STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF A.D.-C., A PERSON UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE. A.D.-C., Appellant, v. STATE OF UTAH, Appellee.
No. 20221120-CA
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
October 24, 2024
2024 UT App 150
Fourth District Juvenile Court, Provo Department; The Honorable F. Richards Smith; No. 1208680
Sean D. Reyes and Emily Sopp, Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES RYAN D. TENNEY and JOHN D. LUTHY concurred.
HARRIS, Judge:
¶1 A.D.-C. (ADC), a sixteen-year-old juvenile, borrowed his father‘s Cadillac Escalade one night and took it for a spin, accompanied by a friend. At the time, ADC had a learner permit but not a driver license. The ride ended when ADC took a turn too fast, rolled the vehicle, and crashed through a backyard fence. The State filed a delinquency petition against ADC, alleging that he had taken actions constituting the crimes of reckless driving and driving without a license. ADC admitted that he had been driving without a license, but he contested the reckless driving
¶2 ADC now appeals that determination, asserting that some of the testimony offered by responding police officers was improperly admitted, and that the evidence was insufficient to support a determination that he violated the reckless driving statute. We reject ADC‘s assertions and affirm his adjudication.
BACKGROUND
¶3 One evening after dark, police received a report that there had been a vehicle “rollover” near the local high school. Two officers arrived at the scene, and they found a Cadillac Escalade that had come to rest “in someone‘s yard,” “right where a fence” used to be, right-side up but “turned the opposite direction of the travel.” The vehicle had extensive “damage to [its] top and sides,” and had “scraping” on its chrome hubcaps. Officers also observed damage to nearby shrubbery, trees, and fences. And on the pavement, the officers observed “scrape marks from the vehicle” as well as “extensive skid marks,” which they deduced were “from the tires” because there was “rubber residue on the road.”
¶4 The accident occurred at a relatively large intersection, and the posted speed limit on the more arterial of the two intersecting roads was 45 miles per hour. Both of the intersecting roads had at least one lane of travel in each direction as well as a shared turn lane in the middle. The officers located ADC at the scene, who told them that he had been “traveling southbound” on the busier road and that the vehicle‘s “steering” or “front tire” had “locked up,” causing him to lose control of the vehicle. The officers also learned that ADC did not have a driver license, although he did have a learner permit. Fortunately, neither ADC nor his passenger was seriously injured, despite the severity of the crash.
¶5 From ADC‘s statements and their own observations at the crash scene, the officers concluded that ADC had been traveling southbound at or near 45 miles per hour and had attempted to turn left (eastbound) onto the cross-street, but that he had not successfully navigated the turn and had rolled the vehicle over and crashed through a fence and into the yard. At the scene, officers cited ADC for “reckless driving” and for “violation of [his] learner‘s permit.”
¶6 One month later, the State filed a delinquency petition against ADC, asserting that he had taken actions that constituted the crimes of reckless driving and driving without a license. As the case proceeded, ADC admitted to the unlicensed driving charge, but he elected to contest the reckless driving charge, and the case moved toward trial.
¶7 A few months later, the juvenile court held a half-day bench trial to consider the reckless driving charge. At the outset, ADC‘s attorney (Counsel) indicated that the State had told him that it would not be offering any expert testimony and that he intended to object to any testimony that he thought constituted expert testimony.
¶8 In support of its case, the State called only two witnesses: the officers who had responded to the crash scene. The first officer (Officer 1) offered his observations of the scene, including a description of the location and positioning of the vehicle, the skid marks on the road, the statements ADC had made, and the general layout of the intersection. Officer 1 also testified that when the vehicle was pulled onto a tow truck, the wheels appeared intact and were not locked in any position, leading him to conclude that the vehicle “had not locked up.” Counsel lodged no objection to any of this testimony.
¶9 At one point, the State asked Officer 1 how, in his opinion, the vehicle could have come “to rest on its wheels” facing the wrong direction in the yard. At this, Counsel objected, arguing
¶10 Later, the State asked Officer 1 which individual traffic citations could have been issued to ADC under the circumstances. Officer 1 stated that, among other things, ADC could have been cited for speeding, failing to maintain lane of travel, making an improper turn, failing to maintain control of the vehicle, and driving carelessly. While Officer 1 acknowledged on cross-examination that he did not observe ADC speeding, he clarified that “the skid marks and the totality [of the circumstances] would suggest [ADC] was speeding.”
¶11 Officer 2 likewise offered his observations of the accident scene, which testimony came in without objection. Later, though, Officer 2 testified about the particulars of the skid marks he observed on the pavement, stating that some of the marks were “yaw marks.” He explained that yaw marks are a type of skid mark that “almost look like half-moons” and that these marks indicate that “the vehicle is sliding sideways,” usually as a result of “excessive speed.” At this point, Counsel objected, asserting that this testimony about yaw marks was expert testimony that had not been previously disclosed and for which insufficient foundation had been laid. The court overruled this objection. Officer 2 then added that he had learned about yaw marks from instruction he had received “in the police academy.”
¶12 Shortly thereafter, the State asked Officer 2 for his opinion about “what [he thought] happened.” Counsel lodged no objection to this question. In response, Officer 2 stated, “I believe the vehicle was trying to make a left-hand turn to go eastbound on [the cross-street] and was going at a high rate of speed and couldn‘t control the vehicle and rolled.”
¶13 The State also asked Officer 2 whether drivers have less control over their vehicles at higher speeds. When Officer 2 answered in the affirmative, Counsel objected, arguing that the State was once again calling for expert testimony. In response to this objection, the State asked a series of questions intended to offer additional foundation for Officer 2‘s response, and Counsel did not thereafter renew the objection. The court was therefore never asked to make an ultimate ruling on the objection. Officer 2 eventually offered a response to the original question, testifying that it “[a]bsolutely” becomes more difficult to turn a vehicle at high speed.
¶14 As with Officer 1, the State also asked Officer 2 what individual citations could have been given to ADC, and Officer 2 responded that his “three top ones would be speeding, improper turn, and failure to maintain control of the vehicle.”
¶15 After eliciting testimony from the two officers, the State rested its case. ADC then called his parents as defense witnesses, and he attempted to elicit testimony aimed at demonstrating that the vehicle was mechanically unreliable. The parents testified that the family had owned the vehicle since 2006 and that about “[f]our years ago” the vehicle‘s “steering wheel became very stiff,” making it difficult to turn. To fix this problem, ADC‘s father had replaced the power steering pump twice, most recently the year before the crash. He acknowledged, however, that since the latest pump replacement, the vehicle‘s steering had been working just fine as far as he knew. And just two weeks before the crash, ADC‘s father had replaced the rear brakes and brake discs. He further
¶16 In its closing argument, the State argued that ADC had committed reckless driving in two different ways. First, it asserted that ADC had been driving the vehicle in general “willful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” See
¶17 In response, Counsel argued that ADC had not been driving with a general “willful and wanton disregard” for the safety of others and that he had not committed three “separate and distinct” traffic violations. In particular, Counsel argued that all the alleged individual traffic violations occurred at roughly the same time and during the same set of acts, and that the State‘s asserted violations were therefore “all the same thing.”
¶18 At the conclusion of the trial, the juvenile court concluded that ADC had committed three separate traffic violations in rapid succession, stating as follows:
[T]he reasonable inference that is drawn is that there was excessive speed for the circumstances. [ADC] [m]ay have only been traveling the speed limit which is not a problem. You can travel the speed limit. But if you‘re trying to make a turn at 45 miles an hour (the speed limit there), that is excessive. So with . . . all of that evidence it becomes obvious that speed was involved, that there was an attempt to make a turn improperly, and a failure . . . to remain in the lane of travel.
¶19 On this basis, the court adjudicated ADC delinquent on the reckless driving charge; the court did not address whether ADC had exhibited a general “willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.” See
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶20 ADC now appeals, and he raises two issues for our consideration. First, ADC challenges the juvenile court‘s decision to overrule his objections to the officers’ trial testimony, lodged on the ground that the officers were offering improper expert testimony. We review a trial court‘s determination that a witness‘s testimony was not expert testimony for “abuse of discretion.” State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶ 8, 147 P.3d 1176. “Abuse of discretion occurs only if it can be said that no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court.” State v. Sanchez, 2017 UT App 229, ¶ 2, 409 P.3d 156 (quotation simplified).
