In re J.F.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Preston, Willamowski, Zimmerman J.J.
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Joyous F. (“Joyous“), appeals the September 24, 2019 judgments of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, Family Division awarding permanent custody of her children to Marion County Children Services (the “agency“). For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
{¶2} Joyous is the biological mother of J.F., born 2007, M.A., born 2010, J.M. 1, born 2012, T.M., born 2014, and J.M. 2, born 2015. Mason F. is the biological father of J.F. Randy M. is the biological father of M.A. Travis M. is the
{¶3} On October 19, 2017, the agency filed complaints alleging that J.F., J.M. 1, T.M., and J.M. 2 were dependent children. (Case No. 17 AB 0242, Doc. No. 2); (Case No. 17 AB 0244, Doc. No. 2); (Case No. 17 AB 0245, Doc. No. 2); (Case No. 17 AB 0246, Doc. No. 2). The agency also filed a complaint alleging that M.A. was an abused and dependent child. (Case No. 17 AB 0243, Doc. No. 2). That same day, the agency filed motions requesting that the trial court grant emergency temporary custody of the children to the agency. (Case No. 17 AB 0242, Doc. No. 1); (Case No. 17 AB 0243, Doc. No. 1); (Case No. 17 AB 0244, Doc. No. 1); (Case No. 17 AB 0245, Doc. No. 1); (Case No. 17 AB 0246, Doc. No. 1). The trial court granted the agency‘s motions for emergency temporary custody, and following a hearing on October 20, 2017, the trial court extended the agency‘s emergency temporary custody of the children pending a hearing on the agency‘s complaints. (Case No. 17 AB 0242, Doc. Nos. 4, 5); (Case No. 17 AB 0243, Doc. Nos. 4, 5); (Case No. 17 AB 0244, Doc. Nos. 4, 5); (Case No. 17 AB 0245, Doc. Nos. 4, 5); (Case No. 17 AB 0246, Doc. Nos. 4, 5).
{¶4} At a hearing on November 29, 2017, Joyous agreed to stipulate to a finding of dependency with respect to all five of her children. (Case No. 17 AB 0242, Doc. No. 12); (Case No. 17 AB 0243, Doc. No. 15); (Case No. 17 AB 0244,
{¶6} On July 11, 2019, the agency filed motions for permanent custody of J.F., M.A., J.M. 1, T.M., and J.M. 2. (Case No. 17 AB 0242, Doc. No. 32); (Case No. 17 AB 0243, Doc. No. 34); (Case No. 17 AB 0244, Doc. No. 33); (Case No. 17 AB 0245, Doc. No. 33); (Case No. 17 AB 0246, Doc. No. 32). The first hearing on the agency‘s motions for permanent custody took place on August 8, 2019. (Aug. 8, 2019 Tr. at 1). The GAL filed her reports on August 27, 2019. (Case No. 17 AB 0242, Doc. No. 41); (Case No. 17 AB 0243, Doc. No. 43); (Case No. 17 AB 0244, Doc. No. 42); (Case No. 17 AB 0245, Doc. No. 42); (Case No. 17 AB 0246, Doc. No. 41). A second hearing on the agency‘s motions for permanent custody was held on September 3, 2019. (Sept. 3, 2019 Tr. at 1). On September 24, 2019, the trial
{¶7} On October 23, 2019, Joyous filed notices of appeal. (Case No. 17 AB 0242, Doc. No. 48); (Case No. 17 AB 0243, Doc. No. 49); (Case No. 17 AB 0244, Doc. No. 47); (Case No. 17 AB 0245, Doc. No. 47); (Case No. 17 AB 0246, Doc. No. 46). Joyous‘s appeals were subsequently consolidated for purposes of briefing and argument. She raises three assignments of error for our review. Because it is dispositive of Joyous‘s appeals, we begin with Joyous‘s third assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. III
The decision of the Trial Court is not in the best interest of the children and the determination was against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence.
{¶8} In her third assignment of error, Joyous argues that clear and convincing evidence does not support that it is in the best interest of the children to grant permanent custody of the children to the agency.
{¶9} The right to raise one‘s child is a basic and essential right. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208 (1972) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923). “Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody, and management of the child.” Id., quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388 (1982). However, the rights and interests of a natural parent are not absolute. In re Thomas, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-03-08, 2003-Ohio-5885, ¶ 7. These rights may be terminated under appropriate circumstances and when the trial court has met all due process requirements. In re Leveck, 3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-02-52, 5-02-53 and 5-02-54, 2003-Ohio-1269, ¶ 6.
