IN RE: BIO-LAB CLASS ACTIONS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-CV-4407-SEG
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION
September 15, 2025
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Bio-Lab, Inc. (“Bio-Lab“), KIK International LLC, KIK U.S. Holdings LLC, and KIK Custom Products Inc.‘s (collectively, the “KIK Defendants“) partial motion to dismiss. (Doc. 176.)1 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for strict liability and their request for medical monitoring. After careful consideration, the Court enters the following order.
This is a putative class action stemming from a fire that engulfed a chemical plant in Conyers, Georgia last year. The plant is owned by Bio-Lab, a company that manufactures swimming pool chemicals. (Consolidated Class Action Complaint (“CAC“), Doc. 138 ¶¶ 40-42.)
A. The Fire
On September 29, 2024, a fire erupted at Bio-Lab‘s Conyers plant, producing a “toxic chemical plume” that was visible as far as 30 miles away. (Id. ¶ 1.)
According to Plaintiffs, “Plant 12” (or “Building 12“) was the source of the September 2024 fire at the Conyers facility. (Id. ¶ 293.) Plaintiffs allege that Plant 12 stored large quantities of chemicals that were highly combustible and prone to causing fires. Citing a November 2024 U.S. Chemical Safety Board (“CSB“) report, Plaintiffs indicate that the primary chemicals stored at Plant 12 were TCCA and DCCA.3 (Id. ¶ 267.) TCCA, or “trichloroisocyanuric
Plaintiffs assert, moreover, that TCCA and DCCA are harmful to human health, particularly when they combust and decompose during a fire. For instance, TCCA is “severely irritating to eyes and can cause serious and irreversible eye damage and burns[,]” as well as respiratory distress. (Id. ¶ 270.) DCCA is a “corrosive chemical” that can cause similar respiratory problems, skin corrosion, and eye damage. (Id. ¶ 268.) As TCCA and DCCA decompose, they “can release toxic and corrosive products such as chlorine gas and hydrogen chloride” which are also hazardous to human health. (Id. ¶ 267.)
In the hours and days following the fire, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Georgia Environmental Protection Division detected chlorine, chlorine compounds, chloramine, carbon monoxide, hydrogen chloride, and phosgene in the air over Rockdale County. (Id. ¶¶ 352-53.)
These chemicals, Plaintiffs allege, “are incredibly caustic, and even short-term exposures can cause severe, life-changing injuries.” (Id. ¶ 427.) According to Plaintiffs, hundreds of residents of Rockdale County have “visited emergency rooms and clinics complaining of symptoms associated with an exposure to the BioLab smoke[.]” (Id. ¶ 355.) Moreover, Plaintiffs claim that due to the release of toxic chemicals and debris from the fire, residents in communities surrounding Bio-Lab‘s facility have been unable to fully use their property. (Id. ¶ 356.)
B. Previous Fires and Regulatory Issues
Plaintiffs allege that Bio-Lab‘s Conyers plant has experienced several large fires over the past two decades. For instance, in 2004, a warehouse at the facility caught fire after an explosion involving 250,000 pounds of dry chlorine pellets. (Id. ¶¶ 229-30.) That fire allegedly injured 28 people and
In the years leading up to the 2024 fire, Plaintiffs state, environmental regulators discovered several violations at the Bio-Lab facility. (Id. ¶¶ 245-56.) For example, in February 2024, Georgia environmental regulators cited Bio-Lab for violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA“). (Id. ¶ 252.) Specifically, “regulators found multiple improperly sealed and unlabeled hazardous waste containers on site” and noted that “multiple areas showed a neglect of maintenance to the point of creating potential safety hazards.” (Id..) Plaintiffs also claim that in the past five years, Bio-Lab has
C. Plaintiffs
The named Plaintiffs in this case are several residents and businesses located in the vicinity of Bio-Lab‘s Conyers facility who were impacted by the September 2024 fire. (Id. ¶¶ 357-88.) To take one example of many, Plaintiff Teresa Boyd, a teacher in Rockdale County, was attending church near Bio-Lab‘s plant at the time of the fire. (Id. ¶ 362.) She alleges that she soon began to suffer symptoms including “skin irritation, a headache, coughing, shortness of breath, and aching of the eyes, nose, throat, and ears.” (Id.) When she returned home, she discovered that her dog had gotten sick and her husband and son were also feeling ill. (Id. ¶ 363.) The Boyd family then decided to evacuate their home for four days. (Id.) Upon returning, however, Ms. Boyd‘s family was still under a shelter-in-place order that advised them to avoid running any air conditioning. (Id. ¶ 364.) According to Ms. Boyd, her health and that of her family continued to deteriorate and each of them received medical treatment. (Id.) Ms. Boyd also has been unable to fully use and enjoy her home due to the presence of smoke, debris, and harmful pollutants that have been deposited on her property from the fire. (Id. ¶ 365.)
