In re A.G.M.C.
APPEARANCES:
Robert C. Nemo for Appellant
David Stamolis for Appellee
Douglas Diequez, Guardian Ad Litem
{¶1} Mother-Appellant, Tammy Crisp, appeals from the judgment of the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, Family Division, granting permanent custody of her daughter, A.C., to Marion County Children’s Services (“Children’s Services”). On appeal, Crisp argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a continuance of the hearing for modification of temporary custody to permanent custody, and that the trial court erred in granting permanent custody to Children’s Services where clear and convincing evidence was not presented that the child could not be placed with her and that it was in the best interest of the child to be placed in the permanent custody of Children’s Services. Based on the following, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} In December 2007, Children’s Services filed a motion for ex parte emergency orders, requesting that temporary custody of Crisp’s daughter, A.C., be given to Flossie Nichols, A.C.’s grandmother, due to Crisp’s history of drug and alcohol abuse, and the recent charges against Crisp for child endangerment and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated1. Subsequently, the magistrate granted the motion and awarded temporary custody of A.C. to Nichols.
{¶4} Subsequently, on January 14, 2008, Children’s Services filed an amended complaint, listing A.C.’s father as unknown, alleging her to be both a dependent and neglected child, and requesting the same disposition.
{¶5} On January 17, 2008, the trial court appointed Doug Diequez as Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”).
{¶6} On January 31, 2008, Children’s Services filed another motion for ex parte temporary orders, requesting that A.C. be placed in its temporary custody due to Nichols allowing Crisp unsupervised visitation of A.C., where A.C. was with Crisp when she entered the emergency room in an incoherent state and appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Subsequently, the trial court granted the motion and placed A.C. in the temporary custody of Children’s Services.
{¶7} In February 2008, the trial court approved the case plan submitted by Children’s Services which called for reunification between A.C. and Crisp, and
{¶8} In April 2008, Children’s Services filed and the trial court granted a motion to dismiss its January 4, 2008 complaint and to continue with all previously imposed orders. Subsequently, Children’s Services filed another complaint, alleging A.C. to be neglected and dependant based upon Crisp’s drug and alcohol abuse, recent arrest for a probation violation for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and positive test for marijuana use, and requesting that it be awarded temporary custody and protective supervision of A.C.
{¶9} On May 27, 2008, the trial court found A.C. to be dependent based upon a stipulation by the parties, ordered that A.C. remain in the temporary custody of Children’s Services, and ordered Crisp to comply with the case plan and Children’s Services to arrange visitation.
{¶10} On May 29, 2008, Children’s Services filed a semi-annual administrative review with the trial court, stating that Crisp had failed to abstain from alcohol use, as she was forced to leave a homeless shelter because of her alcohol consumption; that Crisp had completed several drug screens with no
{¶11} In May 2008, the trial court adopted an amended case plan submitted by Children’s Services, providing that Crisp follow all recommendations of the drug and alcohol assessment program; that she submit to random drug screenings within twenty-four hours of a caseworker’s request; that she abstain from drug and alcohol use while providing care for A.C.; that she demonstrate appropriate parenting techniques during all visitation times; that she not participate in any activity that would result in a finding of child abuse or neglect; that she continue with mental health counseling and medication; that she obtain approved housing; that she maintain such housing for no less than three consecutive months; that she provide her caseworker with copies of the rental agreement and her pay stubs upon
{¶12} In September 2008, Crisp filed a motion requesting reunification with A.C. and a temporary order of increased visitation time, arguing that she had substantially complied with the case plan and that reunification and increased visitation time was in A.C.’s best interest.
{¶13} In October 2008, Children’s Services filed a motion for an annual review and an extension of the temporary commitment order for A.C., stating that A.C.’s foster family continues to provide for her basic needs; that Crisp had completed all case plan goals and objectives with the exception of being able to provide for A.C.’s basic needs; that Crisp needed to obtain a stable and legal source of income to provide for A.C.; and, that the previously approved case plan should remain in effect.
