In re F.M.
Some crimes, known as wobbler offenses, are punishable either as misdemeanors or as felonies at the discretion of the sentencing court.
A juvenile court‘s choice to classify a wobbler as a misdemeanor or felony can have significant implications for the juvenile. If an offense is treated as a felony, it may constitute a serious or violent felony for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law, potentially exposing the juvenile to dramatically increased sentences if he or she reoffends. (
In this case, the trial court did not comply with
I.
F.M. first came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court after he punched a classmate in 2019. The juvenile court sustained an allegation that F.M. hаd committed simple battery (
The following year, F.M. was again brought before the juvenile court after he and a group of gang members threatened a victim with a deadly weapon and then fled from police. A wardship petition (Petition B) alleged a number of offenses, including various forms of felony assault for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (
The Petition B allegations that F.M. admitted — assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, active participation in a criminal street gang, and reckless evasion of a police officer — are wobbler offenses. Each may be punished by imprisonment in a state prison or by imprisonment in a county jail for less than a year. (
While in custody, F.M. participated in an assault on another minor. The district attorney responded with another wardship petition (Petition C) alleging felony assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, undertaken for the benefit of a criminal street gang (
Petitions B and C were resolved at a dispositional hearing in November 2020. The juvenile court continued F.M.‘s wardship and found him suitable for placement at a ranch camp. Neither the transcript nor the minute order for the dispositional hearing indicate that the juvenile court acknowledged its discretion to treat the offenses F.M. admitted as misdemeanors rather than as feloniеs. F.M. appealed.
On appeal, the Attorney General argued that F.M. forfeited any argument that the juvenile court had failed to comply with
Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court failed to comply with
II.
We said in Manzy W. that “the purpose of the statute is not solely administrative“;
Since
Similarly, in In re Kenneth H. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 616 (Kenneth H.), the minor was found to have committed a wobbler offense, and the juvenile court failed to make an express declaration as to its choice to treat the offense as a felony or as a misdemeanor. (Id. at pp. 618–620.) The Attorney General opposed remand on the grounds “that the accusatory pleading (the petition) described the offense as a felony; that at the jurisdictional hearing the court found the allegations of the petition to be true; that the finding of truth was referred to at the dispositional hearing; and that the court would not have found the allegations of the supplemental petition true if it had not found the burglary to be a felony.” (Id. at p. 619.) We rejected these arguments and remanded for compliance with
Manzy W. came next. Again, the juvеnile court imposed a felony-level term of confinement for a wobbler offense without making an express declaration that it was exercising its discretion to treat the offense as a felony rather than as a misdemeanor. (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1201.) We reaffirmed Ricky H. and Kenneth H., explaining that “neither the pleading, the minute order, nor the setting of a felony-level period of physical confinement may substitute for a declaration by the juvenile court as to whether an offense is a misdemeanor or a felony.” (Manzy W., at p. 1208.) To comply with
Even as we affirmed the holdings in Kenneth H. and Ricky H. in Manzy W., we also explained that remand is not ” ‘automatic[ally]’ ” required “whenever the juvenile court fails to make a formal declaration” as mandated by
III.
Before this court, the Attorney General argues that F.M. forfeited his right to challenge the juvenile court‘s lack of compliance with
The same argument was raised before the Court of Appeal, which rejected it. We granted review to decide the issue presented by F.M.‘s petition: whether this matter should be remanded to the juvenile court in light of its failure to comply with
It is true that a defendant who fails to object before the trial court to a sentence on the ground that it is being “imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed manner” generally forfeits the right to challenge such an error on appeal. (Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354; see People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234 [“It is settled that failure to object and make an offer of proof at the sentencing hearing concerning alleged errors or omissions in the probation report waives the claim on appeal.“].) But “neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is аutomatic. [Citation.] Competing concerns may cause an appellate court to conclude that an objection has not been forfeited.” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593.)
Such concerns are present in the context of
The Attorney General relies on G.C. for the proposition that a juvenile court‘s failure to comply with
We have no occasion here to elucidate the full extent of what “forfeitable legal error” in the
IV.
A.
