OPINION ON REHEARING
This original proceeding concerns named defendants’ efforts to designate a former co-defendant as a responsible third party in a wrongful death suit.
CVR seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to (1) vacate its October 12, 2015 order denying CVR’s motion for leave to designate Wynnewood as a responsible third party and (2) grant CVR’s motion for leave to make the designation. By opinion dated February 9, 2016, we conditionally granted the writ.
Plaintiffs have filed a motion for rehearing. We overrule the motion for rehearing, withdraw our opinion of February 9, 2016, and issue this opinion, conditionally granting the writ.
Russell Mann and Billy Smith were killed in a September 28, 2012 explosion at the Wynnewood refinery in Wynnewood, Oklahoma. According to the Fifth Amended Petition filed by their wives, the explosion occurred when Mann and Smith were assisting in an effort to “re-start” the pilot light in a large “outdated and archaic” boiler. They were both employed by Wynnewood. Wynnewood is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CVR Refining, which was, at the time of the accident, a wholly-owned subsidiary of CVR Energy, Inc.
According to Plaintiffs petition, the boiler “had to be re-started manually because it was not equipped with a Boiler Management System (BMS)” to permit an operator to re-start it “from a safe and remote site.” They were both, therefore, very close to the boiler when it exploded— Smith inches and Mann a few feet away. Furthermore, the boiler was not equipped with “gas-flowing gauges or any device to advise how much gas was entering the chamber.” Wynnewood “received several proposals” for a BMS for the boiler but rejected them all. Wynnewood, and later CVR, “had actual knowledge of prior detonations” of the boiler that injured workers. Finally, Plaintiffs’ petition alleged that Wynnewood was “rife with dangerous practices and working conditions,” resulting in numerous Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) violations.
The refinery was originally owned by Gary-Williams Energy Co., LLC. In 2011, CVR Refining purchased the refinery from Gary-Williams. Thus, CVR became the premises owner. According to CVR, Wynnewood employed Mann and Smith and, on the day of the explosion, it was Wynnewood employees who tasked Smith and charged Mann with their responsibilities.
In their Fifth Amended Petition, Plaintiffs allege that CVR, as the owner and parent company of Wynnewood, committed the following acts of negligence and gross negligence: (1) failed to install a i boiler management system (BMS) on the boiler; (2) failed to install boiler management controls on all heating equipment as ordered by OSHA; (3) failed to monitor adequately the dangerous condition of the refinery and its boiler; (4) failed to alleviate or repair hazardous conditions capable of causing injury or death, including the boiler; and (5) failed to comply with OSHA directives to install a BMS system on the boiler. Plaintiffs further alleged these acts constituted gross negligence.
Wynnewood and CVR remained named as defendants through two amended petitions, but, in April 2015, approximately 20 months after suit was filed and 55 days before trial, Plaintiffs filed a notice of non-suit of Wynnewood. The date of nonsuit was beyond the limitations period for a wrongful death claim against Wynnewood (except for claims by Smith’s young son).
Twenty-six days after the notice of non-suit, and 29 days before the then-scheduled trial, CVR filed a motion for leave to designate Wynnewood as a responsible third party.
Issue Presented
CVR contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying its motion for leave to depignate Wynnewood as a responsible third party because (1) Wynnewood had been an active defendant in the case for more than 19 months; (2) Plaintiffs non-suited Wynnewood 55 days before the trial setting, which was five months before the subsequent trial date;
Standard for Granting Mandamus Relief
To be entitled to mandamus relief, a petitioner must show both that the trial court abused its discretion and thát there is no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co.,
Abuse of Discretion
A. Overview of Proportionate Responsibility Statute
Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code sets out the Texas proportionate responsibility law. Tex. Civ. PeaC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.001-33.017 (West 2015). These statutes allow a tort defendant to designate as a responsible third party a person who “is alleged to have caused in any way the harm for which the plaintiff seeks damages.” See Jay Miller & Sundown, Inc. v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc.,
There are limitations to a defendant’s ability to designate responsible third parties under Subsection 33.004. These limitations add “procedural safeguard[s]” that prevent a defendant from undercutting “the plaintiffs case by belatedly pointing its finger at a time-barred responsible third-party against whom the plaintiff has no possibility of recovery.” Withers v. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc.,
A defendant may not designate a person as a responsible third party with respect ■ to a claimant’s cause of action after the applicable limitations period on the cause of action has expired with respect to the responsible third party if the defendant has failed to comply with its obligations, if any, to timely disclose that the person may be designated as a responsible third party -under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Tex. Civ. Pkag & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.004(d).
These timing limitations are part of a “statutory balance” created by the Legislature that seeks to address a defendant’s interest in identifying nonparties who may have some culpability while recognizing that a plaintiff has time limitations on pursuing its claims against parties not already included in its suit. See Withers,
Plaintiffs contend that, under the statute’s plain meaning, the trial court correctly denied CVR’s motion to designate Wynnewood as a responsible third party because CVR did not comply with either of these two time limitations, i.e., it attempted to designate Wynnewood within 60 days of trial and after Plaintiffs’ statute of limitations against Wynnewood had expired.
But Plaintiffs’ reading of the statute ignores the limiting clause included at the end of Subsection (d). That clause states that a party may not designate responsible third parties after limitations have run “if the defendant has failed to comply with its obligations, if any, to timely disclose that the person may be' designated as a responsible third party under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” Tex. Civ. Peac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(d). Thus, in addressing the extent to which Subsection (d) might prohibit CVR’s attempted designation, we must consider whether CVR failed to comply with an existing discovery obligation to disclose Wynnewood as a responsible third party.
CVR asserts that it did not. According to CVR, it owed no obligation to disclose Wynnewood, under Rule 194.2(1) as a party “who may be designated as a responsible third party,” while Wynnewood was a named party defendant.
B. Rule 194.2’s Disclosure Obligation
Rule 194.2 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure obligates a defendant, upon a request from the plaintiff, to disclose, among other things, its defensive legal theories, any potential parties, any witnesses with “knowledge of relevant facts,” as well as “any person who may be designated as a responsible third party.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 194.2. - The response must be complete, “based on all information reasonably available” at the time. Tex.R. Civ. P. 193.1. The scope of the defendant’s response is, to a large extent, shaped by the allegations contained in the plaintiffs live pleading. See generally Tex.R. Civ. P. 194.2(e) (requiring disclosure of identifying information for people “having knowledge of relevant facts”); Frazin v. Hanley,
. When CVR responded to the requests for disclosure, Plaintiffs were suing Wynnewood as a defendant, asserting claims against it, and seeking to hold it legally responsible for their damages. At that time, CVR had no obligation to disclose Wynnewood as a potentially responsible party; it was already a party whose conduct would be considered by the jury in the jury charge. It was not until Plaintiffs nonsuited Wynnewood that CVR had a duty to “reasonably promptly” supplement its disclosures if necessary to respond to
C. The Statutory Definition of “Responsible Third Party”
The proportionate responsibility statute supports our holding that Rules 193.5(b) and 194.2(1) did not require CVR to designate Wynnewood as a responsible third party until after Plaintiffs nonsuited their claims against it. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that we must review de novo, giving.effect to the Legislature’s intent by looking first at the words of the statute. First Am, Title Ins. Co. v. Combs,
The current version of the responsible-third-party statute does not address whether a person may simultaneously be a defendant and a responsible third party. The current definition of a “responsible third party” broadly reads:
[A]ny person who is alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in any way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by negligent act or omission, by any defective or unreasonably dangerous product, by other conduct or activity that violates an applicable legal standard, or by any combina- . tion of these.
Tex. Civ. Peao. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.011(6) (West 2015) (including one limitation on definition not applicable here). To address this issue, “[w]e begin by reviewing dictionary definitions of” the phrase “third party.” Faster v. Comet II Const., Inc.,
We presume that the Legislature adopts the common meaning of a word unless the Legislature provides a different definition or the language clearly indicates otherwise. See Ford Motor,
These common distinctions presumably informed the Texas Supreme Court when it declared, “Chapter 33 provides, among other things, that a defendant in such an action may seek to designate a person, who has not been sued by a claimant, as a responsible third party.” Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha,
As part of construing a term or phrase, we consider the context of the entire statute—the surrounding words or the “lexical environment.” See Ford Motor,
While we must consider the specific statutory language at issue, we must do so while looking to the statute as a whole, rather than as “isolated provisions.” We “endeavor to read the statute contextually, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence.” We thus begin our analysis with the statute’s words and then consider the apparent meaning of those words within their context.
Jaster,
Chapter 33 addresses proportionate responsibility and how the proportioning of that responsibility impacts the amount of recovery available to a plaintiff from the named parties. Subsection 33.003(a) distinguishes a defendant from a responsible third party and permits the jury to allocate some portion of the 100%' of total responsibility to both. It states that the factfinder “shall determine the percentage of responsibility ... for ... (1) each claimant; (2) each defendant; (3) each settling person; and (4) each responsible third party who has been designated under Section 33.004.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.003. We presume that the proportionate responsibility statute maintains this distinction throughout all its provisions. See Horseshoe Bay Resort, Ltd. v. CRVI CDP Portfolio, LLC,
Plaintiffs rely on the history of the proportionate responsibility statute to support their argument that a defendant cannot designate a responsible third party after limitations have expired. In particular, they argue that old versions of the statute included the phrase “person ... [who] was not [ ] sued by the claimant” in the definition of “responsible third party,” and ‘the
[A]ny-person to whom all of the following apply:
(i) the court in which the action was filed could exercise jurisdiction over the person;
(ii) the person could have been, but was not, sued by the claimant; and
(iii) the person is or may be liable to the plaintiff for all or a part of the damages claimed against the named defendant or defendants.
Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., Ch. 136, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 971, 973 (adding earlier version of Section 33.011); see also id. (adding earlier version of Subsection 33.004(a), which stated that “a defendant may seek to join a responsible third party who has not been sued by the claimant.”).
The definition was entirely rewritten in 2003 and it “substantially broadened the meaning of the term ‘responsible third part/ to eliminate ... restrictions,” “such as a [past] requirement for personal jurisdiction and a potential for liability to the claimant.”
We are not persuaded that the deletion of the phrase “person ... [who] was not [ ] sued by the claimant” from the 2003 definition-should be interpreted to mean that a responsible third party, thereafter, includes parties who are already named as defendants for three reasons. First, as we have already discussed, the plain meaning of the phrase “third party” means a person who is not a named litigant with claims asserted directly by or against it and whose responsibility is already a matter for the jury’s consideration. Second, other parts of the statute—the linguistic context—demonstrate a consistent understanding by distinguishing a responsible third party from a defendant. Third, we note that the Legislature did not simply delete the phrase “person ... [who] was not [] sued by the claimant” from the definition. Rather, the Legislature completely rewrote the definition to focus, not on whether the plaintiff could have sued the third party but, instead, on whether that third-party might have some responsibility that should not be borne by the litigating, named defendant.
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude there is “a high level of linguistic clarity” that the Legislature intended to depart from the common meaning of “third party,” Instead, we follow the straightforward construction that “third party” means a party that is not otherwise a party to the litigation.
Plaintiffs object that CVR did not timely move to designate Wynnewood under Subsections 33.004(a) and (d). Subsection (a) requires a defendant to file a motion for leave to designate responsible third parties “on or before the 60th day before the trial date unless the court finds good cause to allow the motion to be filed at a later date.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004(a). When CVR filed its motion for leave 29 days before the trial date, it asserted that it had good cause because Wynnewood was still a named defendant at the 60-day deadline, and thus, CVR was not required to designate Wynnewood as a third-party at that time. We agree. Plaintiffs nonsuited Wynne-wood within the 60-day pretrial period. CVR amended its disclosure responses and moved to designate Wynnewood as a “responsible third party”' within 30 days of the nonsuit. This meets the requirement that the supplementation occur “reasonably promptly.” TexR. Civ. P. 193.5(b). It further demonstrates “good cause” for seeking to designate within the 60-day pretrial period.'
Subsection (d) prohibits a defendant from designating a responsible third party after the claimant’s applicable limitations period has expired if the defendant failed to timely disclose the third party under Rule 194.2(1).
E. Whether CVR alleged Sufficient Facts in its Motion to Warrant Relief
Plaintiffs’ final argument that the trial court’s denial of CVR’s motion for leave to designate Wynnewood as a responsible third party wqs not error is that CVR did' not allege sufficient facts concerning Wynnewood’s responsibility.
Under the notice-pleading standard, fair notice is achieved “if the opposing party can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy, and what type of evidence might be relevant.” Greyhound Lines,
CVR' satisfied this low threshold. Its motion for leave to designate Wynnewood quoted from Plaintiffs’ own allegations against Wynnewood. It also alleged that, if any entity or persons were negligent in a manner that proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries, it was Wynnewood and its employees who were responsible for “the calculations made, instructions given, steps taken and means employed to light the steam boiler.” CVR added that “if this case is submitted to a jury at all, [Wynne-wood] should be included in the initial liability question because the story of the accident itself—what happened—cannot be told without reference to [Wynnewood].” Finally, we note that the allegations of Wynnewood’s responsibility were well-known to Plaintiffs because the 15-page incident report faulted Wynnewood, its employees, procedures, and inadequate training for the explosion, and Plaintiffs themselves continued to include allegations in their amended petition of Wynnewood’s allegedly intentional misconduct. We hold that CVR provided sufficient notice to Plaintiffs of Wynnewood’s alleged wrongdoing.
Because CVR complied with all statutory requirements, the trial court abused its discretion in denying CVR’s motion for leave to designate Wynnewood as a responsible third party.
Adequate Remedy by Appeal
We must next decide if CVR has an adequate remedy by appeal. Mandamus will not issue “when the law provides another plain, adequate, and complete remedy.” In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs.,
A complete analysis of the adequacy of appellate remedies requires consideration of the degree to which “important substantive and procedural rights” are subject to “impairment or loss.” Id. While mandamus review of “incidental, interlocutory rulings” which are “unimpor
to preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.
Id. Thus, courts should consider “the impact on the legal system” in determining whether mandamus relief is appropriate. Id. at 137.
An appellate remedy is “adequate” when the “benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.” Id. at 136. Further, additional expense, by itself, does not warrant granting mandamus relief. See id. Nonetheless, when the error is “clear enough, and correction simple enough,” mandamus review may still be appropriate. Id. at 137.
Courts of appeals that have addressed the adequacy of the remedy by appeal in Chapter 33 cases have reached different conclusions, but they repeatedly refer to the Prudential maxim that the decision “depends heavily upon the circumstances presented.” In re Investment Capital Corp., No. 14-09-00105-CV,
The courts holding that the appellate remedy was adequate reasoned that a lack of exceptional circumstances in those cases caused the detriments of mandamus review to outweigh the benefits. See Unitec,
The courts reaching the opposite conclusion have based their decisions on the following considerations:
(1) denial of the right to designate responsible third parties would “skew the proceedings, potentially affect the outcome of the litigation, and compromise the presentation of [the relator’s] defense in ways unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record”;13
(2) there would be a substantial waste of time and money to proceed totrial without error correction; 14 and
(3) review would allow appellate courts to offer “needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments.”15
Because the issue of-the adequacy of the remedy by appeal “is practical and prudential,” “depends heavily on the circumstances,” and is determined by a balancing test, this split is not surprising. See Prudential,
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals likewise has held that an appellate remedy would be inadequate in one case but not in others. Compare E. Rio Hondo,
The Dallas Court of Appeals has adopted a rule that the improper denial of a motion for leave to designate a responsible third party is generally curable by mandamus. See In re Smith,
Plaintiffs rely on a case from our court that held that “a relatively straightforward personal injury case” did not present exceptional circumstances. See Unitec, 178
Unitec is distinguishable for a second reason. Unlike Unitec, this case presents a novel legal issue: whether, under the 2003 definition of “responsible third party,” a defendant is required to designate a co-defendant. Interpreting Subsection 33.004(d) to answer that issue allows us “to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would otherwise prove elusive” and enables us to “spare private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.” See Prudential,
Another factor is the potential difficulty in demonstrating on appeal that the absence of a responsible third party caused harm. See Hughes,
We further agree with CVR that the evidence regarding its conduct as the premises owner with respect to the boiler and the procedures and training of personnel at the refinery cannot be readily separated from Wynnewood’s conduct, procedures, training, supervision, and responsibility for the same boiler and explosion. These facts further support allowing CVR to designate Wynnewood as a responsible third party so that its responsibility as the employer may be apportioned together with the responsibility of the premises owner.