{¶14} Subsequently, the trial court issued a journal entry ordering that Children’s Services continue to have temporary custody of the child; that Crisp comply with the case plan; and, that Crisp have additional times of unsupervised visitation.
{¶16} Subsequently, the trial court adopted another amended case plan on the basis of its award of custody of A.C. back to Crisp, stating that Crisp had complied with the requirements of completing a drug and alcohol assessment, parenting classes, and a psychological assessment, and terminating the visitation plan.
{¶17} Additionally, Children’s Services filed its semi-annual review, finding that A.C. was returned to Crisp’s custody; that Crisp took multiple random drug screenings and never tested positive; that no drugs or drug paraphernalia was observed in Crisp’s home on multiple visits; that Crisp successfully completed drug and alcohol counseling; that Crisp moved out of a shelter and had been living in a home since July 2008; that Crisp’s friend paid the rent for the home; that all utilities were functioning in the home and there were no household environmental hazards present; that Crisp’s past substance abuse history, mental health instability, and limited financial resources continued to create the likelihood of maltreatment of A.C.; that Children’s Services will continue to monitor Crisp’s progress toward case plan goals and her ability to provide for A.C.; that, when
{¶18} On February 9, 2009, Children’s Services filed a motion for an ex parte/emergency order granting it custody of A.C. on the basis that Crisp was arrested for disorderly conduct, child endangerment, and obstruction of justice, and that there were no other appropriate adults to provide for A.C. Subsequently, the trial granted the motion and awarded Children’s Services emergency temporary custody of A.C.
{¶19} On February 11, 2009, Children’s Services filed a motion requesting a modification of the protective supervision order of A.C. to an order granting it temporary custody, and, in March 2009, the trial court granted the motion.
{¶20} In May 2009, Children’s Services filed its semi-annual administrative review stating that A.C. was placed with her previous foster parents, George and Dorene Sturm; that Crisp tested positive for cocaine in April and May 2009, and was arrested in February 2009 as a result of being intoxicated; that Crisp did not have a legal form of income; that Crisp continued to live in a home in which the rent is paid by one of her friends; that Crisp continued to deny her drug use and had been consistently unable to maintain a sober lifestyle; that
{¶21} In July 2009, the trial court adopted an amended case plan which required Crisp to continue to submit to random drug screenings within twenty-four hours of a request, to abstain from drug and alcohol use, to continue with mental health counseling and medication, to maintain stable, approved housing that is clean and free from hazards, and to report any changes in her residence to the caseworker within seventy-two hours. Additionally, the case plan set forth a goal of reunification and permitted Crisp visitation with A.C. twice each week for two hours.
{¶22} In August 2009, Children’s Services filed a motion requesting the modification of temporary custody to permanent custody on the basis of Crisp’s failure to comply with the case plan, including her failure to refrain from drug and alcohol abuse, her arrest for disorderly conduct while intoxicated in June and
{¶23} In September 2009, Crisp filed a motion requesting that Flossie Nichols, A.C.’s maternal grandmother, be granted legal custody of A.C.
{¶24} On March 18, 2010, the case proceeded to a dispositional hearing, at which Crisp’s attorney made an oral motion for a continuance due to Crisp’s absence. Specifically, trial counsel informed the trial court that he had not had contact with Crisp for several months; that when he arrived in court, Crisp called him and inquired into the time of the hearing and informed him that she was on her way to the emergency room; and, that Crisp subsequently called his office and informed them that she would not be in court. The trial court then denied the motion, finding that Crisp was attempting to further delay the proceedings.
{¶25} Thereafter, Nancy Bernhard testified that she was a paralegal and court liaison for Children’s Services; that a Putative Father Registry had been certified by the State that indicated no putative father was registered for A.C.; that B.C., one of Crisp’s children, was in the custody of his father, David McGue; that the Hardin County Juvenile Court granted custody of another one of Crisp’s children, W.C., to Shannon and William McKinley; and, that Crisp had convictions in April 2009 for endangering children, criminal damaging, and obstructing official business, a conviction in August 2009 for criminal trespassing,
{¶26} Kristin Warren testified that she was the quality improvement coordinator and mental health therapist for the Marion Area Counseling Center (“Counseling Center”); that Crisp attended mental health therapy sessions at the Counseling Center; that Crisp failed to attend numerous appointments; and, that Crisp was terminated from the care of the Counseling Center because she failed to return for treatment.
{¶27} Brad Gerfen testified that he was employed as an intake investigator for Children’s Services; that he was previously a caseworker for Children’s Services and was assigned to Crisp’s case for a period of time; that Crisp met some of the goals and objectives for the case plan, but failed to meet others; that Crisp would “jump back and forth” between psychiatrists (dispositional hearing tr., p. 19); that Crisp was initially living in a shelter in Marion, but moved to a house where a friend paid rent on her behalf; that he conducted random drug screenings of Crisp, and she passed all of those screenings; that, however, it was later discovered those drug screenings were not producing accurate results, as they would only show a positive test if the individual was impaired or actively using drugs; that Crisp was arrested in December 2008 for disorderly conduct while intoxicated; that Crisp did not have a job and was not paying her own rent or
{¶28} Matt Coldiron testified that he conducted case management at Children’s Services, including case plans and case counseling with clients; that, on February 8, 2009, he was contacted to respond to Marion General Hospital, as A.C. was at the hospital after Crisp had been arrested; that he was not able to contact Crisp after arriving at the hospital because she was incarcerated; that he was ordered to request a removal of A.C. from Crisp’s custody due to the incident; that A.C. was placed in foster care with the Sturm family; and, that he did not attempt to contact any of Crisp’s relatives because he did not know the identity of any of her relatives.
{¶29} Tim Brown testified that he was employed as a mental health and addictions counselor at Community Counseling Services; that he counseled Crisp sporadically from 2007 until November 2009; that Crisp made some progress
{¶30} Brandy Page testified that she was employed with Children’s Services and was Crisp’s caseworker since February 2009; that her case plan for Crisp included mental health and substance abuse treatment, and a requirement that Crisp maintain stable housing; that Crisp had seven children, all of whom were with their respective fathers, with the exception of one child who was with Crisp’s sister; that Crisp had three different addresses since she had been handling her case; that she did visit the residence at which Crisp lived from February to July of 2009, and it was an appropriate place for a child; that a man by the name of Tim Roberts was paying Crisp’s rent on her behalf while she lived at that residence; that Crisp had not held a job since she had been handling her case, and Crisp did not receive any public assistance other than Medicaid; that she had not visited any of Crisp’s other residences despite her requests to Crisp to do so; that Crisp
{¶31} Page further testified that she supervised visitation between Crisp and A.C.; that Crisp attended most of the visitation appointments, and her interaction with A.C. was appropriate; that A.C. had been in foster care and was adjusting well, although she had experienced “some emotional issues related to * * * not understanding the situation due to her young age” (id. at p. 50); that A.C. and Crisp had a strong bond, and A.C. often threw temper tantrums when she was forced to separate from Crisp; that these temper tantrums were more severe following a visitation period where there had been an extended time between visitations; that, if Crisp did not have a drug and mental-health problem, she would have adequate parenting skills; that Crisp recently requested to be placed in
{¶32} Page continued that A.C. and her foster parents had a very good relationship; that she often referred to her foster mother as “mom” and referred to their residence as her “home” (id. at p. 58); that, if A.C. was placed back with Crisp, there would be risks, as Crisp uses very poor judgment when she is under the influence of drugs or alcohol; that she investigated multiple family members and friends of Crisp for placement, but none were appropriate; that, on a previous occasion, A.C. was placed with Crisp’s mother, but Children’s Services requested and was granted an emergency removal after her mother permitted Crisp to drive A.C. to the emergency room while Crisp was under the influence of drugs or
{¶33} Doreen Sturm testified that she and her husband George Sturm had been the foster parents to A.C. for most of the past two years; that A.C. did very well in their home; that A.C. was integrated into the family and recognized herself as a member of the family; that there was also an eight-year-old boy in the residence; that he and A.C. had a brother/sister relationship, as they liked each other, but also argued; that she and her husband had been foster parents for approximately eight years; and, that, after A.C. had visitations with Crisp, she would observe negative behaviors from A.C. for one or two days, including aggressiveness.
