In re ex parte Application of GLOBAL ENERGY HORIZONS CORPORATION; Global Energy Horizons Corporation v. Sheridan Production Company
No. 14-3180
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
April 26, 2016
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) Oct. 8, 2015.
The District Court was also correct in finding that the Association Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue RICO and Sherman Act antitrust claims in a representative capacity.7 As with the ERISA claim, the participation of individuаl members of the Association Plaintiffs would be essential for the Association Plaintiffs to show an entitlement to relief. In this regard, it does not matter that the Association Plaintiffs purport to seek only injunctive and declaratory relief. In ordеr to show a violation of the racketeering act or the antitrust law, detailed inquiries concerning healthcare providers’ billing practices and claims processing experience with CIGNA would be necessary. Thus, the third prong of the test for association standing for the RICO and antitrust claims cannot be satisfied. Accordingly, the dismissal of the Association Plaintiffs’ claims will be affirmed.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‘s various rulings with respect to the Subscriber Plaintiffs аnd its dismissal of the claims of the Association Plaintiffs. As to the Provider Plaintiffs, however, we will vacate the dismissal of their ERISA claims and remand for further proceedings.
Christopher J. Cunio, Esq., Lawrence K. Demeo, Esq., Manion Gaynor & Manning, Boston, MA, Marc J. Phillips, Esq., Manion Gaynor & Manning, Wilmington, DE, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, аnd HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
McKEE, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff Global Energy Horizons Corporation appeals the district court‘s orders denying its motions to compel discovery from Sheridan Production Company and for reargument. For the reasons that fol-
I.
Because we write for the parties who are already familiar with the facts and procedural history, we set forth only the background necessary to our conclusion.2 The district court‘s grant of Global‘s request for discovery from Sheridan pursuant to
The district court denied the motion, concluding, inter alia, that Sheridan had already responded to multiple burdensome and costly discovery requests from Global and that it was unlikely that all 400 to 450 Sheridan employees had responsive information regarding Gray‘s ill-received profits. The court denied Global‘s motion for reargument and this appeal followed.
We review a district court‘s decision on a request for discovery under § 1782 for abuse of discretion.3 In instances where the district court “misinterpreted or misаpplied the law,” or “relied on inappropriate factors in the exercise of its discretion,” our review is plenary.4 Because the district court did not commit any such errors in this case, we confine our review to abuse of discretion. We also review the district court‘s denial of the motion for reargument for abuse of discretion.5
II.
Only the fourth factor is disputed here. Section 1782 expressly incorporates the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Global alleges that the district court committed five errors in denying its discovery request. We disagree. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Global‘s motion to compel.
The district court reasonably concluded that much of the information Global sought was not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as required by Rule 26. The court found that Global‘s assertion that all 400 to 450 Sheridan employees were likely to have discoverable information was speculative: As the district court noted, Global did not provide any basis for this expansive assertion.11
Additionally, the district court properly treated the apparent lack of a formal business rеlationship between Sheridan and Gray as another count against Global‘s motion. Although not dispositive, the tenuous connection between Sheridan and Gray lessens the likelihood that Sheridan employees would be in possession of information likely to lead to discoverable evidence relating to Gray‘s profits. Similarly, the court did not abuse its discretion in considering Sheridan‘s CEO‘s affidavits and deposition testimony regarding Sheridan‘s business relationship with Gray. The fact that the сourt presiding over the foreign proceeding may have questioned the CEO‘s credibility is of little moment since that testimony was in a different context and the validity of the foreign court‘s determination in the district court is dubious.
The district court was on firm grоund in concluding that the discovery sought by Global would likely have been intrusive and burdensome in violation of Rule 45 despite Global‘s offer to pay for reasonable costs. Rule 45 counsels against loosely tailored and burdensome demаnds for production such as Global‘s. As the district court explained, Global‘s desired discovery would likely have had a significant “collateral effect” on Sheridan‘s operations.12 The record indicates that it would cause the disruptiоn of each Sheridan employee, and not only require that they be interviewed to understand how their files are organized but also require that their hard drives be copied. Sheridan estimated that this process would entail
We realize, of coursе, that the district court could have modified the motion, however, it was under no obligation to do so.13 Sheridan had already spent thousands of dollars and substantial time responding to multiple discovery requests from Global since 2008, despite nоt being a party to the foreign proceedings. In other words, this is not a case where a party has wholly failed to provide discovery.14 Sheridan had generally been responsive to Global‘s requests. Therefore, the district court‘s dеcision not to modify the subpoena was reasonable. Moreover, as discussed above, the record suggests that even a modified discovery request would not have led to additional discoverable information.
Finally, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in finding that Sheridan was under no duty to preserve its emails. The record did not lead the district court to conclude that Sheridan should have known that litigation was imminent.15 Sheridan was not a party to thе foreign proceeding and Global never sought a litigation hold on Sheridan‘s electronically stored information. Therefore, the district court did not demonstrate a “gross abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness” requiring reversal of its denial to compel.16
III.
Global‘s motion for reargument fares no better. As a general rule, such motions should only be granted “sparingly.”17 It is appropriate to grant reconsideration when at least one of the following can bе shown: “(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.”18
Global‘s motion rests only on the second factor. Global cоntends that it is entitled to reargument because: (1) new evidence suggests that Gray and Sheridan had a business relationship; (2) there are omissions in the documents that Sheridan has produced; and (3) the affidavits provided by Sheridan are from an individual whо has a motive to mislead and has been found unreliable in the foreign proceeding. However, the district court found that Global‘s motion was not based on any new evidence or newly discovered facts. Global simply asked the district court to revisit the same arguments it already considered in ruling on the motion to compel. We will not negate the limitations on reargument and encourage “a never ending polemic” between the parties and the court by vali-
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the district court‘s orders.