IN RE DEALER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ANTITRUST LITIGATION
No. 18 C864
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION
June 29, 2023
Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer
MDL 2817; This dоcument relates to: CDK‘s Counterclaims against Dealers
CDK, a business that sells a Dealership Management System (“DMS“) to car dealerships, has been sued by a number of those dealerships for alleged anticompetitive conduct. Those actions are consolidated before this court and have generated a number of rulings. This opinion addresses two remaining counterclaims brought by CDK against a putative class of car dealerships (“Dealership Counter-Defendants” or “Dealers“) [522]. First, CDK alleges that all the Dealers breached their contracts with CDK by allowing independent data integrators to access CDK‘s DMS without authorization. Second, CDK alleges that two groups of dealerships, referred to as the “Continental” and the “Warrensburg” Counter-Defendants, have violated Section 1201(a) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA“),
BACKGROUND
I. Parties
A. CDK
Counter-Plaintiff CDK provides DMS software and services to car dealerships across the United States. (Dealership Counter-Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. on CDK‘s Counterclaims (“PSUF“) [968] ¶ 1.) A DMS is a complex enterprise
B. Authenticom
Non-party Authenticom is an independent data integrator, or, as CDK refers to such actors, a “hostile integrator.” The Dealers have allowed third-party integrators including Authenticom to extract their data from CDK‘s DMS. Authenticom reorganizes the extracted data and sells it to vendors, who use the datа for other commercial purposes, including making apps that dealerships use to market and advertise their cars and maintain contact with vehicle owners. Unlike the Dealers, Authenticom is not a paying licensee of CDK‘s DMS software.
C. Dealership Counter-Defendants
The Dealership Counter-Defendants are 17 automotive dealerships located in Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, and New York. (Id. ¶ 2.) CDK brings specific claims against two subsets of Dealership Counter-Defendants. CDK uses the term “Continental Counter-Defendants” to collectively refer to a group of eight individually-owned dealerships.1 CDK uses the term “Warrensburg Counter-Defendants” to collectively refer to a group of three jointly-owned dealerships located in or near Warrensburg, Missouri.2
II. Relevant Facts for Breach-of-Contract Counterclaim
Each Dealership Counter-Defendant is party to a “Master Service Agreement” (“MSA“) with CDK. (Id. ¶ 5.) By their terms, the MSAs restrict unauthorized third-party access tо CDK‘s
Since the 1990s, CDK‘s standard MSA has prohibited dealers from issuing login credentials to unauthorized third parties. (PSUF ¶ 26; PSUFR ¶ 26.) CDK‘s enforcement of those provisions has evolved over time. Historically, CDK was lenient regarding “dealer-permissioned” access to its DMS; beginning in or about 2010, however, CDK became more concerned about system security, and it sought to strengthen its system security by strictly enforcing limitations on third-party access from then on. (PSUF ¶¶ 28-31; PSUFR ¶¶ 28-31, 32.) Those limitations are the basis for CDK‘s counterclaims: CDK alleges that the Dealers breached their contractual obligations by providing login credentials to Authenticom and other third parties, thus enabling those third parties to access CDK‘s DMS withоut CDK‘s authorization. (Countercl. ¶ 136.) CDK further alleges that this conduct has damaged CDK by (a) depriving CDK of revenue it could otherwise collect by charging the third parties for access, (b) causing CDK to incur costs for investigating third-party access and attempting to stop it, and (c) “degrading CDK‘s DMS system and corrupting the data thereon.” (Id. ¶ 137.)
The Dealers do not dispute that they did in the past permit third parties to access the data they stored on CDK‘s DMS. However, there is no evidence in the record that the Dealers continue to do so. The only record evidence relating to the issue of ongoing violations are CDK Dealer Data Exchange Non-Authorized Access Reports, which, because they are blank, show that CDK has in fact detected no access by any suspected unauthorized third-party on the Dealers’ servers as of spring 2020. (PSUF ¶¶ 10-25; PSUFR ¶¶ 10-25.)
