In re A.Z.
{¶1} Kent and Kim Eads (hereinafter the “Eadses“) appeal the judgment of the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which dismissed the Eadses’ claim for reasonable companionship time with A.Z., a minor сhild. The juvenile court found that, as applied in this case,
I.
{¶3} In late 2009, the juvenile court granted temporary custody of A.Z. to the Eadses. Willis and Zahran, however, regained custody оf A.Z. the following June.
{¶4} On September 17, 2010, the Eadses filed a complaint for reasonable companionship time with A.Z. The Eadses based their complaint on
{¶5} On September 20, 2010, Willis and Zahran were married.
{¶6} On Octоber 4, 2010, Willis and Zahran filed a motion to dismiss the Eadses’ complaint for reasonable companionship time. Willis and Zahran argued that, as applied in this case,
{¶7} The juvenile court agreed with Willis and Zahran and found an “as applied” equal-protection violation. As the juvenile court held, “[T]his court finds no rational basis to differentiate married biolоgical parents, who happen to be unmarried at the time that a relative files a complaint seeking companionship rights, from married biolоgical parents who married before the child was born. Relatives, absent a showing of parental
{¶8} “Therefore, the Court holds that Ohio Revised Code Section 3109.12 is unconstitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of this case. * * *.
{¶9} “Based on the foregoing, the Complaint for Companionship Rights is dismissed.” January 4, 2011 Judgmеnt Entry.
{¶10} The Eadses appeal and assert the following assignment of error: I. “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN GRANTING APPELLEES’ MOTION TO DISMISS APPELLANTS’ COMPLAINT FOR REASONABLE COMPANIONSHIP TIME PURSUANT TO OHIO REVISED CODE [SECTION] 3109.12.”
II.
{¶11} On appeal, the Eadses contend that the trial court erred when it dismissed their сomplaint for companionship time with A.Z. And although the trial court dismissed the Eadses’ complaint based on equal-protection grounds, the Eadses do nоt make any equal-protection arguments in their appellate brief. Instead, the Eadses argue that the trial court should have followed our deсision in Moore.
A. Equal Protection
{¶12} “Constitutional analysis is a question of law that we review de novo.” State v. Rayburn, Jackson App. No. 09CA6, 2010-Ohio-5693, at ¶25 (citations omitted).
{¶13} The Equal Protection Clause of the
{¶14} “The Equal Protection Clauses require that all similarly situated individuals be treated in a similаr manner.” Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 122, 2008-Ohio-511, at ¶90, citing McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, at ¶6. See, also, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. (1985), 473 U.S. 432, 439 (stating that the Equal Protection clause “is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike“). In other words, “‘[t]he equal protection of law implies that all litigants similarly situated may appeal to courts for both relief and defense under like conditions, with like protection, and without discrimination.‘” Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 288, 1992-Ohio-133, quoting Sexton v. Barry (C.A.6, 1956), 233 F.2d 220, 224.
{¶15} “A statute may be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis that it is invalid on its face or as applied to a particulаr set of facts. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman (1990), 496 U.S. 310, 312[.] In an as-applied challenge, the challenger ‘contends that application of the statute in the particulаr context in which he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, [is] unconstitutional.’ Ada v. Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists (1992), 506 U.S. 1011[,] (Scalia, J., dissenting).” State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, at ¶17. In the proceedings below, the trial court found that
B. The Eadses’ Argument
{¶16} According to the Eadses, “the trial court in this matter should have followed the reasoning of the Moore court in rendering its decisiоn.” Appellants’ Brief at 13. In Moore, we found that
{¶17} The trial court, however, based its decision on the equal-protection clause -- a fact the Eаdses completely ignore in their appellate brief. The Eadses do not make any constitutional arguments in support of their assignment of error. In fаct, the Eadses’ argument does not even contain the words “equal protection.” Furthermore, because our decision in Moore did not involve an as-applied-equal-protection challenge to
{¶18} Because the Eadses’ arguments are irrelevant, we find no merit in the Eadses’ appeal. “If an argument exists that can support [an] assignment of error, it is not this court‘s duty to root it out. * * * It is not the function of this court to construct a
{¶19} Finally, it wоuld be inappropriate for us to create an argument on the Eadses’ behalf. Under App.R. 16(A)(7), the appellants’ brief “shall include * * * [a]n argument cоntaining the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in suppоrt of the contentions[.]” Here, the Eadses presented their argument under App.R. 16(A)(7). Unfortunately, the reasons in support of the Eadses’ contentions do nоt address the relevant issues before us on appeal. And in our view, we would be circumventing the appellate rules if we created a new argument for the Eadses.
{¶20} Accordingly, we (1) reject the Eadses’ argument as irrelevant, (2) overrule the Eadses’ assignment of error, and (3) affirm the judgment of the trial court.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED. Appellants shall pay the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that а special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Meigs County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Harsha, P.J. and McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY:_____________________________
Roger L. Kline, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.