In re B.S.
Hoffman, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
{¶2} On April 12, 2010, TCJFS filed a Complaint, alleging B.S. (dob 11/22/05) and S.S. (dob 9/22/09) were neglected and dependent. Mother and Brock Schenker are the biological parents of the two girls.1 TCJFS became involved after Mother dismissed a protection order she had sought against Father based upon threats of harm by Father as well as domestic violence. At the adjudicatory hearing on June 11, 2010, Mother and Father stipulated the children were neglected and dependent. The trial court approved and adopted a case plan for both parents. The children remained in the temporary custody of TCJFS with parents being granted supervised visitation. TCJFS suspended Mother’s visits following her first visit as Mother engaged in disruptive conduct and left the visitation room and the agency inexplicably. The trial court reinstated her visits, but suspended such again in April, 2011, after Mother repeatedly tested positive for illegal drugs. Following the suspension of her visit in April, 2011, Mother did not see the children and did not have any contact with TCJFS or the trial court.
{¶3}
{¶4} At the hearing, Dr. Anita Exley, a clinical psychologist at Chrysalis Counseling Center, testified she conducted an evaluation of Mother. As a result, Dr. Exley diagnosed Mother with adjustment disorder with a histrionic personality disorder as well as narcissistic personality features. Dr. Exley recommended Mother engage in therapy to assist her in confronting her issues and to develop an ability to be more emotionally available to her daughters. Dr. Exley stated if Mother did not follow through with the recommendation of therapy, she would have concerns about reuniting the children with Mother. The doctor explained she found Mother to be self-absorbed, focused on her own issues, and placed her own needs and concerns above those of her daughters.
{¶5} Jamie Grunder, the ongoing case manager for the family, testified drug use was not a concern when the complaint was initially filed, but developed over time regarding both parents. Grunder stated the last time she saw Mother was April 4, 2011, at the hearing during which her visits with the children were suspended. Grunder indicated Mother had moved out of state and had been evicted from her last residence in April, 2011. Mother tested positive for marijuana at each meeting with Grunder. Grunder had a difficult time finding Mother, who would not show up for appointments or cancel them. Although the case plan was adopted in May, 2010, Mother did not submit to her psychological evaluation until January, 2011. Mother did not follow through with any of the recommendations. Mother completed the parenting classes. Grunder did not know if Mother had housing as she had been evicted in April. Mother never provided
{¶6} Via Judgment Entry dated September 25, 2011, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights, privileges and responsibilities with respect to her two minor daughters and granted permanent custody of the children to TCJFS.
{¶7} It is from this judgment entry Mother appeals, raising the following assignments of error:
{¶8} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES PERMANENT CUSTODY AS SAID DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AS REQUIRED BY O.R.C. 2151.414 AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶9} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES PERMANENT CUSTODY WHEN APPROPRIATE RELATIVE PLACEMENT WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE CHILDREN.
{¶10} “III. THE CHILDREN WERE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS GUARANTEED BY THE OHIO AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONS WHEN THEY WERE NOT APPOINTED LEGAL COUNSEL.”
{¶11} This case comes to us on the expedited calendar and shall be considered in compliance with
I
{¶12} In her first assignment of error, Mother contends the trial court erred in granting permanent custody of B.S. and S.S. to TCJFS as such decision was not
{¶13} As an appellate court, we neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Our role is to determine whether there is relevant, competent and credible evidence upon which the fact finder could base its judgment. Cross Truck v. Jeffries (Feb. 10, 1982), Stark App. No. CA5758. Accordingly, judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578.
{¶14}
{¶15} Following the hearing,
{¶16} In determining the best interest of the child at a permanent custody hearing,
{¶17} Therefore,
{¶18} If the child is not abandoned or orphaned, then the focus turns to whether the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the parents. Under
{¶19}
{¶20} Some seven months after she was ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation, Mother commenced the process. There was no evidence Mother followed through with any of the recommendations. The psychologist diagnosed Mother with adjustment and histrionic personality disorders as well as narcissistic personality traits. Without Mother’s engaging in therapy, Dr. Extley expressed concerns about returning the children to Mother.
{¶21} Mother’s visitation with the children was suspended as the result of her drug use on two occasions during the pendency of the matter. Mother, however, did not complete a drug and alcohol assessment. After her visitation was suspended on April 14, 2011, Mother had no further contact with the children, TCJFS, or the trial court.