Despite the absence of specific evidence of unauthorized third-party access, CDK insists it has been damaged. To date, however, CDK has not quantified damages it claims to have suffered as a result of past access. CDK asserted on several occasions that it would present
III. Relevant Facts for DMCA Counterclaim3
In 2017, CDK implemented access controls to enhance data security and ward off threats to system performance and data corruption. (PSUFR ¶ 43.) These access controls included using CAPTCHA prompts4 and disabling accounts that CDK suspected were being used for automated third-party access. (PSUF ¶ 43; PSUFR ¶ 43.)
A. Continental Counter-Defendants
The Continental Counter-Defendants are eight individually-owned dealerships. Each Continental dealership is a paying licensee of CDK‘s DMS software; CDK bills each dealership
CDK alleges that the Continental Counter-Defendants are secondarily liable for a claim it has brought against Authenticom, a party that has since settled with CDK. CDK alleges that Authenticom unlawfully circumvented CDK‘s CAPTCHA prompts and that the Continental Counter-Defendants materially contributed to that circumvention. (Countercl. ¶¶ 147-58.) In an effort to prevent unauthorized access to its DMS, CDK created a CATPCHA prompt that a user must respond to when logging into the DMS:
Only dealer personnel are authorized to use the CDK Global DMS. Use or access by unauthorized third parties is strictly prohibited and is in violation of the terms on which CDK licenses its software and services. Machine/automated access, access via the use of non CDK software or issuing of user names and passwords for third party use is considered non-authorized access. Those using this system without authorization will be denied access and may be subject to legal action.
(DSOAFR ¶ 48.) CDK alleges that Authenticom circumvented its CAPTCHA control by entering the system even after being presented with the above prompt; CDK further asserts that the Continental Counter-Defendants induced Authenticom to circumvent this CAPTCHA control when the Continental Dealers’ IT Director, Mark Johnson, continued to provide Authenticom login credentials even after CDK implemented the CAPTCHA prompt.5 (DSOAF ¶ 96.)
CDK hired Edward M. Stroz, a cybersecurity expert, to opine on the nature of CDK‘s technological access controls and the extent of the Counter-Defendants’ purported violations. Assuming that Authenticom‘s purported CAPTCHA circumventions qualify as DMCA violations аnd that the Continental Counter-Defendants are secondarily liable for those violations, Mr. Stroz
B. Warrensburg Counter-Defendants
The Warrensburg Counter-Defendants are separately incorporated entities. (DSOAFR ¶ 99.) They share common ownership (Cliff Harris), a common controller (Linda Smith), and common general managers (Adam Harris and Shawn Jeffrey). (DSOAF ¶ 99; DSOAFR ¶ 99.) CDK entered into separate contracts for DMS services with each Warrensburg dealership, though the dealerships also share a common DMS server. (PSUFR ¶ 41.) Each of the Warrensburg Counter-Defendants is a pаying licensee of CDK‘s DMS software, and CDK bills each dealership separately for DMS access. (PSUF ¶ 39.) The Dealers are authorized and able to use CDK‘s DMS to create new login credentials to access the DMS system. (See id. ¶ 60.)
