{1} The New Mexico Board of Veterinary Medicine (the Board) issued a notice of contemplated action against veterinarian Michael Riegger, alleging violations of the Veterinary Practice Act (VPA), NMSA 1978, §§ 61-14-1 to -20 (1967, as amended through 2005). The Board considered the evidence, determined that Riegger violated several provisions of the VPA, Section 61-14-13(A), and ordered Riegger to fulfill several conditions, including payment of $22,021.83 in costs associated with the disciplinary proceeding. According to the Uniform Licensing Act (ULA), “[l]icensees shall bear all costs of disciplinary proceedings unless they are excused by the board from paying all or part of the fees or if they prevail at the hearing.” NMSA 1978, § 61-1-4(G) (1993). Riegger appealed several issues to the district court, including the assessment of costs. The court found that Section 61-1-4(G) should be read to permit only those costs anticipated by Rule 1-054 NMRA, which governs the recoverable costs in civil cases before district courts. The Board then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which held that Section 61-1-4(G) “costs” are “not limited by the terms of Rule 1-054(D).” Bd. of Veterinary Med. v. Riegger,
{2} Riegger petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, asking us to reverse the Court of Appeals. While we agree with the Court of Appeals that Rule 1-054 provides only guidance to the assessment of costs under Section 61 — 1—4(G), we hold that the Board cannot seek reimbursement of expenses associated with the hiring of the hearing officer, the renting of the hearing room, or the Board members’ per diem and mileage costs, and reverse the Court of Appeals with respect to these costs. We remand the case to the district court to reconsider the assessment of costs in accordance with this Opinion.
I. FACTS
{3} On August 9, 1999, Ms. Tea Schiano hired Riegger to provide veterinary care for her horse, Eagle. Riegger suggested Eagle undergo surgery to repair a urethral abnormality. After the October 1, 1999, surgery, Eagle developed myositis (muscle inflammation), and was suffering, unable to stand. Due to Eagle’s condition, Riegger recommended that Eagle be euthanized, and Schiano directed Riegger to euthanize Eagle the morning after the surgery. As a result of Eagle’s death, Schiano filed a complaint with the Board against Riegger.
{4} The Board issued a notice of contemplated action on August 15, 2001, and an amended notice on July 31, 2002. The amended notice alleged that Riegger committed four violations of the VPA, Section 61-14-13(A). Hearing Officer G.T.S. Khalsa conducted a hearing from September 9 to 13, 2002. Khalsa found Riegger’s actions violated only certain provisions of Section 61-14-13(A) and submitted his recommendations to the Board on October 1, 2002.
{5} On November 11, 2002, the Board issued its decision, adopting only some of Khalsa’s recommendations. The Board concluded that Riegger violated three subsections of Section 61-14-13(A) and placed Riegger
{6} The Board submitted an itemized list of costs totaling $21,535.91. The costs included hearing transcription costs, the Board’s expert witness Dr. Elizabeth Martinez’s fees, Hearing Officer Khalsa’s fees, and the per diem expenses of the Board members. Riegger contested the transcription, expert witness, hearing officer, and per diem costs as unauthorized by Rule 1-054. The Board responded that Section 61-1-4(G) authorized it to collect “all costs of disciplinary proceedings” from Riegger and provided a new total of $22,210.91 as the cost of Riegger’s disciplinary proceeding. The district court issued a December 16, 2004, order, finding the Board’s assessment of fees was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law, and allowed the Board to recover only $1,669.11 worth of costs.
{7} The Board submitted a motion for reconsideration, asking the district court to reconsider its decision regarding costs, and argued that Rule 1-054 did not apply, that Section 61-1-4(G) specifically provides for the recovery of all disciplinary proceeding costs, and that, consequently, the Board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. In its motion, the Board, for the first time, explained in detail how the costs of Hearing Officer Khalsa, expert witness Dr. Martinez, deposition and hearing transcription, and hearing venue related to the disciplinary proceeding, included various invoices and bills related to these costs, and submitted a new total of $20,255.17 in disciplinary proceeding costs. In his response, Riegger reiterated that Section 61-1-4(G) costs should be read with Rule 1-054. Riegger averred that the Board should not recover Khalsa’s costs because a hearing officer is used at the election of the board, see NMSA 1978, § 61-1~7(A) (1993), and that elective costs should not be passed along to him. Riegger utilized an elective cost argument with regard to the hearing venue and the hearing transcription costs, see NMSA 1978, § 61-1-12 (1981) (giving the Board discretion to record proceedings through transcription or tape recording). Riegger asserted the expert Dr. Martinez’s costs could not be recovered because her testimony was cumulative of another expert’s testimony, who donated his services to the Board. Riegger also challenged the Board’s contention that the Board’s per diem and mileage could be recovered because Section 61-14^1(E) requires these costs “be paid exclusively from fees received pursuant to the provisions of the [VPA].” Riegger agreed that he was responsible for the deposition costs for another expert in the amount of $253.95.
{8} The district court issued a memorandum opinion on February 21, 2005. Acknowledging no New Mexico cases have addressed the issue of Section 61-1-4(G) disciplinary proceeding costs, the district court looked to Gilman v. Nevada State Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners,
{9} The Board petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of certiorari concerning the district court’s order.
1
See Riegger,
{10} Riegger filed a petition for certiorari with this Court on May 10, 2006, which this Court granted on June 14, 2006. See Bd. of Veterinary Medicine v. Riegger,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{11} In this case of first impression, we must determine what the Legislature
III. RULE 1-054 AND OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS PROVIDE GUIDANCE IN THE DETERMINATION OF COSTS RECOVERABLE UNDER SECTION 61-1-4(G)
{12} Riegger claims that “all costs” in Section 61-1-4(G) is a term of art that must be read in conjunction with Rule 1-054, which explains which costs are generally recoverable by prevailing parties in civil cases. Riegger concludes that this reading provides uniformity between statutes and alerts licensees to the full potential costs of a disciplinary proceeding. The Board contends that the language in Section 61-1^4(G) is clear as written: “all costs” means all costs associated with the disciplinary proceeding. The Board avers that this does not give the Board unfettered discretion in seeking reimbursement because the district court can review the costs assessment to assure that the Board did not act fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously; that the decision was supported by substantial evidence; and that the agency acted in accordance with law. See § 39-3-1.1(D). We conclude that Rule 1-054 provides guidance in the determination of which disciplinary proceeding costs licensees shall bear if they do not prevail at a hearing under the ULA.
{13} According to Section 61-1-4(G), “[(licensees shall bear all costs of disciplinary proceedings unless they are excused by the board from paying all or part of the fees or if they prevail at the hearing.” (Emphasis added.) The Legislature failed to define “costs” for the purposes of the ULA. Thus, we apply the “ ‘fundamental rule of statutory construction ... that all provisions of a statute, together with other statutes in pari materia, must be read together to ascertain the legislative intent.’ ” Wilson v. Denver,
(a) filing fees;
(b) fees for service of summonses, subpoenas, writs and other service of process;
(c) jury fees as provided in Rule 1-038 NMRA;
(d) transcript fees including those for daily transcripts and transcripts of hearings pri- or or subsequent to trial, when requested or approved by the court;
(e) the cost of a deposition if any part is used at trial or in successful support or defense of a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 1-056 NMRA;
(f) witness mileage or travel fare and per diem expenses, when the witness testifies at trial or at a deposition which is deemed reasonable and necessary, and as limited by Sections 38-6-4(A), 39-2-8, 39-2-9 and 39-2-10 NMSA 1978;
(g) expert witness fees for services as limited by Section 38-6-4(B) NMSA 1978;
(h) translator fees, when the translated document is admitted into evidence;
(i) reasonable expenses involved in the production of exhibits which are admitted into evidence;
(j) official certification fees for documents admitted into evidence; and
(k) interpreter fees for judicial proceedings and depositions.
Unless exonerated by the board, persons who have been subjected to formal disciplinary sanctions by the board shall be responsible for the payment of costs of the disciplinary proceedings, which include costs for:
(1) court reporters;
(2) transcripts;
(3) certification or notarization;
(4) photocopies;
(5) witness attendance and mileage fees;
(6) postage for mailings required by law;
(7) expert witnesses; and
(8) depositions.
(Emphasis added.) While several other articles in Chapter 61 provide that a disciplined licensee will be responsible for the costs of their disciplinary proceedings only the Thanatopractice Act contains a list of recoverable costs. See NMSA 1978, §§ 61-1-3.2(B) (2003) (ULA), -3-28(F) (2003) (Nursing Practice Act), -4-10(D) (2006) (Chiropractic Physician Practice Act), -5A-21(C) (2003) (Dental Health Care Act), -12C-24(E) (1999) (Massage Therapy Practice Act), -14A-17(D) (1997) (Acupuncture and Oriental Medicine Practice Act), -15-12(F) (1999) (Architectural Act), -24C-12(F) (2007) (Interior Designers Act), -28B-20(D) (2007) (1999 Public Accountancy Act), -29-17.2 (2001) (Real Estate Brokers and Salespersons), -30-22(C) (2003) (Real Estate Appraisers Act). Therefore, Section 61-32-24(F) of the Thanatopractice Act provides guidance to all professional boards imposing disciplinary proceeding costs as provided for by Section 61-1-4(G) of the ULA.
{14} This Court took similar steps in a different ease, looking to other statutory provisions when the Legislature failed to define residency for the purposes of the venue statute, NMSA 1978, Section 38-3-l(A) (1988). See Sunwest Bank of Albuquerque, N.M v. Nelson,
{15} The Court of Appeals was unpersuaded that Rule 1-054 applied directly or indirectly to Section 61-1-4(G) because the statute did not explicitly reference the rules of civil procedure. Riegger,
{16} We also point to the inconsistent positions the Court of Appeals took with respect to Rule 1-054. While holding that Rule 1-054 did not apply directly or indirectly to this case, the Court acknowledged that Rule 1-054 can provide the district court guidance when “reviewing an agency’s cost assessment to determine whether the agency acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously, without substantial evidence, or contrary to law.” Riegger,
{17} We also advise administrative boards to develop a record of costs during or at the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. In this case, from November 22, 2002, to December 16, 2004, the Board provided four different totals of disciplinary proceeding costs to be paid by Riegger: $22,021.83, $21,535.91, $22,210.91, and $20,255.17, respectively. Additionally, the Board did not explain how the costs related to Riegger’s disciplinary proceeding until it submitted a motion for reconsideration to the district court. Under these facts, we agree with the district court that the Board’s assessment of costs was arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law until the Board submitted its motion for reconsideration. Had the Board provided this information during Riegger’s proceeding, the Board might have been able to avoid this challenge to its cost assessment.
{18} Our holding, that Rule 1-054 and Section 61-32-24(F) provide guidance in the assessment of costs under Section 61-1-4(G), is supported by cases from other jurisdictions. In In re Wang, a Minnesota administrative board suspended a doctor’s license, but stayed the suspension after sixty days on the condition that the doctor fulfill certain requirements, including payment of $35,000 worth of costs associated with a disciplinary proceeding.
{19} The Court of Appeals distinguished In re Wang and Gilman and relied instead on the Colorado Court of Appeals case of Sears v. Romer,
{20} In conclusion, to the extent that the Court of Appeals concluded that Rule 1-054 plays no indirect role in determining costs, we reverse. To the contrary, Rule 1-054 and Section 61-32-24(F) provide guidance to New Mexico’s administrative boards operating under ULA provisions and our district courts, and they should presume that any costs listed in Rule 1-054 and Section 61-32-24(F) are costs which may be assessed to disciplined licensees. Costs not included in the provisions should be reviewed to determine whether the board acted fraudulently, arbitrarily or capriciously; whether the cost assessment was not supported by substantial evidence; or whether the board did not act in accordance with law. See § 39-3-1.1(D). We now turn to the individual costs the Board assessed to Riegger.
