IN RE B.C.; C.P., APPELLANT.
No. 19-FS-984
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
August 19, 2021
Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (NEG-9-19) (Hon. Janet Albert, Magistrate Judge) (Hon. Darlene Soltys, Associate Judge) (Argued June 16, 2021)
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.
Allison K. Bauer was on the brief for appellant.
Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Stacy L. Anderson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and David Stark, Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief for appellee.
Before THOMPSON and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and OKUN, Associate Judge, Superior Court of the District of
EASTERLY, Associate Judge: A determination that a parent is unable to discharge their responsibilities to care for their child due to mental incapacity under
I. Facts and Procedural History
In 2018, the District‘s Child and Family Services Agency opened an investigation into then eight-year-old B.C.‘s care by his mother, C.P. CFSA subsequently filed neglect charges pursuant to
A. The Government‘s Theories of Neglect and the Evidence at Trial
At the 2019 neglect trial before a magistrate judge, the government argued that B.C. was a neglected child under
Separately, the government argued that B.C. was a neglected child under
The government did not present any recent psychiatric records or expert testimony to substantiate its allegation that C.P.‘s mental incapacity led her to seek unnecessary treatment for B.C. Instead, the government presented a variety of medical records from (1) Jordan House, a psychiatric facility where C.P. received treatment for three days in 2011 for depression and suicidal ideation before checking herself out against therapeutic advice; (2) Core Health and Wellness Center, a “primary care, alternative medicine and holistic wellness services” facility,2 documenting numerous appointments for a range of reported ailments in 2012-16 which indicated that she may have had ongoing mental health issues,3 but only a handful of appointments in 2017 and 2018 for ailments which were verified and treated; and (3) United Medical Center, spanning 2011-19, documenting appointments in 2017-19 for verified and treated ailments and minor injuries (e.g., a recurring sore throat, a urinary tract infection, and a bruised finger).
The government also presented testimony regarding C.P.‘s mental health from three CFSA employees who had interacted with C.P.4 Narendra Date, the social worker
Edward Rodrigues, the social worker assigned to B.C.‘s case in January 2019 after B.C. was removed from C.P.‘s care, testified that he had talked on the phone and texted with C.P. weekly but met with her only once to supervise a visit with B.C. He noted that her texts could sometimes “go[] onto a tangent” and that she had called the police on him twice.5 He expressed concern about her “lack of awareness of her mental health needs” but also stated that “I don‘t know if it‘s — we have an understanding of where she is at mentally right now.” When asked to explain why he thought she had current mental health needs, he testified that it was “[j]ust the long text messages that are . . . kind of incoherent; the ongoing lack of trust with anyone, particularly me,” and “[t]he idea that she still sees . . . a medical problem, or dental problems despite the advice of the doctor.” But he also testified that their relationship had improved over time, that she had become “more open” to working with the agency, and that she was working with a peer mentor. When asked to connect his concerns about C.P.‘s mental health to her parenting, he testified that “I can‘t say because I‘ve only witnessed one visit.”
Lastly, Shanay Tymus, a registered nurse employed by CFSA, testified about accompanying Mr. Date on a home visit to C.P.‘s house in April 2018. At that visit, she and Mr. Date tried to get more information about B.C.‘s health history, but C.P. refused to provide them any documents or sign a release form. Ms. Tymus testified that C.P. was “frustrated, really defensive, kind of like paranoid, but she wasn‘t confrontational or anything.”
C.P. testified on her own behalf. Regarding B.C.‘s education, she explained that, with authorization and instructions from OSSE, she had homeschooled him in 2017 (when B.C. would have been in first grade) because “he improves with working one-on-one.” She testified that she used “many” curriculums from the D.C. Library, but she was not asked to identify any one of them by name. She testified that, for reading, she used flash cards to teach B.C. sight words; for math, she worked with him on addition and subtraction (she noted that he struggled with double digit numbers); for science, she had him draw pictures of “plants, and things like that.” Over the summer of 2018, she enrolled him in Beers Elementary School, but she explained that he never attended because it was 30 minutes away and she wanted to enroll him at a school closer to home. She then enrolled B.C. at Martin Luther King, Jr. Elementary School, but when he got a spot at Ingenuity Prep, she decided to enroll him there because she wanted him to “go to a prep school [instead of a] public school.” She took him out of Ingenuity Prep after a few weeks because
Regarding her mental health, C.P. admitted that she had received treatment in 2011-12 for postpartum depression but stated that she had no current diagnoses. Regarding B.C.‘s medical care, she testified that his facial swelling was documented and diagnosed as the reaction to an impacted molar, and she pushed back against the notion that “[she] was just paranoid.” She explained that B.C. was scheduled to have a surgical procedure to address his impacted molar in January, but he was removed from her care before the procedure could be performed.
B. The Neglect Determinations by the Magistrate Judge and the Associate Judge
After the government gave its initial closing argument, the magistrate judge indicated for the first time that she was contemplating whether B.C. was neglected not only based on the government‘s theories that (1) C.P. had failed to ensure B.C. was getting adequate educational support, and (2) C.P.‘s mental incapacity had caused her to seek out unnecessary medical care for B.C., but also based on a theory that the government had not argued, namely, (3) C.P.‘s alleged mental incapacity had affected her decisionmaking regarding B.C.‘s education.6
Alluding to the need to prove that a parent‘s mental incapacity has a nexus to a child‘s neglect, the magistrate judge asked the government during its rebuttal, “what‘s the nexus for both the school and the medical?” The government responded only “as it relates to the medical” by explaining that “there‘s a nexus between her mental health, her paranoia and her fixation that something is wrong with B.[C.]” The magistrate judge subsequently asked again, “what do you say the nexus is on the mental health on the decision making around schooling?” Obliged to address the court‘s question, the government focused on the fact that B.C. was not getting the educational support he needed but proffered no link to C.P.‘s mental health. Indeed, highlighting C.P.‘s movement of B.C. from school to school, the counsel for the government acknowledged that he was “not sure of” “[t]he reason” for her actions. Even so, the government ended the discussion by conclusorily arguing that B.C. was “unable to get what he needs educationally in [C.P.‘s] care because [of] the mental health and the medical issue.”
In a written order, the magistrate judge determined that the government had carried its burden to prove educational neglect,
Nevertheless, the magistrate judge concluded that B.C. was neglected under
C.P. sought review by an associate judge and raised sufficiency challenges to both of the magistrate judge‘s neglect determinations. The associate judge determined that the educational neglect determination under
II. Analysis
A. Standing
Before we consider the merits of C.P.‘s sufficiency challenge, we must address the government‘s challenge to her standing to pursue this appeal. See D.C. Appleseed Ctr. for Law & Justice, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep‘t of Ins., Sec., & Banking, 54 A.3d 1188, 1199 (D.C. 2012) (“Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party‘s claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In her brief to this court, C.P. does not challenge the educational neglect determination pursuant to
Generally, to establish standing, a litigant must have “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.” Equal Rights Ctr. v. Props. Int‘l, 110 A.3d 599, 603 (D.C. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The litigant must claim “an actual or imminent, concrete and particularized, invasion of a legally protected interest” that can be “‘fairly trace[d]’ to [the opposing party‘s] challenged actions” and that can “be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)); see also UMC Dev., LLC v. District of Columbia, 120 A.3d 37, 42 (D.C. 2015) (explaining that this court, although created under Article I, “generally adhere[s] to the case and controversy requirement of Article III” of the Constitution). We have no trouble concluding that C.P. has the requisite personal stake in the outcome of this appeal.
Beyond the injury of having a child removed from their care, a parent whose child has been deemed neglected is adversely impacted by the neglect determination itself, which “constitutes a permanent, and significant, stigma.” In re E.R., 649 A.2d 10, 12 (D.C. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The impact on a parent‘s reputational interest alone gives them standing to challenge a determination of neglect. Cf. id. at 13 (holding that the mother‘s appeal of a neglect determination was not moot even though her child had left the country and did not intend to return); In re G.H., 797 A.2d 679, 683 (D.C. 2002) (in a neglect appeal, holding that the mother‘s boyfriend had “a reputational interest sufficient to provide him with standing to challenge” the determination that he had physically abused a child, even though he was “in no position to complain of the disposition of the children in the absence of an appeal by the mother“).
The government argues that it is “purely speculative” for C.P. to argue that she will suffer reputational harm from the neglect determination under
In re Z.C., 813 A.2d 199 (D.C. 2002), cited by the government, is factually inapposite and does not support a different conclusion. In that case, the mother, who had repeatedly and severely beaten her son, was convicted of assaulting him with a dangerous weapon and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. She was then deemed to have neglected him on multiple grounds, including that she was unable to discharge her responsibilities as a parent “because of incarceration.” Id. at 200 n.3 (quoting
In any event, the harm from the mental incapacity neglect determination that C.P. seeks to challenge is not just reputational and not at all speculative. Once a child has been deemed neglected and removed from the parent‘s custody, the court must regularly conduct permanency planning hearings to determine inter alia “whether, and if so when, the child will be returned to the parent(s).” In re Ta.L., 149 A.3d 1060, 1077 (D.C. 2016) (en banc) (citing
The government dismisses these collateral legal consequences, however. It asserts that “there is no reason to think that permanency planning for B.C. will be adversely impacted by” the
The government separately argues that even if C.P. can show the requisite injury for standing, there is another reason to conclude that C.P. cannot pursue this appeal, namely that “this [c]ourt reviews judgments and not merely findings.” As support for this proposition, the government once again relies on this court‘s decision in In re Z.C. We acknowledge that, after concluding that the mother in that case did not have standing to pursue an appeal, this court went on to observe in its final paragraph that the appeal was “subject to dismissal for a slightly different, but related, reason.” In re Z.C., 813 A.2d at 203. We explained that “the case [was] reminiscent of Thoubboron v. Ford Motor Co., 624 A.2d 1210 (D.C. 1993),” where we had observed that “this court reviews judgments, not opinions” and declined the appellant‘s request to “strike . . . dictum” from a trial court‘s order. In re Z.C., 813 A.2d at 203 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We then said in In re Z.C. that “this case does not differ in principle from the issue addressed in the Thoubboron footnote.” 813 A.2d at 203 (emphasis added).
For multiple reasons, we disagree that In re Z.C. categorically bars appellate review of fewer than all neglect determinations made in a case. First, if this court in In re Z.C. had meant to impose such a categorical bar, the preceding standing analysis that serves as the foundation for the court‘s primary holding would have been entirely unnecessary. See 813 A.2d at 203 (discussing the lack of reputational harm and concluding that “[a]ccordingly, the mother lacks standing to prosecute her appeal“); see also In re M.L., 28 A.3d 520, 531 n.22 (D.C. 2011) (relying on In re Z.C. for the principle that an appellant who cannot secure “any remedial benefit from a decision by this court” lacks standing to bring an appeal (internal quotation marks
challenge every neglect determination just to be able to claim standing to challenge one that can cause real injury under a traditional standing analysis. In the absence of any subsequent decision relying on this language in the manner the government advocates, we thus interpret In re Z.C. narrowly as a decision where our discussion of appealability was driven by our assessment that the mother—who was not challenging the determination either that she was in prison or that she was unable to personally care for her children as a result—was, like the litigant in Thoubboron, seeking review of inconsequential facts. See In re Z.C., 813 A.2d at 200 n.4.
For all of these reasons, we hold that C.P. has standing to challenge on appeal the determination of neglect pursuant to
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
“In a child neglect proceeding, the [government] has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is neglected . . . .” In re E.H., 718 A.2d 162, 168 (D.C. 1998). On appeal, “[w]e will reverse a finding of neglect only if it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it, and only after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the court‘s ruling.” In re Ta.C., 237 A.3d 114, 120 (D.C. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “But consistent with that deference, we must ensure that a finding of neglect embodies a correct understanding of the relevant statutory terms. The proper construction of the neglect statute is a legal question, as to which our review is not deferential, but de novo.” Id. (brackets, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, as we explained in In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d 1275 (D.C. 2015), although our review is of “the order of the associate judge, who reviewed the magistrate judge‘s order in this case for errors of law, abuse of discretion, or clear lack of evidentiary support,” we may still “look to the findings and conclusions of the fact finder on which that ruling is based.” Id. at 1285 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In order to make out a case of neglect under
1. Mental incapacity
While acknowledging that “she has a history of mental health issues and hospitalization in 2010 through 2012” after
Before we assess the sufficiency of the evidence of mental incapacity presented at the neglect trial in this case, we must address two predicate subjects, namely, the meaning of “mental incapacity” and the manner in which it may be proved. The term “mental incapacity” is not defined in the neglect statute, and the closest this court has come to discerning the definition of the term is to reject efforts to interpret it too narrowly. See, e.g. In re N.P., 882 A.2d at 251 (concluding that the government‘s expert testimony diagnosing the mother with battered woman syndrome, “severe dependency,” and low-level intellectual functioning was sufficient evidence of “mental incapacity“); In re P.B., 54 A.3d at 664–65, 667 (concluding that the government‘s evidence of the mother‘s mental incapacity was sufficient where (1) the government‘s expert testified that the mother suffered from some sort of mood disorder, (2) the mother‘s expert agreed that testimony about the mother‘s behavior, if credited, indicated she “might be suffering from some kind of psychotic condition,” and (3) “numerous witnesses . . . described [the mother‘s] paranoid beliefs, delusional thinking, and seclusion” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, we have yet to discern a comprehensive definition for this statutory term.
“We start, as we must, with the language of the statute.” Tippett v. Daly, 10 A.3d 1123, 1126 (D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). In examining this language, “it is axiomatic that the words . . . should be construed according to their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1127 (endorsing “look[ing] to dictionary definitions to determine the ordinary meaning“). The ordinary meaning of “mental” is “of or relating to the mind,” Mental, Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2003); and the ordinary meaning of “incapacity” is the “quality or state of being incapable,” Incapacity, Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary, with “incapable” meaning “lacking capacity, ability, or qualification for the purpose or end in view,” Incapable, Merriam-Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary. Reading these words together makes readily apparent that “mental incapacity” encompasses, but is not limited to, debilitating mental illness. See In re N.P., 882 A.2d at 251 (incorporating an assessment of mother‘s cognitive ability). The cause of mental incapacity encompasses a range of psychiatric, psychological, or physiological conditions that may adversely impact a parent‘s thought processes. But those conditions must be related to mental functioning, and they must be “incapacitating,” i.e., they must pose a serious impediment to the parent‘s ability to navigate their daily life. This conclusion is compelled not just because of the statutory language, but also because of the underlying constitutional considerations which limit the government‘s power to intrude into the parent-child relationship.7
Relatedly, because mental incapacity often is “related to some science, profession, or occupation [so] as to be beyond the ken of the average layperson,”8 it may well need to be substantiated with expert testimony, as the neglect statute and our cases reflect. Like other provisions of the
cases reflect regular reliance on the testimony of one or more experts to support a determination of mental capacity.11 See, e.g., In re E.H., 718 A.2d at 166–68 (five medical experts testified); In re P.B., 54 A.3d at 664–65 (two medical experts testified); In re K.M., 75 A.3d 224, 233–35 (D.C. 2013) (two medical experts testified, but evidence of nexus to neglect deemed insufficient).
Turning to the evidence in this case, we consider the foundation for the associate judge‘s conclusion that the government had carried its burden to prove C.P.‘s “mental incapacity, specifically obsession with imaginary medical conditions
To support her determination of C.P.‘s mental incapacity, the associate judge relied on nine years of C.P.‘s medical records that the government put into evidence. The associate judge noted that these records documented C.P.‘s “several mental health hospitalizations, including an involuntary commitment” and her receipt of “Haldol, a psychotropic medication, on multiple occasions” and reflected her “history of paranoia, depression, and anxiety.” The associate judge also relied on “[r]ecords from [C.P.‘s] primary care physician, Core Health and Wellness, indicat[ing] that [C.P.] would frequently request unnecessary medical procedures [and] exaggerate her symptoms.”
While this court has held that “[i]n evaluating the child‘s condition, the trial court‘s inquiry must go beyond simply examining the most recent episode [of neglect] or a single snapshot [in time], and instead must consider the entire mosaic in making its determination,” In re P.B., 54 A.3d at 666 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted), particularly when assessing a parent‘s mental incapacity, the trial court must also take care not to rely too heavily on dated and potentially stale information. Here, we cannot agree that C.P.‘s medical records carry much weight in establishing C.P.‘s mental incapacity at the time of the alleged neglect. C.P.‘s actual mental health records were, like her postpartum depression diagnosis, see supra note 12, many years old, from 2010–12. See In re L.H., 925 A.2d 579, 582–83 (D.C. 2007) (concluding that there was no foundation for the “perceived . . . link” between mother‘s hospitalization and mental health treatment in 1998 and the state of her mental health at the time of the alleged neglect in 2004–05). Although C.P.‘s overall medical records spanned a time period up to the time of the alleged neglect, the records that reflected a potential mental health problem—those documenting her efforts to obtain medical care for perhaps questionable complaints—were not contemporaneous with the alleged neglect. Rather, the medical records from 2018–19 reflected that she had properly sought and received treatment for verified ailments. Particularly in the absence of expert testimony explaining what could be gleaned from these records about C.P.‘s current mental health, the associate judge‘s inference from these records that C.P. was currently mentally incapacitated “rests, in our view, on too much speculation.” Id. at 582–83 (“[T]he judge heard no psychiatric or other medical testimony relating the mother‘s past medical condition to her conduct in 2004 and her present capacity to parent.“).
As additional and more current evidence of C.P.‘s mental incapacity, the associate judge also relied on the medical records reflecting C.P.‘s multiple efforts to obtain medical care primarily for B.C.‘s facial swelling. But the magistrate judge had deemed these same records insufficient
This leaves the testimony from three lay witnesses—two CFSA social workers assigned to C.P.‘s case, Mr. Date and Mr. Rodrigues, and one CFSA registered nurse, Ms. Tymus—who testified for the government about their observations of C.P. The associate judge, like the magistrate judge before her, relied on this testimony to support her determination that C.P. was mentally incapacitated. Examining this testimony, we conclude that, at most, it constituted some evidence on which an expert diagnosis could have been based or corroborated. But these witnesses were not themselves qualified to make such a diagnosis, see supra note 8, and their ultimately equivocal testimony did not provide a foundation for the associate judge to determine that C.P.‘s mental state could be assessed based on common knowledge.
All three witnesses testified about C.P.‘s resistance to working with them, and Mr. Date and Mr. Rodrigues both cited C.P.‘s distrust of them as a basis of their belief that C.P. might have mental health issues. Although these CFSA employees considered C.P.‘s hostility abnormal, some amount of distrust and resentment is not surprising under the circumstances where parents know that CFSA is responsible for the removal of their child from their custody. Furthermore, Mr. Rodrigues, who had had the most recent contact with C.P., testified that the situation had improved in the four months he had been working on B.C.‘s case. Mr. Date and Mr. Rodrigues also grounded their mental health concerns in C.P.‘s efforts to seek medical treatment for B.C. But as discussed above, this was the allegation the magistrate judge determined could not be supported in the absence of expert testimony. Ultimately, none of these witnesses testified with any certainty that C.P. actually had a mental illness. Mr. Date, who worked on B.C.‘s case for the longest time and had the most in-person interactions with C.P., testified only that “there was an indication that she had unaddressed mental health needs.” (emphasis added). Mr. Rodrigues testified only that he was “concern[ed]” about C.P.‘s “lack of awareness of her mental health needs” but also acknowledged that he was unsure that the agency had “an understanding of where she is at mentally right now.”
2. Nexus to Educational Neglect
As noted above, in addition to proving a parent‘s mental incapacity at the time of the alleged neglect, the government must demonstrate a causal relationship between a parent‘s mental incapacity and their inability provide parental care. See In re E.H., 718 A.2d at 169. “Without any evidence of such a nexus, the adjudication of neglect under [subsection (9)(A)(iii)] cannot be sustained.” In re Am. V., 833 A.2d 493, 499 (D.C. 2003) (insufficient evidence of nexus between mother‘s incapacity and inadequate care for her child); see also In re K.M., 75 A.3d at 231–33; In re N.P., 882 A.2d at 251. Assuming for the sake of argument that C.P. was mentally incapacitated at the time of the alleged neglect, there is simply no proof in this record that her mental health had any bearing on B.C.‘s educational neglect. None of the government‘s witnesses provided any such nexus testimony because this was not the theory of neglect that the government pursued at trial. See supra I.A. The government‘s theory was that C.P.‘s mental incapacity had led her to seek unnecessary medical care for B.C. It was only after the magistrate judge twice prompted the government to argue this alternate rationale that C.P.‘s mental incapacity led to B.C.‘s educational neglect that the government pivoted to this theory of neglect under
To the extent any relevant evidence was presented, it did not support a nexus between any mental incapacity and B.C.‘s educational neglect; instead it indicated that C.P. was attentive to and concerned about B.C.‘s education, even as she failed to make good choices for him. Although she enrolled B.C. at three different schools in a short span of time, C.P. offered not patently unreasonable explanations for her actions—she withdrew B.C. from the first school because the commute was too long, from the second because a spot opened up at the third that she thought would be better for him, and from the third because she had some concern about bullying and because in her estimation he worked better in “one-on-one sessions.” And she contacted OSSE thereafter to get permission to homeschool B.C., as she had done the year prior, and followed the agency‘s instructions. None of this evidence indicates that any mental incapacity had a causal connection to B.C.‘s educational neglect, and the government never argued otherwise. Instead, the government conceded in rebuttal that it was “not sure of” “[t]he reason” for C.P.‘s educational decisions for B.C.
The associate judge‘s conclusion that B.C.‘s “numerous excused and unexcused absences” from school were “presumably at least in part due to some of” his appointments to address his “imaginary facial swelling” is problematic for multiple reasons. First, B.C.‘s facial swelling was not “imaginary.” Second, as the magistrate judge found, the allegation that C.P. had sought unnecessary treatment for B.C. was unsubstantiated. And third, the associate
Likewise, the associate judge‘s finding that C.P. opted to homeschool B.C. because she did not want to leave him in the care of third parties had no foundation. No witness ever attributed that rationale for homeschooling to C.P., and she never testified to that effect. Nor can we conclude there was a reasonable basis for the court to draw this inference either from Mr. Date‘s testimony that C.P. was unwilling to let B.C. be alone with him—a perceived adversary in the neglect process—or from his testimony about C.P.‘s actions at a January court hearing when B.C. was removed from C.P.‘s custody. The government presented no evidence at the neglect trial that C.P. would not leave B.C. in the care of third parties, “even in the hallway of the courthouse,” as the associate judge found. Mr. Date simply testified that C.P. had failed to make arrangements for someone to watch B.C., that the hearing was delayed “until some professional could watch him,” and that C.P. had to leave the courtroom several times because B.C. was being disruptive. Mr. Date was unable to say whether C.P. was willing to leave B.C. with someone else on that day.
Lastly, the associate judge‘s conclusion that C.P.‘s mental incapacity “precluded her from recognizing her own inadequacies as a home schooling teacher” is also unsubstantiated. Other than the fact that C.P. sought to homeschool B.C., there is no evidence about what C.P. thought at the time of her own abilities as a homeschooling teacher. Without more, her decision to homeschool him in 2018 cannot be attributed to mental incapacity, especially when OSSE had authorized her to homeschool him in 2017. Moreover, C.P. subsequently acknowledged at the neglect trial that she could see now that she had not made the best choices for B.C. vis-a-vis his education.15
For all these reasons, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support the associate judge‘s affirmance of the magistrate judge‘s determination of mental incapacity neglect pursuant to
III. Conclusion
Based on the above analysis, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Notes
Mental health professionals in the District are required to be professionally licensed (e.g., license to practice medicine, license to practice psychology, license to serve as a social worker). See