In re Application of THE REPUBLIC OF TÜRKIYE
24 Misc. 557 (JPC)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
August 1, 2025
JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge
OPINION AND ORDER
JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge:
Cеvdet Turkyolu, a member of the faith-based Gülen movement, is one of several targets of a Turkish money-laundering investigation and insider-trading prosecution. Pursuant to an application under
Turkyolu now moves to quash both subpoenas and to vacate the Court‘s prior Order granting Türkiye‘s application. According to Turkyolu, Türkiye‘s application does not represent a bona fide attempt to seek evidence relevant to the criminal matters involving him, but is instead part of a years-long campaign of harassment and retaliation against the Turkish government‘s political enemies and the Gülen movement in particular. For that reason, Turkyolu says, Türkiye‘s application cannot satisfy Section 1782‘s requirement that the discovery sought be “for use” in a foreign proceeding. And even setting that issue aside, Turkyolu maintains that Türkiye‘s application is unduly intrusive and made in bad faith, justifying denial of the application on
For the following reasons, the Court agrees that Türkiye failed to comply with
I. Background
A. Factual Background
1. Turkyolu and the Gülen Movement
Turkyolu, who currently lives in the United States, is a member of the Gülen movement, a “faith based civic society initiative.” Dkt. 26 (“Turkyolu Decl.“) ¶ 3. According to Turkyolu, the Gülen movement “is known for its emphasis on and commitment to active civic participation, community service, and open dialogue, all groundеd in modern and democratic principles.” Id. ¶ 5.
The Gülen movement “emerged from the sphere of Civil Islam in the late 1960[]s under the leadership of Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish scholar, who lived in self-exile in Pennsylvania from 1999 until his passing in 2024.” Id. ¶ 4. Turkyolu was introduced to the movement after attending Mr. Gülen‘s sermons in Izmir, Türkiye, and became a member in 1972. Id. ¶ 6. Beginning in 1974, Turkyolu “served as a trusted and loyal aide to Mr. Gülen.” Id. ¶ 7. In 1999, Turkyolu
In or around 2013, the relationship between the Gülen movement and Türkiye‘s ruling Justice and Development Party, once political allies, soured. Id. ¶ 11. Turkyolu alleges that since then, “the Turkish government has been engaged in a well-documented, prolonged, and improper campaign of harassment and abuse directed against the Gülen movement and its members.” Id. ¶ 10. As part of that alleged harassment campaign, Turkyolu contends that he “became a target of the Turkish government‘s crackdown on the Gülen movement” and that, in the wake of “an unsuccessful coup attempt in July 2016,” the Turkish government “сonfiscated multiple business” that he owned. Id. ¶ 11. Turkyolu further alleges that he has “been subject to relentless defamatory attacks by the government-aligned Turkish media, including outlandish claims of criminal activity.” Id. ¶ 12. For these reasons, Turkyolu says he is certain that “the evidence requested by the Turkish government in its [discovery application in this matter] will not be used in an impartial or objective proceeding.” Id. ¶ 13.
2. Türkiye‘s Section 1782 Application
On December 3, 2024, Türkiye filed an ex parte discovery application pursuant to
- All documents relating to financial transactions made in U.S. dollars to, from, and through accounts held by, Cevdet Turkyolu, Hasan Sayin, Ybrahym Sayin, Muhammet Erhan Koseoylu, and/or Ferhat Aktay, including any financial transactions made through [the respective Respondent Bank] as correspondent or intermediary bank. This includes all bank statements and any other records showing transfer of mоney and any other financial instrument, including but not limited to checks, wire transfers, or any other method of transfer between December 18, 2002 and the present.
- All documents and communications relating to Cevdet Turkyolu, Hasan Sayin, Ybrahym Sayin, Muhammet Erhan Koseoylu, and/or Ferhat Aktay, including all documents and communications relating to potential fraud, money laundering or suspicious activity related to them individually or collectively.
Subpoenas at 7, 19.
