IN RE CONTEMPT OF MICHELA HUTH [In thе matter styled: City of Parma v. Nikki J. Novak] [Appeal by Michela Huth]
No. 108501
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
June 4, 2020
2020-Ohio-3177
Criminal Appeal from the Parma Municipal Court Case No. 19MIS005
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 4, 2020
Appearances:
Joseph I. Tripodi, for appellant.
Timothy G. Dobeck, City of Parma Director of Law, and Michael P. Maloney, Assistant Director of Law, for appellee.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Appellant Michela Huth aрpeals the decision of the Parma Municipal Court that found her in direct contempt of court. Upon review, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On March 19, 2019, a pretrial was scheduled in a case pending before Judge Timothy P. Gilligan in the Parma Municipal Court. Appеllant, who had not filed a notice of appearance, appeared at the pretrial to represent the defendant. She provided her name and Ohio bar number to the court. When the judge inquired if appellant had donе a pretrial with the prosecutor, appellant responded “No” and asked the court “that the case be dismissed based upon a jurat defection in the complaint which is a jurisdictional issue.” The judge informed appellant that if she wished to make a motion, that she “would need to file something as the attorney of record, and file a motion to dismiss.” Despite this instruction, appellant indicated that she could file a written motion but also wished to make an oral motion to dismiss. The judge informed appellant that the court was not going to hear an oral motion, and indicated that “[t]here‘s going to be a pretrial first, that‘s what we do here.”
{¶ 3} As the judge continued to reiterate the court‘s procedure and instruct аppellant that a pretrial was to occur with the prosecutor, appellant interjected that “this court doesn‘t have jurisdiction over my client because the complaint is defective[;] there should be no pretrial * * *. The court has no jurisdiction according to the law.” The judge instructed appellant not to interrupt him or tell him how to run his courtroom, and again stated, “it‘s set for a pretrial today, if you would like to act courteous and professional and have a pretrial with the prosecutor, than [sic] do so.” Appellant rejected this procedure, stating “I do not Your Honor.” The judge
{¶ 4} The judge commented upon appellant‘s behavior while at the court, and heard from the prosecutor. Appellant continued to indicate that she had nothing to say to the prosecutor, that she did not believe the court had jurisdiction over the case, that she did not believe there should be a pretrial, and that she was “not trying to be disrespectful.” The judge noted that appellant had not filed an appearance, did not bring a business card, and had not filed any motion, and that “you just walk in here and take over the room.”
{¶ 5} Appellant was taken into custody, and a contempt hearing was hеld later the same day. At the contempt hearing, appellant apologized for having interrupted the court. The judge indicated that along with interrupting the court, appellant did not file a notice of appearance and did not have any form of identification; she demanded a ruling without having filed a motion for the court to review and consider; she displayed a lack of courtesy to the court and refused to follow the court‘s procedure; and she aсted unprofessionally toward others in the building. When appellant apologized for not understanding the court‘s procedure,
{¶ 6} On March 20, 2019, the trial cоurt issued a judgment entry finding appellant in direct contempt of court in violation of
{¶ 7} Appellant timely appealed the trial court‘s decision.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 8} Appellant raises two assignments of error for our review. She claims that the trial court abused its discretion in finding appellant in direct contempt in violation of
{¶ 9} Under her first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court judge lacked personal knowledge of some of the alleged conduct, which involved interactions with the court bailiff and the prosecutor outside the presence of the judge. She claims that this conduct would involve indirect contempt, which requires due process protections that were not afforded to appellant.
{¶ 10} The record reflects that appellant was found in direct contempt of court. The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth the distinction between direct contempt and indirect contempt as follows:
Direct contempt occurs “in the presence of or so near the court or judgе as to obstruct the administration of justice.”
R.C. 2705.01 . It may be punished summarily.Id. ; Codispoti v. Pennsylvania (1974), 418 U.S. 506, 514, 94 S.Ct. 2687, 2692, 41 L.Ed.2d 912, 920; State v. Kilbane (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 204, 15 O.O.3d 221, 223, 400 N.E.2d 386, 389, fn. 4. Indirect contempt occurs outside the court‘s presence, In re Gonzalez (1990), 70 Ohio App.3d 752, 755, 591 N.E.2d 1371, 1373, and the alleged contemnor is entitled to a hearing before he may be convicted and punished,R.C. 2705.03 .
Burt v. Dodge, 65 Ohio St.3d 34, 35, 599 N.E.2d 693 (1992), fn. 1.
{¶ 11} Moreover, “[i]n order to constitute direct contempt, an act need not be in the immediate presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or interfere with the actions of the cоurt in the courtroom itself.” State ex rel. Seventh Urban, Inc. v. McFaul, 5 Ohio St.3d 120, 122-123, 449 N.E.2d 445 (1983), citing In re Estate of Wright, 165 Ohio St. 15, 26, 133 N.E.2d 350 (1956). Thus, direct contempt can involve conduct occurring in the actual presence of the judge or in the constructive
{¶ 12} Here, the trial court commented upon appellant‘s disrespect for the court, the assistant prosecutor, and the bailiff while appearing at the courthouse on the underlying matter. The court explained that this behavior along with her failure to present any form of professional identification led to the court‘s concern over whether appellant was actually an attorney. Notwithstanding these other interactions, the transсript reflects that the finding of direct contempt resulted from appellant‘s conduct that occurred in the actual presence of the judge.
{¶ 14} We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court‘s classification of the contempt as direct contempt. Our review reflects that the conduct that led to the finding of contempt occurred in the actual presence of the judge and interfered with the orderly procedure of the сourt. Therefore, appellant could be summarily punished pursuant to
{¶ 15} Under her second assignment of error, appellant claims that her conduct did not warrant a finding of direct contempt. She asserts that she was not interrupting the judge, and that at the point she was held in contempt she was responding to the judge‘s comment about the “smug little look on your face.” She
{¶ 16} A determination of direct contempt is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Cleveland v. Heben, 74 Ohio App.3d 568, 573, 599 N.E.2d 766 (8th Dist.1991); State v. Kilbane, 61 Ohio St.2d 201, 400 N.E.2d 386 (1980), paragraph one of the syllabus. An аbuse of discretion “implies that the court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶ 17} The record reflects that although the matter was set for a pretrial, appellant appеared and demanded that the case be dismissed without having filed any notice of appearance or motion to dismiss with the court. We recognize that appellant was seeking to present a jurisdictional challenge to the court in the underlying matter and believed that a pretrial was unnecessary. However, despite being informed that the court would not consider an oral motion to dismiss, instructed that she would need to have a pretrial with the prosecutor, and wаrned regarding her behavior, appellant continued to disregard the court‘s procedure and to challenge the authority of the court. Appellant‘s conduct was disruptive of the proceedings and could be punished summarily. Upon our review, we find the trial court acted within its discretion in finding appellant‘s conduct constituted an interference with the orderly administration of justice and in holding appellant in direct contempt of court.
{¶ 18} Appellant‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the municipal court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, A.J., and LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR