IN RE DIOCESE OF LUBBOCK, RELATOR
No. 07-19-00307-CV
In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
December 6, 2019
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FOR WRIT
OPINION
“Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar‘s; and unto God the things that are God‘s.”1 The biblical verse captures the inherent conflict long existent between civil and religious authority. We now address an aspect of that conflict raised through the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
Jesus Guerrero sued the Diocese of Lubbock for allegedly defaming and intentionally inflicting emotional distress upon him. The accusations underlying both causes of action concern the Diocese‘s publication of a list entitled “Names of All Clergy with a Credible Allegation of Sexual Abuse of a Minor.” Guerrero, a former deacon with the Diocese, found his name on the list. The Diocese moved to dismiss the action under
Abstention Doctrine and Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only in limited situations. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); In re Talley, No. 07-15-00198-CV, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 6268, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 22, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Its small umbrella, though, extends over jurisdictional disputes. In re Torres, No. 07-19-00220-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6516, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 30, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Alief Vietnamese Alliance, 576 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st. Dist.] 2019, orig. proceeding). Within such disputes lie questions about the effect certain religious liberties have upon a trial court‘s subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Tex. 2007) (stating that a lack of jurisdiction may be raised through a plea to a court‘s jurisdiction when religious-liberty grounds form the basis of the jurisdictional challenge); In re Torres, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6516, at *3. And,
We recognized in In re Torres, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6516, that the doctrine may indeed deprive trial courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate certain civil actions and entitle an ecclesiastical entity to a writ of mandamus. See id. at *6-7. It all depends upon whether the factual circumstances underlying the causes of action fall within the doctrine‘s scope.
Generally speaking, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine bars civil courts from adjudicating matters concerning theology, theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, and compliance with church moral doctrine. Reese v. Gen. Assembly of Faith Cumberland Presbyterian Church in Am., 425 S.W.2d 625, 629 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.). Though easily described, its application and scope are the source of debate. This is so because the doctrine does not necessarily bar civil courts from adjudicating all controversies touching sectarian interests. In re First Christian Methodist Evangelistic Church, No. 05-18-01533-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 8045, at *12 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re St. Thomas High Sch., 495 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding). After all, religious entities, like the coins of Caesar, co-exist within the secular world.
Several years ago, our Texas Supreme Court provided a framework to utilize when parsing through the debate. We were told, in Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Tex., 422 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2013), to apply the neutral principles methodology. Id. at 596; In re Torres, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 6516, at *3 (so acknowledging). It better conforms to a court‘s constitutional duty to decide disputes within their jurisdiction while respecting limitations imposed by those provisions in the
Normally, matters of religion or theology, church discipline, church governance, church membership, and the conformity
The court observed that Westbrook‘s disclosure was grounded in religious doctrine concerning a three-step disciplinary process. Id. at 404. An “integral part” of that doctrine required disclosure to church elders, that is, “to ‘tell it to the church.‘” Id. Furthermore, “[t]he letter itself was disseminated to the congregation as the final step in the process,” that process being “‘[t]hrough their continuing sin, they forfeit their membership in the church, and members of the church are to break fellowship with them.‘” Id. That Westbrook‘s action was founded upon church tenet obligating church members to respond in a particular way to the discovery of a particular act was incremental to the decision by the Supreme Court.