In its Application, Türkiye represents that these materials are relevant to two criminal matters involving Turkyolu and his associates: an “ongoing criminal prosecution . . . for insider trading” and an “investigation for potential money laundering.” Application ¶ 2. Türkiye explains that it is “actively investigating the financial activities of Turkyolu and the other four named individuals as it relates to suspected attempts by them and other individuals to launder money in violation of Turkish law, and seeks discovery related to their banking activities at the Respondent Banks.” Id. ¶ 4.
In support of its Application, Türkiye attached a declaration by Veysel Kaçmaz, the Deputy Chief Public Prosecutor of Ankara. Dkt. 1-2 (“Kaçmaz Decl.“). In his declaration, Mr. Kaçmaz states that he is “aware of active and ongoing proseсutions of [Turkyolu] and associated individuals for insider trading and money laundering.” Id. ¶ 3. Mr. Kaçmaz further explains that
[a]mong these cases is one that is focused on, among other things, whether the proceeds of illicit activities (including those taking place within the United States of America) have been transmitted and transferred, through international wire transfers and other means, to individuals and entities operating within the Republic
of Türkiye in violation of the prohibitions on money laundering codified in Article 282 of the Turkish Penal Code.
Id. ¶ 5. Mr. Kaçmaz asserts that the Turkish Financial Crimes Investigation Board “identified various transactions Turkyolu has conducted with [the Respondent Banks]” and that “[t]he information sought from [the Respondent Banks] would be highly relevant to our ongoing criminal proceedings and is admissible in Turkish prosecutions.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. For these reasons, Mr. Kaçmaz stresses that “it is crucial that [his] office receives access to any records held by the [Respondent Banks].” Id. ¶ 8.
In addition to Mr. Kaçmaz‘s declaration, Türkiye submitted a copy of a criminal indictment filed in June 2017 in connection with a Turkish insider-trading prosecution. Dkt. 1-4 (“2017 Indictment“). The 2017 Indictment lists Turkyolu as one of several defendants and alleges violations of “Articles 106/1 of the Capital Market Law, 53/1 of the Turkish Penal Code.” Id. at 2. According to the 2017 Indictment, Turkyolu traded on non-public information regarding “partnership talks” between Bank Asya and Qatar Islamic Bank that took place in early 2014 and were announced on March 25, 2014. Id. Specifically, the indictment alleges that Turkyolu and his associates purchased Bank Asya shares “at a low price and, after Bank Asya publicly announced that partnership talks had begun with [Qatar Islamic Bank], they sold the previously purchased [Bank Asya] shares at a high price, thus gaining benefit.” Id. Türkiye has not provided any information, beyond the 2017 Indictment itself, concerning the status of the prosecution.
B. Procedural History
The Court granted Türkiye‘s Application on December 17, 2024, authorizing Türkiye to serve the Subpoenas on the Respondent Banks. Dkt. 5. Türkiye served the Subpoenas on Bank of America and Wells Fargo, respectively, on December 18, 2024, and December 23, 2024. Dkt. 25 (Declaration of Michael C. Miller) ¶ 5.
