In re D.E.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, Angela Miller, Office of the Ohio Public Defender, 250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400, Columbus, OH 43215, for appellant
O P I N I O N
POWELL, J.
{¶1} Appellant, D.E., appeals his disposition from the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, with regard to the suspension of his ability to apply for a driver‘s license and the imposition of an order of restitution. We reverse and remand the disposition for the reasons outlined below.
{¶3} Appellant‘s delinquency disposition included a commitment to the Ohio Department of Youth Services for a minimum term of 12 months, not to exceed his 21st birthday. The juvenile court also suspended appellant‘s right to apply for an operator‘s license from the date of the dispositional hearing in February 2009 until “12/31/2099.” Appellant was ordered to pay restitution in an amount to be determined by probation. The juvenile court‘s order indicated that the probation department‘s determination of restitution would be final unless appellant timely requested a hearing on restitution.
{¶4} For the OVI traffic disposition, the juvenile court ordered that appellant‘s ability to apply for an operator‘s license be suspended from the date of the 2009 dispositional hearing until “2/08/2014,” which is appellant‘s 21st birthday.
{¶5} Appellant‘s appeal and supplemental appeal were consolidated. Three assignments of error were presented for our review. We will consider the
{¶6} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶7} “THE BUTLER COUNTY JUVENILE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT IMPOSED IMPROPER ORDERS OF DISPOSITION IN VIOLATION OF
{¶8} Appellant‘s first issue under this assignment of error claims the juvenile court erred in imposing a delinquency disposition suspending appellant‘s right to apply for a driver‘s license for 90 years.
{¶9} We begin our review mindful that a juvenile court‘s disposition for a child adjudicated delinquent is a matter within the juvenile court‘s discretion. In re T.H., Clermont App. No. CA2006-02-021, 2007-Ohio-352, ¶10. This court will not disturb such a disposition absent an abuse of discretion. Id.
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{¶13} A juvenile court may utilize
{¶14} Under the facts of T.S., a 14-year-old juvenile, who did not possess a license, caused the death of another person while driving a vehicle. The T.S. court found that the juvenile court‘s disposition under
{¶15} We find the reasoning of the T.S. case persuasive and reject the argument that suspending a juvenile‘s ability to obtain a license under
{¶16} Nevertheless, we find no authority for the juvenile court to impose a 90-
{¶17} While the aggravated vehicular homicide statute of
{¶18} While the juvenile court was within its discretion to impose a suspension on appellant‘s right to apply for a driver‘s license as an additional order of disposition on the delinquency finding, it did not do so within the constraints of
{¶20} As we noted above, the juvenile court left the amount of restitution open to a determination by the juvenile probation department, noting that appellant could request a hearing if he disputed the amount determined. There is no indication in the record that a determination was made or that a restitution hearing was held.
{¶21} The state concedes and the record reflects that the juvenile court erred when it failed to order a specific amount of restitution. See In the Matter of Brown (June 24, 1998), Richland App. No. 97CA112, 1998 WL 430028 at *2; see In re Boss B., Lucas App. No. L-07-1343, 2008-Ohio-2995, ¶17; see
{¶22} Appellant‘s first assignment of error is sustained.
Supplemental Assignment of Error:
{¶24} “THE BUTLER COUNTY JUVENILE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT IMPOSED IMPROPER ORDERS OF DISPOSITION.”
{¶25} Appellant argues under this supplemental assignment of error that the juvenile court‘s traffic disposition was not authorized by law when it suspended appellant‘s right to apply for an operator‘s license for the OVI adjudication for five years from the date of the dispositional hearing.
{¶26} The state concedes error in regard to appellant‘s supplemental assignment of error, arguing that appellant already received a 90-year suspension of his right to apply for a license, and therefore, the juvenile court‘s traffic-offender disposition was “harmless error.”
{¶28} Appellant asserts that the juvenile court is not permitted to impose a suspension because the language of
{¶29} “Suspend” or “suspension” with regard to a driver‘s license is defined as “the permanent or temporary withdrawal, by action of a court or the bureau of motor vehicles, of a driver‘s license, * * * temporary instruction permit, probationary license, * * * or the permanent or temporary withdrawal of the privilege to obtain a license, permit, or privilege of that type for the period of the suspension.”
{¶30} Statutory law related to the possession or suspension of an operator‘s or driver‘s license clearly encompasses the ability to suspend the privilege to obtain a license, and therefore, we are not persuaded that appellant‘s unlicensed status prohibits the juvenile court from suspending his ability to apply for such a license under the juvenile traffic offender disposition statute.
{¶31} Appellant also argues that if this court determines that the juvenile court had the authority to suspend appellant‘s ability to apply for a license, it could do so
{¶32}
{¶33} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶34} “D.E. WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN COUNSEL FAILED TO: 1) OBJECT TO LIFETIME SUSPENSION AND; 2) REQUEST AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING REGARDING RESTITUTION.”
{¶35} Appellant indicated that he was arguing this assignment of error in the alternative to his first assignment of error. Based upon our determination under appellant‘s first assignment of error, appellant‘s second assignment of error is moot.
{¶36} We note that the original juvenile complaint filed in the delinquency portion of the case alleged that appellant was delinquent for conduct constituting a violation of
{¶37} The judgment on disposition is reversed and this cause is remanded for a new disposition hearing and a hearing on restitution.