IN RE HENRY B.
Kno-16-308
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
April 20, 2017
2017 ME 72
Argued: March 2, 2017
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Reporter of Decisions
JABAR, J.
[¶1] Henry B.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] On March 15, 2016, Henry B. was admitted to Pen Bay Medical Center (PBMC) pursuant to the “blue paper” procedures of
[¶3] Based on the testimony of the medical director of PBMC‘s Psychiatric and Addiction Recovery Center (PARC), an independent medical examiner, and two of Henry‘s sisters, the District Court concluded that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that Henry was mentally ill and that he had suffered an “acute psychotic episode, possibly related to a schizophrenic break.” Further, the court concluded that Henry posed a “serious risk” of harming himself or others, that there was not “an adequate community of resources for his care or treatment, that it would not be wise or safe to return him to his family‘s care,” and that constant observation at PBMC would be “more structured and reliable than [treatment] he would be getting at home.” The court therefore ordered that Henry be subject to involuntary hospitalization for up to 120 days.
[¶4] Henry appealed to the Superior Court (Knox County, Billings, J.), and after a hearing on June 29, 2016, the Superior Court affirmed the District Court‘s judgment of involuntary commitment. See
[¶5] Henry contends that he was not provided with effective assistance of counsel at the March 28 District Court hearing. He asserts that we should adopt the Strickland standard, see Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), when analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in involuntary commitment cases, and that by any standard, hearing counsel‘s assistance was prejudicially ineffective.
A. Effective Assistance Standard
[¶6] Maine law requires that an individual be represented by counsel at all stages of involuntary commitment proceedings. See
[¶7] Having announced the right to effective counsel, we must also ensure that, when there is a claim of ineffective assistance, parties, counsel, and courts understand what processes to use and the standard to apply. A majority of jurisdictions holding that the effective assistance of counsel applies to involuntary commitment proceedings have also held that the Strickland standard applies. See, e.g., Pope v. Alston, 537 So. 2d 953, 956-57 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988); In re Carmody, 653 N.E.2d 977, 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Crane, 704 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Iowa 2005); In re Alleged Mental Illness of Cordie, 372 N.W.2d 24, 28-29 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); State ex rel. H.W., 85 S.W.3d 348, 356 (Tex. App. 2002); Jenkins v. Dir. of the Va. Ctr. for Behavioral Rehab., 624 S.E.2d 453, 460 (Va. 2006); In re Det. of T.A.H.-L., 97 P.3d 767, 768 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). In Maine, we recently applied a modified Strickland standard to hearings resulting in the termination of parental rights, stating that “the deprivation of parental rights is in many ways similar to the deprivation of liberty interests at stake in criminal cases.” In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 1, 26, 126 A.3d 718. There, we further noted that the ”Strickland standard is known to the bar and the bench, and . . . carries with it a developing body of case law, which will aid courts in the efficient and timely resolution of . . . claims.” Id. ¶ 26.
[¶8] A similar rationale supports the application of Strickland to involuntary commitment cases: Maine law requires representation at all stages of the involuntary commitment proceedings, the liberty interests at stake are on par with those at stake in criminal cases, Strickland is a well-known and developing standard, and a “more intrusive post-trial inquiry could encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges, and possibly delay the permanency necessary to stabilize” a mentally ill individual‘s treatment in a safe environment. Id. (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
[¶9] For these reasons, we declare that the Strickland standard applies to resolve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in involuntary commitment cases in Maine, using the process we enunciated in In re M.P., 2015 ME 138, ¶¶ 18-21, 126 A.3d 718. A direct appeal from an order of involuntary commitment may include a claim that the individual‘s attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel “when the record is sufficiently well developed to permit a fair evaluation” of the
[¶10] To bring a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel following an involuntary commitment proceeding, whether by direct appeal or by
B. Application of Strickland
[¶11] Although at the time Henry appealed the District Court‘s decision we had not yet enunciated any process to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims following involuntary commitment hearings, we conclude that the Superior Court‘s consideration of Henry B.‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel complied with the process we adopted in In re M.P. and now adopt for involuntary commitment proceedings, and will therefore address his assignments of error without remand.1
[¶12] Strickland provides that, in order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, an individual must show (1) “that counsel‘s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) that “errors of counsel . . . actually had an adverse effect on the defense.” Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 14, 125 A.3d 1163 (quotation marks omitted). The second prong requires an individual to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. Henry B. contends in this appeal that his counsel failed to provide effective assistance of counsel pursuant to the Strickland standard in two respects: by failing to object to certain hearsay statements, and by failing to investigate Henry‘s previous medical treatments.
1. Hearsay
[¶13] Generally, out-of-court statements are not admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See
[¶14] Here, during the District Court hearing, a PARC psychiatrist who worked personally with Henry following his admission to PBMC testified that Henry was brought to the hospital because “[a]pparenty, [he] was found wandering on Route 1, running in traffic, and screaming that he wanted to die.” That psychiatrist then testified that Henry “had been brought in, also, on March 4th when he was found wandering outside without shoes and socks in 20-degree weather knocking on people‘s doors.” Finally, the psychiatrist stated that Henry “started to try and ingest Magic Markers, ingest checkers, suck on hand sanitizer, and stick himself in the neck with a fork, and bashed his head through the wall.”
[¶15] Hearing counsel‘s failure to object to these alleged hearsay statements did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The statements provide the foundation of the psychiatrist‘s expert opinion and are admissible for that purpose. See id;
2. Previous Medical Treatments
[¶16] Although Henry‘s counsel did not conduct an independent investigation into the incidents that occurred before Henry was admitted to PBMC, counsel did inquire on cross examination into the hospital‘s care of Henry and the intended treatment plan. Counsel also probed whether Henry‘s medication regimen would be effective in alleviating his symptoms, to which the psychiatrist replied affirmatively. Further, counsel inquired whether medications that the family alleged Henry had received several weeks prior to his admission to PBMC could have caused his symptoms, which the psychiatrist denied. The psychiatrist concluded that Henry would benefit from commitment, as did a court-appointed independent medical examiner, citing similar reasons.
[¶17] Because the District Court explicitly weighed the evidence and determined that the physician‘s opinions were more credible than the testimony of Henry‘s sisters, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had Henry‘s counsel independently investigated his medical history. See Levesque v. State, 664 A.2d 849, 852 (Me. 1995) (holding that where a defendant was not “deprived of an otherwise available substantial ground of defense,” counsel was effective pursuant to the Strickland standard).
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶18] In addition to raising ineffective assistance arguments, Henry contends that the evidence presented at the District Court hearing was insufficient to support the court‘s findings that Henry
[¶19] A court must find the following facts by clear and convincing evidence to commit a person involuntarily to a psychiatric hospital: (1) that the person is mentally ill and poses a likelihood of serious harm, (2) that adequate community resources for the person‘s care are not available, (3) that inpatient hospitalization is the best available means of treatment, and (4) that it is satisfied with the individual treatment plan offered by the committing hospital.
[¶20] At the March 28 hearing, the psychiatrist testified that Henry was brought to the PBMC emergency room on March 4 after having been found “wandering outside without shoes and socks in 20-degree weather knocking on people‘s doors,” and that Henry‘s family took him home, but Henry was again brought to PBMC by police on March 15 after he was found running in traffic on Route 1, screaming that he wanted to die. The psychiatrist also testified that, after admission to PBMC, Henry tried to ingest magic markers, checkers, and hand sanitizer; stuck himself in the neck with a fork; bashed his head into the wall; told hospital workers that if he looked at people they would die; thought another patient was using mind control on him; and tried to electrocute himself.
[¶21] The psychiatrist further testified that Henry was suffering acute psychotic episodes that could have been caused by a schizophrenic break or a psychotic disorder due to the ingestion of drugs prior to admission, but that Henry had screened negative for drug use. Regardless of the differential diagnosis, the psychiatrist concluded that a treatment regimen at the hospital including Ativan and Risperidone would help Henry and noted that his demeanor had improved since admission. The independent medical examiner, a clinical psychologist, expressed concerns that Henry would harm himself if released, and was supportive of the treatment plan proposed by the psychiatrist, including involuntary commitment.
[¶22] Although Henry‘s sisters also testified, expressing their beliefs that Henry‘s symptoms were caused by the medications he had been provided by medical staff on March 4 and following an earlier incident in Massachusetts, and that the family did not want him taking any medications at all, the court noted that the sisters’ opinions were “not founded in any sort of expert testimony.” However, the court explicitly weighed the doctors’ testimony with that of the sisters, and made its findings based “on the most persuasive evidence, which is
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Scott F. Hess, Esq. (orally), The Law Office of Scott F. Hess, LLC, Augusta, for appellant Henry B.
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and N. Paul Gauvreau, Asst. Atty. Gen. (orally), Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services
Knox Superior Court docket number AP-2016-10
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY