In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d 67

Background

A refinery boiler explosion on Sept. 28, 2012 killed two employees (Mann, Smith); Wynnewood Refining Co., LLC (employer) and CVR entities (parent/premises owner) were defendants.
Plaintiffs sued Wynnewood and CVR; Wynnewood remained a defendant for ~19 months but Plaintiffs nonsuited Wynnewood 55 days before trial — after the Oklahoma limitations period had expired for adult plaintiffs.
Twenty-six days after the nonsuit (29 days before trial), CVR moved for leave to designate Wynnewood as a "responsible third party;" the trial court denied the motion.
CVR petitioned for mandamus, arguing the trial court abused its discretion and that appeal was inadequate; this court had previously conditionally granted the writ and issued this opinion on rehearing, again granting mandamus.
Key legal questions: whether Rule 194 required CVR to disclose Wynnewood while Wynnewood was a party, whether Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §33.004(d) bars post‑limitations designations of formerly named defendants, whether CVR’s motion met pleading notice, and whether mandamus relief is warranted.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiffs' Argument	CVR's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 194 required CVR to disclose Wynnewood as a potential responsible third party while Wynnewood remained a named defendant	CVR should have disclosed Wynnewood earlier under Rule 194.2(1)	No duty to disclose a co‑defendant as a "responsible third party" while that person is a named defendant; supplement only after nonsuit	CVR had no obligation to disclose Wynnewood while Wynnewood was a party; supplementation after nonsuit was appropriate
Whether §33.004(d) categorically prohibits designating a person as a responsible third party after the claimant’s limitations period has expired if that person was formerly a defendant	§33.004(d) bars post‑limitations designations per its plain text	§33.004(d) only bars post‑limitations designation when the defendant failed to timely disclose the person under Rule 194 — not when the person was previously a named defendant	§33.004(d) does not bar designation here because CVR had not failed to disclose Wynnewood while Wynnewood was a party; statute read in context presumes "third party" is a nonparty
Whether CVR filed its motion within the 60‑day rule (§33.004(a)) or showed good cause	Motion was untimely (filed 29 days before trial)	Good cause exists because Wynnewood was a party at the 60‑day deadline and CVR moved promptly after the nonsuit	CVR’s motion was timely: nonsuit within the 60‑day window and CVR moved "reasonably promptly" thereafter, showing good cause
Whether CVR’s motion pleaded sufficient facts to permit designation under §33.004(g)(1) and Rule 47	Motion lacked sufficient factual pleading to notify Plaintiffs of Wynnewood’s alleged responsibility	Motion provided notice by quoting Plaintiffs’ own allegations and alleging Wynnewood’s direct role in the boiler restart and related acts	Motion satisfied the low notice‑pleading standard; trial court erred to deny leave

Key Cases Cited

In re Prudential Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (mandamus standard and adequacy of appellate remedy factors)
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985) (abuse of discretion definitions)
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is)
Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2009) (Chapter 33 allows designation of persons not sued by plaintiff)
Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. 2011) (statutory interpretation: start with plain text)
In re Unitec Elevator Servs. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. 2005) (designation standard and appellate remedy analysis)
Jay Miller & Sundown, Inc. v. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., 381 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012) (responsible‑third‑party statutory scope)
In re Brokers Logistics, Ltd., 320 S.W.3d 402 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010) (disclosure obligations and responsible third party issues)