¶21 Second, ADC asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the court‘s determination that he committed reckless driving. “When reviewing a juvenile court‘s decision for sufficiency of the evidence, [an appellate court] must consider all the facts, and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the juvenile court‘s determination,” and we reverse “only when it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches
ANALYSIS
I. The Officers’ Testimony
¶22 ADC‘s first challenge is to the juvenile court‘s decision to overrule his objections to portions of the officers’ trial testimony that he asserts was undisclosed expert testimony. Officer 2‘s challenged testimony about “yaw marks” may well have been expert testimony. But even assuming that this testimony was improperly admitted, we reject ADC‘s challenge, because the rest of the officers’ testimony was properly admitted lay testimony and because ADC has not shown a reasonable probability of a different result in the absence of the yaw mark testimony. We discuss ADC‘s challenges to each officer‘s testimony in turn.
A. Officer 1‘s Testimony
¶23 ADC challenges the admission of only one part of Officer 1‘s trial testimony: his opinion as to how the vehicle could have ended up turned the wrong way in a residential yard. ADC contends that this testimony constituted improper and undisclosed expert testimony. We disagree.
¶24 “[T]he test for determining whether testimony must be provided by an expert is whether the testimony requires that the witness have scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge; in other words, whether an average bystander would be able to provide the same testimony.” State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 49, ¶ 34, 147 P.3d 1176. Indeed, a “lay witness may testify in the form of fact or opinion to information within her personal knowledge or perception when it is helpful to the finder of fact and it is ‘not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.‘” State v. Sellers, 2011 UT App 38, ¶ 26, 248 P.3d 70 (quoting
¶25 Applying these principles, Utah courts have deemed lay opinions within the ken of the average bystander, and therefore admissible, in various circumstances, including opinions about whether a person is intoxicated, whether moans sound as though they were associated with sexual pleasure, whether footprints and shoeprints appear to be similar, and whether a victim‘s wounds are fresh. See State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 190–91 (Utah 1987) (similarity of footprints); State v. Garcia-Lorenzo, 2022 UT App 101, ¶¶ 66–67, 517 P.3d 424, cert. granted, 525 P.3d 1263 (Utah 2022) (moans of pleasure or pain); State v. Hulse, 2019 UT App 105, ¶ 35, 444 P.3d 1158 (freshness of wounds); State v. Yalowski, 2017 UT App 177, ¶¶ 32, 39, 404 P.3d 53 (similarity of shoeprints); Sellers, 2011 UT App 38, ¶ 26 (intoxication).
¶26 In this case, Officer 1 testified, based on his observations at the crash scene, that ADC had attempted to take a turn that “had exceeded the speed limit” and that the vehicle had “rolled, hit the curb, and then flipped itself back upright” and came to rest in the yard. He further made note of “the velocity that must have occurred in order for that vehicle to roll and crash through trees, fences and end up in somebody‘s backyard.”
¶27 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by deeming this testimony an admissible lay opinion, because the opinion Officer 1 gave is within the ken of the average bystander. Just as most people have sufficient experience with intoxicated people or footprints, most people have sufficient experience with car travel and accidents to offer basic opinions, based on their observations, about how a car ended up in a particular location. Although the juvenile court mentioned, in passing, that Officer 1‘s opinions may have been based on his “training and [experience],” Officer
¶28 It is important to our conclusion here that Officer 1‘s testimony was fairly cursory and non-technical, and—as the juvenile court noted—was a far cry from “the realm of [accident] reconstruction” testimony. When a vehicle has damage to its side and top and to its chrome wheels, and when there are skid marks and scrape marks on the pavement, it does not require any specialized training or experience to conclude that the vehicle was traveling too fast, lost control, rolled over and ended up in its terminal location.
¶29 On this basis, we reject ADC‘s challenge to the admissibility of Officer 1‘s lay opinion about how the vehicle came to rest in the residential backyard.
¶30 ADC challenges the admission of two parts of Officer 2‘s testimony: (1) his opinion that drivers have less control over their vehicles at higher speeds than they do at lower speeds, and (2) his opinion that some of the skid marks were “yaw marks” that indicated the vehicle had been “sliding sideways” as a result of “excessive speed.” We discuss these challenges in turn.
¶31 The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Officer 2 to offer the opinion that drivers have less control over their vehicles at higher speeds. In this context, this opinion is permissible lay testimony, because most people have sufficient experience with car travel to be able to intuit that it is easier to control a vehicle and keep it in the proper lane of travel when moving at slow speeds than when moving at high speeds. This opinion was within the ken of the average bystander and was therefore not objectionable.2
¶32 We resolve ADC‘s challenge to Officer 2‘s “yaw marks” testimony on a different ground. ADC asserts—with considerable force—that this testimony constitutes expert testimony because average bystanders do not have much knowledge about the specifics of skid marks, including yaw marks. But even assuming—without deciding—that the juvenile court abused its discretion by allowing Officer 2 to opine about yaw marks, any such error was harmless on this record.
¶33 Not every trial error regarding the admission of evidence requires reversal. Indeed, such errors “require[] reversal only if a review of the record persuades the appellate court that without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.” State v. Jones, 2020 UT App 161, ¶ 14, 478 P.3d 1055 (quotation simplified); see also State v. Ellis, 2018 UT 2, ¶ 42, 417 P.3d 86 (“Prejudice analysis is counterfactual. To decide whether a trial affected by error is reasonably likely to have turned out differently we have to consider a hypothetical—an alternative universe in which the trial went off without the error.“). Thus, to assess whether the admission of Officer 2‘s yaw mark testimony can constitute reversible error, we must imagine
¶34 On this record, a different conclusion is not reasonably likely, even in the absence of the yaw mark testimony. The other evidence indicating that ADC had rolled his vehicle due to excessive speed and inexperience was overwhelming. After all, the vehicle had sustained severe damage, including to its top and sides, and had ended up in a yard resting in the opposite direction than it had been traveling. The court did not need Officer 2‘s yaw mark testimony to reach the rather intuitive conclusion that the vehicle had rolled over while making a turn at excessive speed and that it had therefore at some point been moving sideways. We also note that, in its explanation of its conclusions, the juvenile court made only passing mention of yaw marks—in the context of commenting on the presence of skid marks on the pavement—and does not appear to have meaningfully relied on Officer 2‘s specific opinion about the yaw marks.
¶35 Accordingly, for these reasons, we reject ADC‘s challenges to Officer 2‘s testimony.
¶36 Finally, ADC brings a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, asserting that the evidence presented does not support the juvenile court‘s determination that ADC violated the reckless driving statute. That statute states, as a general matter, that “[a] person is guilty of reckless driving who operates a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.”
¶37 ADC challenges the juvenile court‘s determination that he committed three separate traffic violations. The State responds by asserting that ADC violated at least three traffic laws during the rollover accident, and alternatively invites us to affirm on the ground that ADC “committed reckless driving through willful and wanton disregard.”
¶38 We elect to affirm on the alternative basis suggested by the State. We can, of course, affirm a trial court‘s decision on any “legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action.” Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158 (quotation simplified). And this principle rings especially true in juvenile delinquency cases, because in such cases the court is not required to make any findings at all. See
¶39 And when we examine the evidence presented, it supports the conclusion that ADC committed reckless driving. Although ADC was a relatively inexperienced driver, his age as well as his possession of a learner permit demonstrate sufficient experience to impute to him an understanding that a car cannot safely make a 90-degree turn on a city street while moving at 45 miles per hour. Thus, even if he was not driving in excess of the posted speed limit
¶40 On this basis, then, we conclude that the juvenile court‘s ultimate adjudication was not against the clear weight of the evidence and is therefore not subject to reversal on appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶41 For the most part, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in overruling ADC‘s objections to portions of the officers’ testimony. And ADC has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by admission of Officer 2‘s testimony about yaw marks. Finally, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court‘s ultimate delinquency adjudication.
¶42 Affirmed.