In re: FTX TRADING LTD., et al., Debtors
No. 23-2297
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
January 19, 2024
PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 23-2297
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In re: FTX TRADING LTD., et al.,
Debtors
ANDREW R. VARA, US Trustee for Region 3,
Appellant
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for the District of Delaware
(Case No. 22-11068)
Bankruptcy Judge: Honorable John T. Dorsey
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Argued: November 8, 2023
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Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 19, 2024)
Anna O. Mohan
Brian J. Springer [ARGUED]
United States Department of Justice
Civil Division, Appellate Staff
Room 7533
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant
Jonathan C. Lipson [ARGUED]
Temple University
Beasley School of Law
1719 North Broad Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122
Counsel for Amicus Appellant
Irv Ackelsberg
John J. Grogan
David A. Nagdeman
Langer Grogan & Diver
1717 Arch Street
Suite 4020, The Bell Atlantic Tower
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Amicus Appellant
James L. Bromley [ARGUED]
Brian D. Glueckstein
Sullivan & Cromwell
125 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004
Counsel for Debtor-Appellee
Adam G. Landis
Matthew R. Pierce
Landis Rath & Cobb
919 Market Street
Suite 1800, P.O. Box 2087
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Debtor-Appellee
Kristopher M. Hansen
Kenneth Pasquale [ARGUED]
Isaac S. Sasson
John F. Iaffaldano
Paul Hastings
200 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10166
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee
Matthew B. Lunn
Robert F. Poppiti, Jr.
Young Conaway Stargatt & Taylor
1000 N. King Street
Rodney Square
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
Sometimes highly complex cases give rise to straightforward issues on appeal. Such is the case here. Multi-billion-dollar company FTX Trading Ltd. (“FTX”) filed for bankruptcy after a sudden and unprecedented collapse that sent shockwaves through the cryptocurrency industry. The issue before us is whether
I. Factual and Procedural History
Over the course of eight days in November 2022, the cryptocurrency company FTX suffered a catastrophic decline in value. The primary owner of FTX, Samuel Bankman-Fried, also owned most of Alameda Research, a cryptocurrency hedge fund. In early November, industry reports claimed that Alameda Research was financially compromised, and questions regarding a conflict of interest between the two allegedly independent companies began to arise. What followed were discoveries of multiple corporate failures, including FTX’s use of software to conceal the funneling of FTX customer funds into Alameda Research to bolster its balance sheet. These discoveries caused FTX, a company that had been valued at $32 billion earlier in 2022, to face a sudden and severe liquidity crisis as customers withdrew billions of dollars over the course of a few days. Since the collapse,
criminal investigations into FTX have unearthed evidence of widespread fraud and the embezzlement of customers’ funds.1
Immediately following the crash, on November 11, 2022, Mr. Bankman-Fried appointed John J. Ray, III to replace him as CEO of FTX and its numerous affiliates (“FTX Group”). Over the next three days, Mr. Ray filed multiple voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code,
Mr. Ray further reported that many of the companies in FTX Group lacked “appropriate corporate governance,” operating without a functioning board of directors and failing to produce audited financial statements. JA 59. He maintained that FTX Group “did not maintain centralized control of its cash” and
companies’ failure to “keep complete books and records.” JA 66.
In addition, Mr. Ray described how FTX Group failed to implement a corporate system to regulate cash disbursements. Employees would simply submit “payment requests through an on-line ‘chat’ platform where a disparate group of supervisors approved disbursements by responding with personalized emojis.”2 JA 64. Mr. Ray discovered that corporate funds were used to purchase homes and other personal items for employees in the Bahamas, where FTX was headquartered. For some real estate purchases, there was no documentation categorizing the transactions as corporate loans and the properties were recorded in the Bahamas under the names of the FTX employees or advisors.
Regarding the companies’ cryptocurrency assets, Mr. Ray declared FTX Group engaged in “[u]nacceptable management practices” including, inter alia, “the use of an unsecured group email account” to access “critically sensitive data” and “the use of software to conceal the misuse of customer funds.” JA 64–65. Mr. Ray claimed to identify $372 million of unauthorized cryptocurrency transfers initiated on FTX’s petition date, and the subsequent unauthorized “minting” of $300 million in FTX’s cryptocurrency tokens, FTTs. Id. The disordered state of FTX Group at the time it filed for bankruptcy, exacerbated by the failure of FTX founders to identify sources of supposed additional assets, meant that Mr. Ray and his team of professionals “located and secured only a fraction of the digital assets.” Id.
Within weeks of the filing of the bankruptcy petitions, the United States Trustee moved for the appointment of an examiner pursuant to
bankruptcy proceedings because Mr. Ray could concentrate on his “primary duty of stabilizing the debtors’ businesses” while the examiner investigated FTX’s compromised pre-petition management, which was purportedly responsible for misappropriating $10 billion in customers’ assets. Id.