IV. COSTS RECOVERABLE UNDER SECTION 61-1-4(G)
A. HEARING TRANSCRIPTION COSTS
{21} Riegger averred that the Board erred in requiring repayment of the transcription costs of the hearing before Hearing Officer Khalsa. Riegger claims that the Board opted to employ a stenographer instead of making a tape recording of the proceedings, and that he should not be responsible for costs the Board elected to incur. The Board contends that Section 61-1-12 authorizes it to make a stenographic transcript and thus is a recoverable cost. We agree with the Board that the transcription costs are recoverable.
{22} Section 61-1-12 states, “[t]he [hearing] record shall be preserved by any stenographic method in use in the district courts of this state, or in the discretion of the board, by tape recording.” The Legislature has clearly stated that a stenographic record will be made, and gives the Board the discretion to choose to tape record the proceedings instead. See NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-4(A) (1997) (“ ‘Shall’ ... expresses] a duty, obligation, requirement or condition precedent.”). Additionally, Rule l-054(D)(2)(d) and Section 61-32-24(F)(2) explicitly permit the Board to recover transcription costs. Consequently, on remand, the district court should presume that the Board can assess these transcription costs against Riegger.
B. EXPERT WITNESS COSTS
{23} The Board assessed the cost associated with its expert witness, Dr. Elizabeth Martinez, to Riegger. The district court ruled this cost was not authorized by Rule 1-054(D)(2) because it viewed Dr. Martinez’s testimony as cumulative of another expert witness who volunteered his services to the Board. Riegger,
{24} We begin by looking to Rule 1-054(D)(2)(g) and Section 61-32-24(F)(7), which both permit recovery of expert witness costs. Rule l-054(D)(2)(g) references a different statute, which states: “The expert witness fee which may be allowed by the court shall be limited to one expert regarding liability and one expert regarding damages unless the court finds that additional expert testimony was reasonably necessary to the prevailing party and the expert testimony was not cumulative.” NMSA 1978, § 38-6-4(B) (1983). In this case, the Board had two witnesses, but only sought recovery of Dr. Martinez’s costs. Under the plain language of Rule 1-054 and Section 61-32-24(F), the Board is entitled to recover the cost of at least one expert witness as the prevailing party, thereby permitting recovery of Dr. Martinez’s costs.
{25} The district court found that Dr. Martinez’s testimony was cumulative of the
V. THE BOARD MAY NOT RECOVER THE COSTS OF THE HEARING OFFICER OR HEARING VENUE WITHOUT VIOLATING RIEGGER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
{26} We now turn to costs not explicitly listed in Rule 1-054 or Section 61-32-24(F). The Board sought recovery of Hearing Officer Khalsa’s costs and the cost of the hearing room. The district court reversed the Board’s finding that the costs were not permitted under Rule 1-054. The court deemed that imposition of the hearing officer’s costs would implicate Riegger’s due process rights and, quoting In re Wang,
{27} We review questions of constitutional law and constitutional rights, such as due process protections, de novo. State v. DeGraff,
The inquiry is not whether the Board members are actually biased or prejudiced, but whether, in the natural course of events, there is an indication of a possible temptation to an average [person] sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for or against any issue presented to him [or her].
Id. Furthermore, these due process protections apply to administrative proceedings. Id.
