In re G.M.
Robin N. Piper, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Government Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45012-0515
O P I N I O N
HENDRICKSON, J.
{¶1} Appellant, G.M., appeals from a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, dismissing his motion for alternative disposition and special findings. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court.
{¶2} Appellant is an undocumented immigrant from Mexico. On October 10, 2008, a complaint was filed in the juvenile court alleging that appellant, then 17 years old, was a delinquent child by reason of his commission of one count of rape in violation
{¶3} On June 8, 2009, five months after he was committed to the custody of ODYS, appellant filed a motion for alternative disposition and special findings. Appellant‘s motion requested that the court find he was eligible for long-term foster care as an abandoned child under
{¶4} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶5} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO ADDRESS THE SUBSTANCE OF A MOTION PROPERLY BEFORE IT.”
{¶6} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶7} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY INCORRECTLY IMPUTING INTENTIONS TO CONGRESS RATHER THAN APPLYING THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE OHIO REVISED CODE AS PRAYED FOR BY G.M.”
{¶8} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶9} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT DENIED
{¶10} Assignment of Error No. 4:
{¶11} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT‘S MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE DISPOSITION FOR PUNITIVE REASONS.”
{¶12} Although appellant‘s motion argued that he was eligible for placement in long-term foster care (called a “planned permanent living arrangement” in Ohio), his attorney clarified at oral argument that such placement was irrelevant to the case at bar. In addition, while appellant insisted that he qualified for “special immigrant juvenile” status under
{¶13} Due to the fact that the remaining arguments in appellant‘s four assignments of error are interrelated, we shall address them together. Appellant insists that the juvenile court retains exclusive original jurisdiction over him because he was adjudicated delinquent and committed to ODYS, therefore his motion for alternative disposition was properly filed before the court. Appellant further submits that the juvenile court improperly ignored the issue of whether he met the statutory definition of an “abandoned child.” Such a finding, appellant insists, would have permitted him to pursue an application for legal status with the federal government. In addition, appellant alleges that his motion was improperly denied on the basis of race and for punitive reasons.
{¶14}
{¶15} As stated, appellant was adjudicated a delinquent child and committed to the custody of ODYS. Accordingly, in addition to any disposition authorized or required by
{¶16} At the time of the hearing on appellant‘s motion, appellant was four months away from turning 18 years old. As indicated in the statement of facts, ODYS was ordered to detain appellant for a minimum term of six months. With his release from ODYS potentially imminent, appellant seeks for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over him so that he may apply for legal status with the federal government and avoid deportation.
{¶17} The record indicates that appellant was sent to the United States at age 15, unaccompanied, because his impoverished parents in Mexico could no longer support him. By the time appellant‘s motion was heard, he had not had any contact with his parents for at least one year. A child is presumed to be abandoned when he has not
{¶18} Appellant operates under the erroneous presumption that because the juvenile court had jurisdiction to hear his motion for alternative disposition, the court was authorized to make a finding of abandonment. It is true that
{¶19} The legislative authority permitting the juvenile court to access the dispositional orders in
{¶20} It is undisputed that, in the present matter, no complaint was filed under
{¶21} We now turn to the propriety of the juvenile court‘s decision dismissing appellant‘s motion for alternative disposition. The juvenile court has broad discretion to fashion a disposition for a delinquent child which comports with the overriding purposes for dispositions under
{¶22} “(A) The overriding purposes for dispositions under this chapter are to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical development of children subject to this chapter, protect the public interest and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender‘s actions, restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender. * * *
{¶23} “(B) Dispositions under this chapter shall be reasonably calculated to achieve the overriding purposes set forth in this section, commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the delinquent child‘s * * * conduct and its impact on the victim, and consistent with dispositions for similar acts committed by similar delinquent children * * *. The court shall not base the disposition on the race, ethnic background, gender, or religion of the delinquent child * * *.”
{¶24} Notably, appellant‘s brief cites only the clauses of the statute most favorable to him in advancing his argument. Appellant contends that the juvenile court‘s decision dismissing his motion did not consider his care, protection, and mental and physical development or serve the purpose of rehabilitation. Appellant‘s brief omits the
{¶25} After reviewing the record, we hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in premising its decision upon these factors. Despite the stated purposes in
{¶26} Appellant‘s first, second, third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
{¶27} Judgment affirmed.