In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liability Litigation (Alabama Plaintiffs).
Nos. 10-30921, 10-30945.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 23, 2012.
Finally, Varco challenges the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the jury‘s award of punitive damages. The jury instructions limited punitive damages to Bohnsack‘s fraud claim. Because we have found that Bohnsack is not entitled to compensatory damages for fraud, no punitive damages can be awarded on that claim. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis, 904 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex.1995) (“[A]ctual damages sustained from a tort must be proven before punitive damages are available.“). We therefore hold that the district court erred in denying Bohnsack‘s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the award of punitive damages.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the jury‘s award of compensatory damages for misappropriation of trade secrets. We REVERSE the jury‘s award of compensatory damages on Bohnsack‘s fraud claim and RENDER a take-nothing judgment, and we REVERSE the jury‘s award of punitive damages.
In re FEMA TRAILER FORMALDEHYDE PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION (MISSISSIPPI PLAINTIFFS).
Adam Michael Dinnell, Trail Atty. (argued), U.S. Dept. of Justice, Dept. of Environmental Torts, John Adam Bain, Sr. Trial Atty., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Henry Thomas Miller, Sr. Trial Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Torts Branch Civ. Div., Washington, DC, for Defendant-Appellee.
CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Appellants“)1 brought this Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA“),
I.
In 2005, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita destroyed the homes of thousands of residents along the Gulf Coast.2 Over the months and years following the hurricanes, displaced residents returned to find a shortage of alternative housing. Pursuant to
Shortly thereafter, FEMA activated its Individual and Household Assistance Program and, from September 2005 through May 1, 2009, the agency supplied disaster victims with EHUs, at no cost, to use as temporary shelter. The EHUs were taken from FEMA‘s preexisting inventory, which had been purchased from public retailers as well as manufacturers. The EHUs were small, portable, and usually placed at the disaster victims’ home sites. The trailers were installed by Government contractors who placed the units on blocks or piers, anchored them to the ground using straps or bolts, and connected them to public sewer and water lines. To obtain use of an EHU, the person seeking assistance would complete and sign an application acknowledging that he was requesting an EHU to use as shelter because he was currently unable to live in his own residence due to the disaster. The EHU applications indicated that the units were intended for temporary use and that applicants were required to accept alternative housing options as they became available.
In March 2006, FEMA began receiving complaints from EHU occupants regarding formaldehyde odors inside of the units and continued receiving complaints during the following months. Formaldehyde is a chemical substance commonly found in many construction materials such as plywood, particle board, home furnishing, fabrics, and other household products. According to the Center for Disease Control-Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (CDC-ATSDR), elevated and high levels of formaldehyde can act as an irritant and lead to other health problems.
In March 2006, when FEMA began receiving formaldehyde complaints, it encouraged shelter occupants to ventilate their EHUs by opening the doors and
In September 2006, FEMA began working with the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA“) which tested the EHUs for formaldehyde and developed mitigation techniques. Over the next year, FEMA received approximately 200 formaldehyde complaints from EHU occupants. In July 2007, FEMA distributed another informational brochure to EHU occupants, set up a hotline and a dedicated call center to field formaldehyde complaints from occupants, and continued to assist occupants in locating alternative housing. FEMA subsequently entered into an agreement with the CDC to conduct additional testing, the findings of which were compiled in a third informational brochure and distributed to EHU occupants in early 2008. On May 1, 2009, the Government officially ended efforts to provide EHUs to disaster victims from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
Appellants are individuals who resided in the EHUs in Mississippi and Alabama. The Mississippi and Alabama appellants each sued more than 100 entities, including the Government. In October 2007, the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“MDL“) created MDL No. 07-1873 (In re: FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Products Liability Litigation)3 and assigned the litigation to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. In March 2008, in accordance with the district court‘s order, Appellants filed a consolidated master complaint containing class allegations and naming as defendants various private manufacturers and contractors as well as the Government. All actions centralized in the MDL share factual questions relating to allegations that the EHUs provided by FEMA in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita contained materials which emit dangerous levels of formaldehyde.
Appellants allege that, for the period of time between March and June 2006, FEMA caused them harm by placing litigation concerns ahead of the safety of EHU occupants by exposing them to trailers FEMA knew to contain dangerous levels of formaldehyde, without warning occupants of the dangerous nature of the units or remedying the dangerous nature of the units.
