In re C.L.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM M. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant William M.
Christopher R. Booth, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant B.P.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* Pursuant to
B.P. (mother) and William M. (father) challenge orders of the juvenile dependency court related to their four children.
Mother argues the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court‘s finding thаt the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (
Second, although DCFS informed the juvenile court that the parents, the maternal and paternal grandmothers, a maternal great uncle, a paternal cousin, and others reported that the children have no Native American ancestry, mother contends DCFS‘s inquiry was inadequate, and the juvenile court lacked sufficiеnt evidence to determine whether the children are or may be Indian children, because the agency failed to interview a maternal uncle about ICWA. Following the usual principles of appellate review and the applicable standard of review, we find no error.
Father argues the juvenile court erred in denying his petition for a change of court order pursuant to
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Initial Referral and Section 300 Petition
In January 2023, DCFS responded to a referral alleging that the parents’ domestic violence placed eight-year-old C.L., six-year-old D.M., and three-year-old H.M. at risk of harm.
Although mother had an active criminal protective order prohibiting father from contacting her, father had gone to the home mothеr shared with the children. Father started drinking, cursed at mother, threatened to kill her, held her against the wall with his forearm pressed to her throat, and threw a liquor bottle at her, injuring her lip and her head. The children were present during the altercation.
A police report indicated the incident was the third time the law enforcement agency had taken a report for domestic violence between the parents and there were 20 to 30 prior incidents that had gone unreported. Despite the criminal protective order, which was issued in late 2022 and did not expire until late 2025, the parents had “tried to make it work.” Mother was pregnant with father‘s child. She told a social worker that father was violent when he was intoxicated. When he was drinking, father became a “different person.”
Fаther denied assaulting mother and denied that he had been drinking. He was already participating in a 52-week domestic violence counseling program as part of his criminal probation. He had perfect attendance in the program.
Subsequent and Supplemental Petitions
In August 2023, father engaged in another violent incident. According to a police report, father and the maternal uncle had been at mother‘s home, watching a movie and drinking beer. The maternal uncle had just arrived from Texas. The two men argued and got into a physical altercation, which ended with father hitting the maternal uncle with his car. The car then flipped over and crashed into a neighbor‘s property. Following this incident, the juvenile court detained the children from mоther and found visitation with father would be detrimental to the children.
The family‘s accounts of the incident were inconsistent. The maternal grandmother told police that father and the maternal uncle had been inside mother‘s home, drinking, when they began to argue. She later recanted this statement and claimed father had not been in the home. She also said that when the maternal uncle arrived at the house he was possibly intoxicated and was not allowed to enter. The maternal grandmother was not sure if father was intoxicated. Mother told a social worker father came to the home despite the restraining order and ” ‘maybe he was drunk.’ ” She denied that either man was inside the home.
Around two weeks after the incident, a DCFS social worker received a call from a рerson who identified himself as the maternal uncle. He had learned about the content of the police report from the maternal grandmother. He denied telling police officers “that he was in mother‘s home watching a movie with father and drinking beers.” The police had interviewed him while he was in the hospital and he claimed he was heavily medicated at the time. As the maternal uncle described the incident to the social worker, he had “just arrived from Texas to join Christian Recovery Center in Long Beach.” He was visiting the family when father arrived at mother‘s home. Although the maternal uncle and father argued outside the home, they resolved the
A social worker later attempted to contact the maternal uncle for a further interview. The maternal uncle did not answer at the telephone number the social worker called. She was unable to leave a message because the voicemail was not set up. The social worker sent the maternal uncle a text message but received no response. The worker had been told that the maternal uncle was receiving inpatient rehabilitation services at a facility in Long Beach. The social worker searched for a telephone number for the program, “but reached a facility in [Florida].” DCFS asked the maternal grandmother about contacting the maternal uncle. She “confirmed the [maternal uncle] is still in his program, and stated he is unable to receive phone calls on his personal cellphone.”
In October 2023, the juvenile court sustained
Reunification Period
In the year that followed, father had no contact with DCFS. The social workers’ attempts to contact father were unsuccessful. DCFS learned that in Dеcember 2023 and February 2024, police reports were generated documenting further domestic violence between the parents. The December 2023 report stated that father had climbed into mother‘s home through an unlocked window. Father took mother‘s phone, hit her, kicked her, and pulled her hair. The February 2024 report indicated that father arrived at mother‘s home and appeared to be under the influence. He became enraged upon seeing that mother was wearing makeup and was dressed to go out. He ripped off mother‘s bra and fled only after mother said she was calling the police.
In October 2024, the juvenile court terminated the parents’ reunification services and set a date for a permanency planning hearing. In November 2024, father met with DCFS social workers. He said he had avoided contact with DCFS because “he did not want his children to see him have an unstable lifestyle.” He reported having no contact with the children.
Father‘s Section 388 Petition and Permanency Planning
In March 2025, father filed a
Father asserted he had been told the children cried and wanted to see him. He argued they would benefit from having a relationship with him. He wanted to learn more about the children and their interests, and he sought to “help motivate them and support them so they can be the best person they can be in society.” His paperwork reflected that he had attended four Alcoholiсs Anonymous meetings in November 2024.
DCFS reports indicated the children were thriving in their respective placements. C.L. was placed with a maternal great uncle who wished to adopt her. C.L. told a social worker she felt safe with the maternal great uncle and wanted to be adopted. The two youngest children were living with a paternal cousin and his wife, who wished to adopt them. H.M.‘s verbal skills had developed. She said she felt safe, happy, and comfortable in the paternal cousin‘s home. W.M. was crawling and developing appropriately. He appeared bonded to the caregivers. D.M. was in a foster care placement. D.M. is autistic and non-verbal. However, he appeared comfortable and happy during DCFS visits to his caregiver‘s home. The carеgiver reported D.M. was eating and sleeping well.
The juvenile court set father‘s
parenting courses, was not licensed in California. Father had no proof he had enrolled in or completed individual counseling. DCFS also had reports of father being seen with mother, in violation of the criminal protective order.
Following a hearing, the juvenile court denied father‘s
ICWA Background
The March 2023 detention report indicated that in February 2023, mother, the maternal grandmother, and father “stated” the family had no Native American ancestry. A DCFS social worker also inquired of the initial child abuse reporter, a police officer.
Mother and father subsequently filed ICWA-020 forms. The form asked whether the parent is or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe; whether the children are or may be members of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe; whether one of the responding parent‘s parents, grandparents, or other lineal ancestors is or was a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe; whether the parent or the children are residents of or are domiciled on a reservation, rancheria, Alaska Native village, or other tribal trust land; whether the children are or have been wards of a tribal court; and whether the parent or the children possess an Indian identifiсation card indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe. Both parents checked the box on their respective forms stating “none of the above apply.”
At the March 2023 detention hearing, the parents were present without any other family members. The juvenile court reviewed the ICWA-020 forms on the record and asked the parents each to confirm their written statements that they had no Native American ancestry. The juvenile court found it had no reason to know the children were Indian children. However, the court ordered DCFS to “speak with maternal relatives and paternal relatives . . . and learn if there‘s any Indian ancestry and reduce their findings into writing in the next report.”
In September 2023, a DCFS social worker again attempted to interview the parents about the children‘s potential Indian status. A report indicated “mother stated she has no knowledge of anyone in her family being a member of, or being enrolled with, any Nativе American Indian tribe. She was unable to identify a tribe of affiliation and advised there are no other family members who could provide further information regarding the matter.” The social worker was unable to reach father.
As the case continued, reports noted the existence of, and DCFS‘s eventual contact with, extended family members, including the paternal grandmother, the maternal uncle with whom father had an altercation in August 2023, the maternal great uncle who was C.L.‘s caregiver, and the paternal first cousin who, along with his wife, was H.M. and W.M.‘s caregiver.
Only one report provided a narrative description of DCFS‘s interview with an extended family member about whether the children are or may be Indian children. An October 2023 last minute information report informed the court that the maternаl grandmother “was also asked about the family‘s Native American Indian ancestry.” The report quoted her response: ” ‘We don‘t have any Native American Indian heritage, and none of my family members are enrolled with a tribe. I don‘t have any family members who can provide any[ ]more information about this.’ ”
However, an April 2024 status report informed the court: “During this reporting period, the paternal grandmother, [F.M.], continues to report no known Native American ancestry. [¶] During this reporting period, the paternal cousin, [S.M.], continues to report no known Native American ancestry. [¶] During this reporting period, the paternal [sic] great uncle, [E.I.], continues to report no known Native American ancestry.”3
A January 2025
Every other individual “reported ‘No,’ as to having any Native American ancestry in the family.” In January 2025, father also filed another ICWA-020 form as to W.M., stating none of the listed indicia of possible membership, or eligibility for membership, in an Indian tribe applied.
At the January 2025 permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply.
DISCUSSION
I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Finding ICWA Does Not Apply
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence for the juvenile court to find ICWA does not apply to the proceedings because DCFS failed to make an adequate inquiry of the children‘s extended family members. We find no error.
A. Duty of inquiry
”
Under
The inquiry duties continue if the child comes into the temporary or protective custody of the child welfare agency. Under
Under
Although the statute does not specify what information must be included in the agency‘s record of its inquiry,
“The petitioner [here, the child welfare agency] must on an ongoing basis include in its filings a detailed description of all inquiries, and further inquiries it has undertaken, and all information received pertaining to the child‘s Indian status, as well as evidence of how and when this information was provided to the relevant tribes. Whenever new information is received, that information must be expeditiously provided to the tribes.” (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1131, fn. 5 [rules adopted by the Judicial Council are entitled to deference].)
” ‘On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency‘s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.’ ” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1101–1102 (Kenneth D.).)
B. Standard of
In In re Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004–1005, disapproved on another ground in Dezi C., a panel of this court
concluded that a juvenile court‘s finding that there is no reason to know a child is an Indian child is reviewed for substantial evidence. However, the court reasoned that the determination of whether the child welfare agency has engaged in a “proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence as required” under
C. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding DCFS‘s inquiry of extended family members adequate
i. Paternal extended family members
Mother contends DCFS‘s inquiry of the children‘s paternal extended family members was inadequate because although DCFS “repeatedly reported” the paternal grandmother and paternal cousin “denied having Native American heritage,” “the record does not indicate [DCFS] actually asked [them].” Mother does not provide any further explanation of this argument. We can only understand her to suggest that because the DCFS reports did not expressly state that a social worker asked these paternal relatives whether the family had any Native American ancestry, the court should not have credited what were obviously their responses to that question.
We reject mother‘s argument. When a report indicates that a child‘s relative has denied having Native American ancestry, it is reasonable for the juvenile court to infer that the denial was in response to a social worker‘s question. Indeed, it is difficult to discern under what circumstances a person would “[deny] having Native American heritage” unless DCFS had first asked whether the person had any Native American heritаge. There is no indication in the record that DCFS had an alternative source of such information here.
To the extent mother contends the juvenile court should not have credited the reports of the paternal family members’ denials of Native American ancestry because there was insufficient detail about the ICWA inquiry process, we reject the contention as a basis for reversal because it disregards the standard of review. As the Dezi C. court held, the determination of whether the agency‘s inquiry was adequate and duly diligent is quintessentially discretionary. Likewise, on appeal, we defer to
the juvenile court‘s credibility findings. (See Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1105–1106 [whether paternal grandmother‘s denial of native ancestry should be credited was for juvenile court to determine in the first instance].) We also draw all inferences in favor of the juvenile court‘s orders and ” ’ “review the recоrd in the light most favorable to the court‘s determinations.” ’ ”6 (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
These fundamental precepts of appellate review remain applicable in ICWA inquiry cases. Applying a deferential standard of review, as we must, we conclude the evidence supported the juvenile court‘s discretionary determination that DCFS conducted an adequate and duly diligent inquiry of the
reasonably available paternal family members mother has identified.
ii. Maternal uncle
Mother additionally argues the juvenile court erred in finding DCFS‘s inquiry adequate because the record does not reflect that the agency asked the maternal uncle whether the children are, or may be, Indian children. We again disagree.
Similarly, in explaining why parents may not have knowledge of their Native American heritage, the court again quoted amici curiae who emphasized the potential loss of information at a generational level: ” ‘[G]enerations who lived through trauma at the hands of state actors pass a lack of self-identification as Native American to younger generations, leaving
only the older family members or extended family members with knowledge of’ Indian ancestry. [Citation.] Parents may simply be estranged from, or have an unfavorable relationship with, extended family.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1146.)
The Dezi C. court also rejected the appellate court‘s concern that automatic reversal when the inquiry was inadequate “would result in an ‘endless feedback loop of remand, appeal, and remand’ because the statutory duty of inquiry ‘creates an open-ended universe of stones’ . . . .” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) The Dezi C. court responded: “[O]ur conclusion does not require reversal in all cases in which every possible extended family member has not been asked about the child‘s Indian ancestry. As mother herself concedes,
The Dezi C. court further explained that “[i]f, upon review, a juvenile court‘s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence and record
Applying these overarching principles here, we conclude that sufficient evidence and record documentation supported the juvenile court‘s determination that DCFS‘s inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply, even though the agency did not appear to ask the maternal uncle if the children are or may be Indian children. As an initial matter, the record does not clearly demonstrate that the maternal uncle was “reasonably available to help the agency with its investigation.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) The DCFS reports indicated the maternal uncle had been in Texas until the incident with father at mother‘s home; before the incident, the maternal grandmother had not seen the maternal uncle “for a couple of years“; he was possibly intoxicated during that incident and was in California specifically to check into a rehabilitation facility; and he contacted DCFS unexpectedly to recant the portions of his statement to police that were unfavorable to mother. A social worker was subsequently unable to reach him for a further interview.
However, even if the maternal uncle was available, we determine that, under the circumstances of this case, there was nonetheless substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court‘s implied and express findings. (In re C.R. (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 793, 802 (C.R.) [juvenile court could reasonably find inquiry adequate where maternal grandmother was interviewed in a prior case and even though DCFS did not interview maternal aunt or maternal cousin about potential Native American ancestry]; but see In re Claudia R. (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76, 81 [finding DCFS inquiry inadequate where agency did not interview living and potentially available grandfathers and other relatives; concluding court may not find inquiry adequate if
agency did not interview all reasonably available extended family members].)
When first contacted about the family, DCFS social workers inquired of the individual reporting of the alleged abuse or neglect (a law enforcement officer), the parents, and the then available extended family member, the maternal grandmother.
Mother does not contend that, besides the maternal uncle, therе were other relatives or avenues of inquiry the juvenile court should have required DCFS to pursue. Mother also does not suggest that interviewing the maternal uncle could potentially have filled a gap in the information DCFS already had. The court could reasonably consider the responses of mother, the maternal grandmother, and the maternal great uncle, as well as
the absence of any indication the maternal uncle would have more information than his own mother (the maternal grandmother) as to whether the children are or may be Indian children. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1169 (dis. opn. of Groban, J., joined by three justices [focus of court‘s analysis should be on whether the inquiry has resulted in reliable information about child‘s possible tribal affiliation, not the number of individuals interviewed].)
Mindful of the standard of review, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly finding DCFS‘s inquiry was adequate, and substantial evidence supported the court‘s finding that ICWA did not apply. (C.R., supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at p. 802.)
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II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Denying Father‘s Section 388 Petition
Father contends the juvenile court erred in denying his
Once the juvenile court has terminated reunification services, the focus of dependency proceedings shifts to the child‘s
need for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) “[T]he parents’ interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount.” (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) “A court entertaining a
“In determining whether the petitioning party has carried his or her burden, ‘the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case.’ [Citation.] ‘Whether the juvenile court should modify a previously made order rests within its discretion, and its determination may not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 120.)
Here, the evidence amply supported the juvenile court‘s finding that father failed to show there were changed circumstances оr that reinstating reunification services, including visitation, would be in the children‘s best interest. There was evidence that father abused alcohol, and that his use of alcohol was linked to his violent behavior in the presence of the children. Although mother denied that father was an alcoholic, she told DCFS more than once that when father was intoxicated, he was “a different person,” was violent, and “made stupid choices.” The maternal grandmother likewise reported that father had “a problem” when he drank alcohol, but that when he was sober, “he is good.” In the reported violent incidents, including the altercation with the maternal uncle, there was evidence that father had been drinking. Yet, father had enrolled in a substance abuse program only one day before he filеd his
“The change in circumstances supporting a
The juvenile court also reasonably concluded father failed to establish that reinstating reunification services would be in the children‘s best interests. Since the court had terminated reunification services, the focus of the proceedings was necessarily on providing the children with permanence and stability. Father absented himself from the proceedings for over a year. He proffered no evidence indicating that, during that time, he attempted to maintain, or develop, his relationship with the children, either by pursuing contact in an allowed form, or by engaging in efforts to show thаt visitation would no longer be detrimental. He had not addressed his abuse of alcohol through
treatment and had no evidence to support his claims of sobriety. In the meantime, the children thrived with their respective caregivers. C.L. wanted the maternal great uncle to adopt her. H.M. and W.M. were bonded to their caregivers, the paternal cousin and his wife. Although a prospective adoptive parent had not yet been identified for D.M., he was doing well with his caregiver, who had cared for his needs as an autistic, non-verbal child.
In his petition, father asserted he had gained stability and wanted to learn about the children‘s interests and support them. This fell short of demonstrating it would be in the children‘s best interest to upend the permanence and stability they would gain in alternative permanent plans, to provide father an additional opportunity to attempt to build a relationship with them. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 [after termination of reunification services the minor‘s “best interests are not to further delay permanency and stability in favor of rewarding Mother for her hard work and efforts to reunify“].) The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying father‘s
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court orders are affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
HANASONO, J.