Hyde v. State, 299 Ga. 135

Hyde v. State

299 Ga. 135

Ga.

2016

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S16A0698. HYDE v. THE STATE.

S16A0698

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 23, 2016

299 Ga. 135 | 786 SE2d 681

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED MAY 23, 2016.

The Jarman Firm, Camille N. Jarman, for appellant.

Hughes & Manning, S. M. Alexandra Manning; The Douglas Law Group, Chevelle D. Douglas, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Chief Justice.

Appellant Hopton Hyde appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate an alleged void sentence of life without the possibility of parole. As the State concedes, the trial court erred in denying the motion. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case with direction.

On February 1, 2000, a jury found appellant guilty of malice murder, aggravated assault, felony murder in the commission of aggravated assault, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime. Under subsection (c) of Georgia’s recidivist statute, OCGA § 17-10-7, the trial court sentenced appellant as a recidivist to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder.¹ We affirmed on direct appeal. See Hyde v. State, 275 Ga. 693 (572 SE2d 562) (2002). In May 2014, Hyde filed a pro se motion, contending that his sentence of life without the possibility of parole was void because the trial court, when it sentenced him, was not allowed by law to impose that sentence for murder. The trial court denied the motion, and appellant filed a timely appeal.

“[W]hen a court imposes a criminal punishment that the law does not allow, the sentence is not just an error, it is void.” Humphrey v. State, 297 Ga. 349, 350 (773 SE2d 760) (2015). An attack on a sentence on the ground that it imposed a punishment that the law does not allow “may be made at any time by means of a motion to vacate a void sentence.” Rooney v. State, 287 Ga. 1, 2 (690 SE2d 804) (2010). Here, in 2000, appellant was sentenced as a recidivist to life without the possibility of parole under subsection (c) of OCGA § 17-10-7 for a murder that he committed in 1999. At both of those times, however, OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) did not allow recidivist punishment for capital felonies, of which malice murder is one.² See Funderburk v. State, 276 Ga. 554, 555 (580 SE2d 234) (2003) (holding that the sentence of life without the possibility of parole that was imposed in 2000 on the defendant for malice murder was void because, at that time, OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) did not apply to capital felonies such as murder). Accordingly, appellant’s sentence of life without the possibility of parole is void, see Funderburk, 276 Ga. at 555, and the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to vacate. We thus reverse the denial of the motion, vacate the sentence of life without parole, and remand for the imposition of a legal sentence.

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.

DECIDED MAY 23, 2016.

Hopton Hyde, pro se.

Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Paige Reese Whitaker, Marc A. Mallon, Assistant District Attorneys; Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

S16F0279. DAVENPORT v. DAVENPORT.

S16F0279

Supreme Court of Georgia

May 23, 2016

299 Ga. 136 | 786 SE2d 682

NAHMIAS, Justice.

Dustin Davenport (Husband) and Keisha Davenport (Wife) were divorced by final decree in the Union County Superior Court. Husband appeared pro se in the divorce proceeding. Wife, who had counsel, paid for a court reporter to record the bench trial on May 5, 2014; Husband did not participate in paying for the takedown. After the trial, Husband hired a lawyer, who filed a motion for new trial and a motion to compel production of the trial transcript (which Husband was now willing to pay for), asserting that the trial court failed to make a ruling at the start of the trial that Husband expressly refused to share the takedown expense. In response, Wife claimed that Husband had expressly refused to participate in the takedown after being given an opportunity to do so.

Notes

The felony murder verdict was vacated by operation of law, and the trial court merged the remaining counts for sentencing purposes.

Since 2000, “the General Assembly has amended subsection (c) to remove the exception for capital felonies. See OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) (2013).” . See also Ga. L. 2010, p. 563, § 1.

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