On August 23, 2016, Smith received an email in which Authenticom reported that CDK had invalidated a profile that Authenticom had used to access the DMS; Authenticom requested that Smith create a new profile with the same access controls as the disabled one. (DSOAF ¶ 101.) The invalidated profile was an “elead” profile, meaning simply that the profile had “elead” in its name. (See id.) CDK has come to associate “elead” profiles with Authenticom based on those accounts’ usage patterns. (Countercl. ¶ 112.) On March 3, 2017, Lisa Johnston, a technical services representative at Authenticom, sent Smith an email with the subject line “Disabled Profile - Marshall Chrysler - DSS 1384.” (DSOAF ¶ 102.) Johnston wrote that CDK had disabled the
The tool Johnston referred to is called “Profile Manager,” which is a comрuter script developed by Authenticom that “runs” or “launches” by logging into CDK‘s DMS using a preexisting dealership DMS user account that has administrative permissions. (PSUF ¶ 59.) As explained in Mr. Stroz‘s report, administrator-level accounts on the CDK DMS have “the broadest access and use permissions,” allowing them to create and set the access level permissions for other accounts. (Ex. DDD (Stroz Rep.) to Wedgworth Decl. [968-1] at 16.) According to that same report, administrator-level accounts are “usually reserved for individuals at the dealership with IT and/or network security responsibilities.” (Id.) The Profile Manager program developed by Authenticom is an automated process for re-enabling login credentials that CDK has disabled.7 (PSUF ¶ 59; PSUFR ¶ 59.) Authenticom also developed a scheduler function that prompted
In 2016 and 2017, Warrensburg controller Linda Smith received four emails from CDK stating that CDK had detected unauthorized access on the Warrensburg server. (DSOAF ¶ 100.) The first three emails predate the email exchange between Smith and Johnston and thus do not concern Profile Manager; they are dated July 6, August 22, and November 18, 2016. (Id.) The fourth notice also does not directly relate to Profile Manager: it is dated June 13, 2017 and therefore postdates the patch that rendered Profile Manager ineffective. (Id.)
Mr. Stroz, CDK‘s cybersecurity expert, did not identify or quantify any violations by аny individual Warrensburg Counter-Defendant. (PSUF ¶ 41; PSUFR ¶ 41.) His opinion is not based on login data coming from each Warrensburg dealership. Instead, he calculates the number of times Profile Manager re-enabled the Warrensburg Counter-Defendants’ user accounts by reference to (i) the number of dates between March 20 and April 24, 2017 in which Profile Manager was running on an (unspecified) Warrensburg Counter-Defendant‘s account and (ii) his assumption that Profile Manager successfully re-enabled one disabled user account per day per dealer group.8 (PSUF ¶ 63.) Based on this calculation, Mr. Stroz attributes 36 re-enablements to the dealership group. As for damages, Professor Rubinfeld calculated statutory damages, but not actual damages, resulting from the Warrensburg Counter-Defendants’ alleged DMCA violations. (PSUF ¶ 58; PSUFR ¶ 58.)
The Dealers moved to dismiss CDK‘s counterclaims, and on September 3, 2019, Judge Dow granted that motion in part. The сourt dismissed CDK‘s counterclaim arising under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
On May 20, 2020, the Dealers moved for summary judgment on those counterclaims [963], raising several complementary and alternative arguments. (See generally Dealership Counter-Defs.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. on CDK Countercl. (“Dealers’ Br.“) [965].)
Regarding CDK‘s breach-of-contract claim, the Dealers argue that CDK is entitled to no relief because it has no evidence of actual damages, an essential element of its claim. (Dealers’ Br. at 11-22.) Even if CDK could show damages, the Dealers contend, CDK is not entitled to injunctive relief. (Id. at 16-22.) The Dealers further argue that, alternatively, they are entitled to summary judgment on CDK‘s breach-of-contract counterclaim under the doctrines of waiver and unclean hands. (Id. at 22-32.)
Regаrding CDK‘s DMCA counterclaim, the Dealers argue that CDK cannot establish the basic elements of that claim because (1) CDK‘s software is not entitled to protection under the Copyright Act, (2) the Counter-Defendants (and data integrators) did not “circumvent” CDK‘s technological measures, and (3) CDK‘s technology did not “effectively control” access to CDK‘s software. (Id. at 33 (incorporating by reference Authenticom‘s Mem. in Supp. of its Mot. for Summ. J. on Defs.’ Countercl. [978] at 41-55).) The Dealers further argue that they cannot be held liable under the DMCA because the purpose of that statute is to protect copyrighted works from piracy, and any purported circumvention did not threaten CDK‘s copyright interests. (Dealers’ Br. at 34-53.) As an alternative basis for summary judgment, the Dealers argue that CDK‘s claim fails because CDK has not proffered any evidence of DMCA violations by any individual Counter-Defendant. (Id. at 53-56.) Furthermоre, the Dealers argue, the record cannot
In the time since the parties submitted their summary judgment briefing, the court ruled on their Daubert motions. In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 581 F. Supp. 3d 1029 (N.D. Ill. 2022). In that ruling, the court deemed admissible the report of CDK‘s cybersecurity expert, Mr. Stroz. Id. at 1088. The court noted, however, that Mr. Stroz‘s report supported damages only at the dealership-group level, and the court declined to rule on the Dealers’ argument that the DMCA does not permit joint and several liability. See id. at 1094. In supplemental briefing, the parties informed the court of their shared understanding that the Daubert rulings would not affect the court‘s summary judgment rulings [1327, 1333]. In that same briefing, the Dealership Counter-Defendants again emphasized their argument that the DMCA does not permit joint and several liability for DMCA statutory damages, the issue on which Judge Dow had reserved ruling.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
A party opposing summary judgment must go beyond the pleadings and “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250. The nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party‘s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Ellis v. CCA of Tennessee LLC, 650 F.3d 640, 646 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).
II. Breach-of-Contract Counterclaim
CDK brings a breach-of-contract claim against all Dealership Counter-Defendants, asserting that the Dealers have breached obligations under their MSAs “by providing login credentials to Authenticom and other third parties to enable those third parties to hostilely access CDK‘s DMS.” (Countercl. ¶ 136.) As noted above, CDK switched course during discovery, choosing not to calculate actual damages but instead to pursue declaratory and injunctive relief and/or nominal damages. (PSUMF ¶ 7.) Significantly, in its brief opposing summary judgment CDK stated that “the record shows CDK did suffer monetary harm from Counter-Defendants’ conduct, even if CDK is not pursuing a damages remedy . . . CDK has elected not to seek those damages at trial because CDK did not think it worthwhile to pursue the expensive expert analysis needed to quantify those damages. . . .” (CDK Global, LLC‘s Opp. to the Dealership Counter-Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“CDK‘s Opp.“) [1057] at 6 (emphasis omitted).) Dealership Counter-Defendants argue that, because CDK has not even attempted to provide a reasonable basis for calculating damages, its breach-of-contract counterclaim cannot survive summary judgment.
The Dealers’ focus on this motion is a narrow one: they challenge CDK‘s claim for damages, reasoning that the “damages” element for breach of contract requires a showing of actual damages, which CDK alleged but chose not to calculate. See TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co. (“TAS“), 491 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Merely showing that a contract has been breached without demonstrating actual damage does not suffice, under Illinois law, to state a claim for breach of contract.“). CDK responds that Illinois law does not require a showing of actual damage to establish a prima facie case, but rather requires a “resultant injury to the plaintiff,” Avila v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 801 F.3d 777, 786 (7th Cir. 2015), and, under New Jersey law, “proof of actual damages is not necessary to survive summary judgment on a breach of contract claim.” Interlink Grp. Corp. USA v. Am. Trade & Fin. Corp., No. 12-6179 (JBC), 2014 WL 3578748, at *7 (D.N.J. July 18, 2014) (quoting Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 97 N.J. 37, 45-46, 477 A.2d 1224, 1228 (1984)).
The trouble with CDK‘s position, as discussed in greater detail below, is that the kinds of remedies it seeks (nominal damages, declaratory relief, and an injunction) are available only when money damages are difficult to calculate or are inadequate to remedy the harm identified in the complaint. In this case, CDK‘s breаch-of-contract counterclaim alleges pecuniary loss, which
A. Nominal Damages
Nominal damages are appropriate where a plaintiff has been injured but is unable to calculate damages within a reasonable degree of certainty. See TAS, 491 F.3d at 632. CDK cites no case in which a plaintiff affirmatively casts aside its burden to prove actual damages—let alone a case where a plaintiff chose not to calculate damages after representing for several months that an expert report on the matter is on the way, as CDK has done here. Cf. Hentze v. Unverfehrt, 237 Ill. App. 3d 606, 612, 604 N.E.2d 536, 640 (5th Dist. 1992) (awarding nominal damages only after finding that “[t]he calсulation given cannot reasonably be broken down” to establish lost profits without “pure speculation and conjecture“); Jones v. Rempert, 2012 IL App (2d) 110208-U, ¶¶ 12, 24 (awarding nominal damages after “[b]oth parties elicited expert testimony from certified public accountants“).9
CDK insists that nominal damages are available as a standalone remedy for its counterclaim under New Jersey law, but that is not so. In Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, on which CDK relies, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated: “The general rule is that whenever there is a breach of contract . . . the law ordinarily infers that damage ensued, and, in the absence of actual damages, the law vindicates the right by awarding nominal damages.” 97 N.J. 37, 46, 477 A.2d 1224, 1228 (1984). The New Jersey Supreme Court has since clarified that “if compensatory damages are otherwise available to the plaintiff, nominal damages are not to be awarded.” Graphnet, Inc. v. Retarus, Inc., 250 N.J. 24, 38, 269 A.3d 413, 422 (2022) (internal
B. Declaratory Relief
Declaratory relief is not a typical remedy for breach of contract, and CDK has cited no authority in which a court has issued declaratory relief as a remedy for such a claim.11 CDK urges that declaratory relief is appropriate here because “a key purpose of declaratory relief is to authorize judgments in cases where there are no quantifiable damages.” (CDK‘s Opp. at 14 (citing Central Brown Cnty. Water Auth. v. Consoer, Townsend, Envirodyne, No. 09-C-0131, 2013 WL 501419, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 11, 2013)).) But, again, CDK represents that the Dealers’ alleged breaches did lead to quantifiable damages—CDK simply chose not to calculate them. (CDK‘s Opp. at 6 n.3.) This court has “unique and substantiаl discretion to abstain from hearing claims for declaratory relief,” and it would decline to award such relief here. Rarick v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co., 852 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting R.R. St. & Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569 F.3d 711, 716-17 (7th Cir. 2009)).
C. Injunctive Relief
The only remaining relief CDK seeks for its breach-of-contract counterclaim is an injunction. Such relief “is not available as a matter of course; it remains a creature of equity, and so the district court has discretion to decide whether that relief is warranted, even if it has found liability.” Liebhart v. SPX Corp., 998 F.3d 772, 774 (7th Cir. 2021). The party seeking an
Again, CDK has not met its burden. Even if questions of fact persist on the third and fourth injunctive-relief factors, CDK has failed to present evidence that the alleged contract breaches are (1) a cause of the irreparable harm it claims to suffer and (2) ongoing or likely to reoccur, such that monetary damages would not adequately compensate CDK for its injury.
With respect to irreparable harm: CDK argues that it faces increased security risks stemming from unauthorized DMS access.12 In support, CDK‘s cybersecurity expert opines that “[h]ostile third-party access to DMSs poses a security risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of DMS data and the underlying systems.” (Stroz Rep. at 4.) Beyond this general statement, however, CDK has presented no evidence that the Dealers’ alleged contract breaches actually caused those increased risks. For example, CDK discusses a security breach of DealerBuilt‘s DMS in 2016, but it identifies no connection between the DealerBuilt incident and Dealers issuing login credentials to data integrators. Instead, record evidence reveals that the
CDK has also not satisfied the court that an award of money damages would be an inadequate remedy. Such an award may be inadequate where a violation is ongoing—but there is no evidence in this record that the Dealers are currently violating their MSAs. CDK‘s own system reports show that no Counter-Defendant is currently providing log-in credentials to non-authorized third parties. (PSUMF ¶¶ 10-25; Exs. K-O to Wedgworth Decl. [968-1].) CDK protests that its system reports “show[] only that CDK is unable to detect third-party credential sharing“—not that such breaches are not occurring. (CDK‘s Opp. at 11.) But summary judgment is the “put up or shut up” moment in litigation. Reed v. Brex, Inc., 8 F.4th 569, 578 (7th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). It is CDK‘s burden to present evidence that a Dealer Counter-Defendant is providing login credentials to “non-authorized” entities or that such conduct is likely to occur in the future, and CDK has not done so.