{¶34} At the close of the presentation of evidence, Crisp’s attorney made an oral motion for the trial court to order Crisp into an inpatient drug-addiction treatment center, as Crisp previously requested, and the trial court denied the motion. Additionally, at the close of the hearing, Children’s Services notified the trial court that, according to its other staff members, Crisp never arrived at the hospital despite her request for a motion to continue the hearing on that basis.
I hope that the court would consider a less restrictive alternative than permanent custody, so that Ms. Crisp would have the possibility of regaining custody of her daughter at some point in the future, or at the very least to maintain visitation with [A.C.]. I would not recommend she have unsupervised visits, and definitely not to have her daughter returned to her for a substantial period of time until she has exhibited a period of sobriety.
(Id. at p. 4).
{¶36} On March 30, 2010, the GAL testified that, since he was appointed Crisp’s GAL in January 2008, he had not known Crisp to be employed; that she had also had two or three different residences during this time, and that he often had difficulty contacting her; that, for the past eighteen months, Crisp had not been able to care for a child, and that it would not be in the child’s best interest to be placed with Crisp; that Crisp’s aunt came forward on March 15, 2010, and expressed her interest in obtaining custody of A.C., but she had never come forward before this time, and she had not filed a motion with the trial court; and, that reunification between Crisp and A.C. was not possible, and that permanent custody was the only option.
{¶37} The GAL continued that Crisp had a bond with A.C.; that A.C. loved Crisp; that, if Crisp were involved in the rehabilitation program at Stepping Stones
{¶38} In April 2010, the trial court granted Children’s Services motion for permanent custody, stating the following in its judgment entry:
The Court, in making findings of fact, has considered all the evidence admitted. * * * The Court does not make findings of fact as to every piece of evidence. The omission of the Court to make a specific finding does not suggest that the Court did not consider the fact in arriving at the ultimate decision.
* * *
Mother has failed to make significant progress under the Case Plan from February, 2009, to date. Mother has changed residences three (3) times, and is currently homeless and her whereabouts are unknown. Tammy Crisp is currently unemployed, and without any income. She admittedly continues abusing drugs and alcohol, and of the seven (7) drug screens administered, she tested positive five (5) times for cocaine and marijuana. Mother was referred for mental health counseling and only sporadically attended and eventually was terminated from treatment due to failure to keep appointments. * * *
* * *
The Foster Mother indicated that [A.C.] has lived with her and her family a majority of the past three (3) years, with the exception of approximately three (3) months when she returned to Mother. She testified that A.C. has become integrated in their family, and she considers her eight year old son her brother, and refers to her as Mom. * * * She further stated she is a stay at home mom, and has observed some negative behaviors by [A.C.] following visits with her mother, such as temper tantrums. The negative behaviors also seem to be worse after extended absences of [A.C.] not seeing her mother. * * *
* * *
* * * [A.C.] has been in the temporary custody of [Children’s Services] from January, 2008 to November 2008, and from February, 2009, to the present, or approximately twenty-three (23) months of the last twenty-six (26) months, and she has continued to reside in her current foster home placement during that time. This continued placement is the direct result of Mother’s inability and/or refusal to abstain from the abuse of alcohol and drugs. Due to Mother’s continued substance abuse, she has failed to provide suitable support for her daughter. * * * Mother’s current circumstances of addiction, lack of employment, homelessness and untreated mental illness do not present any opportunity for return of her daughter within a reasonable time or in the foreseeable future.
Tammy Crisp has seven (7) children, all of which have been removed from her care and custody. She continued to admit abuse of alcohol and drugs, and this is evidenced by her positive drugs screens and her most recent arrest for Disorderly Conduct on March 8, 2010. * * *
This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of [A.C.] to approve the Motion filed by [Children’s Services] and grant permanent custody of [A.C] to Marion County Children’s Services. In examining the factors contained in
Ohio Revised Code Section 2141.414(D) , including all other relevant factors presented, continuing her current placement with the foster care family is in her best interests.
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that [A.C.] cannot be placed with her mother within a reasonable period of time and further should not be placed with her due to her current circumstances, with no expectation for improvement in the foreseeable future. Pursuant to
In addition, Tammy Crisp has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward her daughter by her failure to regularly support and visit her, and her inability to provide an adequate permanent home pursuant to
The Court having considered all relevant factors contained in
{¶39} It is from this judgment that Crisp appeals, presenting the following assignments of error for our review.
Assignment of Error No. I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT‘S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE.
Assignment of Error No. II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY GRANTING APPELLEE‘S MOTION FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY WHEN THERE WAS NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO FIND THAT THE MINOR CHILD SHOULD NOT BE PLACED WITH APPELLANT AND THAT IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD TO BE PLACED IN THE PERMANENT CUSTODY OF APPELLEE.
Assignment of Error No. I
{¶40} In her first assignment of error, Crisp argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a continuance of the permanent custody hearing. Specifically, she contends that the legitimacy of her delay, caused by her need to go to the hospital, coupled with the importance of the proceedings and the insignificant inconvenience to the parties necessitated a continuance. We disagree.
{¶42} ‘“The review of a decision on a motion for continuance requires the appellate court to apply a balancing test, weighing the trial court‘s interest in controlling its own docket, including facilitating the efficient dispensation of justice, versus the potential prejudice to the moving party.“’ Gabel v. Gabel, 3d Dist. No. 9-04-13, 2004-Ohio-4292, ¶12, quoting Burton v. Burton (1999), 132 Ohio App.3d 473, 476, 1999-Ohio-844. Furthermore, the factors a court must consider in deciding a motion for a continuance include the length of the delay requested, whether previous continuances have been granted, the inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, attorneys, and the court, whether the request is reasonable or purposeful and contrived to delay the proceedings, and whether the movant contributed to the circumstances giving rise to the request. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 3d Dist. No. 15-08-08, 2008-Ohio-6754, ¶16, citing Gabel, 2004-Ohio-4292, at ¶12.
{¶43} In the case sub judice, Crisp‘s attorney made an oral motion for a continuance on the basis that Crisp called and informed him that she would not be able to attend the hearing because she needed to go to the hospital. While this may appear to be a valid reason for the trial court to grant the continuance, no evidence was ever submitted, either prior or subsequent to the hearing, that Crisp actually went to the hospital, and her attorney‘s statements were not evidence on the matter. See, generally, Calex Corp v. United Steelworkers of Am. (2000), 137 Ohio App.3d 74, 86. Additionally, a number of other continuances had been granted in this case, and the case had been pending in the trial court for over a year and a half. Although the other continuances were not on account of requests by Crisp, a continuance would have resulted in several more months of delays, and the trial court had a duty to resolve this case as quickly as possible for the best interest of the child. Moreover, while we recognize the importance of a parent‘s due process right to attend a permanent custody hearing, In re J.W., 9th Dist. No. 24924, 2009-Ohio-6957, ¶20, such right is not absolute, see In re P.J., 11th Dist. Nos. 2008-A-0047, 2008-A-0053, 2009-Ohio-182, ¶68, and we must also give deference to the trial court‘s finding that Crisp‘s motion to continue was for purposes of delaying the proceedings, which is further supported by the lack of
{¶44} Consequently, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Crisp‘s motion for a continuance.
{¶45} Accordingly, we overrule Crisp‘s first assignment of error.
Assignment of Error No. II
{¶46} In her second assignment of error, Crisp argues that the trial court erred by granting permanent custody to Children‘s Services. Specifically, she contends that clear and convincing evidence was not presented that A.C. could not be placed with her, and that it was in A.C.‘s best interest to be placed in the permanent custody of Children‘s Services. We disagree.
