In re C.R. CA2/3
Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Mother appeals from the juvenile court‘s orders denying her
BACKGROUND
1. Summary of C.R.‘s dependency case
Mother gave birth to C.R. in December 2020, less than a month before she turned 16 years old. The father was mother‘s adult boyfriend. Mother herself was a minor dependent of the juvenile court. The Department had filed a
Mother, who was pregnant, had been placed in a short-term residential program (STRP). Mother had a “history of running away/being AWOL” from her placement to be with father. Father abused mother, had forced mother to have sex with him, and reportedly used methamphetamines. In August 2020, the court issued a ten-year criminal protective order protecting mother from father, but she continued to run away to be with him.
Shortly after C.R.‘s birth in December 2020, the Department received a report of general neglect of C.R. The reporting party expressed a concern that
At the January 27, 2021 detention hearing, the court detained C.R. from parents. The court gave the Department discretion to place C.R. with “any appropriate, assessed” maternal relative, other than maternal grandmother. The Department assessed both maternal aunt and maternal cousin for C.R.‘s possible placement. Maternal aunt decided against placement, and the Department could not immediately place C.R. with maternal cousin.
Mother entered a waiver of rights and no-contest plea at the May 21, 2021 adjudication and disposition hearing. The court sustained the petition, declared C.R. a dependent, and removed her from parents’ custody. The court granted mother reunification services. C.R. remained in foster care.
The court continued mother‘s reunification services several times. The Department again asked maternal cousin and aunt about becoming C.R.‘s caregiver, but they declined. Mother continued to run away from her STRP to be with father. On September 20, 2023, the court terminated mother‘s reunification services.
On September 24, 2024, the court denied the
2. ICWA inquiry and findings
When the Department social worker first visited mother and C.R. on December 24, 2020, mother denied Native American ancestry. The Department‘s January 22, 2021 detention report—referring to mother‘s earlier denial of Native American ancestry—stated ICWA “does not apply.” On January 26,
A year earlier—as part of mother‘s dependency case—maternal grandmother filed, on January 22, 2020, an ICWA-020 form also stating, “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know.”4 Maternal grandfather was deceased. That same day, the juvenile court found it had “no reason to know” mother “is an Indian Child, as defined under ICWA.” The court acknowledged maternal grandmother‘s ICWA-020 form was “signed and filed,” and ordered her to keep the Department, her attorney, and the court aware of any new information relating to possible ICWA status. The court noted it made its no-ICWA finding “after inquiry of [maternal grandmother] regarding her knowledge of any possible American Indian ancestry on [maternal grandfather‘s] side.” The Department‘s jurisdiction report noted the court‘s January 22, 2020 finding. The report also stated that, on January 29, 2020, maternal grandmother told the Department she didn‘t have contact information for maternal grandfather‘s family, and she didn‘t believe he had any American Indian heritage.
At the January 27, 2021 detention hearing in C.R.‘s case,5 the juvenile court confirmed with mother that her statement in the ICWA-020 form was correct. The juvenile court found it did “not have a reason to know that ICWA applies as to [m]other.”6 Before detaining C.R., the court—over mother‘s objection—admitted into evidence three reports from mother‘s dependency case. One of those reports—the report for the January 15, 2021
The court admitted the same three reports in evidence at the May 21, 2021 adjudication hearing. At mother‘s request, the court again admitted the status review report into evidence at permanency review hearings in October 2022. At the September 2023 hearing, the court admitted three reports from mother‘s case into evidence, including the status review report, on the Department‘s request.
DISCUSSION
1. Applicable law and standard of review
ICWA was enacted ” ‘to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .’ ” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1128–1129, quoting
Under Cal-ICWA, the juvenile court and DCFS “have ‘an affirmative and continuing duty’ in every dependency proceeding to determine whether ICWA applies by inquiring whether a child is or may be an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1131–1132, quoting
“The [D]epartment‘s duty arises when a report of abuse or neglect is made and/or when the county takes the child into its temporary custody.” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1099 (Kenneth D.).) This initial inquiry “includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members,
The juvenile court may find ICWA does not apply to a child‘s proceeding if it finds DCFS‘s “inquiry and due diligence were ‘proper and adequate,’ and the resulting record provided no reason to know the child is an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1134;
We generally review the juvenile court‘s factual finding that ICWA does not apply for substantial evidence. (
“[T]he juvenile court‘s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141, quoting Ezequiel G., supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 1005.) ” ‘On a well-developed record, the court has relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency‘s inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case. However, the less developed the record, the more limited that discretion necessarily becomes.’ ” (Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1101–1102.) Our high court thus has held, “[i]f, upon review, a juvenile court‘s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA does not apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence
2. Initial inquiry
Mother contends the Department‘s ICWA inquiry was inadequate because the record does not indicate the Department interviewed maternal relatives about C.R.‘s potential Indian ancestry, specifically, maternal grandmother, maternal aunt, and maternal cousin. The Department‘s reports relating to C.R.‘s case show it asked mother, father, and paternal relatives about possible Indian ancestry, all of whom denied having any. As mother notes, the Department was in contact with maternal aunt—mother‘s sister—and maternal cousin, but there is no record of the Department having asked them about C.R.‘s potential Indian ancestry. We also acknowledge there is no record of the Department having asked maternal grandmother about the family‘s potential Indian ancestry in C.R.‘s dependency case.
However, the Department and the court had questioned maternal grandmother about both her and deceased maternal grandfather‘s Indian ancestry during mother‘s dependency case, only a year before C.R.‘s case began. The undisputed evidence shows maternal grandmother denied Indian ancestry in her ICWA-20 form and again when questioned by the court about it. She also told the Department she didn‘t believe maternal grandfather (mother‘s father) had any Indian ancestry and had no contact information for any of his relatives, as he had been deceased for some time.
Mother‘s dependency case was ongoing at the time C.R.‘s case began. Both cases were assigned to the same dependency court department. Moreover, records from mother‘s dependency case were introduced and admitted into evidence in C.R.‘s case at several hearings, albeit not for the purpose of establishing ICWA did not apply. Nevertheless, the status review report containing the court‘s earlier January 2020 finding that ICWA did not apply to mother‘s case was among the records admitted into evidence and—as the Department argues—was before the court when it found ICWA did not apply to C.R.‘s case. Accordingly, this is not a situation where the Department is relying on evidence showing it made its ICWA inquiry after the juvenile court had issued its no-ICWA finding. (Cf. Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1096, 1100–1101, 1107 [appellate court could not consider evidence of postjudgment inquiry of father‘s and paternal grandmother‘s tribal heritage to conclude failure to conduct a proper inquiry was harmless].) Moreover, in Kenneth D., the child welfare agency and court never inquired into the father‘s Indian ancestry before the court terminated parental rights. (Id. at pp. 1095–1096.) Here, both the Department and the court asked mother and
As the Department and the court already had inquired of maternal grandmother—and the court had found ICWA did not apply to mother—the court reasonably could conclude there was no reason to duplicate inquiry efforts as to mother‘s side of the family by asking maternal grandmother about her potential Indian ancestry yet again. (See Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140 [compliance with ICWA early in the proceedings “avoid[s] . . . duplicative efforts“].) The court also reasonably could find mother‘s sister (maternal aunt) would not have had any more information about the family‘s potential Indian ancestry than their own mother (maternal grandmother) had. Similarly, given maternal grandmother‘s denial of Indian ancestry, the court reasonably could conclude asking maternal cousin about C.R.‘s Indian ancestry was unnecessary. (See Ibid. [reversal is not required where “every possible extended family member has not been asked about the child‘s Indian ancestry“].) Nor has mother identified any other maternal relatives who would have information about the family‘s possible Indian ancestry superior to maternal grandmother‘s knowledge. (See In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1053 [department “is not required to ‘cast about’ for information or pursue unproductive investigative leads“].)
Accordingly, we agree with the Department that the juvenile court‘s finding that ICWA did not apply to C.R.‘s case was based on a well-developed record demonstrating substantial evidence supported its finding: maternal grandmother repeatedly denied Indian ancestry in mother‘s case; maternal grandfather was deceased and maternal grandmother had no contact information for his family; and mother repeatedly denied Indian ancestry in C.R.‘s case. In the unusual circumstances presented here, we thus conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in impliedly finding the Department made an adequate inquiry into C.R.‘s potential Indian ancestry under ICWA and Cal-ICWA, and substantial evidence supported the court‘s finding that ICWA did not apply.
We affirm the juvenile court‘s September 24, 2024 orders.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
CODY, J.*
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.