{¶10} ”
{¶11} “‘If the trial court determines that any provision enumerated in
{¶12} “Under
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;
(d) The child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶13} If the trial court makes these statutorily required determinations, a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court‘s decision unless it is not supported by
{¶14} In granting the agency‘s motions for permanent custody, the trial court found and concluded, in relevant part, as follows:
The evidence at trial showed that [Joyous] has not been able to find stable housing for herself as well as the children.
[Joyous‘s] testimony revealed that she has stayed at approximately eighteen different homes or places during the course of this case. At the present time[,] [Joyous] is attempting to rehabilitate a house that is in poor condition.
The evidence also shows [Joyous] worked at Marion Industrial for two weeks but quit due to a blood clot. She found work at Goodwill but was fired due to being incarcerated. [Joyous] tried to secure a job at Honda but was unsuccessful. She worked at McDonalds briefly but
left there as well. She discontinued her job search efforts due to a felony conviction. [Joyous] was directed to Marion Area Counseling Center to address her anger issues, PTSD and ADHD. The evidence indicates that minimal efforts were made by [Joyous].
[Joyous] was given the opportunity to visit with the children at the Agency. The initial visits were difficult. The children expressed their anger towards [Joyous]. She missed the last two visits and some were cancelled.
The children have been in foster homes since their removal. [T.M. and J.M. 2] have been in foster care since November 2017. After [M.A.] was treated for mental health issues. [sic] At the conclusion of her treatment[,] [M.A.] was placed in foster care with [T.M.] and [J.M. 2] on Memorial Day 2018.
The other two children, [J.F. and J.M. 1], were placed in another foster home as well.
The evidence shows the children have negative behaviors thought to be a result of the trauma they have suffered. The evidence also shows that the children continue to exhibit negative behaviors but the incidents are decreasing.
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Agency provided nearly two years of case planning and made diligent efforts to assist [Joyous] to remedy the problems that caused the children to be placed outside the home. The Court further finds the parents failed continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions that caused the children to remain in Agency custody.
* * *
[The GAL] recommends the children be placed in the custody of [the agency].
Pursuant to [
R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) ], the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence the parents demonstrated [a] lack of commitment to the children by failing to regularly support, visit or communicate with the children when able and offered the opportunity to do so.The Court further finds pursuant to [
R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) ]2 that the Agency made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the children from their parents’ home and had taken steps to make it possible for the children to be returned home safely. However, the Court finds theparents’ failure to work with the Agency in achieving the goals and objectives of the case plan prevent return of the children to the parents’ home. The Agency has made reasonable efforts to prevent the need for placement and reasonable efforts to finalize the children‘s permanency plan in accordance with [ R.C. 2151.353(4) ].
(Case No. 17 AB 0242, Doc. No. 43); (Case No. 17 AB 0243, Doc. No. 44); (Case No. 17 AB 0244, Doc. No. 43); (Case No. 17 AB 0245, Doc. No. 43); (Case No. 17 AB 0246, Doc. No. 42).
{¶15} After reviewing the trial court‘s judgment entries, we find that we cannot properly analyze whether clear and convincing evidence supports that it is in the children‘s best interest to grant permanent custody to the agency because the trial court failed to adequately address the best-interest factors enumerated in
{¶16} Finally, we recognize that many of the trial court‘s findings of fact are arguably relevant under several of the factors listed in
{¶17} Absent an affirmative indication that the trial court considered all of the best-interest factors listed in
{¶18} Joyous‘s third assignment of error is sustained.
Assignment of Error No. I
The Trial Court erred in finding that the Agency had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family as required under Ohio Law.
Assignment of Error No. II
The Trial Court erred when it determined that the children could not be returned in a timely manner.
{¶19} In her first and second assignments of error, Joyous takes issue with the trial court‘s determinations that reasonable efforts were made to reunify her with her children and that her children cannot be placed with her within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her. However, given our disposition of Joyous‘s third assignment of error, Joyous‘s first and second assignments of error are rendered moot and we decline to address them. See In re K.T. 1, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-170667, C-170687, C-170701, C-170702 and C-170707, 2018-Ohio-1381, ¶ 16, citing
Judgments Reversed and Causes Remanded
WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.
/jlr