In re I.K.
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Jessica R. Moss, Assistant Public Defender, Guardian Ad Litem for I.K. and J.D.,
Erik Laursen, for Appellant Mother,
Roger Kirk, for Appellant J.D.,
Christopher Kapsal, Guardian Ad Litem for Appellant Mother.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
O P I N I O N.
{¶1} Appellant mother has eight children. She has lost custody of all of them for various reasons over the years. The two children involved in this case are her son, appellant J.D., born on December 8, 1999, and her daughter I.K., born on January 2, 2014. Appellee Hamilton County Department of Job and Family Services (“HCJFS“) became involved with J.D. because mother was not taking him to his appointments, was not attending school meetings, was not giving J.D. his medication, and was failing ensure that J.D. attended school, and because of an incident in which mother had chased J.D. with a belt into traffic. I.K. was taken into the custody of HCJFS immediately after she was born.
{¶2} As part of her case plan, mother was ordered to participate in parenting education, random drug screenings, drug-addiction treatment and therapy, to meet with a case worker, to comply with recommended medsomatic services, to complete a psychological evaluation, to obtain housing, to participate in family therapy with her son, and to participate in supervised visits with her children. While she did make some progress toward her goals, it was insufficient to prepare her to care for her special-needs son and newborn daughter. After several attempts to reunite mother with J.D. and I.K., HCJFS sought permanent custody of both children. After extensive hearings, the magistrate awarded custody of I.K. to HCJFS, but declined to do so for J.D. On objections to that decision, the trial court adopted the decision and analysis of the magistrate as they related to I.K., but then also awarded custody of J.D. to HCJFS. Mother and J.D. have appealed that decision.
{¶3} In her sole assignment of error, mother argues that the decision of the trial court was contrary to the weight of the evidence. J.D. similarly argues in one assignment of error that the trial court improperly determined that termination of mother‘s rights was in his best interest. When considering these arguments, we review the evidence, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed. See State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). But “[i]n weighing the evidence, [we] must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 21.
{¶4}
{¶5} Former
{¶6} In determining a child‘s best interest, the court must consider “all relevant factors,” including (1) the child‘s interaction with the parents, relatives, foster caregivers, out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child, (2) the wishes of the child, as expressed by the child or a guardian ad litem, (3) the custodial history of the child, (4) the child‘s need for legally secure placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody, and (5) whether any of the factors under former
{¶7} In this case, the trial court examined each factor as it related to J.D. and found that termination of mother‘s parental rights was in his best interest. J.D. had been out of mother‘s custody since 2010. Mother also demonstrated that she did not understand the nature and scope of J.D.‘s mental-health issues, she could not supervise or redirect his inappropriate behavior, and she was incapable of caring for his mental-health needs.
{¶8} As for I.K., the trial court agreed with the magistrate‘s analysis and adopted it. I.K. had been out of mother‘s custody since she had been born. Mother was unable to provide basic care for her infant. She attended only one of the child‘s medical appointments, and was so inconsistent with her visits that she was required to call ahead before her scheduled times.
{¶9} Mother frequently failed to make use of services that were offered to her. Her visits with both children were infrequent and inconsistent. Family therapy could not continue because of her inconsistent involvement. She failed to effectively address her own mental-health and substance-abuse issues. In light of this evidence,
{¶10} Based on this record, the determination of the trial court that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate mother‘s parental rights was not against the weight of the evidence.
Former R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) Findings
{¶11} Next we consider whether the trial court properly determined that one of the four conditions in former
{¶12} J.D. had clearly been in the custody of the agency longer than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. Therefore, the trial court properly determined that former
{¶13} Alternately, the trial court determined that I.K. could not be placed with either parent in a reasonable time. See former
{¶14} The identity of the father was unknown. Therefore, placement with him was not possible. As to the mother, the trial court concluded that she had failed to remedy the problems that had initially caused the children to be placed outside the
{¶15} The determination that former
Conclusion
{¶16} Upon our review of the record, we hold that the court‘s findings as to the best-interest factors and the former
Judgment affirmed.
DEWINE, P.J., and STAUTBERG, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.