INQUIRY CONCERNING A JUDGE, JSC Inquiry Nos. 2023-061, 2023-078, 2024-020, 2024-021, 2024-024, 2024-030, 2024-085, 2024-089, 2024-090, 2024-111, 2024-130 IN THE MATTER OF HON. BRENT A. DETSOI, McKinley County Magistrate Court
NO. S-1-SC-40574
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
July 10, 2026
New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission; Phyllis A. Dominguez; Marcus J. Blais; Albuquerque, NM for Petitioner; Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, PA; Jack M. Brant; Charles K. Purcell; Albuquerque, NM; Wiggins, Williams & Wesenberg, PC; Patricia G. Williams; Albuquerque, NM for Respondent
PER CURIAM.
{1} This matter came before the Court on a petition for discipline filed by the Judicial Standards Commission (the Commission). As grounds for recommending the immediate and permanent removal of the Honorable Brent A. Detsoi (Respondent) from his position as a magistrate judge in McKinley County, New Mexico, the Commission determined that Respondent had engaged in willful misconduct in a series of thirteen cases in which he raised the issue of criminal jurisdiction sua sponte at various points in cases, including at arraignment and, after informally confirming the respective defendants’ Indian status, summarily dismissed each of the prosecutions without sufficient or any notice and without a hearing. Testimony elicited at Respondent‘s hearing before the Commission indicated that Respondent had dismissed as many as sixty-three criminal prosecutions under similar circumstances. Respondent continued to dismiss criminal prosecutions despite multiple prior occasions on which he was reversed on appeal or counseled, warned, or admonished about the impropriety of such wholesale dismissals by fellow judges, court staff, and Administrative Office of the Courts personnel.
{2} To counter the Commission‘s recommendation to discipline and remove him from office, Respondent advances two principal contentions. First, Respondent
{3} Second, Respondent challenges the validity of the Commission‘s disciplinary recommendation on the ground that the charges against him are founded on nothing more than accusations of simple legal error, which he asserts “[can]not constitute willful misconduct in office . . . [and are not] a permissible basis upon which to discipline a [j]udge.” As Respondent sees it, reversal on appeal—not a judge‘s discipline or removal—is the appropriate remedy for a judge‘s legal error.
{4} After oral argument, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on Respondent‘s first argument, limited to the following question: “whether the procedure provided by [the Commission] in this proceeding is constitutional under the New Mexico Constitution.” Amended Order, In re Detsoi, S-1-SC-40574 (N.M. Nov. 3, 2025). Upon review of the briefing from the parties, we issued an order granting the Commission‘s petition for discipline and imposing the recommended sanction of removal. Order, In re Detsoi, S-1-SC-40574 (N.M. Feb. 25, 2026). At the Commission‘s request, we now file this opinion to set out the reasoning behind our prior order. Order, In re Detsoi, S-1-SC-40574 (N.M. Apr. 13, 2026).
A. Standard of Review
{5} In deciding whether to discipline a judge, this Court “undertake[s] an independent evaluation of the record to determine whether clear and convincing evidence supports the Commission‘s recommendation, but in so doing, . . . give[s] weight to the evidentiary findings of those who were able to judge credibility.” In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 10, 144 N.M. 617, 190 P.3d 338 (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The meaning of clear and convincing evidence is well established: the evidence “‘instantly tilts the scales in the affirmative when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the fact finder‘s mind is left with an abiding conviction that the evidence is true.‘” Id. (text only)2 (quoting State ex rel. Child., Youth & Fams. Dep‘t v. Joseph M., 2006-NMCA-029, ¶ 15, 139 N.M. 137, 130 P.3d 198). And “[t]here need not be clear and convincing evidence to support each and every one of the Commission‘s evidentiary findings,” so long as there is “clear and convincing evidence that there is willful judicial misconduct which merits discipline.” In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 37, 119 N.M. 140, 889 P.2d 175 (per curiam). “[W]e review conclusions of law and recommendations for discipline de novo.” In re Griego, 2008-NMSC-020, ¶ 7, 143 N.M. 698, 181 P.3d 690 (per curiam). Applying our standard of review to this case, we turn first to Respondent‘s arguments related to the constitutionality of the Commission‘s procedures. Finding no merit in those arguments, we address his argument about the viability of judicial discipline founded on legal error and determine that he is not entitled to relief based on that theory.
B. The Commission Has Wide Discretion Under Article VI, Section 32 of the New Mexico Constitution and as a Matter of Federal Due Process to Decide Whether to Appoint Masters or Hear a Matter Itself Absent Evidence of Unconstitutional Bias
{6} A body of binding and persuasive case law already exists to help navigate the question of whether the procedures followed by the Commission in this disciplinary proceeding pass muster under the New Mexico Constitution. As explained below, this Court has repeatedly recognized the Commission‘s discretionary authority to appoint masters absent evidence of actual or inherent bias under
1. Role of the Commission
{7} From a historical perspective, the Commission was created by constitutional amendment in 1967 for the purpose of “oversee[ing] and investigat[ing] the performance, conduct and fitness of members of the judiciary.” State ex rel. N.M. Jud. Standards Comm‘n v. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, ¶ 2, 134 N.M. 59, 73 P.3d 197 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The provisions of
The commission may, after investigation it deems necessary, order a hearing to be held before it concerning the discipline, removal or retirement of a justice, judge or magistrate, or the commission may appoint three masters who are justices or judges of courts of
record to hear and take evidence in the matter and to report their findings to the commission. After hearing or after considering the record and the findings and report of the masters, if the commission finds good cause, it shall recommend to the supreme court the discipline, removal or retirement of the justice, judge or magistrate.
(Emphasis added.)
{8} The New Mexico Constitution assigns this Court an active—and ultimately dispositive—role in those judicial disciplinary cases in which discipline is recommended. Upon receiving a recommendation for discipline from the Commission, the Court “shall review the record of the proceedings on the law and facts” and order any discipline it deems “just and proper.”
{9}
2. Our precedent supports the Commission‘s discretion to hear disciplinary matters or appoint masters without violating due process
{10} Applying these ground rules, this Court held in In re Rodella that “the decision whether to appoint special masters is left to the discretion of the Commission” and is reviewed for “an abuse of that discretion.” 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8; see also In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 16 (declining to impose limitations on the Commission‘s “flexibility in adopting procedures” for the appointment of masters). The conclusion in In re Rodella came in response to and refuted an argument that
{11} In re Rodella is consistent with In re Castellano, an earlier case from this Court, which rejected arguments that due process was violated when the Commission appointed masters who were also members of the Commission.3 See
{12} Addressing the merits, the In re Castellano Court disagreed that the masters’ participation in multiple stages of the proceedings violated due process. Id. The Court saw “no basis in the record for finding . . . conduct that could be viewed as having predetermined the facts,” even in circumstances where the masters had presided over the respondent judge‘s hearings, issued findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending his removal, and voted with the Commission to recommend his removal by the Court. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15. The Court also disagreed that the Commission had given “disproportionate influence” to its member-judges by
{13} A final aspect of the parallel reasoning of In re Rodella and In re Castellano is noteworthy. In both cases, the Court emphasized the distinct roles assigned to the Commission and the Court under
3. This Court‘s longstanding interpretation of federal due process in the administrative context additionally undercuts Respondent‘s position
{15} Even beyond In re Rodella and In re Castellano, this Court has long adopted the consensus—if not unanimous—view that, as a matter of federal due process, an administrative agency‘s dual role as investigator and adjudicator does not, “in itself,”
{16} Looking to other state court jurisdictions for guidance, there seems to be near unanimity that a judicial disciplinary body‘s combined investigatory and adjudicatory functions do not violate due process. Because these cases are heavily influenced by the United States Supreme Court‘s holding to that effect in Withrow, we summarize Withrow‘s holding and rationale before discussing the uniform out-of-state authorities that cut against Respondent‘s position here.
{17} Similar to the approach taken by Respondent in this case, the physician in Withrow objected to a licensing board‘s dual roles of investigator and adjudicator in overseeing his disciplinary proceeding, arguing the arrangement would violate the physician‘s right to a neutral, detached decisionmaker. See Id. at 38-39, 42. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged that due process requires “a fair trial in a fair tribunal,” including in administrative agencies. Id. at 46 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court also noted circumstances when “the probability of actual bias . . . is too high to be constitutionally tolerable,” such as when a decisionmaker “has a pecuniary interest in the outcome . . . [or] has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him.” Id. at 47 (footnote omitted). But the Court remained unpersuaded that “conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of
{18} In the matter at hand, the Commission cites persuasive authority from other jurisdictions citing and reaching the same conclusion as Withrow, specifically in the context of judicial disciplinary proceedings. See Gentry v. Jud. Conduct Comm‘n, 612 S.W.3d 832, 841 (Ky. 2020) (citing Withrow in concluding that the judge under investigation “offer[ed] no persuasive evidence to overcome the presumption of lack of bias” purportedly resulting from “the combined investigative and adjudicative functions of the [c]ommission“); Adams v. Comm‘n on Jud. Performance, 897 P.2d 544, 550 (Cal. 1995) (en banc) (discussing precedent that relied on Withrow to reject the argument that “the [c]ommission did not provide a neutral forum, because the accusatory, investigatory, and adjudicatory functions were combined so that the adjudicatory process did not comport with generally accepted standards of due process“); In re Zoarski, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (Conn. 1993) (citing Withrow and
{19} Further, in a case cited by neither party, the Alaska Supreme Court explained that as of 1975, twenty-four states, including New Mexico, had adopted procedures allowing “the [c]ommission both to conduct a preliminary investigation and to adjudicate facts and make a recommendation to the supreme court.”5 In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 & n.9 (Alaska 1975). Disagreeing that this “combination of judicial and investigative functions” violated due process “under [either] the federal constitution or Alaska‘s constitution,” the In re Hanson court observed that the “argument has been rejected by all courts which have considered the question.” Id. at 306; see also In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727, 736 (Mich. 1977) (per curiam) (“[T]he authority is legion in support of the proposition that combining the investigative and adjudicative roles in a single agency does not necessarily violate due process in administrative adjudications such as judicial fitness hearings.“). Since
{20} In re Hanson also presaged this Court‘s approach in In re Rodella on two important points. First, in holding that the Alaska commission‘s dual functions “did not result in a biased or partial tribunal,” the Alaska Supreme Court emphasized its own role in the disciplinary process, noting that it has “the ultimate authority in disciplinary matters affecting the judiciary.” In re Hanson, 532 P.2d at 306-07; accord In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 8. Second, the Alaska high court rejected an argument—identical to the one made by Respondent here—that due process was violated by the Alaska commission‘s “option to hear the matter itself or to refer the charges to a master for a hearing.” In re Hanson, 532 P.2d at 307 & n.15. The In re Hanson court found it “untenable” that “the [c]ommission must always appoint a master,” reasoning as follows:
The [c]ommission should have the option of referral to a master where the particular matter requires extensive testimony or specialized fact-finding. On the other hand, where the [c]ommission wishes to handle the matter without appointment of a master, we can discern no legal impediment to proceeding in such a manner.
{21} The rule appears to be unanimous in New Mexico and elsewhere that the Commission‘s combined investigatory and adjudicatory functions do not, of themselves, violate generally accepted standards of due process, including in the many states that employ judicial disciplinary structures and procedures substantially identical to those in use in New Mexico. Effectively conceding as much, Respondent urges this Court to “part company with Withrow” and its progeny by invalidating the Commission‘s procedures through a broadening of the due process provisions of
{22} In undertaking an interstitial analysis6 in support of his state constitutional claim, Respondent invokes two of the three grounds generally relied on to justify a state constitutional departure from federal jurisprudence: first, that “the federal analysis [in Withrow] is flawed,” and second, that “distinctive state characteristics exist that would support the departure.” See State v. Crane, 2014-NMSC-026, ¶ 15, 329 P.3d 689 (citing State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1). As we explain, Respondent misses the mark on both points.
{23} To begin, Respondent likens the situation at bar to that presented to this Court in State v. Martinez, 2021-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 36, 85, 478 P.3d 880, in which we agreed to construe the due process provisions of
{25} As Respondent would have it, ”Reid calls for heightened vigilance against denials of due process in administrative settings,” in contrast to Withrow‘s more permissive approach in entertaining what the United States Supreme Court described therein as a rebuttable “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. Respondent further argues that since Reid was decided, this Court has favored its requirement that there need be “the appearance of complete fairness” in administrative proceedings, Reid, 1979-NMSC-005, ¶ 7, over Withrow‘s above-stated “presumption of honesty and integrity,” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. But the only support Respondent offers for these assertions is Riegger, which held that allowing the Board of Veterinary Medicine‘s recovery
{26} Respondent overstates the holdings in both Reid and Riegger in arguing that they support a higher standard of neutrality in administrative proceedings under
{27} Neither Reid nor Riegger can be read to stray from the core rule articulated in Seidenberg and Withrow that, absent evidence of unconstitutional bias, the combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions in the administrative realm does not violate due process. We thus conclude that neither Reid nor Riegger is imbued with any distinctive state characteristics relevant to this case that would
{28} Having rejected Respondent‘s constitutional challenges to the Commission‘s disciplinary recommendation, we turn next to Respondent‘s alternative argument that even if he committed legal error as alleged—which he steadfastly refuses to concede—his actions did not rise to the level of willful misconduct subject to discipline. As will be shown below, this contention too must fail.
D. The Commission Properly Relied on the Series of Improper Case Dismissals Ordered by Respondent as a Basis for Discipline in This Case
{29} Respondent relies on the committee commentary to the “[i]mpartiality and fairness” requirement of the Code of Judicial Conduct contained in
{30} The Commission, on the other hand, asserts in its petition seeking Respondent‘s removal from office that its disciplinary recommendation is not based on “mere legal mistakes.” Instead, the Commission maintains that Respondent‘s repeated dismissal of cases on jurisdictional grounds at the preliminary arraignment stage of multiple proceedings and without a hearing, “despite repeated guidance from mentors, peers, and higher courts” to refrain from such conduct, “reflects intentional, repeated, and egregious legal error made in bad faith, clearly exceeding the threshold established by this Court and consistent with standards adopted in other jurisdictions.” The Commission goes on to argue that discipline is warranted because
{31} Respondent‘s contention is foreclosed by In re Locatelli, 2007-NMSC-029, ¶ 6, 141 N.M. 755, 161 P.3d 252 (per curiam), a case in which this Court considered the respondent municipal judge‘s analogous argument that legal error presents a “question for the appellate courts” and “should not expose [the respondent] to discipline.” The In re Locatelli Court disagreed, holding that legal error may support discipline when there is clear and convincing evidence that the alleged error amounted to “[w]illful misconduct in office[, which] is improper and wrong conduct of a judge acting in his official capacity done intentionally, knowingly, and, generally, in bad faith.” Id. ¶¶ 7-8 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court clarified, however, that to constitute willful misconduct, the challenged conduct must be “more than a mere error of judgment or an act of negligence.” Id. ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Applying that standard, the In re Locatelli Court rejected the recommendation for discipline based on the Commission‘s findings that the judge had improperly held two lawyers in contempt without a legal or factual basis. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 17. The Court held that the Commission‘s disciplinary recommendation was not supported by clear
{32} The reasoning employed by the In re Locatelli Court, while reaching a different result than that produced here, plainly endorses the Commission‘s ability to recommend discipline based on “improper and wrong conduct,” including legal error, so long as the conduct rises to the level of willful misconduct. Id. ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As this Court made clear in In re Rodella, discipline is often imposed on judges based on their “patterns of behavior,” 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 35 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), a conclusion buttressed by commentators and courts alike. See, e.g., Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Error and Judicial Misconduct: Balancing Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1245, 1263-64 & n.98 (2004) (recognizing
{33} And considering Respondent‘s choice in this case to forego any challenge to the Commission‘s factual findings, we are left with a record that establishes Respondent‘s habitual practice—often at arraignments and without the benefit of a hearing—of “routinely dismiss[ing] matters sua sponte . . . if he [determined that] jurisdictional issues were present on the face of a complaint.” He did this “despite repeated guidance [to the contrary] from mentors, peers, and higher courts.”
{34} We emphasize that, as a general matter, “[t]he burden [is on the] defendant to demonstrate a lack of jurisdiction in the district court.” State v. Cutnose, 1974-NMCA-130, ¶¶ 4-7, 87 N.M. 307, 532 P.2d 896; see also, e.g., State v. Verdugo, 901 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (“The majority of other courts addressing this issue have held that a defendant bears the burden to show facts that would establish an exception to the state court‘s jurisdiction under the Indian Country Crimes Act.“). And such a determination demands an opportunity for the State to
E. Respondent‘s Pattern of Willful Misconduct Was More than Sufficient to Warrant His Removal from Office
{35} Traditionally, this Court has “removed judges from the bench when their conduct threatened the integrity and independence of the judiciary.” In re Rodella, 2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 34, citing, inter alia, In re Castellano, 1995-NMSC-007, ¶ 40 (removing the judge because of a “pattern [of behavior that] adversely affected his reputation for impartiality, independence, and integrity“). The impetus to remove a
In this case, we see a pattern of misconduct that was not corrected, but which increased in its seriousness, despite training and mentoring. In addition, we are deeply troubled by the Commission‘s determination, which our independent review of the record supports, that Judge Rodella‘s testimony lacked credibility. When a new judge, through lack of knowledge, experience or judgment, acts in ways that are inconsistent with [a judge‘s] new role, we hope that such conduct can be corrected through discipline in the form of training, mentoring, and supervision. However, when a judge denies making mistakes, [the judge] cannot learn from the mistakes, and there is little that can be done to correct the behavior. Under such circumstances, to allow a judge who is not truthful to remain on the bench betrays the public trust and threatens the integrity and independence of the judiciary as a whole. . . . [W]e cannot allow a judge who lacks credibility to preside over cases in which he is charged with weighing evidence and determining the credibility of others.
2008-NMSC-050, ¶ 36 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The same rationale applies here.
II. CONCLUSION
{36} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Respondent committed willful misconduct in office and stand by our prior order directing his permanent removal from the bench.
JULIE J. VARGAS, Chief Justice
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice
C. SHANNON BACON, Justice
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice
BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice