present evidence establishing that L.C. was a dependent child. She argues that the evidence
{¶ 22} The social worker testified that the mother continuously refused to take an active role in caring for L.C., had serious cognitive delays, lacked insight into her mental condition, was unwilling to participate in services as outlined in the case plan, and had three other children that had already been adjudicated dependent and/or neglected and placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS.
{¶ 23} We find that the state provided clear and convincing evidence pursuant to
{¶ 24} Therefore, the first assignment of error is overruled.
Disposition
{¶ 25} In the second assignment of error, the mother argues that the trial court erred in granting permanent custody of L.C. to CCDCFS.
{¶ 26}
{¶ 28}
“(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
“(2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
“(3) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999;
“(4) The child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether
* * [it] can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
“(5) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
R.C. 2151.414(D) .”
{¶ 29} This court has stated that only one of these enumerated factors needs to be resolved in favor of the award of permanent custody. In re Moore (Aug. 31, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76942, citing, In re Shaeffer Children (1993), 85 Ohio App.3d 683, 621 N.E.2d 426; In re C.H., Cuyahoga App. Nos. 82258 and 82852, 2003-Ohio-6854.
{¶ 30} The mother argues that permanent custody should not have been granted because she substantially complied with the case plan, had housing, and attended visits with the child. The record, however, belies that argument.
{¶ 31} The trial court found that although the mother initially demonstrated an ability to care for L.C. at birth and during his infancy, observations by the caseworker and visitation supervisors showed that the mother failed to engage or provide appropriate suрervision for the child as he developed into a toddler. The court stated that “[t]he significance of bond between the child and mother is questionable, and without behaviors supporting a bond between mother and child, the relationship appears to be based on scheduled visitation, routine, and care taking.” The court also noted that the mother missed scheduled visitation appointments, was unable to adequately supervise or engage the child, and had failed to engage a family member or community based support system to help her care for the child.
{¶ 33} We find that the evidence presented at the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings show that a grant of permanent custody to CCDCFS was in the best interest of the child.
{¶ 34} Therefore, we find that there was sufficient evidence to suppоrt the trial court‘s decision to grant permanent custody to CCDCFS. We likewise find that the granting of permanent custody was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 35} Accordingly, judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds thеre were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
LARRY A. JONES, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR