In rе C.C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. C.C., a Minor, Respondent-Appellant).
No. 1-14-2306
Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division
January 6, 2015
2015 IL App (1st) 142306
JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Howse and Epstein concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-JD-3853; the Hon. Lori Wolfson, Judge, presiding.
Held
(Note: This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.)
Where respondent, a 14-year-old minor who was convicted of first-degree murdеr in the shooting death of another minor was sentenced to imprisonment in the Department of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first birthday and he also was given a mandatory minimum 45-year adult criminal sentence, which was stayed under the extended jurisdiction juvenile statute and will be vacated if he completes his juvenile sentеnce without any new offenses or violations of the juvenile sentence, the appellate court held that since the stay on respondent‘s adult criminal sentence has not been revoked, the State has not sought its revocation and the sentence may never be imposed, respоndent lacks standing to challenge the severity of that sentence at this time and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed.
Anita M. Alvarez, State‘s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Sрellberg, Kathleen Warnick, and Adam Meczyk, Assistant State‘s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
OPINION
¶ 1 Respondent C.C. was convicted of first-degree murder for the shooting death of 17-year-old Dejuan Jackson. Respondent was 14 years old at the time of the shooting. He was sentenced to imprisonment in the Department of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first birthday and also given a mandatory minimum 45-year adult criminal sentence. Under the extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ) statute, the adult portion of his sentence is stayed, and if respondent completes his juvenile sentence without committing a new offense or violating the conditions of his juvenile sentence, that adult sentence will be vacated on completion of that juvenile sentence.
¶ 2 Respondent appeals, arguing that his 45-year mandatory minimum adult-stayed sentence violates both the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportional penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 3 The preliminary and ultimately dispositive issue in this case is whether a minor-respondent sentenced under the EJJ statute, who receives a juvenile sentence plus a stayed adult criminal sentence, has standing to challenge the severity of his adult sentence when it has not yet been imposed and when the State has not petitioned for its imposition. On at least
¶ 4 We hold that, because the stay on respondent‘s adult criminal sentence has not been revoked, the State has not sought its revocation, and the sentence may never be imposed, respondent lacks standing to challenge the severity of his sentence at this time. We therefore affirm the judgment below.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 6 Respondent was charged with the first-degree murder of Jackson and the attempted first-degree murders of Robert Thompson and Andre Cribbs. On July 17, 2013, the trial court granted the State‘s motion to designate respondеnt‘s case as an EJJ prosecution under section 5-810 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (
¶ 7 The case proceeded to a jury trial. Since respondent is not raising any substantive challenges related to his proceedings, we will briefly summarize the facts adduced at trial. Thompson and Cribbs both testified for the State. They testified that, on September 26, 2012, they were walking to their friend Willie‘s house with Jackson. A black sport utility vehicle (SUV) approached them, and they saw respondent leaning out the passenger‘s side window with a revolver. Respondent fired several shots and Thompson and Cribbs ran. When they returned to the scene, they saw Jackson lying in a pool of blood. Jackson died from a gunshot wound to the back of his head. Both Thompson and Cribbs identified respondent as the shooter in a police lineup.
¶ 8 Respondent was acquitted of both counts of attempted murder but found guilty of the first-degree murder of Jackson. The trial court sentenced respondent to imprisonment in the Department of Juvenile Justice until his twenty-first birthday. Additionally, the trial court imposed an adult-stayed sentence of 45 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections, the mandatory minimum for first-degree murder with a firеarm.
II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, respondent raises no challenge to his conviction, but he contends that his adult criminal sentence is unconstitutional. Specifically, he argues that the mandatory minimum adult-stayed sentence of 45 years violates both the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. He asks this court to vacate that sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing at which the juvenile court may impose a stayed sentence below the mandatory minimum.
¶ 11 Here, as noted earlier, respondent‘s case was designated as an EJJ prosecution under section 5-810 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (
¶ 12 Respondent‘s adult criminal sentence is currently stayed. The State has not petitioned to revoke his stay for committing a new offense, and respondent has not been accused of violating the conditions of his juvenile sentence, which would subject him to discretionary revocation. The State argues that, under these facts, respondent lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of his adult sentence. Unless and until the stay on that sentence is revoked, the State claims, respondent has not suffered a sufficient injury to confer standing.
¶ 13 The doctrine of standing precludes courts from ruling upon mere abstract propositions of law, rendering advisory opinions, or giving legal advice as to future events. Underground Contractors Ass‘n v. City of Chicago, 66 Ill. 2d 371, 375 (1977). “A party mаy question the constitutional validity of a statutory provision only if he or she has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of enforcement of the statute.” People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 512 (1988).
¶ 14 We first note that, in two decisions where the State did not challenge defendant‘s standing, this court has questioned minor-respondents’ stаnding to challenge the length of their stayed adult sentences before those sentences are imposed. E.g., In re Vincent K., 2013 IL App (1st) 112915, ¶ 43 (questioning the minor‘s standing to challenge his stayed adult sentence because “respondent has not violated the provisions of his juvenile sentence and, accordingly, his adult sentence has not kicked in“); In re Phillip C., 364 Ill. App. 3d 822, 832 (2006) (though State failed to object to defendant‘s standing, questioning the minor‘s standing to challenge his stayed adult sentence because he “ha[d] it within his own power to determine whether the adult sentence will kick in“). Because the State failed to raise the issue in those cases, however, this court did not decide the standing question. In this case, the State has challenged respondent‘s standing.
¶ 15 We agree with the State that respondent lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of this adult criminal sentence at this juncture. Respondent has not committed a new offense that would trigger the imposition of his adult offense and, of course, may never do so. Likewise, he may never violate the terms of his juvenile sentence–and even if he does, the trial court may decide, in its discretion, not to order the execution of that adult sentence.
¶ 16 In In re M.I., 2013 IL 113776, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the respondent lacked standing to assert a due рrocess challenge to the revocation provision of the EJJ statute after the State, alleging that the respondent had committed a new offense, petitioned the court to revoke the stay on his adult sentence. Id. ¶ 34. The supreme court held that the respondent lacked standing beсause the language that he challenged as vague pertained to revocations based, not on the commission of a new offense, but on violations of the conditions of his juvenile sentence. Id. ¶ 36. Because the language he challenged was not the basis for his possible revocation, he could show no injury caused by that language. Id.
¶ 17 Similarly, in In re Omar M., 2014 IL App (1st) 100866-B, ¶ 1, the respondent alleged that the revocation provision of the EJJ statute was unconstitutionally vague. At the time, the State had not filed a petition to revoke the stay on respondent‘s adult sentence. Id. ¶ 10. Applying M.I., the court stated that the “vague fear” of the imposition of an adult sentence under the EJJ statute was insufficient to confer standing. Id. ¶ 11.
¶ 18 Finally, in In re J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3 (2004), the respondent was subjected to EJJ prosecution and given a stayed adult sentence. On appeal, the respondent claimed that the statutory provision providing for revocation of the stay on her adult sentence was unconstitutionally vague, even though her adult sentence had not been imposed. Id. at 14. The court found that the respondent lacked standing to challenge the revocation provision because her “claim [was] premature until a petition to revoke the stay [was] filed in аccordance with the EJJ statute.” Id. at 15.
¶ 19 Like M.I., Omar M., and J.W., this case involves a challenge to a statute that has not yet affected respondent and may never affect him. The stay on respondent‘s adult sentence has not been revoked and he has not been required to serve his adult sentence. Like Omar M. and J.W., the State in this case has not even filed a petition to revoke the stay on respondent‘s adult sentence. At this stage, respondent has not been directly or materially affected by the statute that provides for a mandatory minimum sentence of 45 years, and he is in no immediate danger of being affected by it. If a constitutional challenge to the procedure for revoking the stay is premature unless and until that procedure is instigated, it follows that the imposition of the adult-stayed sentence–which is one step further removed in time–is likewise premature.
¶ 20 Respondent claims that Omar M. and J.W. support his contention that he has standing in this case, because, while those cases found that respondents lacked standing to challenge the EJJ revocation procedure, those decisions did consider the respondents’ challenges to their adult sentences based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Respondent misreads those cases. The Apprendi challenges in those cases did not concern the adult sentence imposed; respondents challenged the fact that their cases were designated as EJJ prosecutions, which they claimed
¶ 21 For this same reason, respondent‘s reliance on In re Matthew M., 335 Ill. App. 3d 276 (2002), is misplaced. See id. at 286-87 (respondent raised Apprendi challenges directed at EJJ designation, after respondent‘s case had been designated as an EJJ prosecution and respondent had been tried and convicted). Matthew M. is also distinguishable because it concerned ripeness, an admittedly related doctrine that often overlaps with standing (see Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217, 252 (2010)), but a distinct doctrine nevertheless, and not one raised in this case by the State.
¶ 22 People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209 (1991), cited by respondent, likewise does not support his position. In P.H., the defendant was in the midst of a hearing in which the State sought to transfer him to adult criminal court. Id. at 217. Part of the defendant‘s argument at the transfer hearing was that the adult-transfer provision, itself, was unconstitutional. Id. The defendant unquestionably had standing to challenge that provision, as he was in immediate danger of being injured–the injury there being a transfer to adult court, which the State sought both below and on appeal. Id. at 220.
¶ 23 In contrast, in this case, the injury respondent asserts is a cruel and unusual sentence–but he is not serving that sentence, nor is he in immediate danger of serving it. He very well might never serve it. His asserted injury, at this stage, is too remote to confer standing.
¶ 24 By no means should our opinion be construed as limiting respondent‘s ability to challenge his adult sentence if he is required to serve it or if he is in imminent danger of serving it. We express no opinion on respondent‘s standing should those circumstances arise. We simply hold that, because the stay on his adult sentence has not been revoked and it is currently in no jeopardy of being revoked, respondent lacks standing at this time to challenge the severity of his sentence. In light of our decision, we express no opinion on the merits of defendant‘s constitutional challenges to his adult sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 26 For the foregoing reason, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 27 Affirmed.