In re A.C.
Appearances:
Michael Gordillo, for appellant Mother.
Michael C. O‘Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:
{¶ 1} Appellant, M.B., the mother of five minor children, appeals the juvenile court‘s award of permanent custody to the Cuyahoga County Department of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS or the Agency“). M.B. alleges that the juvenile court‘s award of permanent custody was against the manifest weight of the
I. Procedural History and Relevant Facts
A. Procedural History
{¶ 2} On September 24, 2020, the Agency filed five complaints alleging that each of M.B.‘s five children were neglected and dependent requesting temporary custody of the children. After a hearing held on November 16, 2020, the children were placed in the temporary custody of the Agency and then on December 15, 2020, the children were placed in the temporary custody of their paternal grandfather. The order of temporary custody had been extended twice. On March 16, 2022, the Agency filed motions to modify temporary custody to permanent custody in each of the children‘s cases.1
B. Motion for Permanent Custody and Evidence Presented at Hearing
{¶ 3} On June 13, 2022, the juvenile court held a hearing on the motions for permanent custody. The magistrate issued opinions finding that the children‘s continued residence in or the return to the home of M.B., mother, and to C.C., father,
{¶ 4} At the hearing, the trial court received as exhibits the plea and sentencing entries from M.B.‘s criminal case. The entries indicate that M.B. entered guilty pleas to six counts of endangering children in violation of
{¶ 5} The juvenile court received testimony from the CCDCFS extended services worker who was assigned to the children‘s family. The worker testified that she was familiar with the family and that there were five children, then aged 5 to 11 years old, who were all in the temporary custody of the Agency. The children were placed with their paternal grandparents, their needs, including counseling, were being met, and they were bonded with their grandparents.
{¶ 6} The extended services worker testified that the children were placed into temporary custody in part due to M.B.‘s substance abuse and parenting issues
{¶ 7} M.B. completed a nonintensive outpatient program to address substance abuse. Because of the no-contact order in the criminal case, M.B. did not have contact with any of the children since October 2021. The extended services worker further stated the children were bonded with their grandparents and that the children‘s needs were being met. M.B. also completed a parenting class, but due to her continuing no-contact order, the Agency could not assess whether she benefitted from the parenting services she completed or that she could presently meet the children‘s basic needs.
{¶ 8} The guardian ad litem testified to the children‘s living environment. She stated that they received appropriate medical and dental care, including mental health treatment for several of the children. The guardian ad litem submitted a recommendation to the court that permanent custody be granted, basing the recommendation on the children‘s need for a stable secure placement. Further, the guardian ad litem testified that in light of the parents’ criminal convictions and sentences, they would not be able to provide the care necessary for the children. As to the children, the guardian ad litem report submitted to the juvenile court noted
C. Decision Granting Permanent Custody to the Agency
{¶ 9} In awarding permanent custody to the Agency, the juvenile court determined the allegations within the motions for permanent custody were proven by clear and convincing evidence. It further found that each of the children had been in the temporary custody of a public children services agency or private child placing agency for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and that reasonable efforts were made to prevent the continued removal of the children from her home, or to return the children to the home, and to finalize the permanency plan, to wit: reunification. It further found that custody with M.B. would be contrary to the children‘s best interest under the factor‘s listed within
{¶ 10} The juvenile court also made the following determination:
Upon considering the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, and foster parents; the wishes of the child; the custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in temporary custody of a public children services agency or private child placing agency under one or more separate orders of disposition for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period; the child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without the grant of permanent custody; and, the report of the Guardian ad Litem, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a grant of permanent custody is in the best interests of the child and the child cannot be placed with one of the child‘s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent. The Court further finds, it is in the best interest of the child to be placed in the permanent custody of the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services.
The juvenile court explained the reasoning supporting its finding by noting that the focus of the case was the best interest of the children, that
A. Assignment of Error
{¶ 11} M.B.‘s sole assignment of error reads:
The trial court‘s termination of Appellant‘s parental rights is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 12} M.B. argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights pursuant to
{¶ 13} The Agency argues that because M.B. and C.C. were found guilty of an offense listed within
B. Relevant Law and Standards of Review
{¶ 14}
that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence” but not to the extent of such certainty required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.
In re Awkal, 95 Ohio App.3d 309, 315, 642 N.E.2d 424 (8th Dist.1994), fn. 2, citing Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 512 N.E.2d 979 (1987).
{¶ 15}
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child‘s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child‘s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division
(d) The child‘s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶ 16} When determining the best-interest of a child pursuant to
{¶ 17} If it is in the best interests of a child that permanent custody be granted,
(1) Except as provided in division (B)(2) of this section, the court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) of section
2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and thechild cannot be placed with either of the child‘s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child‘s parents. * * *
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1) of section
2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state.
{¶ 18} Where a child is the victim of a crime committed by a parent or parents,
If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section
2151.353 of the Revised Code that one or more of the following exist as to each of the child‘s parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:* * *
(6) The parent has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense under division (A) or (C) of section
2919.22 or under section2903.16 ,2903.21 ,2903.34 ,2905.01 ,2905.02 ,2905.03 ,2905.04 ,2905.05 ,2907.07 ,2907.08 ,2907.09 ,2907.12 ,2907.23 ,2907.25 ,2907.31 ,2907.32 ,2907.321 ,2907.322 ,2907.323 ,2911.01 ,2911.02 ,2911.11 ,2911.12 ,2919.12 ,2919.24 ,2919.25 ,2923.12 ,2923.13 ,2923.161 ,2925.02 , or3716.11 of the Revised Code, and the child or a sibling ofthe child was a victim of the offense, or the parent has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense under section 2903.04 of the Revised Code, a sibling of the child was the victim of the offense, and the parent who committed the offense poses an ongoing danger to the child or a sibling of the child.
{¶ 19} An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. Such an abuse “implies that the court‘s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).
C. The Juvenile Court‘s Grant of Permanent Custody to the Agency Was Based on Credible, Competent Evidence, Was Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence, and Did Not Constitute an Abuse of the Juvenile Court‘s Discretion
{¶ 20} Pursuant to
{¶ 22} The Agency argues that because M.B. and C.C. were found guilty of an offense listed within
{¶ 23} In making its determination that permanent custody would be in the best interests of the children in this case, the juvenile court was required pursuant to
{¶ 24} As to the interaction and relationship of the children with their parents and extended family pursuant to
{¶ 25} The juvenile court‘s finding that the children were in temporary custody under
{¶ 26} M.B. specifically alleges that the record did not support the determination that she presented an ongoing risk of harm to her children. However, the record reflects that M.B. committed multiple criminal offenses against her children over the course of 18 months. Further M.B. was prohibited from contact with her children as a condition of her criminal sentence for a period of time up to five years. In light of this evidence, we cannot say the juvenile court‘s determination that “the seriousness, nature, or likelihood of recurrence of the abuse or neglect makes the child[ren]‘s placement with the child[ren]‘s parent a threat to the child[ren]‘s safety” was an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 27} The juvenile court‘s decision to grant permanent custody was based upon a review of the appropriate statutory considerations and supported by competent, credible evidence. Accordingly, we do not find the judgment is against
{¶ 28} The sole assignment of error presented is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 29} We find that the juvenile court‘s judgment to award permanent custody was based on competent, credible evidence in the record. Further, we find that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that permanent custody was in the children‘s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
{¶ 30} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR