In the matter of the adoption of C.C., a person under eighteen years of age.
No. 20190627
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
June 10, 2021
2021 UT 20
On Certification from the Court of Appeals. Fourth District, American Fork. The Honorable Roger W. Griffin. No. 172100011.
J.S.P., Appellant, v. C.D.C. and M.L.S., Appellees.
Attorneys:
Benjamin B. Grindstaff, Salt Lake City, for appellant
Larry S. Jenkins, Lance D. Rich, Salt Lake City, for appellees
ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE HIMONAS, JUSTICE PEARCE, and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.
¶1 This is an appeal from the entry of a final order of adoption. The adoption was challenged in the district court by the child‘s putative father, J.S.P. J.S.P. sought to intervene on the ground that he was the presumed father of the child (C.C.) under
¶2 J.S.P. made an initial attempt to appeal this decision (prior to the entry of the final adoption order) but abandoned the appeal after the court of appeals asked for briefing on whether the order dismissing J.S.P. was a final, appealable order. The adoption action then went forward in the district court, culminating in the entry of a final order of adoption.
¶3 J.S.P. then filed this appeal, asserting that the district court erred in dismissing him on partial summary judgment. The adoptive parents defend the district court‘s decision. They also challenge our jurisdiction,
¶4 We conclude that the appeal was timely and hold that the district court erred in dismissing J.S.P. from the adoption action. The decision on partial summary judgment was not final and we accordingly have appellate jurisdiction. And the district court erred in dismissing J.S.P. because (a) the marriage between J.S.P. and K.C., while legally invalid, was entered into “in apparent compliance with law” under
I
¶5 J.S.P. and K.C. sought to solemnize a marriage in New Hampshire in November 2013. They requested and received a marriage license, participated in a marriage ceremony, and received a certificate evidencing the “fact of the[ir] marriage.” See
¶6 The couple thereafter lived together in various states, went through some difficult times, and allegedly made several attempts to conceive a child. Many of the details are matters of dispute—and of no particular relevance to this appeal. But it is undisputed that K.C. became pregnant with J.S.P.‘s child in late 2016, when the couple was again living in New Hampshire. Soon thereafter, K.C. apparently told J.S.P. that she was leaving him and would be staying with family in Texas and Arizona. She left. And over the ensuing weeks, she also identified other locations where she planned to stay. Eventually she told J.S.P. that she was in Utah and would remain in Utah until the baby was born.
¶7 K.C. gave birth to C.C. on August 14, 2017, in Utah County. Two days later, K.C. signed a relinquishment of her parental rights and consent to placement of C.C. for adoption. The signed documents included sworn statements from K.C. attesting that she was unmarried but that J.S.P. was the potential father of the child—allegations made in light of K.C.‘s knowledge that her 2013 marriage to J.S.P. had been entered into at a time when she was still married to another man. See
¶8 The adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption in the district court on August 17, 2017. Thereafter, they also filed a motion for temporary custody and determination of parental rights. In connection with that motion, the adoptive parents submitted results of paternity searches from Utah and New Hampshire, demonstrating that no putative father had claimed paternity of the child before the mother relinquished her rights.
¶9 The district court entered an order of temporary custody and determination of parental rights on September 20, 2017. In so doing, the court determined that K.C. had relinquished her parental rights, concluded that no putative father had taken any steps to establish paternity in either Utah or New Hampshire, and held that the putative father was not entitled to receive notice nor required to consent to the adoption under Utah law.
¶10 Two days later, J.S.P. filed a petition for custody and paternity and notice of commencement of paternity proceedings in the district court. He also filed a verified petition for custody and paternity with the Utah Department of Vital Statistics. In these petitions, J.S.P. acknowledged that he and K.C. were not married but asserted that they “at one time maintained a romantic relationship from which [C.C.] was born.”
¶11 The adoptive parents responded by filing a motion in the adoption action. Their motion asked the district court to confirm its determination of parental rights. The district court granted that motion. It concluded that J.S.P. was an unmarried biological father who had failed to fulfill statutory prerequisites
¶12 J.S.P. next filed a motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding. He claimed a right of intervention by statute—under
¶13 The district court granted the motion to intervene, opening the door to discovery on the question whether J.S.P. could ultimately qualify as a presumed father. Some of the discovery focused on the timing of J.S.P.‘s knowledge that his marriage to K.C. had been bigamous (and thus invalid). The adoptive parents discovered tax filings from 2015 and 2016 and other documents executed as early as March 2014, suggesting that J.S.P. had considered himself to be single during that time frame. With those documents in hand, the adoptive parents filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asking the court to conclude as a matter of law that J.S.P. could not qualify as the presumed father under
¶14 The district court granted that motion. It noted that it was undisputed that the couple had sought to solemnize the 2013 marriage at a time when K.C.‘s former marriage was still intact. And it held that the 2013 marriage accordingly was “absolutely void without any legal process” under New Hampshire law. Alternatively, the court concluded that the 2013 marriage “terminated” the day J.S.P. and K.C. entered into it—or at the latest once J.S.P. discovered that K.C.‘s previous marriage was still intact (which, in the district court‘s view, was in November 2015 when K.C. learned that her divorce from her ex-husband had been finalized). Because J.S.P. could not qualify as the presumed father of C.C., the district court concluded that his consent to the adoption was not required and held that he was “not entitled to participate” in the proceedings and “must be dismissed with prejudice as a party.”