On April 4, 2025, Turkyolu appeared in this matter as an interested party and sought leave to intervene for purposes of moving to quash the Subpoenas. Dkt. 8 (“April 4 Turkyolu Letter“). Turkyolu asserted that Türkiye served the Subpoenas on the Respondent Banks prior to serving them on him, in violation of
The Court held a telephonic conference on April 11, 2025, to discuss the issues raised in the April 4 Turkyolu Letter. See April 11, 2025 Minute Entry. At that conference, the Court granted Turkyolu‘s request to intervene, set a briefing schedule for his contemplated motion to quash, and ordered preliminary relief pending the Court‘s ruling on the forthcoming motion. Id. The Court memorialized those rulings in a written order issued the same day. Dkt. 15.1
On April 25, 2025, Turkyolu filed his motion to quash the Subpoenas and to vacate the Court‘s Order of December 17, 2024, granting Türkiye‘s Application. Dkts. 23, 24 (“Motion“),
II. Legal Standard
Through Section 1782, Congress created a mechanism “to provide federal-court assistance in gathering evidence for use in foreign tribunals.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 247. In relevant part, the statute provides:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation. The order may be made . . . upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. . . . To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
It is well-established, however, that “a district court is not required to grant a § 1782(a) discovery application simply because it has the authority to do so.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. Instead, “[o]nce section 1782(a)‘s minimum requirements are met, ‘a district court is free to grant discovery
In determining whether to exercise its discretion to grant a Section 1782 application, a district court “must consider the twin aims of the statute: providing efficient means of assistance to participants in international litigation in our federal courts; and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar means of assistance to our courts.” In re BonSens.org (”BonSens“), 95 F.4th 75, 79-80 (2d Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). To that end, the Supreme Court in Intel articulated four factors “that ‘bear consideration’ by district courts.” IJK Palm LLC v. Anholt Servs. USA, Inc., 33 F.4th 669, 676 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 264). Those factors are:
- Whether the “person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding,” in which case “the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent” because a foreign tribunal presumably has authority to order discovery on its own;
- “[T]he nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance“;
- Whether the discovery request “conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States“; and
- Whether the requests are unduly intrusive or burdensome.
Id. (quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65).
These factors, however, are non-exhaustive and “not to be applied mechanically,” and thus, “[a] district court should also take into account any other pertinent issues arising from the facts of the particular dispute.” Kiobel ex rel. Samkalden v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 895 F.3d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 2018); see also In re Eli Lilly & Co., 37 F.4th 160, 168 (4th Cir. 2022) (”Intel does
While the parties are largely in agreement regarding the legal standards applicable to Section 1782 applications, they disagree as to how those standards should be applied in the procedural context of Turkyolu‘s motion. Turkyolu maintains that to secure vacatur of the Court‘s December 17, 2024 Order and quashal of the Subpoenas, he need only show that Türkiye‘s Application fails to satisfy Section 1782‘s statutory requirements, that the discretionary Intel factors disfavor the Application, or that Türkiye failed to comply with
This due process-friendly regime is incompatible with Türkiye‘s view that to obtain relief from an ex parte order authorizing discovery under Section 1782, an affected party to the foreign proceeding must either identify a specific ground under
Accordingly, to the extent a showing of exceptional circumstances under
III. Discussion
On several grounds, Turkyolu moves to quash the Subpoenas and to vacate the Court‘s December 17, 2024 Order granting Türkiye‘s Application. Turkyolu first argues that Türkiye violated
A. Türkiye Violated Rule 45(a)(4) By Failing to Timely Serve the Subpoenas on Turkyolu.
Section 1782 commands that, unless the district court has ordered otherwise, discovery must be conducted “in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
In the context of ex parte discovery applications under Section 1782,
Under a straightforward application of
Türkiye nevertheless contends that it was not required to provide Turkyolu with advance notice of the Subpoenas for several reasons, but none are persuasive.
First, Türkiye argues that Congress could not have intended to require targets of foreign criminal investigations to receive notice of subpoenas under
Türkiye next argues that it was not required to serve Turkyolu since “he has not appeared in the foreign criminal proceeding and therefore he is not entitled to service under
Finally, Türkiye argues that Section 1782 must be interpreted consistent with its purpose of “encourag[ing] reciprocal assistance’ from other countries.” Opposition at 4 (quoting Webuild S.P.A. v. WSP USA Inc., 108 F.4th 138, 142 (2d Cir. 2024)). “[I]f foreign governments are required
As the Supreme Court has explained, however, “no statute yet known pursues its stated purpose at all costs,” and therefore courts “will not presume . . . that any result consistent with [a party‘s] account of the statute‘s overarching goal must be the law.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 89 (2017) (alterations adopted). Instead, courts “will presume more modestly . . . that the legislature says what it means and means what it says” in the statutes it enacts. Id. (alterations adopted and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 334 (2010) (“We cannot replace the actual text with speculation as to Congress’ intent.“). And again, the plain text of Section 1782 requires by default that discovery taken pursuant to the statute comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—whether the discovery being sought is for use in a civil case or in a criminal prosecution. The Court cannot override that clear textual command simply because, in Türkiye view, a different approach would better serve the purpose of the statute in this context.