The CAC defines the putative class in this case as “[a]ll persons who resided, owned property, worked or operated businesses within a 25-mile radius of the Conyers Plant on September 29, 2024.” (Id. ¶ 395.) The class definition, however, excludes any personal injury claims. (Id. ¶ 398 (“Also excluded from the Class are any personal injury claims.“).)
D. Defendants
In addition to Bio-Lab, the owner of the Conyers chemical plant, the CAC names several defendants that can be categorized into two groups. The KIK Defendants—KIK International LLC, KIK Custom Products Inc., and KIK U.S. Holdings LLC—are various entities that are alleged to be parent companies of Bio-Lab and alleged to have directly operated the Conyers
The second group—the Centerbridge Defendants—is comprised of Centerbridge Capital Partners III, LP and Centerbridge Partners, LP. (Id. ¶¶ 60-66.) Plaintiffs allege that Centerbridge Capital Partners III, LP is a controlling shareholder of the KIK Defendants, and that Centerbridge Partners, LP controls Centerbridge Capital Partners III, LP. (Id. ¶¶ 97-100.) The relationship between the Centerbridge Defendants and Bio-Lab, or lack thereof, will be addressed in greater detail in the Court‘s forthcoming order on the Centerbridge Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (See Doc. 177.)
E. Procedural History
Between September 30, 2024, and November 5, 2024, over twenty putative class actions were filed in this Court bringing various claims related to the Bio-Lab fire. (Doc. 59, 97.) On November 5, 2024, the Court consolidated the related cases into the present action. (Id..) Soon after, the Court appointed interim class counsel to represent Plaintiffs through the pre-class certification phase of the proceedings. (Doc. 112.)
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a case when the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
The Bio-Lab and KIK Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for strict liability and their request for medical monitoring.4 (Doc. 176.) Before turning to the merits of Defendants’ motion, the Court addresses the substantive law to be applied to Plaintiffs’ claims.
A. Application of Georgia Law
The parties appear to agree that Georgia law applies to Plaintiffs’ claims. This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act,
Georgia follows the choice-of-law rule of lex loci delicti, which holds that “tort cases are governed by the substantive law of the state where the tort was committed.” Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Exchange v. R.D. Moody & Associates,
The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that when “a state‘s highest appellate court (in this case the Georgia Supreme Court) has addressed an issue of state law, [courts must] simply apply its holding.” CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 82 F.4th 1315, 1326 n.6 (11th Cir. 2023). However, when a court is “confronted with a state-law issue of first impression, [it] must attempt to predict how the state‘s highest court would decide the issue.” Id. “Absent certainty from the state‘s highest court,” a district court must “apply the decisions of the state‘s intermediate court—here,
B. Strict Liability Claim
There is “no general rule of strict liability in Georgia[.]” McEntyre v. Sam‘s E., Inc., 870 S.E.2d 385, 389 (Ga. 2022) (quoting Reeves v. Bridges, 284 S.E.2d 416, 418 (Ga. 1981)). Rather, strict liability is only available (1) where a statute imposes strict liability, or (2) in “certain circumstances involving abnormally dangerous activities . . . .” Id.
Plaintiffs do not identify a statute imposing strict liability for injuries caused by the manufacture or storage of chemicals. Instead, they assert a claim for strict liability on the ground that “Defendants are engaged in an ultrahazardous activity in the manufacture, processing, and storage of chlorine and other hazardous chemicals.” (Doc. 138 ¶ 142.) Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he manufacture, processing, and storage of highly toxic and combustible chemicals is abnormally dangerous and cannot be made safe by the exercise of the utmost care.” (Id. ¶ 143.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently allege that manufacturing and handling pool chemicals is an
Georgia courts have provided little guidance on the circumstances under which an activity should be considered “abnormally dangerous” for purposes of imposing strict liability. See Gullock v. Spectrum Scis. & Software, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1374 (M.D. Ga. 2001) (“Georgia courts have provided little guidance as to what constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity.“). The Supreme Court of Georgia has noted that “[h]istorically,” the abnormally dangerous label has been applied to “activities like owning vicious animals or explosive blasting[.]” McEntyre, 870 S.E.2d 385, 389 n.2 (Ga. 2022). Almost fifty years ago, in 1977, the Court also determined, in connection with a mining operation, that “the piling of dirt on [one‘s] own property in carrying out a legitimate business activity” was “not abnormally dangerous when supervised under the authority of the law of [the] state[.]” Gen. Refractories Co. v. Rogers, 239 S.E.2d 795, 798 (Ga. 1977).
The Georgia Court of Appeals has more recently evaluated whether certain enterprises were engaged in abnormally dangerous activities in two cases. Lowry v. Cochran considered a suit brought by a spectator who was struck by a skydiver whose parachute collapsed during a skydiving
Another case, Combustion Chemicals, Inc. v. Spires, involved “the emission of highly acidic water which . . . destroys a creek‘s ability to sustain normal aquatic life” in connection with a mining operation. 433 S.E.2d 60, 62 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). The Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned that it could not “hold as a matter of law that the activity of holding highly acidic water in ponds which may pollute streams running through the property of adjoining landowners is not a dangerous activity.” Id. Conversely, the Court also declined to conclude, based on the evidence, “that the activity is dangerous as
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 sets forth a six-part test to determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous. At least one federal district court in Georgia has found that “[i]n the absence of any other state guidance, . . . the Supreme Court of Georgia would apply the Restatement test to determine whether [certain] activities were abnormally dangerous.” Gullock, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1375. In deciding whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the Restatement considers the following factors:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977). While the comments to Section 520 of the Restatement suggest that all factors are to be considered, id. cmt. f.,
Turning to the facts of this case, Plaintiffs contend that Bio-Lab‘s manufacture and storage of pool chemicals constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Bio-Lab handles pool chemicals such as TCCA and DCCA that pose health hazards and are “known to be explosive or combustible.” (Doc. 138 ¶¶ 265, 267.) Plaintiffs highlight that some of these pool chemicals can ignite from being wetted by a small quantity of water, thereby posing a high risk of fire and explosion. (Id. ¶¶ 271-72, 280.) TCCA, in particular, “is a strong oxidizer [that] can intensify existing fires” and “wet TCCA can generate nitrogen trichloride, which creates an
Plaintiffs also emphasize that Bio-Lab has had eight fires in its various facilities since 2004, and that at least eleven fires involving pool chemicals occurred nationwide between 1996 and 2000. (Id. ¶¶ 229-44, 257-63.) According to Plaintiffs, “the fact that these fires keep happening is additional evidence that—if they are not caused by Defendants’ negligence—then the storage and manufacturing of these chemicals is inherently dangerous.” (Doc. 190 at 26; see also Doc. 138 ¶ 486 (“The ultrahazardous nature of Defendants’ conduct is evident in the history of repeated chemical fires at the Conyers Plant, and other BioLab facilities around the country, caused when water-reactive chemicals came into contact with water.“).)