Finally, the district court’s ruling is not a “mere ‘incidental’ ruling.”. See Unitec,
Accordingly, after balancing the jurisprudential considerations, we conclude that the benefits of mandamus review in this case outweigh the detriments and, thus, hold that the appellate remedy under these circumstances is inadequate.
Conclusion
We hold that the trial court abused its discretion and that CVR has demonstrated that it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. Therefore," we direct the trial court to vacate its order of October 12, 2015 and to grant CVR’s motion for leave to designate Wynnewood as a responsible third party. We are confident the trial court will promptly-comply. The writ will issue only if it does not.
, The underlying case is Mann v. CVR Energy, Inc,, et al., cause number 2013-DCV-209679, pending in the 434th District Court of Fort Bend County, Texas, the Honorable James H, Shoemake, presiding.
. Because , we are overruling the motion for rehearing, but issuing an opinion on rehearing, we dismiss the motion for en banc reconsideration as moot. See Poland v. Ott,
. CyR simultaneously amended its response to the request for Rule 194 disclosure and designated Wynnewood as a responsible third party.
. This Court granted CVR’s emergency motion to stay the underlying proceeding and trial setting pending resolution of this petition for writ of mandamus. See Tex. R. App.p. 52.10.
. No one disputes that the two-year Oklahoma statute of limitations ran on September
. When a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we generally do not apply rules of construction or extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to construe the statutory language, • Molinet v. Kimbrell,
. A plurality of the United States Supreme Court has stated the rule somewhat different-iy:
Whether a statutory term is unambiguous, however, does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its component words. Rather, "[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but also by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Ordinarily, a word’s usage accords with its dictionary definition. In law as in life, however, the same words, placed in different contexts, sometimes mean different things.
Yates v. United States, — U.S.-,
I agree with the plurality (really, who does not?) that context matters in interpreting statutes. We do not “construe the meaning of statutory terms in á vacuum.” Rather, we interpret particular words "in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” And sometimes that means, as the plurality says, that the dictionary definition of a disputed term cannot control.
. Similarly,, Section 33.004 was entirely rewritten, and no longer explicitly indicates that a responsible third party subject to joinder is one who has not been sued. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 33.004.
. As a result of the new definition, "the jury should allocate responsibility among all persons who are responsible for the claimant’s injury, regardless of whether they are subject to the court’s jurisdiction or whether there is some other impediment to the imposition of liability on them, such as a statutory immunity.” Galbraith,
.In their motion for rehearing, Plaintiffs contend our opinion conflicts with MCI Sales and Serv., Inc. v. Hinton,
We find no conflict between our construction and that in MCI. MCI did not adopt a "narrow” or "broad" definition of the phrase "responsible third party." Instead, the Court construed the statute and "[gave] effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed by the plain and common meaning of the statute's words,” as do we. Id. at 501; F.F.P. Operating' Partners, L.P. v. Duenez,237 S.W.3d 680 , 683 (Tex.2007). MCI recognizes that there is nothing logically inconsistent with a person being both a settling person and responsible third party. But, under the common understanding of ‘ the phrase "third party,” a person cannot , simultaneously be both a party and a third party to a lawsuit.
. Subsection (1) requires disclosure of “the name, address, and telephone number of any person who may be designated as a responsible third party.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 194.2(1).
. Brokers Logistics,
. See, e.g, Andersen,
. In re Lewis Casing Crews, Inc., No, 11—14— 00137-CV,