Of greater significance for the purposes of this appeal, the U.S. Trustee argued that the Code mandates the Bankruptcy Court to grant their motion and order the appointment of an examiner. Section 1104(c) provides that, in instances like this where no trustee has been appointed, then:
[O]n request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of an examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate, including an investigation of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement,
or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor of or by current or former management of the debtor, if— (1) such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the estate; or
(2) the debtor’s fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000.
The Committee for Unsecured Creditors (“Creditors’ Committee”), the Joint Provisional Liquidators of FTX Digital Markets Ltd., and the Debtors filed their objections to the U.S. Trustee’s motion. At a hearing before the Bankruptcy Court, the U.S. Trustee reiterated their position that the appointment of an examiner in this instance is mandatory, and argued this interpretation is supported by legislative history that conveys Congress’s intent to guarantee an independent investigation into any large-scale bankruptcy. The opposing parties argued the phrase “as is appropriate” in
The Bankruptcy Court agreed with those who opposed the motion and ruled the appointment of an examiner was discretionary under the Code. JA 17–18. The Court acknowledged FTX Group’s unsecured debt far exceeded $5 million but found the phrase “as is appropriate” in
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The U.S. Trustee appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to the District Court and moved to certify the order for direct appeal pursuant to
equity security holders” given the grounds to suspect “actual fraud, dishonesty, or criminal conduct in the management of the Debtors.” JA 100 ¶ 35.
Court granted the certification motion, and this Court authorized the direct appeal. We have jurisdiction over Chapter 11 cases under
The issue before us is one of statutory interpretation: whether the plain text of
“Our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code starts ‘where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself.’” Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 69 (2011) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)). In interpreting a statute, we are required “to give effect to Congress’s intent.” In re Trump, 810 F.3d at 167. We presume that intent is expressed through the ordinary meaning of the statute’s language. Id. If the meaning of the text is clear, “the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.” Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore start by examining the plain text of
Congress made plain its intention to mandate the appointment of an examiner by using the word “shall,” as in the Bankruptcy Court “shall” appoint an examiner if the terms of the statute have been met.
when a court must follow a statute’s directive regardless of whether it agrees with the result. Scott v. Vantage Corp., 64 F.4th 462, 477 (3d Cir. 2023). To interpret “shall” as anything but an obligatory command to appoint an examiner, when the conditions of
Despite the mandatory language, the Bankruptcy Court found that the phrase “as is appropriate” controls the appointment of an examiner under
Although instructive, the last-antecedent rule is not absolute and we therefore look to other indicia to discern the phrase’s meaning. Viera v. Life. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 642 F.3d 407, 419 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Pilosi, 393 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2004)). We need not look far. As the U.S. Trustee argued below,
has a choice, the phrase “as is appropriate” indicates it is permitted to determine what is pertinent given the specific circumstances of each case. This interpretation—that “as is appropriate” refers to the nature of the investigation, not the appointment of the examiner—is further bolstered by the context. Immediately after the phrase “as is appropriate,” the statute provides the word “including” and a list of topics that merit investigation: “allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor of or by current or former management of the debtor.”
Under the Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation, the appointment of an examiner under either subsection of
In addition to contravening rules of statutory construction, reading subsection (c)(2) as discretionary would require disregarding direct evidence of Congress’s intent.5
In obtaining passage of the Bankruptcy Code, the Senate floor manager explained the “business reorganization
Id. at 32406. In enacting Chapter 11, the sponsors adopted a revised approach where the needs of of that legislation, Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini, made “nearly identical statements . . . to their respective chambers.” Id. at 91–92. These statements are “persuasive evidence” of the legislation’s intent. See Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 64 n.5 (1990) (“Because of the absence of a conference and the key roles played by Representative Edwards and his counterpart floor manager Senator DeConcini, we have treated their floor statements on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as persuasive evidence of congressional intent.”).
security holders are balanced against “equally important public needs relating to the economy, such as employment and production, and other factors such as the public health and safety of the people or protection of the national interest.” Id.; see also Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 53 (2002) (“[T]he Bankruptcy Code incorporates traditional equitable principles.”). Because
Despite this clear intention to protect the public interest, Congress tempered the mandatory nature of
In this instance, the Bankruptcy Court denied the motion for an examiner in part because it deemed Mr. Ray to be “completely independent” from FTX’s founding members and that any remaining prior officers “have been stripped of any decision making authority.” JA 9–10. On appeal, the debtors in possession and the Creditors’ Committee argue an investigation would be duplicative and wasteful given their ongoing efforts to uncover all pre-petition mismanagement. Neither position is relevant, given our holding that the appointment of the examiner is mandatory under the Code. But nor is either position persuasive, given that Congress has guaranteed that an investigation under
First, an examiner must be “disinterested” as defined by
See
“large case[] having great public interest.” 124 CONG. REC. 33990 (1978).
Second, an examiner appointed under
Compare
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Bankruptcy Court and remand with instructions to order the appointment of an examiner under
In searching the above-cited docket entries, it appears no motion requesting the appointment of an examiner pursuant to