The Attorney General contends that while we recognized the propriety of harmless error review in Manzy W., we “did not elucidate” the standard. He asserts that we evaluate claims of
The Attorney General is correct that a juvenile court‘s failure to comply with
The Manzy W. standard does not require a juvenile to show a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome, and adopting Watson would be inconsistent with Manzy W. and subsequent Court of Appeal decisions. In Manzy W., we concluded that a
Nothing in this analysis suggests that Manzy had demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have received a more lenient sentence but for the error. Had that been relevant, we would have given weight to the juvenile court‘s rejection of a more lenient sentence, as the dissenting opinion in Manzy W. did in arguing that remand was
The same is true of the Court of Appeal cases that the Attorney General identifies as having been “[a]dequately guided by the rule set forth” in Manzy W. over the years. (See In re Raymundo M. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 78, 90–93 (Raymundo M.); In re Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989, 1000 (Cesar V.); In re Ramon M. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 665, 675–676 (Ramon M.); In re Eduardo D. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 545, 548–549 (Eduardo D.); In re Jorge Q. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 223, 238 (Jorge Q.).) Each of these cases involved a
In Cesar V. and Eduardo D., the Attorney General conceded that the
The courts in Jorge Q. and Ramon M. also remanded with similar reasoning. (Jorge Q., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 238; Ramon M., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at pp. 675–676.) In Jorge Q., the court reiterated that the absence of an “express oral on-the-record finding” violated
Moreover,
In Champion, we held that a trial court‘s failure to give reasons for imposing consecutive sentences was error under a statute that requires courts to “state the reasоns for [their] sentencing choice[s].” (
In Avalos, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a remand for resentencing because the trial court improperly relied on an aggravating circumstance in sentencing him to a consecutive term. (Avalos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 233.) We agreed that this was error but, applying Watson, declined to remand in light of other aggravating factors that would have justified the same sentence. (Avalos, at p. 233.) Similarly, the defendant in Price argued that three of the ten reasons relied on by the trial court in imposing an upper term were not supported by the record. (Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 491.) We again declined to remand, citing Avalos and explaining that “[w]hen a trial court has given both proper and improper reasons for a sentence choice, a reviewing court will set aside the sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons were improper.” (Price, at p. 492, citing Avalos, at p. 233.)
The issues presented in Champion, Avalos, and Price did not have to do with whether a trial court understood the full extent оf its lawful discretion and its obligation to exercise it. Although the trial courts in those cases did not make explicit the reasoning for a particular decision or relied on improper reasons for a decision, there was no suggestion that they were unaware of the decision they were tasked with making. This distinction is significant because
Further, there is a practical difference in assessing the effect of an error when the court has not articulated whether a discretionary decision was made in the first place, as compared to when there were errors in a decision the court actually rendered. In the latter scenario, we may decline to remand because the record reflects aggravating circumstances so numerous that it would be “inconceivable” that the trial court would “impose a different sentence” absent the error. (See Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 934.) By contrast, where the concern is that no discretionary decision was madе, attempting to discern the likelihood of a “more favorable” decision is a more speculative inquiry. Instead of hypothesizing what decision the juvenile court would have made if it had understood the extent of its lawful authority, reviewing courts have consistently held that remand is appropriate in these circumstances. (Ante, at pp. 14–17.)
B.
Applying Manzy W., we conclude that a remand is required on this record. The Court of Appeal justified its refusal to remand with three considerations: first, that the offenses F.M. admitted were alleged as felonies in Petitions B and C; second, that the juvenile court rejected the probation department‘s recommendation to return F.M. to his parents’ custody and to reinstate probation, which would have been consistent with treating the offenses as misdemeanors; and third, that the juvenile court directed the probation department to consider whether to commit F.M. to the custody of the Division of Juvenile Justice or to send him to a ranch camp,
The Attorney General says, “That the assault and evasion offenses were alleged as felonies and the court stated a felony-level maximum time of confinement is consistent with the court having understood its discretion to designate the wobbler offenses as misdemeanors or felonies.” But it is also consistent with the opposite proposition: that the trial court did not understand its discretion in treating the wobblers as felonies. These aspeсts of the record do not demonstrate the awareness required by Manzy W. (See Ricky H., supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 191.)
The Attorney General also points to the juvenile court‘s statement in the minute order for Petition B that “[t]he Court has considered whether the above offense(s) should be felonies or misdemeanors.” But there are no offenses listed “above” the statement, only a list of all of the allegations that F.M. was charged with at the end of the minute order. The statement could have referred to the three offenses F.M. admitted to in the hearing or to the full list of charges, which included those that were dismissed but would be considered in the rendering of a disposition. The minute order does not specify which wobbler offenses were considered, and the transcript of the proceedings does not contain any further clarification or otherwise indicate
Further, the language at issue appears only in the minute order for Petition B; it did not appear in the record of Petition C, which also involved F.M.‘s admission of a wobbler offense. The juvenile court was required to separately exercise its discretion as to that offense, and the record contains insufficient indication that it did so.
F.M. urges us to go beyond Manzy W. to articulate with more specificity what a juvenile court must say in order to avoid a remand for a
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LIU, J.
We Concur:
GUERRERO, C. J.
CORRIGAN, J.
KRUGER, J.
GROBAN, J.
JENKINS, J.
EVANS, J.