IN RE J.W., A Minor Child
No. 109031
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
August 13, 2020
2020-Ohio-4065
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.
[Cite as In re J.W., 2020-Ohio-4065.]
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; MODIFIED IN PART; AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 13, 2020
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. DL 19100239
Appearances:
Susan J. Moran, for defendant-appellant.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Eric Collins, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for plaintiff-appellee.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant J.W. appeals the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court“), that adjudicated him delinquent of three counts of gross sexual imposition and classified him as a Tier II sex offender/child-victim offender registrant. After reviewing the
Background
{¶ 2} On January 8, 2019, J.W. was charged in juvenile court with three counts of gross sexual imposition, each a felony of the fourth degree, in violation of
{¶ 3} The victim testified that the day prior to the incident, J.W. was seated next to her and began asking sexual questions about her relationship with her ex-boyfriend. She testified that she was doing her schoolwork and just responded “sure to everything.” She stated that the improper touching occurred the following day, December 12, 2018, during chemistry class. She testified the class was playing a game called Kahoot, the classroom environment was very loud, the students were moving around, and the teacher was at his computer. She also testified that during
{¶ 4} The victim testified that J.W. sat next to her, about a foot away, during the last 15 minutes of the class. J.W. is a football player and a big individual. The victim testified to the improper sexual contact that occurred, stating in part:
[T]owards the end [of class] he just sat next to me so I could give him the [Kahoot] answers.
* * * [H]e would touch me like on my thigh, and he like would pull me towards him and I would pull away, and he made me touch him on his private outside of the pants with the back of my hand and I like pulled away.
And I tried to stand up, and that was toward like the end of the class, so whenever I stood up to like put my things together, he grabbed me on my vagina outside of the clothes and told me that I would come around and that I would want him and the bell rang, and I just went to my next class.
{¶ 5} The victim further testified that when J.W. first touched her on her upper thigh near her vagina, she pushed his hand away and she told him to stop in an assertive voice. She also asked him if he had a girlfriend, to which he responded “yes” and “she didn‘t have to know anything.” The victim testified that J.W. then pulled her arm toward his leg and she tried to pull her arm back, but because he is bigger than her, he had the strength to make her touch him on top of his jeans over his erect penis. She testified that she stood up and was trying to leave when he cupped his hand and touched her over her clothed vagina, after which he stated she “would come around” and “would want him.” Once the school bell rang, the victim
{¶ 6} The victim testified she went to her next class where she told her friend what happened. The victim‘s friend testified that the victim was upset and seemed more withdrawn than usual. The following day, the victim informed another teacher, whom she trusted, that she was “touched by another student” in her private area. That teacher testified that the victim was “teary eyed,” and he took her to the school administrators to report the incident that occurred. A police officer who investigated the incident also testified and described the victim as “extremely upset,” “emotional,” “crying,” and “definitely shaken up.”
{¶ 7} After the juvenile court denied a
Law and Analysis
{¶ 9} J.W. raises three assignments of error for our review. Under his first assignment of error, he claims the juvenile court erred by denying his
{¶ 10} A
{¶ 11}
{¶ 12} The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “[f]orce need not be overt and physically brutal, but can be subtle and psychological.” State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 58, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988). “A defendant purposely compels another to submit to sexual conduct by force or threat of force if the defendant uses physical force against that person, or creates the belief that physical force will be used if the victim does not submit.” State v. Shaim, 65 Ohio St.3d 51, 55, 600 N.E.2d 661 (1992). “A threat of force can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding sexual conduct * * *.” Id.
{¶ 13} J.W. argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that the sexual contact ever occurred. He argues that the alleged conduct occurred in a class of more than 20 students and that neither the student seated a few feet away nor the teacher observed the incident. However, there was testimony that the class was engaged in a game of Kahoot, which required students and the teacher to look at the board and at their devices. Also, the students in the class were permitted to move around and the class can get loud. The victim provided a detailed account of what transpired, and following the incident, she informed a friend and another teacher of
{¶ 14} J.W. also claims there was insufficient testimony to establish J.W. used force to touch the victim. First, we consider the sexual contact that occurred when J.W. made the victim touch him on top of his pants over his erect penis. J.W. argues the victim testified that when J.W. put her hand on top of his pants, she pulled away from him. However, the victim indicated that J.W. is a big individual and that when J.W. put her hand on top of his erect penis, he had a “strong hold” on her wrist. She testified that J.W. pulled her arm toward his leg and she tried to pull her arm back, but because he is bigger than her, he had the strength to make her touch him. It was after he took her hand and placed it on his erogenous zone that she was able to pull her hand away. The testimony reflects that she did not place her hand on J.W. of her own volition and her hand only contacted J.W.‘s erogenous zone because he forced her hand there. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence of force to support gross sexual imposition with respect to this count. See State v. Salti, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106834, 2019-Ohio-149, ¶ 130 (finding the act of taking the victim‘s hand and moving it to the defendant‘s groin was an act of physical constraint such that there was sufficient evidence of force to support a conviction for gross sexual imposition).
{¶ 16} Although the evidence was not sufficient to establish the offense of gross sexual imposition on these two counts, the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate the lesser-included offense of sexual imposition. We may modify the judgment accordingly pursuant to
{¶ 17} “Sexual imposition is a lesser-included offense of gross sexual imposition because it does not require proof of the additional element of force.” State v. Roy, 2014-Ohio-5186, 22 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 42 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Staab, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008612, 2005-Ohio-3323, ¶ 7.
{¶ 18} A person may not be convicted of sexual imposition “solely upon the victim‘s testimony unsupported by other evidence.”
{¶ 19} J.W. argues that this court should not consider the lesser-included offense of sexual imposition because the state failed to present any evidence of corroboration. We disagree.
{¶ 20} As explained by the Supreme Court of Ohio, the corroboration requirement “does not mandate proof of the facts which are the very substance of the crime charged * * *.” Economo at 59. Moreover, “[t]he corroborating evidence necessary to satisfy
{¶ 22} J.W. also argues that there is insufficient evidence to show he knew the contact was offensive to the victim. He argues that he had a sexually explicit conversation with the victim the day before the incident and claims it was reasonable for a 17-year-old boy to believe the victim was interested in a romantic relationship. We disagree. The record reflects that the victim did not consent to the sexual contact that occurred. The juvenile court heard testimony that J.W. touched the victim‘s inner thigh near her vagina. The victim told J.W. to stop. The victim also tried to pull away from J.W., yet he persisted and forced her to touch his pants over his erect penis. When she stood up, he cupped his hand and touched her over her vagina. The evidence was sufficient to establish that J.W. knew that the sexual contact would be offensive or was reckless in that regard. The evidence also was sufficient for the trier of fact to determine that the touching was for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying J.W.
{¶ 24} Under his second assignment of error, J.W. claims his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. When reviewing a claim challenging the manifest weight of the evidence, “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). When conducting this review, the court of appeals functions as a “thirteenth juror” with the ability to disagree with the factfinder‘s resolution of conflicting testimony. Thompkins at 387, citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.E.2d 652 (1982). “The discretionary power to grant a new trial should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Thompkins at 387, quoting Martin at 175.
{¶ 25} J.W. argues that is “incredible” to conclude that the alleged conduct could have occurred in a class of over 20 students and in the presence of the teacher without anyone observing the actions. He states that both another student in the class and the teacher testified that they did not observe any inappropriate conduct
{¶ 26} Under his third assignment of error, J.W. claims the juvenile court erred by designating him as a Tier II sex offender/child-victim offender registrant. Specifically, he challenges the tier level assigned by the juvenile court.
{¶ 27} In this case, the juvenile court was required to classify J.W. as a juvenile offender registrant pursuant to
Conclusion
{¶ 29} After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the adjudication of delinquent on Count 3 for gross sexual imposition; we modify the adjudication of delinquent on Counts 1 and 2 to the lesser-included offense of sexual imposition, and we remand for redisposition; and we affirm J.W.‘s classification as a Tier II sex offender/child-victim offender registrant.
{¶ 30} Judgment affirmed in part and modified in part. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant and appellee share costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, A.J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR
