IN RE LOGAN M. et al.
Docket: Cum-16-309
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
February 2, 2017
2017 ME 23
Submitted On Briefs: January 19, 2017
[¶ 17] To generate liability for indemnification, the bylaws do not require evidence of the cause of an action or investigation, only that a board action or investigation regarding an employee occurred. While the Board‘s action against Lalonde was prompted by a report made by CMMC, and Lalonde alleged that fact, perhaps unnecessarily, in his complaint, Lalonde‘s complaint does not seek to hold CMMC civilly liable for its report. Therefore, section 2511 is inapplicable. The CMMC bylaws create an indemnification responsibility regardless of the cause of the investigation and, in effect, create a contractual exception to section 2511 immunity when CMMC may initiate or assist an action before the Board that involves one of its employees.
[¶ 18] That the CMMC bylaws create a contractual exception to section 2511 immunity becomes more apparent when one recognizes that section 2511(3) extends immunity to any activity “assisting the board, authority or committee in carrying out any of its duties or functions provided by law.” See
[¶ 19] Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Lalonde, the allegations in the complaint are, as a matter of law, sufficient to overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, because they state the elements of a cause of action and facts that would entitle Lalonde to relief pursuant to some legal theory. Thus, CMMC is not immune from Lalonde‘s action for indemnification for the costs of his defense.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Zack M. Paakkonen, Esq., Portland Legal LLC, Portland, for appellant mother
John F. Zink, Esq., Freeport, for appellant father of Bryson L.
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services
PER CURIAM
[¶ 1] The mother of Logan M. and Bryson L., and the father of Bryson L., appeal from a judgment of the District Court (Portland, Powers, J.) terminating their parental rights pursuant to
[¶ 2] After the issuance of agreed-to jeopardy orders for both children, nearly two years of review hearings, multiple reunification plans, and a two-day hearing held in June 2016, the court issued two judgments on June 24, 2016, terminating the mother‘s parental rights as to both children, and the father‘s parental rights as to Bryson.1 In the judgments, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that the parents are unable to protect the children from jeopardy and are unable to take responsibility for the children within a time reasonably calculated to meet the children‘s needs,
[¶ 3] Reviewed for clear error, there is competent evidence in the record to support the court‘s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, of the mother‘s parental unfitness. See Guardianship of Hailey, 2016 ME 80, ¶ 15, 140 A.3d 478. Evidence in the record supports the court‘s findings that the mother has had a long-standing history of substance abuse, including a relapse in September 2015; insists that she can drink alcohol because it is legal, despite her addictive personality; and continues to require mental health counseling. Also supported by clear and convincing evidence are the court‘s findings that the mother was often late to DHHS-supervised visits with her children, causing significant distress to one of the children; and that she has had issues en
[¶ 4] Although not challenged by the father, the evidence supports the court‘s finding of his parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence.
[¶ 5] Finally, “viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the trial court‘s lens,” the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that termination of the parental rights of the father and mother is in the best interest of the children. See In re R.M., 2015 ME 38, ¶ 7, 114 A.3d 212;
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.