{¶47} In reviewing a grant of permanent custody, it is important to first note that “the right to raise a child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, citing In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157. Although parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the upbringing of their children, those rights are not absolute. In re Thomas, 3d Dist. No. 5-03-08, 2003-Ohio-5885, ¶7, citing Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d at 157. Parental rights “are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or
{¶48} All permanent custody determinations made under
{¶49} Once a child has been adjudicated dependent, neglected, or abused, a children‘s services agency may elect to seek permanent custody either at the initial disposition hearing pursuant to
{¶50} Permanent custody determinations made via a post-dispositional hearing require a two-prong analysis. First, the trial court must determine whether any conditions set forth under
{¶51}
With respect to a motion made pursuant to division (D)(2) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the court shall grant permanent custody of the child to the movant if the court determines in accordance with division (E) of this section that the child cannot be placed with one of the child‘s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent and determines in accordance with division (D) of this section that permanent custody is in the child‘s best interest.
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child‘s home * * *, the parent has failed continuously and repeatedly to
substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child‘s home. * * *
(4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child;
* * *
(14) The parent for any reason is unwilling to provide food, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities for the child or to prevent the child from suffering physical, emotional, or sexual abuse or physical, emotional, or mental neglect;
* * *
(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.
{¶52} If the trial court finds that the child cannot be placed with one of the child‘s parents within a reasonable time or that the child should not be placed with either parent based upon the factors set forth in
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-
home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; * * *
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;
(d) The child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency.
{¶53} In the case at bar, the trial court found several of the
{¶54} Crisp‘s initial caseworker, Gerfen, testified that Crisp was living in a shelter in Marion for some time, but then moved to a house where the rent was paid by one of her friends; that Crisp did not have a job to support herself; and, that, although Crisp passed multiple drug screenings, it was later discovered that those screenings were not producing accurate results.
{¶55} Crisp‘s second caseworker, Page, testified that Crisp was never employed while she was her caseworker; that Crisp tested positive for cocaine and marijuana on five occasions; that Crisp attended a detoxification program at St.
{¶56} Crisp‘s counselor, Brown, testified that Crisp made some progress from 2007 until November 2009, but very little progress in the later half of that time period; that Crisp admitted to drug and alcohol use; that Crisp needed to establish a stable home environment; that he took steps to have Crisp admitted for inpatient treatment, but she did not want to participate; that Crisp would often make future appointments as she left the counseling sessions, but she missed many of those appointments; and, that Crisp was discharged from the agency because she did not follow through with treatment.
{¶57} Additionally, the GAL‘s report stated that Crisp had moved several times and had either lived in other people‘s homes or had someone pay her rent
{¶58} Based upon the evidence presented, we find that the trial court‘s findings that Crisp demonstrated a lack of commitment toward A.C. by failing to regularly support and visit her and provide an adequate permanent home; that Crisp‘s lack of housing and employment, continued drug and alcohol abuse, and refusal of treatment demonstrated an unwillingness to provide for A.C‘s basic needs; and, that Crisp failed to remedy the conditions which caused A.C.‘s removal were supported by clear and convincing evidence.
{¶59} Moreover, we also find that the trial court considered the best interest factors under
{¶60} The trial court specifically found that A.C. had been in the custody of Children‘s Services for twenty-three of the previous twenty-six months; that A.C. was flourishing in her current foster home placement; and, that A.C. was in need of a secure permanent placement, but Crisp‘s current and continuing circumstances prevented this from occurring without a grant of permanent custody to Children‘s Services.
{¶61} Additionally, A.C.‘s foster parent, Sturm, testified that A.C. had adjusted very well in their home, and that A.C. was integrated into the family. Page testified that A.C. and her foster parents had a very good relationship; that she often referred to her foster mother as “mom” and referred to the their residence as her home; that, if A.C. was placed back with Crisp, there would be risks, as Crisp uses very poor judgment when she is under the influence of drugs or alcohol; that, during the time she had acted as the caseworker, there was not an opportunity to reunify Crisp and A.C.; and, that, based upon her experience and training, it was in A.C.‘s best interest to be placed in the permanent custody of Children‘s Services. Finally, the GAL testified that it would not be in A.C‘s best interest to be placed back with Crisp.
{¶63} Accordingly, we overrule Crisp‘s second assignment of error.
{¶64} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
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