In short, CDK has opted not to calculate compensatory damages and has not presented evidence that the Dеalers’ contract breaches resulted in irreparable harm to CDK or harm that cannot be compensated through monetary damages. The Dealership Counter-Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this counterclaim.13
III. DMCA Counterclaim
CDK‘s remaining claim arises under
CDK claims that the Continental and Warrensburg Counter-Defendants have violated
The court begins (and ends) with the argument that the Dealers have repeаtedly asked the court to address: whether CDK‘s inability to proffer evidence assigning particular alleged DMCA violations to particular dealerships is fatal to its counterclaim. Although the Continental Counter-Defendants are a group of eight individual dealerships and the Warrensburg Counter-Defendants are a group of three individual dealerships, CDK has not attributed particular alleged violations to each dealership. The Dealers hone in on this potential defect in their opening brief, arguing that CDK engaged in a group-pleading tactic that cannot overcome summary judgment.
The court agrees with the Dealers that CDK‘s inability to connect any DMCA violation to any particular dealership is fatal to its claim. First and critically, CDK‘s Counterclaims do not allege joint and several liability; it is not enough for CDK to allege that the Dealerships “share common ownership, managers, аnd employees and therefore operate as a single business unit.” (Countercl. ¶¶ 15, 20.) Cf. Papa v. Katy Indus., 166 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The plaintiffs seem to think that unless a corporate group erects a Chinese wall between affiliates, each affiliate is responsible for the other‘s debts. That is nonsense.“). The Dealers assert that, had CDK pleaded joint and several liability, the Dealers would have deposed CDK witnesses concerning CDK‘s decisions to (i) enter into separate MSAs with each Warrensburg dealership, (ii) separately bill the Warrensburg dealerships, and (iii) assign separate client master file numbers to each Continental dealership. (Id.) The court agrees with the Dealers that, if joint and several liability were available for statutory damages under the DMCA, it would be unduly prejudicial to allow CDK to seek such liability at this late date. See Johnson v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Ill., 10 F.3d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1991) (affirming denial of motion to amend a complaint after defendant moved for summary judgment and would be prejudiced by need to engage in substantial additional
Second, even if CDK had pleaded joint and several liability in its Counterclaims, the court would still have serious concerns about CDK‘s inability to attribute the alleged violations to particular dealerships. Assuming that the DMCA does allow for joint and several liability, CDK would still need to present evidence that at least one dealership in each group committed a DMCA violation. See
Finally, although the court dismisses CDK‘s DMCA violations based on the untimeliness of CDK‘s joint-and-several liability theory, the court notes that it has concerns about many additional elements of CDK‘s DMCA counterclaim. In the above discussion, the court assumes without deciding that Authenticom‘s alleged CAPTCHA circumventions and its rollout of Profile
The court further declines to address the Dealers’ alternative argument that CDK‘s DMCA claim must fail because CDK has not shown a requisite “nexus” to copyright infringement. The court recognizes that the Courts of Appeals disagree on that issue: the Federal Circuit holds that a DMCA plaintiff must show a nexus between the alleged DMCA violation and a copyright interest, while the Ninth Circuit holds that no such nexus is required. Compare Storage Technology Corp. v. Custom Hardware Engineering & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202 (Fed. Cir. 2004) with MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm‘t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010). The Seventh Circuit has not spoken on the issue, and this court need not do so to resolve the Dealers’ motion. In short, because CDK has failed to attribute the alleged violations to individual dealerships, the
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Dealership Counter-Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on CDK‘s counterclaims [963] is granted.
ENTER:
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States District Judge
Dated: June 29, 2023