Although this issue presents a close call, at this early motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Bio-Lab‘s manufacture, use, and storage of water-reactive chemicals was abnormally dangerous. In reaching this conclusion, the Court considers that while “Georgia courts have deemed certain activities to be abnormally dangerous as a matter of law, and others not, . . . nothing in [the] applicable precedent either
Several of the Restatement factors also weigh in favor of permitting Plaintiffs’ strict liability claim to move forward. With respect to the first and second factors, Plaintiffs have plausibly pled that there is an elevated risk of fire from handling large quantities of chemicals like TCCA and DCCA that are highly combustible. Further, they have pled that the harm which results from
The parties vigorously dispute how the Court should weigh the critical third factor—whether the risk posed by an activity can be eliminated through the exercise of reasonable care. Plaintiffs argue that the combustible nature of chemicals like TCCA and DCCA, together with the history of frequent fires involving pool chemicals at Bio-Lab‘s plants and elsewhere, raise a plausible inference that the risks of handling such chemicals cannot be eliminated through reasonable care. For their part, Defendants emphasize that the CAC
Plaintiffs have the better argument at this early stage of the proceedings. Whether the risks of manufacturing and storing chemicals like TCCA and DCCA in large quantities can be eliminated through the exercise of reasonable care is a question more apt for resolution following evidentiary development in this case. See, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 965 F.2d 1488, 1495 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Whether reasonable care could have eliminated the risk of harm here is not so easily determined.“); Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 842 F. Supp. 475, 479 (D.N.M. 1993) (“Whether strict liability
In addition, Plaintiffs are permitted to plead alternative and inconsistent theories of liability. See Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1175 (11th Cir. 2014) (“It is a well-settled rule of federal procedure that plaintiffs may assert alternative and contradictory theories of liability.“);
In short, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Bio-Lab was
C. Medical Monitoring Fund
Among the remedies requested in the CAC, Plaintiffs seek the establishment of a medical monitoring fund as a form of equitable relief “to compensate them for ongoing screening for early detection and treatment of illnesses, diseases, or disease processes necessitated by their exposure to toxic chemicals, fumes, smoke, and debris arising from Defendant[s]’ wrongful conduct.” (Doc. 138 ¶ 422.) Plaintiffs allege that such medical monitoring is reasonably necessary due to the increased risk of illness associated with exposure to hazardous substances released during the fire at the Bio-Lab facility. (Id. ¶ 428.)
Plaintiffs, however, have explicitly excluded any “damages claims for any current physical manifestation of personal or bodily injury” from their
After assessing the relevant cases presented by the parties, the Court is left with considerable uncertainty as to whether Georgia law permits medical monitoring as a tort remedy absent a current physical injury. In Boyd v. Orkin Exterminating Co., the Georgia Court of Appeals considered an action brought by a family seeking to recover for injuries allegedly caused by a pest control company‘s negligent application of toxic insecticide inside their home. 381 S.E.2d 295, 296 (1989). The Boyds presented expert medical testimony that their children had significantly elevated levels of heptachlor, a toxic chemical that the insecticide contained, in their bloodstreams. Id. at 297. They contended that their children had “suffered an injury” and would require periodic medical monitoring in the future to ascertain whether they were developing any health problems due to their exposure to the toxic pesticide. Id. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for the pest control company, Orkin, to the extent the Boyds sought damages for an “increased risk
The Court of Appeals affirmed. First, the Court determined that the directed verdict was proper because the Boyds could not recover actual damages against Orkin “based on expert testimony that the presence of elevated levels of the heptachlor metabolite in the children‘s blood itself constituted ‘injury.‘” Id. at 298. Instead, the Court held that “absent any indication that the presence of these metabolites had caused or would eventually cause actual disease, pain, or impairment of some kind, this testimony must be considered insufficient to support an award of actual damages in any amount.” Id. (emphasis added).
Second, the Court decided that partial summary judgment in favor of Orkin was warranted on the issue of whether the Boyds could recover for an alleged “increased risk of cancer” from exposure to the insecticides. Id. Citing an American Law Reports survey,7 the Court stated that “[i]n those jurisdictions which have allowed recovery for an enhanced future risk of developing a new complication, the claimant has been required to establish to
The Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, has read Boyd to preclude recovery of medical monitoring costs where a plaintiff fails to state a current physical injury. Parker v. Wellman, 230 F. App‘x 878, 883 (11th Cir. 2007). The Parker plaintiffs sought damages for injuries allegedly caused by exposure to a hazardous substance, beryllium, during their employment. Id. at 879-80. They alleged, in part, that they “ha[d] suffered and w[ould] suffer in the future personal injuries in the form of sub-clinical, cellular, and sub-cellular damage” and had been “placed at substantially increased risk” of several diseases. Id. at 880. Affirming the district court‘s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ request for medical monitoring, the Parker Court found that “because Plaintiffs’ allegations of subclinical damage are insufficient to state a current physical injury, Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover the ‘quantifiable costs of periodic medical examinations’ as future medical expenses.” Id. at 883 (citing Hendrix v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1504 (11th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiffs, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, had “failed to point us to any Georgia authority that allows recovery of medical monitoring costs in the absence of a current physical injury, and Boyd suggests that Georgia would not recognize such a claim.” Id.
Following the Parker decision, however, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed Boyd in the context of a data breach case. In Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinic, P.A., the Supreme Court of Georgia asked the question, “[w]hen a criminal steals consumers’ sensitive personal data, what do those consumers have to plead against the allegedly negligent business from whom the data was stolen to show a legally cognizable injury under Georgia tort law?” 837 S.E.2d 310, 311 (Ga. 2019). The plaintiffs in Collins alleged that “an anonymous hacker stole the personally identifiable information, including Social Security numbers, addresses, birth dates, and health insurance details, of at least 200,000 current and former patients of Athens Orthopedic Clinic (‘the Clinic‘) from the Clinic‘s computer databases.” Id. at 311. In their suit, the plaintiffs sought costs related to credit monitoring and identity theft protection. Id. at 312. The Clinic moved to dismiss the case. Id.
Before reaching the Supreme Court of Georgia, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals “concluded that although the credit monitoring and other precautionary measures alleged by the plaintiffs were ‘undoubtedly prudent,’
The Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the Court of Appeals’ reasoning based on Boyd. As an initial matter, the Supreme Court noted that Boyd and two other precedents cited by the Court of Appeals were issued at the summary judgment or class certification stage, where evidence was required to prevail, rather than on a motion to dismiss, where a plaintiff‘s allegations must be accepted as true. Id. at 314-315. The Supreme Court also distinguished the Collins plaintiffs’ allegations from previous data breach cases which had presented a more speculative risk of harm. Specifically, the Court explained that while previous cases presented no “reason to believe that the data in question had in fact fallen into a criminal‘s hands; here, plaintiffs allege that their data was stolen by a criminal whose alleged purpose was to sell the data
In a footnote, the Supreme Court of Georgia acknowledged the Eleventh Circuit‘s conclusion in Parker that Boyd precludes recovery of medical monitoring costs where a plaintiff fails to state a current physical injury. Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that the Court of Appeals had “cited an unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinion surmising that Boyd ‘suggests that Georgia would not recognize’ a claim for ‘recovery of medical monitoring costs in the absence of a current physical injury.‘” Id. at 314 n.2 (quoting Parker v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 230 F. App‘x 878, 883 (11th Cir. 2007)). The Supreme Court further stated that “[this] type of claim is not before us, and we express no opinion on the viability of such a claim.” Id. at 314 n.2. A draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts has interpreted this footnote as “cast[ing] doubt” on Parker‘s holding. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Miscellaneous Provisions § 1_0, Tentative Draft No. 3 (2024) (“In 2019, however, the Georgia Supreme Court cast doubt on Parker‘s prediction in a footnote.“).
The legal developments described above leave this Court with uncertainty as to whether Georgia law permits a remedy of medical monitoring
Moreover, neither Boyd nor Collins provides a clear answer on the availability of medical monitoring as a tort remedy. One might fairly read Boyd as expressing skepticism that Plaintiffs can recover for the costs of medical monitoring based on an increased risk of future medical conditions. See Boyd, 381 S.E.2d at 298 (“The appellants merely produced medical testimony that the children would require monitoring in the future to determine whether they developed health problems due to their exposure to the chemicals.“). On the other hand, Boyd appears to have ultimately rested its conclusion that the Boyds could not recover damages related to an increased risk of cancer on a finding that the evidence presented on summary judgment
Adding to this Court‘s doubts as to the proper interpretation of Boyd, the decision did not clearly distinguish between a claim seeking compensation for the increased risk of future disease and a claim seeking medical monitoring. As some courts have explained, “an action for medical monitoring seeks to recover only the quantifiable costs of periodic medical examinations necessary to detect the onset of physical harm, whereas an enhanced risk claim seeks compensation for the anticipated harm itself, proportionately reduced to reflect the chance that it will not occur.” In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 850 (3d Cir. 1990); see Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v. Dep‘t of the Army & Dep‘t of Def. of the U.S., 696 A.2d 137, 144 (Pa. 1997); Petito v. A.H. Robins Co., 750 So. 2d 103, 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). The Third Circuit, for instance, has reasoned that an injury based on enhanced risk “is inherently speculative because courts are forced to anticipate the probability of future injury[,]” while the remedy of medical monitoring “is much less speculative because the issue
This Court expresses no view on whether medical monitoring ought to be a cognizable remedy under Georgia law. However, because Boyd‘s analysis did not clearly distinguish between compensation for the increased risk of disease and medical monitoring as a form of equitable relief, it is difficult to discern whether the Georgia Court of Appeals intended to entirely foreclose the availability of medical monitoring in the absence of a current physical injury. Further, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Collins “express[ed] no opinion on the viability of such a claim[,]” and as far as this Court is aware, has not considered the question since. 837 S.E.2d at 314 n.2.
Furthermore, there does not appear to be a nationwide consensus on the availability of medical monitoring as a remedy when no physical injury is present. To the contrary, “of the jurisdictions in which state courts or federal courts (predicting state law) have expressly considered . . . the issue, roughly half have authorized medical monitoring absent present injury . . . , while approximately half of courts reject such claims.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Miscellaneous Provisions § 1_0, Tentative Draft No. 3 (2024); see also Metro-N. Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 440 (1997) (noting “that federal courts, interpreting state law, have come to different conclusions about”
Finally, the Court would be remiss if it did not acknowledge the high stakes involved in this action. The September 2024 Bio-Lab fire is alleged to have caused 17,000 people to evacuate, prompted another 90,000 to shelter-in-place for several days, and disrupted approximately 2,200 businesses. (Doc. 138 ¶¶ 310-24.) According to Plaintiffs, in the wake of the fire, hundreds of residents of Conyers, Georgia “visited emergency rooms and clinics complaining of symptoms associated with an exposure to the BioLab smoke[.]” (Id. ¶ 355 (internal quotation marks omitted).) Plaintiffs further contend that putative class members experienced “significant exposure to hazardous substances, which are known to cause serious illnesses, diseases, and disease processes.” (Id. ¶ 428.) Given the uncertainty with respect to the availability of medical monitoring as a remedy under Georgia law, as well as the alleged far-reaching impacts of the Bio-Lab fire on Georgia residents, the Court finds it appropriate and prudent to certify this issue to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
Federal courts have discretion to certify “novel, unsettled questions of state law” to the state‘s highest court for resolution. Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997)); see
As the Court has explained above, it has “substantial doubt” as to the availability of medical monitoring as a remedy under Georgia law where a plaintiff does not seek to recover for a present physical injury.8 The Supreme Court of Georgia has never squarely addressed the question. Because of the importance of this issue, and its dispositive impact on Plaintiffs’ request for medical monitoring, principles of federalism and comity weigh in favor of certification to the Supreme Court of Georgia. See Steele v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec., 51 F.4th 1059, 1065 (11th Cir. 2022) (“As a matter of federalism and comity, it is often appropriate to certify dispositive issues of [state] law to [the
- Under Georgia law, may plaintiffs who have been exposed to toxic substances which may cause future disease, but who do not claim a present physical injury, obtain medical monitoring as a form of equitable relief in a tort action?
- If the answer is yes, what is the legal standard for obtaining such a remedy?
The Court‘s phrasing of these questions “is intended only as a guide.” United States v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 1131, 1133 (11th Cir. 2015). The Court does not intend to restrict the Supreme Court of Georgia‘s consideration of the issues or the scope of its inquiry. If the Court has “overlooked or mischaracterized any state law issues or inartfully stated any of the questions . . . posed, [the Court] hope[s] the [Georgia] Supreme Court will feel free to make the necessary corrections.” Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 230 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 2000). To assist its consideration of these issues, the entire record of this case, including the parties’ briefing, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss (Doc. 176) is DENIED IN PART and DEFERRED and STAYED IN PART. The motion is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ strict liability claim. The Court defers consideration of the motion as to Plaintiffs’ request for a medical monitoring fund pending the Supreme Court of Georgia‘s response to the certified questions posed above.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to transmit the full record of this case, including the parties’ briefing, to the Supreme Court of Georgia.
SO ORDERED, this 15th day of September, 2025.
SARAH E. GERAGHTY
United States District Judge