IN RE GABRIEL W.
Yor-16-368
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
June 27, 2017
2017 ME 133
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
Submitted On Briefs: June 14, 2017. Reporter of Decisions.
[¶1] The parents of Gabriel W. appeal from a judgment entered by the District Court (Biddeford, Janelle, J.) terminating their parental rights to the child pursuant tо
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶2] Applying the statute, the court found by clear and convincing еvidence that “the parents are unwilling or unable to protect the child from
[¶3] The court‘s factual findings are supported by competent evidence in the record and are therefore not clearly erroneous. See In re M.B., 2013 ME 46, ¶ 40, 65 A.3d 1260. Concerning the father, the court found that he had not complied with his reunification plan and consequently reunification had been unsuccessful; had been inconsistent in visiting the child and had “struggled to connect” with the child since the child was placed in DHHS custody at five days
[¶4] Concerning the mother, the court found that the child was born drug-affected. It further found that the mother does not have a home of her own, having lived with her aunt for over a year, although she “will begin working two differеnt jobs, which she believes will help her eventually secure stable housing”; “struggle[s] with drug and alcohol addiction, as well as mental health issues,” having been diagnosed with “Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Generalized Depression . . . Opioid Dependence . . . [and] Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder”; “cоntinue[s] to receive mental health and substance abuse treatment . . . [and] has been prescribed several medications, including Suboxone”; “continues to have relapses with alcohol and marijuana, demonstrated by positive urine screens”; has not successfully reunified with the child because she has not complied with her reunification plan; “fails to take responsibility for behavior that has impacted the wellbeing of her children”;
[¶5] Finally, the court, citing its unfitness findings and the parents’ failed reunification efforts, found that “termination is in the best interest of [the child]. [The child] has been in the care of [the foster mother] practically his whole life. [He] is happy in [her] care and has a close bond with her.”
[¶6] The court‘s findings, based on evidence in the record, explaining why the parents cannot or are unwilling to protect the child from jeopardy within the time required by statute and why the child‘s best interest requires termination, are sufficient to support the judgment. The mother‘s contention that the court еrred in making those determinations because “DHHS did not engage in reasonable reunification efforts” is not persuasive on this record, and in any event, as we recently reiterated, “because the Department‘s compliance with its reunification duties prescribed in
B. Due Process
[¶7] The mother contends that it was a violation of due process for the court to make an explicit finding concerning her parental unfitness in an amended order without first holding a new hearing. “We review de novo whether an individual was affоrded procedural due process. The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meаningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mitchell v. Krieckhaus, 2017 ME 70, ¶ 16, --- A.3d --- (alteration and quotation marks omitted). More specifically, “[d]ue process requires: notice of thе issues, an opportunity to be heard, the right to introduce evidence and present witnesses, the right to respond to claims and evidenсe, and an impartial fact-finder.” In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 21, --- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted).
[¶8] The mother was afforded each of those elements at the two-day hearing held on June 3 and June 14, 2016.2 In its July 18, 2016, judgmеnt, the court found explicitly that termination was in the child‘s best interest and made the findings concerning parental fitness recited supra, although it did not explicitly find that the mother was an unfit parent. In its August 9, 2016, order
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents are unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy and these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time which is reasonably calculated to meet the child‘s needs. In making this finding, the court hereby incorporates its findings from the July 18, 2016[,] Termination Order.
The court next finds that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the сhild. In making this finding, the court incorporates the findings of the July 18, 2016[,] Termination Order.
The Court has independently reached this conclusion and applied its own independent analysis in arriving at these legal findings. This Order simply clarifies the Order in which the court makes its findings and that the court has specifically made these findings.
(Emphasis added and numerical headings omitted.)
[¶9] Because the mother fully participated in the hearing from which the facts underlying the court‘s legal judgment were derived—thаt is, she was “heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” Mitchell, 2017 ME 70, ¶ 16, --- A.3d --- (quotation marks omitted)—she was afforded due process.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Rubin Guedalie Segal, Esq., Portland, for appellant Father
Janet T. Mills, Attorney Gеneral, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services
Biddeford District Court docket number PC-2015-18
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