Then, we have Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 18 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied). It involved a missionary trip by Turner undertaken as part of his religious duty. The church ended it early due to Turner purportedly encountering emotional or mental problems. Turner sued the church alleging multiple causes of action including defamation. But since the facts underlying those claims implicated church practice and procedure, most were dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The defamation claim was not, though. It arose from the disclosure of medical records to Turner‘s grandparents. In explaining why it survived, the court initially observed that while “the First Amendment prohibits government regulation of the information a religious organization chooses to record concerning its members, the government may regulate the organization‘s use of that information if the regulation would not actively involve the government in the organization‘s internal affairs, religious practice, or religious doctrine.” Id. at 896. Then, it noted that the church failed to explain how the disclosure of Turner‘s medical records to his grandparents “concern[ed] the internal policies of the Church or matters of faith or ecclesiastical doctrine.” Id. Also absent was any explanation about “how resolution of the claim would actively involve the
The Turner court is not alone in assigning weight to the identity of those told information and their relationship to the church. In Jennison, 391 S.W.3d at 668, the reviewing court held that the facts underlying the claim of defamation concerned discipline imposed by the church upon a priest for inadequate performance. Their adjudication necessarily required inquiry into canon law, the application of church policy, and the church‘s assessment of the complainant‘s fitness to perform his religious duties. Id. Thus, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applied to the claims. Yet, before so holding, the court took care to mention that “[t]he only defamatory statements allegedly made . . . were made to the church itself in connection with the church‘s disciplinary process.” Id. Jennison made “no allegation the allegedly defamatory statements were made in any other forum.” Id. In other words, the injurious act arose from historically ecclesiastical conduct, namely engaging in the internal discipline of clergy, that remained internal.
Similarly, in Patton v. Jones, 212 S.W.3d 541 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet denied), the reviewing court held the abstention doctrine barred the defamation suit Patton commenced against the church and various of its clergy. He was the director of youth ministries and was terminated from the job due to allegedly inappropriate conduct. Id. at 545-46. In holding as it did, the court applied a three-prong test first announced in Heard v. Johnson, 810 A.2d 871 (D.C. App. 2002). Id. at 554-55. Those prongs consisted of whether 1) the claim flowed entirely from an employment dispute between the church and its pastor rendering it impractical to separate the claim from the church‘s decision as to its pastor, 2) the publication was confined within the church, and 3) there existed unusual or egregious circumstances. Id. (quoting Heard, 810 A.2d at 885). Patton‘s claim 1) flowed entirely from an internal employment dispute between the church and its pastor, 2) involved a publication confined within the church, and 3) implicated no unusual or egregious circumstances surrounding the comments. So, as in Jennison, the source of Patton‘s claim emanated from historically ecclesiastical conduct confined within the body having the duty to undertake that conduct. The civil courts were barred for entertaining it.
Kelly v. St. Luke Comm. United Methodist Church, No. 05-16-01171-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 962 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 1, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.), also involved a suit filed by a terminated church employee. So too was the ecclesiastical doctrine the reason why all but one cause of action was dismissed; the one claim retained was that of defamation. Id. at *2
A common thread runs through the authority just cited. A religious body exposing matters historically deemed ecclesiastical to the public eye has consequences. The action leaves the area of deference generally afforded those bodies and enters the civil realm. This is not to say that such a publication alone is always enough, but it is a pivotal nuance. Indeed, arguing that a dispute remains an internal ecclesiastical or church polity issue after that body chooses to expose it publicly rings hollow. And, that is the situation here.
Guerrero‘s claims arise not from the decision of the Diocese to discipline a deacon for engaging in inappropriate sexual activity. That had been done years earlier with its most recent effort having culminated in 2009. Instead, they arise from a decision made some nine to ten years later “to release the names of clergy who have been credibly accused of sexual abuse of a minor.” A list was developed containing those names, and Guerrero‘s name appeared on it. The Diocese not only incorporated the list into a message describing its purpose and inviting those who may have suffered from such abuse to contact the Diocese but also posted it on its website accessible by the general public. The posting occurred on January 31, 2019. The Diocese then accompanied its internet post with a press release. Through the press release dated January 31, 2019, the body announced to local media that it joined other Catholic Dioceses in Texas in “releas[ing] names of clergy who have been credibly accused of sexually abusing
News coverage followed. In one instance, a local television station aired a segment announcing that “four priests . . . and one deacon have credible allegations against them . . . of sexual abuse against children . . . according to the Lubbock Diocese.” (Emphasis added). Guerrero again was mentioned as one of the group. Following that pronouncement were snippets from a chancellor of the Diocese. The snippets included the chancellor 1) explaining that the reason the names were not released “sooner” was “bishops at the time wanted to keep church issues . . . within the church,” 2) saying that “we felt that whatever was handled within the church as far as church punishment was concerned needed to remain in the church,” and 3) revealing that though relevant names initially were disclosed to church members, “they weren‘t made public.” The same church representative also sought to assure that “the church *is* safe for children.”4 (Emphasis added).
Another media outlet reported on the release as well. It alluded to an interview held with the bishop of the Lubbock Diocese several months earlier, in October of 2018. The bishop was quoted as saying in that earlier interview: “[i]t‘s time we need to be honest about these kinds of matters and society hasn‘t always been open and honest about those.” (Emphasis added). He also conceded that the church itself had “maybe done some concealing of such things,” too.
As can be seen, what began years earlier as an exercise in internal church discipline evolved into an effort at transparency broadcast worldwide through the media and internet. Though somewhat confessional in tone, the event was utilized by the Diocese, according to one or more church representatives, as opportunity to address sexual abuse against “children,” help victims of sexual abuse, assuage public concern about the safety of “children” in the church, and criticize both the church and “society” for not “always [being] open and honest about” the topic of sexual abuse.
What we have before us is not an incidental public disclosure of internal church disciplinary matter. Nor was the information leaked to the public via the media by individuals lacking permission to do so. See In re Godwin, 293 S.W.3d 742, 745-46 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, orig. proceeding) (wherein an ex-employee of the church gave a local newspaper the church‘s financial information without permission of the church). Nor did it involve reiteration outside the church of purported statements uttered within church confines, such as in a sermon or message directed to church members. See id. at 746 (where the utterance at issue was made to those attending church services and from the pulpit).5
There is also another bit of nuance distinguishing our situation from the foregoing authority. It is the interjection into the discussion of more than simply the misconduct of those related to the church. The church‘s statements that 1) “our dioceses are serious about ending the cycle of abuse in the Church and in society at large, which has been allowed to exist for decades” and 2) “[i]t‘s time we need to be honest about these kinds of matters and society hasn‘t always been open and honest about those.” (Emphasis added). They reveal 1) an acknowledgement that the issue necessitating attention (i.e., sexual abuse) is more than a church matter but rather one of society at-large, 2) an intent to induce society at-large to address the issue, and 3) an intent to join society at-large in the effort. So, admonishing, inducing, and joining society at-large is telling. Those indicia provide further basis dispelling any nexus between the Diocese‘s conduct and any theological, dogmatic, or doctrinal reason for engaging in it. The same is also true regarding any nexus between the decision to go public and the internal management of the church.
Finally, underlying Guerrero‘s claim of defamation and infliction of emotional distress is more than simply a disagreement about the meaning of a religious term imbedded in canon law, as the Diocese would have us conclude.6 He avers that the church labelled him a “child molester,” given the context of the publication. That context is not the definition of “minor” printed in a retraction posted months later. It is the Diocese using the word “minor” at the same time 1) its chancellor tells the media and public that “the church *is* safe for children” and 2) it represents in a press release that disclosing the names was made “in the context of . . . ongoing work to protect children from sexual abuse.” (Emphasis added). And, the Diocese has not cited us to, nor does it argue that, those of its representatives invoking the word “children” were relying on, at the time, some bit of canon law or theological tenet that includes adults within the category.
Whether one is defamed depends on evaluating not only the statement uttered but also its context or surrounding circumstances based upon how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive it. See Scripps NP Operating, LLC v. Carter, 573 S.W.3d 781, 794-95 (Tex. 2019) (directing the use of context); D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429, 439 (Tex. 2017) (directing consideration of the surrounding circumstances). Canon law is not in play.
What is in play is how a person of ordinary intelligence would perceive the
To quote from Westbrook, “the First Amendment does not necessarily bar all claims that may touch upon religious conduct.” Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 396. Secular courts are not barred from adjudicating all controversies touching sectarian interests. That is the situation here. The Diocese, like the churches in Kliebenstein, Kelly, and Turner, placed the controversy in the realm of Caesar or the secular world by opting to leave the confines of the church. Thus, the secular court in which Guerrero sued is not barred from adjudicating the matter.
We deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice