IN RE: APPLICATION OF IGOR RAYKHELSON, FOR AN ORDER TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY FOR USE IN FOREIGN PROCEEDINGS
25-MC-427 (VSB) (VF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
May 4, 2026
VALERIE FIGUEREDO, United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
On September 26, 2025, Igor Raykhelson (“Raykhelson” or “Applicant“) filed this application ex parte, seeking an order pursuant to
A. Factual Background1
Raykhelsоn has been a U.S. citizen since the 1980s and has never been a Russian citizen nor had a residence in Russia. ECF No. 4 at ¶ 19. Since 2012, Raykhelson has worked as a consultant for Interlink Metals & Chemicals AG (“Interlink“) and has been responsible for facilitating the supply of American Society for Testing and Materials (“ASTM“)-standard titanium scrap metal from the United States and Europe to Russian companies. Id.; ECF No. 5 at ¶ 6. ASTM-standard titanium scrap “includes lighter, stronger titanium for the aerospace industry” and is referred to as “Western Alloy Scrap.” ECF No. 5 at ¶ 6. Raykhelson attests that in his forty years in the titanium industry, he has “never been offered a price in any currency other than [U.S. dollars]” for Western Alloy Scrap. Id. at ¶ 20.
VSMPO is a Russian company that manufactures and еxports ASTM-quality titanium products used in aircraft construction. Id. at ¶ 9. VSMPO is one of the largest producers of titanium in the world. Id. Mikhail Voevodin (“Voevodin“) is the former general director of VSMPO. ECF No. 4 at ¶¶ 6-7. NPO Vtorpromresursy LLC (“VPR“) and Torgovo-promyshlenny Vektor LLC (“TPV“) are Russian titanium suppliers to VSMPO. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 20, 27.
On July 13, 2023, criminal proceedings were brought against Voevodin in Russia for allegedly approving contracts between VSMPO and both VPR and TPV at inflated prices. Id. at ¶ 7. Voevodin was charged with abuse of authority under Article 201(2) of the Russian Criminal Code, and “the case was sent to the Verkhnyaya Salda District Court” on May 31, 2024. Id. On September 20, 2024, the Verkhnyaya Salda District Court “returned the case to prosecutors,
On June 23, 2025, the Investigative Committee of the Sverdlovsk Region initiated a criminal case against Raykhelson, Voevodin, and other unidentified persons under Part 4, Article 159 of the Russian Criminal Code, “alleging fraud in an especially large amount.” Id. at ¶ 6. Thе actions under investigation concern the alleged sale of titanium stock at inflated prices through VPR and TPV and to VSMPO, allegedly causing losses exceeding 1.5 billion Russian rubles to VSMPO. Id. On June 24, 2025, Voevodin was “indicted for fraud under Article 159(4), accused of conspiring with others, including [Raykhelson], to misappropriate funds by arranging inflated contracts with VPR and TPV between January 11, 2016 and May 8, 2020.” Id. at ¶ 9. The next day, Evgeny Lysenko (“Lysenko“), director of VPR, was indicted on the same charges. Id. Voevodin and Lysenko are in Russian custody pending trial. Id.
In the same action, Raykhelson “has been formally charged with conspiracy to commit fraud for inflating prices on sales to VSMPO under Article 159(4),” and there is “a federal arrest warrant [for Raykhelson] limited to the territory of the Russian Federation.” Id. at ¶ 10. The allegations against Raykhelson “concern whether sales of titanium scrap were at inflated prices, and whether [Raykhelson] improperly influenced VSMPO‘s contracting.” Id. at ¶ 45. The allegations stem from the theory that RegionProm, another titanium supplier, offered or sold the
If the prosecutor approves the indictment against Raykhelson, the case will be transferred to the Verkhnesaldinsky District Court, which will sentence him. See ECF No. 4 at ¶ 42. Raykhelson‘s counsel, Bubnov, contends that “once there is a judgment sentencing [ ] Voevodin and Lysenko, this will pave the way for the sentencing of [Raykhelson] as a co-conspirator or participant in the same group of individuals.” Id. at ¶ 14. Bubnov also attests that “[i]n Russian criminal practice, it is increasingly common for pre-trial proceedings in a criminal case, from its initiation to its referral to trial, to be conducted in the absence of the aсcused.” Id. at ¶ 15.
B. Procedural Background
On September 26, 2025, Raykhelson submitted an ex parte application for judicial assistance pursuant to
VSMPO filed a notice of intent to intervene on September 30, 2025 (ECF No. 6) and moved to intervene in this action on November 13, 2025 (ECF No. 9). VSMPO also filed a motion for reciprocal discovery on November 13, 2025. ECF No. 11. On November 28, 2025, Raykhelson filed an omnibus response to the motion to intervene and the motion for reciprocal discovery. ECF No. 18. On December 5, 2025, VSMPO filed a reply. ECF No. 20.
By order dated February 12, 2026, the Honorable Vernon S. Broderick referred the instant application, motion to intervene, and motion for reciprocal discovery to the undersigned for a report and recommendation. See ECF No. 21. On March 18, 2026, Raykhelson submitted a letter to the Court seeking an expedited decision on his application on the grounds that the Russian government has amended the indictment and issued a decree directing that a request be made to Interpol for the issuance of a Red Notice against him. ECF No. 22.
A. Intervention
Pursuant to
B. Section 1782
Under
[t]he district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal . . . . The order may be made . . . upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court.
A district court has jurisdiction to grant an application under Section 1782 if the following statutory requirements are met: “(1) the person from whom discovery is sought resides
Provided that the statutory requirements are met, a court then determines, in its discretion, whether the discovery should be permitted. Kiobel, 895 F.3d at 244; Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 27 F.4th at 148. The Supreme Court has identified four discretionary factors (known as the Intel factors) that a court considers when ruling on a Section 1782 application: (1) whether the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant in the foreign proceeding; (2) the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance; (3) whether the Section 1782 request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States; and (4) whether the Section 1782 application contains unduly intrusivе or burdensome discovery requests. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 264-65 (2004). Courts
As the Second Circuit has explained, “the Intel factors are not to be applied mechanically,” and a court should “take into account any other pertinent issues arising from the facts of the particular dispute.” Kiobel, 895 F.3d at 245. Additionally, although the instant application is ex parte, “it is neither uncommon nor improper for district courts to grant applications made pursuant to § 1782 ex parte.” Gushlak v. Gushlak, 486 F. App‘x 215, 217 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order). The Second Circuit has also clarified that a respondent from whom discovery is sought “can later challenge any discovery request by moving to quash pursuant to
C. Reciprocal Discovery
“Although ‘reciprocal discovery’ is not mentioned in the text of Section 1782, see Sampedro v. Silver Point Capital, L.P., 958 F.3d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 2020), courts frequently entertain requests for such discovery.” In re Porsche Automobil Holding S.E., No. 19-MC-166 (RA), 2021 WL 2530277, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2021). The Second Circuit and the Supreme Court “have suggested that a district court could condition relief [under
In determining whether to grant reciprocal discovery, courts have considered various discretionary factors including “(1) how closely the reciprocal discovery sought relates to the materials requested in the initial Section 1782 application; (2) whether the respondent would be unable to initiate its own independent Section 1782 application against the initial applicant; (3) the location of the evidence sought and whether the respondent would be able to obtain the material from the applicant in the foreign litigation; (4) the degree to which the respondent has a substantial interest in the foreign litigation; and (5) the timing of the request for reciprocal discovеry.” In re Porsche Automobil Holding S.E., 2021 WL 2530277, at *3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
A. VSMPO‘s motion to intervene and request for reciprocal discovery are duplicative.
VSMPO has brought a motion to intervene (ECF No. 9) and a motion for reciprocal discovery (ECF No. 11), but it seeks the same relief in both motions: the ability to obtain copies of the materials that are provided to Applicant through the Section 1782 subpoenas. See ECF No. 10 at 5; ECF No. 12 at 19. In a response to the two motions, Raykhelson argues that “[t]he Court should deny the motion [to intervene] and simply direct [Raykhelson] to provide VSMPO with copies of any documents obtained under the subpoenas.” ECF No. 18 at 2. For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the motion to intervene be denied and that the motion for reciproсal discovery be granted.