{28} In this case, Riegger contends that the Board, sitting as prosecutor and finder of fact, has an incentive to sanction every veterinarian in order to recover disciplinary hearing costs. The Board states that on remand, it has evidence to show that the costs assessed against Riegger are substantially less than its reserves, and that this overcomes any appearance of bias. In spite of the Board’s claims, we hold that imposition of the costs of the hearing officer and the hearing venue violate due process because both relate directly to a fair and impartial hearing. 3
{30} No party has alleged that Hearing Officer Khalsa was biased against Riegger, and our review of the record demonstrates that Khalsa was unbiased. However, we must determine whether there is “an indication of a possible temptation to an average [person] sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for or against any issue presented to him [or her].” Reid,
{31} Furthermore, we assume the hearing officer and hearing venue costs in administrative proceedings are to be treated like attorney fees in civil proceedings. “Generally, absent statutory or other authority, each party is responsible for them own attorney fees.” ACLU v. City of Albuquerque,
{32} As a result, the Board cannot recover the costs associated with the hearing officer or hearing venue without violating due process protections. On remand, the district court may not assess these costs to Riegger.
VI. THE BOARD’S PER DIEM AND MILEAGE COSTS ARE NOT ASSESSABLE TO RIEGGER BECAUSE THESE COSTS ARE PROVIDED FOR EXCLUSIVELY BY SECTION 61-14-4(E)
{33} The Board required Riegger to reimburse its members for per diem and mileage costs associated with his hearing. Riegger argues this is improper under the VPA, Section 61-14-4(E), which states that “[mjembers of the board shall receive per diem and mileage as provided in the Per Diem and Mileage Act____ This reimbursement ... shall be paid exclusively from fees received pursuant to provisions of the [VPA].” Because the Board’s per diem and mileage must come exclusively from fees paid by its licensees, Riegger claims reimbursement is improper. The Board asserts that Section 61-14-4(E) does not directly apply because disciplinary proceedings are unanticipated meetings more appropriately charged
{34} In his partial dissent, Judge Kennedy noted that Section 61-14-4(E) explicitly provides that the Board shall receive per diem and mileage paid exclusively from fees paid by its licensed veterinarians. Riegger,
[b]eeause the Board’s functions are funded by fees defined by statute, turning “costs” into “fees” under the ULA should not control the more specific provisions of VPA Section 61-14-5(0) that authorizes only license and permit fees, and Section 61-14-4(E) that says Board members pursuing their duties are paid per diem from those fees received from all licensees.
Riegger,
VII. CONCLUSION
{35} Riegger urges that “costs” assessed to disciplined licensees under the ULA, Section 61-1^4(G), should be limited to the costs recoverable in civil litigation under Rule 1-054. While we conclude that Rule 1-054 and Section 61-32-24(F) provide guidance to the Board in assessing costs, these provisions are not determinative of Section 61-1-4(G) costs recoverable from disciplined licensees. Costs listed in Rule 1-054 and Section 61-32-24(F) are presumed assessable to Riegger, and other costs are to reviewed under the standard set forth in Section 39-3-1.1(D). Consequently, the transcription and expert witness costs are assessable costs under Section 61-1-4(G). However, the Board cannot recover the hearing officer and hearing venue costs because this would violate Riegger’s due process rights. The Board members’ per diem and mileage is provided for exclusively by Section 61-14-4(E), and consequently, cannot be assessed to Riegger. As a result, we affirm in part and reverse in part the Court of Appeals, and remand to the district court for reassessment of costs in accordance with this Opinion.
{36} IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Court of Appeals also held that the Board "cannot sanction its licensees for acts of ordinary negligence arising out of a single episode of care under NMSA 1978, § 61-14-13(A)(5).” Riegger,
. The Thanatopractice Act governs the handling and care of the recently deceased in funeral homes and is intended to protect the interests of the survivors and the general public. Section 61-32-2.
. Riegger urged the Court to apply this procedural due process argument to resolve the applicability of Rule 1-054 to Section 61 — 1—4(G). Our holding that Rule 1-054 provides guidance but is not conclusive of costs recoverable under Section 61 — 1—4(G), however, is based on statutory interpretation of the statute. Therefore we restrict discussion of this argument to the issues of the hearing officer and hearing venue costs.