In re J.P.
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary Stier, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, Andrew Hakala-Finch, Assistant Public Defender, and Jessica Moss, Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee.
{1} The state of Ohio appeals the juvenile court‘s judgment dismissing an indictment alleging that J.P. was a serious youthful offender (“SYO“). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Factual Background
{2} On April 20, 2021, a complaint was filed against 13-year-old J.P. for murder, a felony of the first or second degree if committed by an adult. The complaint did not request an SYO dispositional sentence, and the state did not file a notice of intent to seek an SYO dispositional sentence within 20 days of J.P.‘s first hearing.
{3} During a pretrial hearing on June 2, 2021, the state indicated that it would be seeking an SYO indictment, and eight days later, the grand jury returned an SYO indictment. J.P. moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the state did not meet the notice or timing requirement under
{4} The juvenile court granted the motion, finding that because the initial complaint did not seek an SYO specification, the state was required to comply with the 20-day written notice requirement set forth in
{5} We ordered supplemental briefing and asked the parties to address: (1) whether a state‘s appeal of right under
Final Appealable Order
{6} The Ohio Constitution grants the courts of appeals “such jurisdiction as may be provided by law” to review “final orders” rendered by inferior courts.
- The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
- The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
{7}
{8} “Whether a state‘s appeal as a matter of right must also be taken from an order that is final and appealable has not been consistently answered in Ohio.” In re D.M.S., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28783, 2020-Ohio-7028, ¶ 13, citing Painter & Pollis, Ohio Appellate Practice, Section 2:25 (2019) (“The extent to which the State must establish that the order on appeal is final under
{9} We agree with the parties that the dismissal of an SYO indictment is a proceeding that is ancillary to the action because the underlying action is the juvenile adjudication, and the dismissal of the SYO indictment determined the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevented a judgment in the state‘s favor. Therefore, we must determine whether the state would be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment in the case.
{10} Serious youthful offenders are both entitled and subject to a blend of juvenile and adult court processes and procedures. Once a child is indicted, “the child is entitled to an open and speedy trial by jury in juvenile court” and “the same right to bail as an adult.”
{11} Juveniles subject to delinquency proceedings are also protected from double jeopardy by both the federal and state constitutions. See In re A.G., 148 Ohio St.3d 118, 2016-Ohio-3306, 69 N.E.3d 646, ¶ 9. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against “a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.” Id. at ¶ 8. “Noting that there ‘is little to distinguish’
{12} Relying on Breed, the Ohio Supreme Court held, in In re A.J.S., that a juvenile court order denying a motion for mandatory transfer prevents the state from obtaining a meaningful or effective remedy by way of appeal at the conclusion of the proceedings because “double jeopardy attaches once the adjudicatory phase of the delinquency proceedings commences.” Id. at ¶ 28. “Thus, a juvenile court‘s decision denying a motion for mandatory bindover satisfies the test for determining whether the denial of a provisional remedy constitutes a final appealable order as set forth in
{13} That rationale applies here. The juvenile court‘s order dismissing the SYO indictment prevents the state from a meaningful remedy by an appeal following an adjudication and disposition. See id. Therefore, the order is a final appealable order as set forth in
Standard of Review
{14} In its sole assignment of error, the state contends that the juvenile court erred in dismissing the indictment because it obtained the SYO indictment pursuant to
{15} An appellate court reviews a juvenile court‘s decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment under a de novo standard of review. See In re J.B., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004-09-226, 2005-Ohio-7029, ¶ 15. “De novo review requires an independent review of the trial court‘s decision without any deference to the trial court‘s determination.” In re E.S., 2020-Ohio-1029, 152 N.E.3d 1213, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.).
Statutory Process to Obtain an SYO Indictment
{16} In order to impose an SYO dispositional sentence, a prosecuting attorney must comply with
- Obtaining an indictment of the child as a serious youthful offender;
- The child waives the right to indictment, charging the child in a bill of information as a serious youthful offender;
- Until an indictment or information is obtained, requesting a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence in the original complaint alleging that the child is a delinquent child;
- Until an indictment or information is obtained, if the original complaint does not request a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence, filing with the juvenile court a written notice of intent to seek a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence within twenty days after the later of the following, unless the time is extended by the juvenile court for good cause shown:
- The date of the child‘s first juvenile court hearing regarding the complaint;
- The date the juvenile court determines not to transfer the case under
section 2152.12 of the Revised Code.
{18} The state argues that the prosecutor may obtain an indictment of a juvenile as an SYO at any time under
this conclusion, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals determined that “nothing in
{19} The state acknowledges that the Eighth District Court of Appeals rejected the Twelfth District‘s analysis and concluded that “because the state filed a complaint in the juvenile court prior to obtaining an indictment, the state was required to initiate SYO proceedings in accordance with
{20} The Eighth District noted that the J.B. court relied solely on the language contained in
- If the child is indicted or charged by information, on the date of the filing of the indictment or information.
- If the child is charged by an original complaint that requests a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence, on the date of the
filing of the complaint.
- If the child is not charged by an original complaint that requests a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence, on the date that the prosecuting attorney files the written notice of intent to seek a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence.
{21} When the state does not request an SYO dispositional sentence in the original complaint, speedy-trial time does not begin until the prosecutor files the written notice of intent. As the Eighth District explained:
In other words, when the state brings a complaint that does not initially include a SYO specification but instead later provides notice of its intent to seek an SYO disposition pursuant to
R.C. 2152.13(A)(4) , the child‘s speedy trial right attaches at the date the written notice is provided rather than the datethat the prosecutor subsequently obtains an indictment. The state‘s proposed interpretation of the statute, whereby it would not be bound by the notice requirements of R.C. 2152.13(A)(4) , would contradict the plain terminology ofR.C. 2152.13(C)(1)(c) and create a loophole for circumventing the speedy trial right set forth therein.
In re T.S. at ¶ 11; In re R.G. at ¶ 12, quoting In re T.S. at ¶ 11.
{22} This interpretation is supported by
the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the alleged delinquency occurs may initiate a case in the juvenile court of the
county by presenting the case to a grand jury for indictment, by charging the child in a bill of information as a serious youthful offender pursuant to
section 2152.13 of the Revised Code, by requesting a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence in the original complaint alleging that the child is a delinquent child, or by filing with the juvenile court a written notice of intent to seek a serious youthful offender dispositional sentence.
These four options mirror the four options set forth in
{23} Here, the state did not initiate the case by presenting an indictment or a bill of information or by filing an original complaint that requested an SYO dispositional sentence. This case was initiated when the state filed an original complaint that did not request an SYO dispositional sentence. Therefore, to initiate the process to obtain an SYO dispositional sentence, the state was required to file a written notice of intent within 20 days of J.P.‘s initial appearance to seek an SYO dispositional sentence under both
{24} Moreover, the rules of juvenile procedure further support the conclusion that the state must provide a timely notice of intent to seek an SYO dispositional sentence when the original complaint does not request it.
{25}
adjudicatory hearing may be continued if the prosecutor files “either a notice of intent to pursue or a statement of an interest in pursuing a serious youthful offender sentence.”
{26} Thus, the juvenile rules recognize that the state has 20 days to file a notice of intent to pursue an SYO disposition when the original complaint did not seek an SYO disposition.
{27} In this case, the state did not request an SYO dispositional sentence in the complaint, or file a timely notice of its intent to do so as required by
Conclusion
{28} Finding the state‘s assignment of error to be without merit, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
Judgment affirmed.
CROUSE and BOCK, JJ., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.