IN RE: Involuntary Hospitalization of T.O.
No. 16-0095
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Submitted: January 11, 2017. Filed: February 8, 2017.
796
C. Joan Parker, Esq., Assistant Public Defender, Kanawha County Public Defender Office, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorney for the Petitioner
Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Allison Carroll Anderson, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Andrew Dornbos, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for the Respondent
The petitioner, T.O.,1 appeals from the January 4, 2016, order through which the Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court found her request for habeas corpus relief was mooted by her release from a mental health facility following an involuntary hospitalization for examination. Raising constitutional arguments that were not asserted in her habeas petition filed below, the petitioner asserts on appeal that the mental health commitment process under
unconstitutional because an indigent litigant cannot afford the expense associated with the procedure set forth in
Based upon the record, the parties’ briefs, and the arguments presented, we find no error. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court‘s denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Around noon on September 25, 2015, the petitioner‘s estranged husband, R.O.2 filed an Application for Involuntary Custody for Mental Health Examination against the petitioner, T.O., pursuant to
quests
Within a few hours of the application being filed, the petitioner was examined by a licensed psychologist. In the Certificate of Licensed Examiner (“certificate“), which was filed in the circuit court the same day, the evaluating psychologist opined that the petitioner was mentally ill and likely to cause harm to herself or others due to her mental illness. He noted the petitioner‘s history of depression, marital problems, and mental health counseling, and found that she had placed others in reasonable fear of physical harm by making threats to her husband and stepdaughter. In addition, the psychologist recited his personal observations that the petitioner presented in an “argumentative manner[;]” had “rapid and pressured” speech; and was “impulsive” with “limited insight.” He further conveyed the petitioner‘s report of agitation since she began taking steroids three weeks earlier; the loss of her job earlier that day with “no reason given;” and a disturbance in her sleep, energy, and mood. The psychologist found the petitioner to be neither suicidal nor homicidal.
Recounting in his certificate the information that had been provided to him by the petitioner‘s husband, the psychologist stated that the petitioner had separated from her husband; had appeared at her husband‘s place of employment the prior day threatening she was “going to have [his] job[;]” had lost her job earlier that day due to causing a commotion at her workplace; had been physically aggressive towards her husband three years earlier; had been engaging in “bizarre behavior” during the past four to six weeks; and had threatened her stepdaughter.
Based on all of the above, the psychologist reached a diagnostic impression of “bi-polar disorder, manic“; “L/O reaction to steroids“; “alcohol abuse“; and a “[m]oderate probability” of seriously harmful behavior. He opined that “[i]mmediate hospitalization in a 24-hour locked facility needed[,]” and recommended the petitioner “be committed for further evaluation pursuant to
Later in the day of September 25, 2015, a hearing was held before a mental hygiene commissioner during which the examining psychologist testified.4 At the conclusion of that hearing, the mental hygiene commissioner entered an order in which she made findings of fact consistent with the information in the application and psychologist‘s certificate, as discussed above;5 found probable cause to believe the petitioner was mentally ill and a danger to self or to others due to mental illness if she were allowed to remain at liberty; and directed the petitioner‘s commitment for examination at a local mental health facility, Highland Hospital. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner was involuntarily committed to Highland Hospital for evaluation.
Six days later, on October 1, 2015, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court seeking her prompt release from custody and alleging her mental health commitment was unlawful because the psychologist‘s certification stated that she (1) was neither suicidal, homicidal nor psychotic; (2) had not made any attempts to harm herself or others in more than three years; and (3) had been separated from her husband for a month prior to him filing the application for her involuntary commitment. She further asserted that the mental hygiene commissioner had failed to make a finding as to whether a less restrictive alternative was available.6 A hearing was
A habeas hearing was held before Judge King on November 10, 2015. The petitioner attempted to orally raise issues that were not addressed in her habeas petition, including her inability to possess firearms8 and the impact that the mental health proceeding could have on future, similar proceedings. Inasmuch as the petitioner had already been released from Highland Hospital, her legal counsel acknowledged “that perhaps a habeas petition is not the right method for this” and asked the circuit court to “restyle this as an appeal[.]” The circuit court declined to do so:
The Court: With all due respect, sir, I cannot, nor will I, convert a habeas petition into an appeal.9
Mr. Danford [petitioner‘s counsel]: I understand.
The Court: And I am not going to go beyond the issue or issues raised in the Habeas Petition. Since she is released and not in custody anymore, it‘s moot. So this case is dismissed.
(Footnote added.).
By order entered January 4, 2016, the circuit court denied the petitioner a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that her cause was mooted by her release from her involuntary hospitalization. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
We are asked to review a circuit court‘s order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In this regard, our review is threefold:
In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard; the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and questions of law are subject to a de novo review.
Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines, 219 W.Va. 417, 633 S.E.2d 771 (2006). With these principles in mind, the parties’ arguments will be considered.
III. Discussion
The petitioner argues that the mental hygiene commissioner failed to consider a less restrictive alternative to involuntary hospitalization10 and failed to make findings of fact
Urging an affirmance of the circuit court‘s habeas ruling, the respondent State of West Virginia argues that the petitioner‘s claims for relief in habeas corpus were mooted by her release from involuntary hospitalization. In the event this Court were to reach the merits of the petitioner‘s claims, the State asserts that the procedure set forth in
these statutes unconstitutionally vague.13 The State maintains that it would be both “impractical and ineffective” to find
For the reasons set forth below, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court‘s ruling that this habeas matter is moot.
It is axiomatic that “[a]n inmate who has been released from incarceration and placed on parole is no longer ‘incarcerated under sentence of imprisonment’ for purposes of seeking habeas corpus relief under the Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Act,
previously ordered in a civil commitment proceeding under
Acknowledging the mootness of her request for habeas relief, the petitioner contends her issues should nonetheless be addressed pursuant to Israel by Israel v. West Virginia Secondary Schools Activities Commission, 182 W.Va. 454, 388 S.E.2d 480 (1989), in which this Court held, as follows:
Three factors to be considered in deciding whether to address technically moot issues are as follows: first, the court will determine whether sufficient collateral consequences will result from determination of the questions presented so as to justify relief; second, while technically moot in the immediate context, questions of great public interest may nevertheless be addressed for the future guidance of the bar and of the public; and third, issues which may be repeatedly presented to the trial court, yet escape review at the appellate level because of their fleeting and determinate nature, may appropriately be decided.
Id. at 455, 388 S.E.2d at 481, syl. pt. 1. Maintaining she can meet the Israel factors, the petitioner argues that she is being denied her Second Amendment right to possess a gun due to her placement on the state mental health registry;15 that gun rights are of great public importance; that the issue is “fleeting” given the brevity of confinement
In B.N., the petitioner appealed a mental hygiene commissioner‘s commitment order, although he had been released from his involuntary hospitalization and the proceeding concluded without a final commitment hearing. B.N. cited two collateral consequences of his mental health commitment: his placement on the state mental health registry and his inability to possess firearms pursuant to the restriction in
Seeking to avoid the precedent established in B.N., the petitioner asks this Court to overrule B.N. because of the “potentially insurmountable difficulty” the process under
because the petitioner has a statutory remedy for her claimed injury, there is no basis for this Court to overrule B.N. or to address the constitutionality of the involuntary commitment statutes (
Without any evidentiary support, the petitioner speculates that a proceeding under
B. Memorandum Decisions
In addition to asking this Court to overrule B.N., the petitioner discounts this Court‘s ruling therein. The petitioner relies upon Hammons v. West Virginia Office of the Insurance Commissioner, 235 W.Va. 577, 775 S.E.2d 458 (2015), wherein the majority of the Court stated: “Given the abbreviated factual and legal discussion set forth in this Court‘s memorandum decisions, we cannot say that such prior decisions have
1. Appeal by Right
To place memorandum decisions in historical context, this Court promulgated extensive amendments to our
Under our amended rules, “every properly perfected appeal ... result[s] in a written decision on the merits.” McKinley, 234 W.Va. at 151, 764 S.E.2d at 311. Because appeal by right greatly increased the number of written decisions issued by this Court, we created memorandum decisions through Rule 21 of our revised appellate rules. See Hammons, 235 W.Va. at 600, 775 S.E.2d at 481 (Loughry, J., dissenting) (“As explained in the comment to Rule 21 of the
when: (1) this Court finds no substantial question of law and the Court does not disagree with the decision of the lower tribunal as to the question of law; (2) upon consideration of the applicable standard of review and the record presented, the Court finds no prejudicial error; or (3) other just cause exists for summary affirmance.
McKinley, 234 W.Va. at 151, 764 S.E.2d at 311 (citing
A review of our memorandum decisions issued during the last six years demonstrates that they are “distinguishable from opinions in that they address cases in which there is no substantial question of law or no prejudicial error, and are almost always used to affirm a lower court‘s decision.” McKinley, 234 W.Va. at 152, 764 S.E.2d at 312. Although memorandum decisions are not published in the bound West Virginia Reports, this is attributable to cost and practicality and does not diminish their value. See Perry, supra. Our memorandum decisions, like our signed opinions, are readily available on the Court‘s website at www.courtswv.gov, as well as through the databases of legal research providers, such as Westlaw and LexisNexis. Indeed, we reaffirm the precedential value of our memorandum decisions, as discussed below.
Whether this Court renders its decision through an opinion or a memorandum decision,
[t]he scope and form of the decisions of this Court are primarily governed by the
West Virginia Constitution . Our decisions are required to address “every point fairly arising upon the record” and are “binding authority upon any court” if concurred in by a majority of the justices.W.Va. Const. art. VIII, § 4 . With regard to the Court‘s decision to affirm, reverse, or modify the order of a lower tribunal, “the reasons therefor shall be concisely stated in writing and preserved with the record.” Id.
McKinley, 234 W.Va. at 149, 764 S.E.2d at 309. As we previously explained, this Court‘s “memorandum decisions are pronouncements on the merits that fully comply with the constitutional requirements18 to address every point fairly arising upon the record and to state the reasons for a decision concisely in writing.” Id. at 151, 764 S.E.2d at 311 (footnote added). To emphasize this point further, we hold that the memorandum decisions issued by the Court fully comply with
in a concisely stated writing the reasons for the Court‘s decision. Furthermore, “memorandum decisions may be cited as legal authority, and are legal precedent”19 through the Court‘s application of settled law to the facts of a particular case. The legal community should remain mindful, however, that “where a conflict exists between a published opinion and a memorandum decision, the published opinion controls.” Id.
Because memorandum decisions establish legal precedent, they are subject to reversal like any other opinion of this Court. In other words, just as the value of our opinions is not diminished because they are subject to reversal, neither is the value of our memorandum decisions. While this Court has reversed prior opinions,20 as well as prior memorandum decisions,21 we certainly did not do so “without evidence of changing conditions or serious judicial error in interpretation sufficient to compel deviation from the basic policy of the doctrine of stare decisis, which is to promote certainty, stability, and uniformity in the law.” Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Dailey v. Bechtel Corp., 157 W.Va. 1023, 207 S.E.2d 169 (1974). As explained by the United States Supreme Court when overruling, in relevant part, two of its prior decisions,
“[a]lthough ‘the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the
rule of law[,]” ... “[o]ur precedents are not sacrosanct.” ... “[W]e have overruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been established.” Ring [v. Arizona], 536 U.S. [584] at 608, 122 S.Ct. 2428 [153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002)] (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989)).
Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 102, 136 S.Ct. 616, 623, 193 L.Ed.2d 504, 513 (2016). Similar to the United States Supreme Court, our precedents, whether set forth in an opinion or a memorandum decision, are not sacrosanct and will be reversed where warranted by the law, just as the majority concluded in overruling the particular group of memorandum decisions in Hammons, 235 W.Va. 577, 775 S.E.2d 458.
In short, every properly perfected appeal in this State results in a written decision on the merits that is readily available for lawyers and judges to cite as precedent, just as the State has done in the case at bar by relying upon our decision in B.N. Upon our consideration of the record before us, the parties’ arguments, our precedent in B.N., and for the reasons set forth above, we find the collateral consequences cited by the petitioner do not warrant our consideration under Israel by Israel, 182 W.Va. 454, 388 S.E.2d 480.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County‘s January 4, 2016, order denying the petitioner‘s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.