In any event, Türkiye‘s concern regarding reciprocal assistance is unfounded. As noted, Section 1782 simply makes compliance with the Federal Rules—and by extension
For these reasons, the Court holds that Türkiye violated
B. Türkiye‘s Application Does Not Show that the Requested Discovery is “For Use” in Foreign Proceedings.
Turkyolu argues that Türkiye‘s Application fails to satisfy the second statutory requirement under Section 1782—that “the discovery is for use in a foreign proceeding before a foreign tribunal.” Brandi-Dohrn, 673 F.3d at 80; see
For the following reasons, the Court agrees that Türkiye‘s Application fails to adequately show that the requested discovery would be “for use” in foreign proceedings, and therefore declines to address Turkyolu‘s contention that the Turkish court in which he would be prosecuted is not a “tribunal” under Section 1782.
1. The Insider-Trading Prosecution
In its Application, Türkiye represents that the Subpoenas seek discovery for use in a criminal insider-trading prosecution against Turkyolu. See Application ¶ 2 (seeking rеlief “for the purposes of obtaining necessary discovery in aid of an ongoing criminal prosecution of [Turkyolu] . . . for insider trading“); Kaçmaz Decl. ¶ 3 (referring to an “active and ongoing” prosecution of Turkyolu for insider trading); 2017 Indictment at 1 (listing Turkyolu as a defendant). Türkiye maintains that its request for discovery in connection with that prosecution satisfies Section 1782‘s “for use” requirement. Opposition at 9.
The Second Circuit has explained that “[t]he ‘for use’ statutory prerequisite assesses the practical ability of an applicant to place a beneficial document—or the information it contains—before a foreign tribunal.” BonSens, 95 F.4th at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to satisfy that requirement, “the requested discovery must be employed with some advantage or serve some use in the proceeding.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “[a] § 1782 applicant satisfies the statute‘s ‘for use’ requirement by showing that the materials she seeks are to be used at some stage of a foreign proceeding.” Mees v. Buiter, 793 F.3d 291, 295 (2d Cir. 2015). Although courts have characterized the “for use” showing as a low burden,
Under these principles, Türkiye‘s Application does not sufficiently demonstrate that the requested discovery is “for use” in the insider-trading prosecution.
To begin, Türkiye has not adequately shown that it “will actually be able to use the information” in the insider-trading prosecution. KPMG, 798 F.3d at 120. The status and outlook of that prosecution are murky: Türkiye has provided a copy of the 2017 Indictment, generic statements by Mr. Kaçmaz that there are active prosecutions against Turkyolu, and a representation that the discovery would be admissible in the relevant Turkish court, but virtually nothing beyond that. It is unclear, therefore, whether the nearly decade-old insider-trading charge in fact remains active in any realistic sense, what stage the prosecution has reached, or whether some “merits proceeding” in that prosecution at which the discovery could be used is “within reasonable contemplation.” BonSens, 95 F.4th at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted); see IJK Palm, 33 F.4th at 680 (exрlaining that district courts must “assess the procedural mechanism by which a movant may inject the discovery it seeks into foreign proceedings“). Without additional information to that effect, the Court cannot determine whether Türkiye has “the practical ability to inject the requested information into” the insider-trading prosecution, In re Accent Delight Int‘l Ltd., 869 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 2017), or whether there is sufficient reason to expect that the
discovery “will be employed with some advantage or serve some use in [that] proceeding,” Mees, 793 F.3d at 298. Thus, Türkiye has not shown that its practical ability to use the requested discovery to advance the 2017 insider-trading charge against Turkyolu is “more than merely speculative.” BonSens, 95 F.4th at 80.Türkiye‘s Application also fails to demonstrate that the requested discovery is at least “minimally relevant” to the insider-trading prosecution. Id. Although, as a general matter, evidence of insider-trading activity obviously can be found in financial records of the sort covered by the Subpoenas, Türkiye does not supply any basis to conclude that Turkyolu‘s Bank of America and Wells Fargo records might turn up evidence relevant to that prosecution. The Application does not, for example, develop any allegation that Turkyolu used accounts at Bank of America or Wells Fargo to engage in any prohibited securities transactions. Nor does the Application articulate any reason to believe that the proceeds of the insider-trading activity alleged in the 2017 Indictment flowed through Turkyolu‘s accounts at those banks.5
Instead, Türkiye relies almost entirely on Mr. Kaçmaz‘s declaration to show that the requested discovery is relevant to the insider-trading prosecution. Yet Mr. Kaçmaz states only that the requested discovery “would be highly relevant to [Türkiye‘s] ongoing criminal proceedings” and notes that Turkish authorities previously “identified various transactions Turkyolu has conducted with [the Respondent Banks].” Kaçmaz Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8. Those conclusory statements do
Absent some indication that evidence relevant to the insider-trading prosecution will actually be found in Turkyolu‘s financial records or other documents kept by the Respondent Banks, Türkiye cannot carry its burden of showing that the discovery sought is relevant to that proceeding. See Sealed 1, 235 F.3d at 1205 (explaining that a Section 1782 application may be denied when there is an “insufficient basis to believe that evidence may be found here“). Although the Court does not suggest that any particular showing is necessary to satisfy the low bar of relevance imposed under the statute, Türkiye was at least required to make some showing to that effect. And in the Court‘s view, it has not done so.
For these reasons, the Court holds that Türkiye has not shown that the requested discovery is “for use” in the insider-trading prosecution represented by the 2017 Indictment.
2. The Money-Laundering Investigation
Türkiye also maintains that the Application satisfies
As Türkiye correctly points out, “in order to qualify as a ‘foreign proceeding’ within the meaning of the statute, the proceeding in question need not be ‘pending’ or ‘imminent.‘” Mangouras v. Squire Patton Boggs, 980 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 259). Nevertheless, “the planned proceedings must be within reasonable contemplation,” KPMG, 798 F.3d at 123, and “[t]his requirement . . . forms an outer limit on which proceedings may constitute the basis of a § 1782 application,” Mangouras, 980 F.3d at 100. The Second Circuit has interpreted that limitation to mean that “the applicant must have more than a subjective intent to undertake some legal action, and instead must provide some objective indicium that the action is being contemplated.” KPMG, 798 F.3d at 123. And to that end, an applicant must “show reliable indications of the likelihood that proceedings will be instituted within a reasonable time.” IJK Palm, 33 F.4th at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re United Kingdom, 870 F.2d at 692. Although the Second Circuit has “not delineated what precisely an applicant must show to establish such indications,” IJK Palm, 33 F.4th at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted), it is clear that “[a]t a minimum, a § 1782 applicant must present to the district court some concrete basis
Under these principles, Türkiye has not shown that criminal proceedings related to the money-laundering investigation referred to in its Application are within reasonable contemplation. See Mangouras, 980 F.3d at 101 (assessing whether criminal proceedings arising out of the applicant‘s investigation are “more than merely speculative“); In re Wilhelm, 470 F. Supp. 2d 409, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (similar).7 Regarding that investigation, Mr. Kaçmaz states that Turkish authorities are attempting to determine “whether the proceeds of illicit activities (including those taking place within the United States of America) have been transmitted and transferred, through international wire transfers and other means, to individuals and entities operating within the Republic of Türkiye in violation of the prohibitions on money laundering codified in Article 282 of the Turkish Penal Code.” Kaçmaz Decl. ¶ 5. Türkiye‘s Application, however, nowhere identifies what potential “illicit activities” the money-laundering investigatiоn is based on.8 That is problematic because under Article 282 of the Turkish Penal Code, a money-laundering charge must relate to the proceeds of a qualifying predicate offense. Dkt. 27 (“Akkoç Decl.“) ¶¶ 9-10.
In addition, Türkiye‘s Application lacks “reliable indications of the likelihood that proceedings will be instituted within a reasonable time.” KPMG, 798 F.3d at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted). For instance, the Application does not contain reliable information concerning the stage of the money-laundering investigation, such as how much progress has been made, what investigative steps remain to be taken, or any other indications regarding the likelihood that criminal charges will be filed within the foreseeable future. See generally Application; Kaçmaz Decl. To that end, the most partiсularized information concerning the progress of the investigation is Mr. Kaçmaz‘s statement that Türkiye‘s Financial Crimes Investigation Board “has identified various transactions Turkyolu has conducted with Bank of America, N.A. and Wells Fargo, N.A.,” copies of which are attached to the Subpoenas. Kaçmaz Decl. ¶ 6; see Subpoenas at 9, 21. Yet Türkiye‘s submissions nowhere offer any explanation regarding the significance of those financial transactions in the context of its money-laundering investigation, other than the fact that they reveal the not-particularly-shocking fact that Turkyolu, a Turkish national who owned businesses and had associates in Türkiye, engaged in financial transactions with what appear to be other Turkish individuals and/or entities using his accounts with the Respondent Banks.910
Plus, Mr. Kaçmaz‘s declaration suggests that Türkiye is still attempting to determine whether any unlawful transfers of criminal proceeds took place. Kaçmaz Decl. ¶ 5. And the Application characterizes the investigation as relating to potential money laundering. Application ¶ 2. These vague and tentative characterizations of the investigation—in the absence of other reliable indicia that a prosecution is within reasonable contemplation—suggest that a prosecution of Turkyolu arising out of that investigation is, at best, speculative. See Mangouras, 980 F.3d at 101 (holding that criminal proceedings were not within reasonable contemplation where the applicant indicated that the proceedings would only be commenced “depending on what the evidence shows” and that the requested discovery would enable it to determine “whether or not” criminal activity took place (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted)); In re China, 2023 WL 3791711, at *2 (“[C]ourts in this District have rejected Section 1782 applications when the petitioner sought discovery to determine whether to initiate a [foreign] proceeding.“).
In the end, without additional information concerning the nature and prospects of the money-laundering investigation, the Court cannot determine whether criminal proceedings arising out of that investigation are “more than just a twinkle in counsel‘s eye,” or whether Türkiye has “more than a subjective intent to undertake some legal action” against Turkyolu relating to the investigation. KPMG, 798 F.3d at 123-24. The Court therefore holds that, on the current record
***
For these reasons, the Court concludes that Türkiye has not presented sufficient information concerning the insider-trading prosecution and the money-laundering investigation to enable it to rely on those matters in satisfying Section 1782‘s “for use” requirement.11 Because the Court holds that Türkiye has not satisfied the “for use” requirement on that ground, the Court does not reach Turkyolu‘s alternative argument that the Turkish court in which he would be prosecuted is not sufficiently impartial to qualify as a “tribunal” under the statute.
C. The Discretionary Section 1782 Factors Disfavor Türkiye‘s Application.
Because the Court concludes that Türkiye‘s Application does satisfy Section 1782‘s “for use” requirement, it is not necessary to conduct a full analysis of the discretionary Intel factors. Even were the Application to satisfy the statutory requirements, however, the Court agrees with Turkyolu that the discretionary Intel factors weigh against the Application as currently constituted.
Start with the considerations that are not in dispute, and which favor Türkiye: Under the first Intel factor, the Respondent Banks, who were the recipients of the Subpoenas, are not parties to or otherwise involved in the insider-trading prosecution or money-laundering investigation underlying Türkiye‘s Application. And under the second factor, Turkyolu does not appear to dispute that the Turkish courts in which he would be prosecuted are receptive to federal-court
Nevertheless, the Court holds that the sheer breadth of the discovery sought in Türkiye‘s Application, considered in light of the colorable allegations of political motivation presented in support of Turkyolu‘s motion, weighs heavily against the Application at this time.
Specifically, the Court agrees with Turkyolu that the categories of documents covered by the Subpoenas “are extremely broad and . . . are suggestive of a fishing expedition and, perhaps, a purpose beyond simply investigating potential money laundering in [Türkiye].” In re Republic of Turkey, 2021 WL 3022318, at *7. For instance, the Subpoenas seek “[a]ll documents relating to financial transactions made in U.S. dollars to, from, and through accounts held by [Turkyolu and the other Turkish defendants]” from December 18, 2002, to the present. Subpoenas at 7, 19.12 That request includes “all bank statements and any other records showing transfer of money and any other financial instrument, including but not limited to checks, wire transfers, or any other
The breadth of Türkiye‘s Application, the unclear status of the 2017 insider-trading prosecution, and the vague descriptions of the money-laundering investigation are particularly troubling in light of the political context of this case. Türkiye does not dispute that Turkyolu is a longtime member of the Gülen movement. Nor has it presented any factual challenge to Turkyolu‘s allegations concerning the Turkish government‘s efforts to retaliate, for political reasons, against members of the Gülen movement—which the Turkish government has branded the Fetullah Terrorist Organization, or “FETÖ” for short. Indeed, as one federal judge in the Southern District of Florida has found, Türkiye “has engaged in an open campaign of repression against individuals with perceived or actual ties to FETÖ,” and “[t]he Turkish regime has frequently targeted individuals—including U.S. nationals—for prosecution on the basis of vindictive rumors and secret testimony.” Sirer v. Aksoy, No. 21 Civ. 22280, 2023 WL 3166453,
Even so, this Court stops short of definitively ruling that Türkiye‘s Application does not “reflect[] a good faith effort to elicit evidence that has probative value in a pending Turkish criminal investigation” and prosecution. In re Republic of Turkey, 2021 WL 3022318, at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted). It should also go without saying that the merе fact that Turkyolu is a member of the Gülen movement does not mean that he is immune from Turkish criminal prosecution, or that Türkiye is categorically precluded from seeking the aid of U.S. federal courts under Section 1782 in holding him accountable under Turkish law. See Dkt. 28, In re Application of Republic of Turkey, 20 Misc. 36 (ALM) (S.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2023) (granting in part a Section 1782 application filed by Türkiye seeking discovery for use in a money-laundering investigation). Instead, the Court merely reaffirms that it cannot abdicate its responsibility to ensure that Section 1782 is not wielded as a tool of political repression. And to that end, the need to prevent Section 1782 from being used to harass political opponents weighs strongly against approval of the Application as currently constituted. See Brandi-Dohrn, 673 F.3d at 81 (explaining
Accordingly, the Court agrees with Turkyolu that, as currently presented, Türkiye‘s Application does not pass muster under the discretionary factors relevant to the decision whether to allow discovery under Section 1782. The Court, however, does not rule out that Türkiye could properly obtain discovery for use in criminal matters against Turkyolu through a more carefully tailored and detailed application that is accompanied by reliable information supporting the statutory requirements and discretionary factors under Section 1782.
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, the Court grants Turkyolu‘s motion. The Subpoenas are hereby quashed, and the Court‘s December 17, 2024 Order, Dkt. 5, is vacated. Türkiye shall serve a copy of this Opinion and Order on the Respondent Banks no later than August 6, 2025. The parties are directed to submit simultaneous supplemental briefs of no more than 5,000 words each addressing the appropriate remedy with respect to the documents that have already been produced pursuant to the Subpoenas. The parties shall file those briefs on or before August 18, 2025. Also on or before August 18, 2025, Türkiye shall file a letter stating whether it intends to file a renewed application in this matter. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at Docket Number 23.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 1, 2025
New York, New York
JOHN P. CRONAN
United States District Judge