IN RE: A.M., DELINQUENT YOUTH.
CASE NO. 9-20-23
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MARION COUNTY
February 16, 2021
2021-Ohio-432
SHAW, J.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court Family Division Trial Court No. 2018 DL 00383 Judgment Affirmed
Lauren Hammersmith for Appellant
Nathan R. Heiser for Appellee
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Delinquent child, A.M., appeals the June 3, 2020 judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, Family Division, adjudicating him delinquent of one count of gross sexual imposition in violation of
Relevant Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} On August 3, 2018, a deputy from the Marion County Sheriff‘s Office filed a complaint alleging A.M. committed one count of gross sexual imposition in violation of
{¶3} On December 12, 2018, A.M. filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to a deputy during a June 19, 2018 interview at the Sheriff‘s department. The State filed a memorandum in oрposition to A.M.‘s motion to suppress.
{¶5} On January 8, 2019, the magistrate issued an “order” denying A.M.‘s motion to suppress. Specifically, the magistrate determined that A.M. was not in custody during the interview and that A.M. had voluntarily madе his statements to law enforcement. A.M. filed a motion to set aside the magistrate‘s decision denying his motion to suppress, which was subsequently overruled by the trial court.
{¶6} On April 9, 2019, A.M. withdrew his denial of the allegations in the complaint and entered pleas of no contest. The magistrate accepted A.M.‘s no contest pleas and adjudicated him a delinquent child of the аllegations in the complaint.
{¶7} On August 5, 2019, the magistrate held a dispositional hearing and on August 6, 2019 the magistrate issued a dispositional “report” recommending that A.M. be committed to the legal care and custody of the Ohio Department of Youth Services (“DYS“) for a minimum of six months. The magistrate further recommended that the DYS commitment be suspended and that 18 months of community control sanctions be imposed by the trial court, including 90 days in detention, with those 90 days suspended conditioned on A.M.‘s compliance with his community control sanctions.
{¶9} A.M. filed an appeal of the trial court‘s disposition. This Court determined that the trial court‘s August 6, 2019 judgment entry of disposition was not a final appealable order and dismissed the appeal. See In re: A.M., 3d Dist. No. 9-19-54, 2020-Ohio-2666.
{¶10} On June 3, 2020, upon remand, the trial court issued a judgment entry adjudicating A.M. delinquent of one count of gross sexual imposition in violation of
{¶11} A.M. filed an appeal from the trial court‘s June 3, 2020 judgment, asserting the following assignments of error for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
A.M. WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS WHEN HE WAS ADJUDICATED DELINQUENT OF
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE MARION COUNTY JUVENILE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND VIOLATED A.M.‘S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN IT DENIED HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS, EVEN THOUGH HE DID NOT VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
First Assignment of Error
{¶12} In his first assignment of error, A.M. argues that his adjudication as a delinquent child for gross sexual imposition violated his constitutional rights because the application of the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, A.M. asserts that
Standard of Review
{¶13} At the outset we notе that A.M. failed to raise this issue during the trial court proceedings. “Constitutional issues apparent at the time of the trial are waived unless brought to the attention of the trial court.” In re J.J., 6th Dist. Erie No. E-11-018, 2012-Ohio-2550, ¶ 10. Our review of A.M.‘s assignment of error is,
Statutory Authority
{¶14} A.M. was adjudicated delinquent of gross sexual imposition in
(A) No persоn shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have sexual contact when any of the following applies:
* * *
(4) The other person, or one of the other persоns, is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person.
{¶15} Revised Code Section 2907.01(B) defines “sexual contact” to mean “any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the
Analysis
{¶16} In arguing that
{¶17} The Supreme Court of Ohio found that “[a]s applied to children under the age of 13 who engage in sexual conduct with other children under the age of 13,
{¶18} The Supreme Court of Ohio further determined that the application of the statutory rape statute violated D.B.‘s rights to equal protection and that under the plain language of the statute “every person who engages in sexual conduct with a child under the age of 13 is strictly liable for statutory rape, and the statute must be enforced equally and without regard to the particular circumstances of an individual‘s situation.” In re J.T., 3d Dist. Paulding No. 11-17-03, 2018-Ohio-457, ¶ 18, citing D.B., supra. (Emphasis Added). The Supreme Court determined that because D.B. and the victim were both under the age of 13, “they were both members of the class protected by the statute, and both could have been charged under the offense. Application of the statute in this case to a single party violates the Equal Protection Clause‘s mandate that persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” D.B., supra, at ¶ 24.
{¶19} Since the Supreme Court‘s decision in D.B., several appellate districts, including this one, have addressed arguments similar to A.M.‘s on appeal comparing the statutory rape statute,
{¶20} Specifically, these cases held that D.B. does not apply to the offense of gross sexual imposition under
{¶21} In other words, even though the offenses of statutory rape under
{¶22} In light of the foregoing, we find no merit, let alone any plain error, to A.M.‘s constitutional arguments concerning the application of
Second Assignment of Error
{¶24} In his second assignment of error, A.M. argues that the trial court erred when it overruled his motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement during an interview. Specifically, A.M. claims that he was in custody at the time he was questioned by a deputy with the Marion County Sheriff‘s Office and he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights.
Standard of Review
{¶25} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015-Ohio-1565, ¶ 32, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. We are required to accept the trial court‘s findings of fact if supported by competent, credible evidence. Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the applicаble legal standard.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 710 (4th Dist.1997). We therefore review the trial court‘s application of the law de novo.
{¶26} The
{¶27} In the instant case the magistrate denied suppression of the statements A.M made to lаw enforcement because she determined that A.M. was not subject to a custodial interrogation and, therefore, did not need to be advised of his Miranda rights.
Custodial Interrogation
{¶28} Police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to every person whom they question. In re C.J., 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2017-06-082, 2018-Ohio-1258, ¶ 26; State v. Biros, 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 440 (1997). Only custodial interrogation triggers the need for Miranda warnings. Biros at 440. Miranda defines custodial interrogation as any “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). In detеrmining whether an individual is in custody, the ultimate inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a “restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983). Moreover, any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. However, a noncustodial situation is not converted into a custodial situation simply because questioning takes place in a police station. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
{¶29} Whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on thе subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323-324 (1994). “Relevant factors to consider in determining whether a custodial interrogation took place are: (1) the location of the questioning; (2) duration of the questioning; (3) statements made during the interview; (4) the presence or absence of physical restraints; and (5) whether the interviewee was released at the end of the interview.” In re R.S., supra, at ¶ 17, citing Howes v. Fields, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). In cases involving a juvenile, the juvenile suspect‘s age may be analyzed
Facts Adduced at the Suppression Hearing
{¶30} At the hearing on A.M.‘s motion to suppress, the State presented testimony from Deputy Eric White of the Marion County Sheriff‘s Office. Deputy White recalled contacting A.M.‘s parents prior to the interview regarding an incident that was reported to have occurred a week before on June 11, 2019. He stated that A.M.‘s parents volunteered to bring A.M. to the Sheriff‘s department. Deputy White conducted an interview of A.M. on June 19, 2018 at the Sheriff‘s department. A.M. arrived with both his parents using their own transportation. Both of A.M.‘s parents rеmained present during the entire 15 to 20 minute interview.
{¶31} Deputy White was not in uniform that day, but he was wearing a badge around his neck and a handgun in its holster around his waist. He recalled that the tone of the interview was “casual.” (Tr. at 12). Deputy White specifically explained to A.M. was he was not under arrest, he was not going to jail, and he was not going to be handcuffed. Deputy White stated that although A.M. was free to leave at any time, the building was secured using key fobs to enter and exit certain rooms, one of them being the interview room. So if A.M., or anyone in the facility, expressed a desire to leave the room, a key fob would be required to open the door. Deputy White explained he advised A.M. and his parents of their rights “as a formality” and
{¶32} A.M.‘s parents also testified at the suppression hearing. Both parents recalled receiving a phone call from Deputy White asking them to bring A.M. to the Sheriff‘s department for some questioning. After discussing the matter together, both parents agreed to drive A.M. to the Sheriff‘s office to talk to Deputy White. A.M.‘s parents remembered that A.M. was scared and expressed hе did not want do the interview, but that they told A.M. that he did not have a choice. A.M.‘s parents indicated at the suppression hearing that they were aware of the circumstances underlying the interview because they had prior discussions with the victim‘s parents who were also their neighbors. A.M.‘s parents viewed the interview as an opportunity for A.M. to tell his side of the story.
{¶33} Both parents recalled meeting a receptionist at the Sheriff‘s department upon their arrival, who asked them to take a seat in the lobby while they
{¶34} A.M. tеstified at the suppression hearing. He explained that his father told him he needed to go to the Sheriff‘s department to tell the truth about the incident. A.M. felt that he could not tell his parents that he did not want to go. He recalled his father signing a form prior to him answering Deputy White‘s questions. He remembered feeling very nervous, but recalled that he calmed down after Deputy Whitе explained that he was not going to jail or be handcuffed. A.M. explained that he felt he would be in trouble with his parents if he did not answer Deputy White‘s questions, and therefore he did not feel free to leave the interview room.
Discussion
{¶35} We conclude that the record, including a video of the interview admitted as Exhibit A, supports the magistrate‘s determination that Deputy White‘s
{¶36} Accordingly, because we have concluded the magistrate did not err in determining that A.M. was not subject to a custodial interrogation with Deputy White, thereby requiring the advisements under Miranda, we do not need to address A.M.‘s contention that he did not validly waive those rights during the interview.
{¶37} For all thesе reasons, the second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶38} Based on the foregoing, the assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.