{¶22} There was no evidence Mother had established stable housing. In fact, the caseworker testified Mother had been evicted in April, 2011. The caseworker had been informed Mother had moved to North Carolina.
{¶23} Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court’s finding the children could not or should not be returned to Mother was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶24} Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶25}
{¶26} In In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 857 N.E.2d 532, 2006–Ohio–5513, the Ohio Supreme Court clearly found a trial court’s statutory duty in determining whether it is in the best interest of a child to grant permanent custody to an agency does not include finding, by clear and convincing evidence, no suitable relative is available for placement. The statute requires the trial court to weigh all relevant factors.
{¶27} TCJFS conducted a home study on the residence of maternal grandmother, Donna Zarnick. Such was conducted even though neither Zarnick nor Mother filed a motion with the trial court requesting Zarncik be considered for placement. Following the home study, the case worker had concerns about placing the children with Zarnick. The case worker noted Zarnick blamed the situation on Father and the court system. Zarncik believed Mother should be able to parent her daughters. The case worker indicated Zarnick was uncooperative and difficult during the home study process. The case worker expressed concerns regarding the physical condition of Zarnick’s home.
{¶28}
{¶29} Mother’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶30} In her final assignment of error, Mother submits the trial court denied the children their right to due process by failing to appoint legal counsel for the children as the children’s wishes conflicted with the guardian ad litem’s recommendation.
{¶31} In In re Williams (2004), 101 Ohio St.3d 398, 805 N.E.2d 1110, 2004–Ohio–1500, the Ohio Supreme Court held a child who is the subject of a juvenile court proceeding to terminate parental rights is a party to that proceeding and is entitled to independent counsel under certain circumstances. “[C]ourts should make a determination, on a case-by-case basis, whether the child actually needs independent counsel, taking into account the maturity of the child and the possibility of the child’s guardian ad litem being appointed to represent the child.” Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶32} The Williams court did not explain what circumstances might trigger the juvenile court’s duty to appoint counsel. See, In re A.T., Summit App. No. 23065, 2006–Ohio–3919 at ¶ 57; In re Wylie, 2d Dist. No.2004CA0054, 2004–Ohio–7243, at ¶ 70. The facts of Williams indicate the child whose custody was at issue was four years of age at the time he was initially placed in the temporary custody of the child protective agency. Williams at ¶ 2. He was subsequently returned to his mother, removed again, and was six years of age at the time the permanent custody hearing was conducted. Id. at ¶ 4. The child was represented by a guardian ad litem, who was an attorney, but was not appointed to represent the child in a dual capacity. In re Williams, 11th Dist. Nos. 2002–G2454, 2002–G–2459, 2002–Ohio–6588, at ¶ 20. The child was said to have “repeatedly expressed a desire to remain with his mother,” and the guardian ad litem recommended that permanent custody be granted to the agency. Williams, 2004–Ohio–1500, at ¶ 5.
{¶33} The Williams Court emphasized the child expressed his wish for reunification “often,” “consistently,” and “repeatedly.” Williams, 2002–Ohio–6588, at ¶ 17, ¶ 20, and ¶ 9. He “often did not want to let appellant out of his sight.” Id. at ¶ 9. Significantly, the appellate court recognized “there is no need to consider the appointment of counsel based upon a child’s occasional expression of a wish to be with a parent or because of a statement made by an immature child.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 24; In re A. T., supra.
{¶34} In the case at bar, the only evidence to which Mother cites in support of her position the trial court should have appointed separate legal counsel for B.S. and S.S. was a letter from Gail Weisend, B.S.’s counselor, to the case worker, in which Weisend stated B.S. was grieving the loss of Father “especially”, and wanted to go home. B.S. never expressed any wishes directly to the case worker.
{¶35} Although the specific wishes of the child/children are a statutory factor the trial court may consider in making a best interest determination, such consideration must be made “with due regard for the maturity of the child”.
{¶36} We find the counselor’s general expression of the girl’s emotions does not equate to the child’s ability to make a knowing choice to remain with one parent. The counselor also noted B.S. was open to being loved by another mother and father. We
{¶37} The judgment of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, J.
Delaney, P.J. and
Farmer, J. concur
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Costs to appellant.
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. SHEILA G. FARMER