Beginning with the motion to intervene, VSMPO does not argue that Raykhelson is not entitled to relief under Section 1782 and nor does VSMPO challenge the lawfulness of the
Turning to the motion for reciprocal discovery, VSMPO explains that it “seeks copies of any materials obtained in this proceeding to ensure the Russian court receives a complete record of all available discovery.” ECF No. 12 at 5. VSMPO avers that because Raykhelson intends to use “negative evidence to prove that banking transactions did not occur . . . [t]he relief sought by VSMPO is particularly warranted because it guards against the risk that the only party in possession of banking records fails to make a full disclosure to a foreign tribunal.” Id. at 5-6. Further, VSMPO asserts that reciprocal discovery “is particularly appropriate because VSMPO is a duly recognized victim of the fraudulent scheme, is actively seeking restitution, and has a direct interest in the outcome.” Id. at 6.
“Section 1782 grants district courts wide discretion to determine whether to grant discovery and equally wide discretion to tailor such discovery to avoid attendant problems.” In re Genial Institucional Corretora de Cambio, Titulos e Valores Mobiliarios S.A., No. 24-MC-348 (JMF), 2025 WL 40783, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2025) (quoting In re Esses, 101 F.3d 873, 876 (2d Cir. 1996)). Here, four of the five discretionary factors weigh in favor of granting reciprocal discovery to VSMPO.
First, VSMPO seeks “precisely what is sought by Mr. Raykhelson through his Application” and nothing more. ECF No. 12 at 19. Second, VSMPO avers that it cannot obtain
In short, VSMPO‘s motion to intervene is a repackaged version of its motion for reciprocal discovery, and intervention is not necessary to achieve the only relief VSMPO seeks by way of its intervention motion. Accordingly, I recommend that VSMPO‘s motion to intervene be denied and its motion for reciprocal discovery be granted.
B. Raykhelson‘s application satisfies the Section 1782 statutory factors.
As explained below, Raykhelson has satisfied the statutory factors in Section 1782.
1. The Discovery Targets are found in this District.
First, each of the Discovery Targets is found in this District. “[Section] 1782‘s ‘resides or found’ language extends its reach to the limits of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.” In re del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 534. “This can be met by showing that the Court has
The Court has general personal jurisdiction over 13 of the 16 Discovery Targets. See In re de Aquino Chad, No. 19-MC-261 (WHP), 2019 WL 2502060, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2019) (finding that banks alleged to be headquartered in this District were subject to general jurisdiction, satisfying the first prong of Section 1782). Bank of China, Bank of Nova Scotia, Barclays Bank PLC, BNP Paribas, Citibank, N.A., Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas,
For the remaining three Discovery Targets—Bank of America, N.A., Commerzbank AG, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A —the Court has specific personal jurisdiction because the banks maintain an office in this District, regularly transact business in this District, and the discovery sought is a proximate result of the contacts with this District. The sought-after discovery “directly relates to TCH and the New York Banks’ U.S. Dollar clearing business in this District—namely, U.S. Dollar-denominatеd wire transfers for which the New York Banks and TCH were involved in as originating bank, beneficiary bank, intermediate or correspondent bank
Other courts in this District have found the existence of personal jurisdiction over these specific banks—Bank of America, N.A., Commerzbank AG, and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.—
The first statutory factor is therefore satisfied.
2. The discovery requested by Raykhelson is “for use” in foreign proceedings.
Second, Raykhelson‘s requested discovery satisfies the “for use” requirement in Section 1782. Section 1782 requires an applicant to make a ”de minimis showing that it is seeking discovery ‘for use’ in proceedings[.]” In re Atvos Agroindustrial Investimentos S.A., 481 F. Supp. 3d 166, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). The term “for use” is afforded a “broad interpretation,” and the “sought-after evidence need not be admissible or even discoverable under the rules of the foreign jurisdiction.” Deposit Ins. Agency v. Leontiev, No. 17-MC-00414 (GBD) (SN), 2018 WL 3536083, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2018) (internal citations omitted). An applicant need only show that he has “the practical ability to inject the requested information into a foreign
Here, Raykhelson seeks to use the sought-after discovery to show that RegionProm did not purchase titanium from suppliers in U.S. Dollars, and therefore RegionProm did “not have Western Alloy Scrap to turn into Western Alloy Charge to then sell to VSMPO,” as a defense to the allegation that Raykhelson‘s sales to VPR and TPV were at inflated prices when compared to sales made by RegionProm. ECF No. 1 at 22. And Raykhelson‘s Russian counsel, Bubnov, explains in a sworn declaration that under Russian law, suspects in criminal cases—such as Raykhelson—are permitted “to present evidence.” ECF No. 4 at ¶ 12. Bubnov also attests that “[u]nder Russiаn law, documents lawfully obtained abroad, such as those sought in this Application, are admissible in defense.” Id. at ¶ 51. This suffices to make the necessary de minimis showing that the discovery sought by Raykhelson will be for use in a foreign criminal proceeding. See In re Ulmans, No. 23-MC-23 (GHW) (VF), 2023 WL 3853703, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2023), adopted by, 2023 WL 3412769 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2023) (concluding that “for use” requirement was satisfied where applicant sought to use the requested discovery “at his trial [in Latvia] to prove his innocence of the charged crime” and applicant‘s foreign counsel attested that “Latvian courts would permit admission of such evidence“). Accordingly, the second statutory factor is also satisfied.
Third, Raykhelson is plainly an “interested person” for purposes of Section 1782 because he is one of the subjects of the criminal prosecutiоn in the Russian proceedings. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 256 (“No doubt litigants are included among . . . the interested persons who may invoke § 1782[.]“) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted); In re Furstenberg Finance SAS, 785 F. App‘x 882, 885 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (affirming determination that applicants were interested persons in light of affidavits indicating that they would be parties to foreign criminal proceeding and would “submit the relevant evidence directly” in that proceeding). Because Raykhelson has “been charged . . . as an accused” in the Russian criminal proceeding (ECF No. 1 at 13-14), the third and final statutory factor is therefore satisfied.
C. Raykhelson‘s application satisfies the discretionary Intel factors under Section 1782.
Once the statutory requirements are met, a district court has discretion to determine whether, and to what extent, to honor a request for assistancе under Section 1782. See Intel, 542 U.S. at 260-61. A district court acts within its discretion so long as it fashions its order in accordance with the “twin aims” of Section 1782—“providing efficient means of assistance to participants in international litigation in our federal courts and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar means of assistance to our courts.” In re Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting In re Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also In re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Congress planned for district courts to exercise broad discretion over the issuance of discovery orders pursuant to § 1782(a)—both over whether to grant a discovery order and, if so, what limits to place on that discovery.“). As explained below, the discretionary factors weigh in favor of permitting Raykhelson to seek the requested discovery.
The first Intel factor рrovides that “when the person from whom discovery is sought is a participant . . . the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising abroad.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. Courts in this District have found that this factor weighs in favor of a Section 1782 applicant where “none of the entities from whom discovery is sought is a party to the [foreign proceeding].” In re Klein, No. 20-MC-203 (PKC), 2022 WL 1567584, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2022).
This factor favors Raykhelson because the application plainly states that the Discovery Targets “are not parties or expected to become parties to” the foreign criminal proceedings. See ECF No. 1 at 26; see In re Kuwait Ports Auth., 2021 WL 5909999, at *9 (quoting Intel, 542 U.S. at 264) (“The [Applicant] has represented that [the subpoena target] will not be a participant in the anticipated litigation proceedings, so the Application does not present a situation where ‘the need for § 1782(a) aid generally is not as apparent as it ordinarily is when evidence is sought from a nonparticipant in the matter arising abroad.‘“).
2. Receptivity of the foreign court
Under the second Intel factor, a district court considers “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceeding underway abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264. “[A] district court‘s inquiry into the discoverability of requested materials should consider only authoritative proof that a foreign tribunal would rejеct evidence obtained with the aid of section 1782,” such as proof “embodied in a forum country‘s judicial, executive or legislative declarations that specifically address the use of evidence gathered under foreign procedures[.]”
First, Raykhelson has been formally charged with crimes in Russia, and the pending criminal proceedings for which Raykhelson seeks discovery are undoubtedly adjudicative in nature. See In re Eurasian Bank, No. 19-MC-00568 (RA), 2020 WL 85226, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2020) (granting Section 1782 application where discovery was for use in “an ongoing Kazakhstani criminal investigation“); In re Ulmans, 2023 WL 3853703, at *5 (finding second discretionary factor weighed in аpplicant‘s favor where applicant “ha[d] been formally charged with a crime in Latvia, and the pending criminal proceeding for which [applicant] s[ought] discovery [wa]s undoubtedly adjudicative in nature“).
Second, there is no authoritative proof or indication that Russian courts generally are not receptive to Section 1782 assistance. To the contrary, other courts in this District have found that “[t]he consensus view among U.S. courts is that Russian tribunals are generally receptive to discovery obtained through [S]ection 1782.” In re Arida, LLC, No. 19-MC-522 (PKC), 2020 WL 7496355, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2020); Deposit Ins. Agency, 2018 WL 3536083, at *4 (explaining that “courts have continued to enforce subpoenas pursuant to § 1782 intended for use in Russian courts“); see also In re Kolomoisky, No. 19-MC-116 (SCR), 2006 WL 2404332, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2006) (“There is no evidence that the Russian government or the court in which the Moscow Action is occurring opposes Petitioner‘s discovery request. There is also no indication that Petitioner‘s request is an attempt to circumvent foreign [Russian] proof-gathering restrictions or other policies.“). Raykhelson‘s Russian counsel, Bubnov, attests that “[Raykhelson], being the suspect in the same criminal case as Voevodin and Lysenko has the
Thus, this factor weighs in favor of granting Raykhelson‘s application.
3. Circumvention of foreign proof-gathering restrictions
The third Intel factor seeks to identify “attempt[s] to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of a foreign country or the United States.” Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65. “In the context of § 1782 and the third Intel factor, circumvention occurs where the applicant uses a § 1782 application to avoid measures that are intended to restrict certain means of gathering or using evidence.” Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 27 F.4th at 153 (emphasis in original). For example, where the Section 1782 application “attempts to circumvent the more limited . . . rules of discovery” in the foreign jurisdiction, this weighs against granting the discovery sought. Kiobel, 895 F.3d at 245-46 (concluding that third Intel factor weighed against granting the application where the discovery could not be obtained under the “more limited Dutch rules of discovery“). Section 1782, however, does not limit a district court‘s authority to require the produсtion of evidence “to materials that could be discovered in the foreign jurisdiction if the materials were located there.” In re Hansainvest Hanseatische Inv.-GmbH, 364 F. Supp. 3d 243, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citation omitted). “The Second Circuit has observed that few if any foreign jurisdictions permit the scope of discovery available in U.S. courts, and that if district courts were free to refuse discovery based upon its unavailability in a foreign court § 1782 would be
Here, “there is no indication that any proof-gathering restrictions exist that would prevent this Court from granting the application.” In re Ulmans, 2023 WL 3853703, at *6; Deposit Ins. Agency, 2018 WL 3536083, at *9 (concluding that “[a]bsent definitive proof that the Russian courts would reject the discоvery materials obtained from this proceeding . . . the Court must assume that the Russian courts would accept that evidence“). Further, there is no evidence that Raykhelson is “engaged in a bad faith endeavor to misuse Section 1782” by circumventing Russian law. See In re Refinería de Cartagena S.A.S., No. 23-MC-455 (JPC), 2024 WL 95056, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2024) (citation omitted).
This factor therefore also favors granting Raykhelson‘s application.
4. Unduly burdensome request
The final Intel factor directs courts to be mindful of overly intrusive or burdensome discovery requests. Intel, 542 U.S. at 264-65. “[A] district court evaluating a [Section] 1782 discovery request should assess whether the discovery sought is overbroad or unduly burdensome by applying the familiar standards of
Raykhelson‘s application and proposed sample subpoena do not suggest an anticipated course of conduct that would be unduly burdensome to the Discovery Targets. To the contrary, Raykhelson seeks temporally limited records of wire transfers related specifically to
“Moreover, should a bank served with a subpoena conclude that the requests are unduly burdensome, the bank may challenge the subpoena by moving to quash under
In sum, because all of the statutory and discretionary factors weigh in favor of Raykhelson, I respectfully recommend that the Section 1782 application be granted, and Raykhelson be permitted to issue the subpoenas to the Discovery Targets.
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that the Section 1782 application be granted, the motion to intervene be denied, and the motion for reciprocal discovery be granted.
DATED: New York, New York
May 4, 2026
VALERIE FIGUEREDO
United States Magistrate Judge
PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to