In support of this contention, Appellants assert that, in spite of being notified on numerous occasions of complaints by EHU residents regarding formaldehyde emissions during March through June of 2006, FEMA persisted in not responding to these concerns. According to Appellants, FEMA‘s lack of a response was part of a deliberate effort to avoid liability for future formaldehyde exposure claims and litigation. Appellants further allege that FEMA ignored and manipulated the concerns of federal scientists in an attempt to avoid negative publicity and legal liability.
In May 2008, the Government moved to dismiss Appellants’ FTCA claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative for summary judgment, based on the FTCA‘s discretionary function exception. In October 2008, the district court found that all of the Government‘s
In May 2009, the Government filed a second motion to dismiss Appellants’ claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative for summary judgment, based on the FTCA‘s discretionary function exception. In August 2009, the district court denied this motion and reaffirmed that the FTCA‘s discretionary function exception may not apply to some or all of Appellants’ claims, the determination of which would be driven by the facts of each individual case.
The district court then denied class certification and scheduled a series of bellwether trials, but none of the FTCA claims brought by the bellwether plaintiffs against the Government advanced to the trial stage. In October 2009, Appellants filed a supplemental administrative master complaint for the purpose of presenting to the district court an updated “procedural vehicle for the disposition of common issues.”
In November 2009, the Government moved under
In August 2010, the district court entered a final, appealable judgment under
II.
A
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm‘n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir.1998). Under
Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be found in the complaint alone, the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts as evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts plus the court‘s resolution of the disputed facts. Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should only be granted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claims entitling him to relief. Wagstaff v. United States Dep‘t of Educ., 509 F.3d 661, 663 (5th Cir.2007).
A plaintiff may only sue the United States if a federal statute explicitly provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity. The United States must consent to be sued, and that consent is a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. Delta Commercial Fisheries Ass‘n v. Gulf of Mex. Fishery Mgmt. Council, 364 F.3d 269, 273 (5th Cir.2004). Waivers of sovereign immunity should be narrowly construed in favor of the United States. In re Supreme Beef Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 248, 253 (5th Cir.2006).
The FTCA is recognized as providing a waiver of sovereign immunity and provides the sole basis of recovery for tort claims against the United States. See
Similarly, section 1346 provides that:
[D]istrict courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Govern-ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission oc-curred.
The “law of the place where the act or omission occurred” refers exclusively to state law. Brown v. United States, 653 F.2d 196, 201 (5th Cir.1981). Since the FTCA requires the Government‘s liability to be measured in accordance with the law of the state where the alleged act or omission occurred, Appellants’ FTCA claims are limited by the provisions set forth in Mississippi and Alabama tort law. See
Mississippi law provides:
(a) Neither the state nor any political subdivision thereof, nor other agencies, nor, except in cases of willful miscon-duct, the agents, employees, or repre-sentatives of any of them engaged in any emergency management activities, while complying with or attempting to comply with this article or any rule or regula-tion promulgated pursuant to the provi-sions of this article, shall be liable for the death of or any injury to persons, or damage to property, as a result of such activity. The provisions of this section shall not affect the right of any person to receive benefits to which he would otherwise be entitled under this article, or under the workmen‘s compensation
law, or under any pension law, nor the right of any such person to receive any benefits or compensation under any act of congress.
(b) Any person owning or controlling real estate or other premises who volun-tarily and without compensation grants a license or privilege, or otherwise per-mits the designation or use of the whole or any part or parts of such real estate or premises for the purpose of shelter-ing persons or providing assistance to persons during or in recovery from an actual, impending, mock or practice at-tack or any man-made, technological or natural disaster, together with his suc-cessors in interest, if any, shall not be civilly liable for negligently causing the death of, or injury to, any person on or about such real estate or premises by virtue of its use for emergency manage-ment purposes, or loss of, or damage to, the property of such person.
Similarly, Alabama law provides:
Neither the state nor any political subdi-vision thereof nor other agencies of the state or political subdivisions thereof, nor, except in cases of willful miscon-duct, gross negligence or bad faith, any emergency management worker, individ-ual, partnership, association or corpora-tion complying with or reasonably at-tempting to comply with this chapter or any order, rule or regulation promulgat-ed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter or pursuant to any ordinance relating to blackout or other precaution-ary measures enacted by any political subdivision of the state, shall be liable for the death of or any injury to persons, or for damage to property, as a result of any such activity. The provisions of this section shall not affect the right of any person to receive benefits to which he
would otherwise be entitled under this chapter or under the Worker‘s Compen-sation Law or under any pension law, nor the right of any such person to receive any benefits or compensation un-der any act of Congress.
Any person owning or controlling real estate or other premises who voluntarily and without compensation grants a li-cense or privilege, or otherwise permits the designation or use of the whole or any part or parts of such real estate or premises for the purpose of sheltering persons during an actual disaster or an actual, impending, mock or practice at-tack, shall, together with his successors in interest, if any, not be civilly liable for negligently causing the death of, or inju-ry to, any person on or about such real estate or premises, or for the loss of, or damage to, the property of such person.
Whether a private person in “like circumstances” would be subject to liability is a question of sovereign immuni-ty and, thus, is ultimately a question of federal law. See United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005). Because the federal govern-ment could never be exactly like a private actor, a court‘s job in applying the stan-dard is to find the most reasonable analo-gy. LaBarge v. Cnty. of Mariposa, 798 F.2d 364, 366-69 (9th Cir.1986). Inherent differences between the government and a private person cannot be allowed to dis-rupt this analysis. Olson, 546 U.S. at 46-47. The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that the Government is entitled to raise any and all defenses that would potentially be available to a private citizen or entity under state law. Camacho v. Tex. Workforce Comm‘n, 445 F.3d 407, 410 (5th Cir.2006); Starnes v. United
Appellants concede that, in accor-dance with the FTCA, the Government can only be held liable to the extent that a private individual or a business entity could be held liable under similar circum-stances under the laws where the act or omission occurred. However, Appellants contend that FEMA‘s actions were non-discretionary, not voluntary, and not with-out compensation, so the most reasonable private person analogue would be a tempo-rary housing manager, not a good Samari-tan provider of free shelter.
Appellants argue that FEMA‘s provision of the trailers was not voluntary because the President, under the Stafford Act, is authorized to direct FEMA and other agencies of the state to provide assistance and services to victims in need as a result of a natural disaster. See
Appellants also claim that the statutory phrase “during or in recovery from an actual disaster,” which provides the time frame for immunized conduct, does not extend to cover FEMA‘s decision-making process in response to post-disaster re-ports of dangerous formaldehyde levels in the EHUs.4
Additionally, Mississippi Appellants ar-gue that, because the FTCA is an “act of congress” under which they are seeking compensation, and because the emergency statutes purport not to affect the rights of those seeking “compensation under any act of congress,” the immunity provisions were erroneously applied to their FTCA claims, interfering with their right to recovery.5
Accordingly, Appellants contend that the Government‘s conduct should not be im-munized under the Mississippi and Ala-bama emergency statutes, effectively bar-ring their FTCA claims. See
Because the Mississippi and Alabama emergency statutes abrogate the tort lia-bility of a private person who, (1) volun-tarily, (2) without compensation, (3) allows his property or premises to be used as shelter during or in recovery from a natu-ral disaster, the Government‘s voluntary, cost-free provision of the EHUs to disaster victims, in connection with Hurricanes Ka-trina and Rita, is also immunized conduct
We pretermit discussion of the re-maining arguments set forth by Appellants that were not raised before the district court, as it is a bedrock principle of appel-late review that claims raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered.7 Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Disc. Ctr., Inc., 200 F.3d 307, 316-17 (5th Cir.2000).8
Additionally, as an alternative to han-dling the issue on appeal with this court, Appellants move to certify the following questions to the Alabama and Mississippi Supreme Courts: (1) Whether the federal government and its political subdivisions are considered “persons” under the emer-gency statutes as read in conjunction with the entire acts in which they are contained; (2) Whether the FTCA preempts state law as to the liability vel non of the federal government when exercising non-discre-tionary duties; and (3) Whether the Mis-sissippi and Alabama state legislatures clearly intended to immunize the federal government under the state emergency statutes. Alabama Appellants also move to certify the following question to the Alabama Supreme Court: (1) Whether the actions of FEMA in failing to properly respond to complaints of formaldehyde ex-posure, months after Hurricane Katrina, occurred “during an actual disaster.”
The decision of whether to cer-tify a question lies within this court‘s sound discretion. Patterson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 487 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Unau-thorized Practice of Law Comm., 283 F.3d 650, 656 (5th Cir.2002)). The court should exercise that discretion sparingly, certify-ing only in “exceptional case[s].” Laves-pere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc.,
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court‘s judgment dismissing Appellants’ FTCA claims against the Unit-ed States for lack of subject-matter juris-diction. Appellants’ motions for certifica-tion are DENIED.