¶15 J.S.P. filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of the order dismissing him on summary judgment. No final adoption order had yet been entered, however, and the court of appeals thus issued an order asking the parties to brief the question whether the court had appellate jurisdiction. And J.S.P. abandoned his appeal after the adoptive parents submitted a brief asserting that the court lacked appellate jurisdiction because the decision on partial summary judgment was not a final, appealable order.
¶16 The adoption proceedings thereafter went forward in the district court. A final adoption order was entered in June 2019. And J.S.P. then filed a new notice of appeal, initiating the case that is before us today.
II
¶17 Two sets of questions are presented for our review. The first is raised by a challenge to our appellate jurisdiction. The second goes to the merits of the district court‘s determination that J.S.P. is not C.C.‘s presumed father under
A
¶18 An appeal of right is available upon entry of a final judgment.
¶19 The adoptive parents question the timeliness of the notice of appeal filed by J.S.P. here. They ask us to treat the decision dismissing J.S.P. on summary judgment as an order triggering an immediate appeal of right. And because J.S.P. abandoned the appeal he took from that order and waited to file a new notice of appeal until much later (after the subsequent entry of the final adoption order), the adoptive parents ask us to conclude that J.S.P.‘s appeal was untimely and to hold that we thus lack appellate jurisdiction.
¶20 We decline this request. We conclude that J.S.P. had no appeal of right until the entry of the final adoption order. And we accordingly hold that the notice of appeal was timely because it was filed within 30 days of the entry of the final judgment.
¶21 An appeal of right is generally triggered only by the entry of a final judgment. And a final judgment is one that “adjudicates all claims and the rights and liabilities of all parties” to a proceeding.
¶22 The adoptive parents nonetheless ask us to treat the summary judgment order as an order triggering an immediate appeal of right. They note that some orders that are nonfinal in the above sense are nonetheless treated as doing so. And they ask us to analogize the order in question here to the kinds of orders treated as immediately appealable under our law.
¶23 We take the threshold point. “The general prohibition on interlocutory appeals is of course subject to exceptions.” Wash. Townhomes, LLC v. Wash. Cnty. Water Conservancy Dist., 2016 UT 43, ¶ 6, 388 P.3d 753. Some nonfinal orders may trigger an immediate appeal of right as “expressly authorized by statute.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Other such orders may give rise to an appeal under “our rules of procedure.” Id. And our case law has also recognized at least one additional exception to the general rule: An order denying a motion to intervene has long been treated as immediately appealable. See Millard Cnty. v. State Tax Comm‘n ex rel. Intermountain Power Agency, 823 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1991) (citing cases).
¶24 No such exception is available here, however. An order of parental termination may trigger an immediate appeal of right when entered in the juvenile court. See
¶25 The order granting partial summary judgment was likewise not a denial of a motion to intervene. J.S.P.‘s motion to intervene was granted by the district court. And once J.S.P. was allowed to participate as a party, he was on equal footing with all other parties. His subsequent dismissal thus could not produce a final, appealable order if the order dismissing him “adjudicate[d] fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties.”
¶26 This is the settled rule under the counterpart provisions of the federal rules. An “intervenor, once allowed to become a party, is treated the same way as any other party.” 15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.18 (2d ed. 2020). For that reason, “[i]f intervention is allowed and the intervenor is thereafter dismissed, appeal is available only if final judgment is entered under
¶27 This is consistent with our understanding of our Utah rules. Once J.S.P.‘s motion to intervene was granted, he became a full-fledged party to the proceeding in every respect. With that in mind, his subsequent dismissal from the action could not trigger an immediate appeal of right unless the decision was certified for immediate appeal under
¶28 We uphold our appellate jurisdiction on this basis. We conclude that the summary judgment order adjudicating J.S.P.‘s rights and dismissing him from the proceeding was not a final order and did not give rise to an immediate appeal of right. Because there was no certification of an appealable order under
¶29 In so holding we are not suggesting that the course taken by J.S.P. was the only one available in these circumstances. One or more of the parties could have sought certification under
B
¶30 By statute, a child under the age of 18 may be placed for adoption only upon consent of certain listed persons or after termination of certain persons’ parental rights. See
¶31 The district court held that J.S.P. did not meet these requirements as a matter of law. First, it held that J.S.P. and K.C. had not married “in apparent compliance with law” because their marriage was “absolutely void without any legal process” under New Hampshire law. Second, it concluded that C.C. had not been born “within 300 days after” termination of the marriage because the marriage “terminated” on the day it was entered into or at the latest when K.C. (and presumably J.S.P.) learned that her divorce from her ex-husband had been finalized (in November 2015).
¶32 We review the district court‘s summary judgment decision de novo. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ¶ 16, 250 P.3d 56 (holding that we “review summary judgments for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court‘s decision“). And we reverse. First, we hold that the 2013 marriage was entered into in “apparent compliance with law” given that it was solemnized under an official marriage license and resulted in the issuance of a genuine certificate of marriage. Second, we conclude that the child was born within the required time frame—“during the invalid marriage or within 300 days after its termination” by one of the means prescribed by statute.
1
¶33 The marriage that J.S.P. and K.C. attempted to enter into in 2013 admittedly was invalid. Because K.C.‘s marriage to another man was still intact at that time, the attempted marriage was a bigamous one. It is undisputed, moreover, that K.C. was aware of the fact that her former marriage was still intact. And that rendered the attempted marriage to J.S.P. invalid ab initio—“absolutely void without any legal process.” See
¶34 The district court granted the motion for summary judgment on this basis. But that was error. A presumed father‘s statutory status cannot be defeated by a determination that the marriage was invalid or void at the outset. That is clear from the plain language of the statute, which provides that presumed fatherhood arises from an “attempted marriage” in “apparent compliance with law“—“even if” such “attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid.”
¶35 Perhaps there is ambiguity in some of the statutory words when read in isolation. Sometimes apparent means “obvious” or “manifest.” Apparent, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). And in that sense, the 2013 marriage was not in “apparent compliance with law.” But we do not interpret statutory words in isolation. We read them in context. See Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 9, 248 P.3d 465 (noting that “the statutory text may not be ‘plain’ when read in isolation, but may become so in light of its linguistic, structural, and statutory context“). And here the context forecloses the “obvious” or “manifest” sense of apparent. The statute is using apparent in the alternative sense of “ostensible” or “seeming.” Apparent, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). That is clear from the above-noted fact that a presumed father‘s statutory status arises from an “attempted marriage” even if it “is or could be declared invalid.”
¶36 An attempted marriage is thus in “apparent compliance” with the law where it is entered into in ostensible or seeming compliance with the law. That requirement is met where the would-be spouses apply for and receive a marriage license and procure an official certificate of marriage. See
¶37 The adoptive parents assert that at least one (if not both) of the parties to the 2013 attempted marriage knew that it was not in “apparent compliance” with the law. And they ask us to affirm summary judgment in their favor on that basis.
¶38 We reject that request as incompatible with the governing statute. Admittedly, we can identify related provisions of law that prescribe a requirement of knowledge or good faith belief of a spouse.2 But this statute includes no such requirement. And we are in no position to graft one onto it. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 93 (2012) (speaking of the “omitted case” canon—the principle that “[n]othing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably implies“); Bryner v. Cardon Outreach, LLC, 2018 UT 52, ¶ 21, 428 P.3d 1096 (“We will not infer substantive terms into the text [of a statute] that are not already there.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2013 UT 22, ¶ 33, 301 P.3d 984 (emphasizing that we “resist the temptation to add language or meaning to [a statute] . . . where no hint of it exists in the text” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶39 We reverse the first ground for the district court‘s summary judgment order on this basis. We hold that J.S.P. entered into an attempted marriage in apparent compliance with law by applying for and receiving a marriage license and procuring a certificate of marriage. And we conclude that J.S.P.‘s status as presumed father is not defeated by the legal invalidity of the attempted marriage or by the fact that J.S.P. or K.C. may have been aware of the invalidity of the marriage.
2
¶40 That leaves the question whether C.C. was born “during the invalid marriage or within 300 days after its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce or after a decree of separation.”
¶41 The statute draws a clear distinction between the invalidity of a marriage in the first instance and the mechanisms envisioned for its subsequent termination. A presumed father‘s status remains intact if the child is born “during the invalid marriage or within 300 days after its termination” by one of the mechanisms set forth by statute.
¶42 C.C. was born “during” J.S.P.‘s “invalid marriage” to K.C. That is clear from the fact that the marriage was not terminated by one of the mechanisms specified by statute—“by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce or after a decree of separation.”
¶44 An action seeking a declaration of invalidity was not necessary to invalidate the 2013 marriage as a matter of New Hampshire law. See
¶45 J.S.P. was thus C.C.‘s presumed father under
III
¶46 We uphold our appellate jurisdiction and reverse the entry of summary judgment against J.S.P. And we reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with our decision.
¶47 In so doing, we of course take no position on the appropriate disposition of the petition for adoption of C.C. or on any eventual question as to whether the child should be placed with J.S.P. We hold only that J.S.P. qualifies as a presumed father under
Notes
J.S.P.‘s presumed father status would not give him a conclusive, perpetual claim of parental rights as to any children ever born to K.C. By statute, a presumed father‘s paternity is rebuttable in proceedings initiated under
Other states provide additional mechanisms for cutting off a presumed father‘s status, as by establishing that the status does not apply to a child born during a marriage that is “invalid without a court order” where the child is born 300 days or more after the parties cease “cohabitation.” See