Gregory Grimes was tried by a Fulton County jury and convicted of the murder of Bobby Greer. He appeals, contending that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his conviction, that he should have been convicted instead of voluntary manslaughter, and that the trial court erred by sentencing him as a recidivist. We find no merit in these claims of error, and we affirm.
1. We begin with the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that Grimes fatally stabbed Greer on the morning of January 26, 2003. Earlier- that morning, Grimes had visited the home of Terrance Barrow, where Grimes had obtained a knife, changed into dark clothing, and said that he was looking to rob someone. Greer later was seen entering a nearby “drug house,” and Grimes was seen walking
That same morning, investigators found the knife that Grimes had obtained from Barrow’s house, and on it, they found Greer’s blood. The knife was found stuck in the porch railing of a house next to Barrow’s, and a resident of that house explained that he earlier had overheard a conversation between his roommate and Grimes. In the course of that conversation, Grimes said that he had “got [ten] into it” with someone who “was shooting at him,” that Grimes “f***ed him up,” and that he “should be resting in peace by now.” Although gunshot residue was found on Greer’s hands, no witness saw Greer with a gun or heard any gunshots, and no weapons were found on or near his body.
Grimes argues on appeal that, because there was some evidence that Greer had a weapon and shot at Grimes before the stabbing — namely, Grimes’s own statement and the gunshot residue found on Greer’s hands — the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not justified in stabbing Greer. But the evidence on those points was conflicting. There was evidence that Greer, in fact, had no weapon and did not shoot at Grimes. As we have explained many times before, conflicts in the evidence, questions about the credibility of witnesses, and questions about the existence of justification are for the jury to resolve. See Hoffler v. State,
2. We next consider whether the trial court properly entered a judgment of conviction for felony murder, rather than for voluntary manslaughter. In its verdict, the jury found Grimes guilty of both crimes, and that verdict, Grimes contends, means that the “modified merger rule” of Edge v. State,
Consequently, we generally do not apply the Edge modified merger rule “to any felony murder conviction in which the underlying felony was not the aggravated assault of the murder victim.” Sims v. State,
3. Last, we consider whether Grimes was erroneously sentenced as a recidivist ineligible for parole pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (c),
any person who, after having been convicted under the laws of this state for three felonies or having been convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States of three crimes which if committed within this state would be felonies, commits a felony within this state other than a capital felony must, upon conviction for such fourth offense or for subsequent offenses, serve the maximum time provided in the sentence of the judge based upon such conviction and shall not be eligible for parole until the maximum sentence has been served.
OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) (2005). Grimes contends that the State failed to prove that he had been convicted previously of three felonies, noting that the prosecuting attorney stated in his place at sentencing that Grimes had three prior felony convictions, but that no certified copies of those convictions were put forward by the State. This contention is misplaced, however, because Grimes did not object to the statements of the prosecuting attorney or otherwise dispute that he had three prior felony convictions, and we have held before that the statements of a prosecuting attorney can prove prior convictions in the absence of an objection. Moret v. State,
And in any event, Grimes is not today under any sentence for which he is parole ineligible pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (c). When
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crime was committed on January 26,2003. Grimes was indicted on May 13,2003 and charged with one count of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, and one count each of aggravated assault and attempted armed robbery. His trial commenced on October 31, 2005, and the jury returned its verdict three days later. As to malice murder, the jury found Grimes guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. As to the other counts, the jury found Grimes guilty as charged. At first, the trial court sentenced Grimes for both felony murder and voluntary manslaughter, sentencing him to imprisonment for life for felony murder and a concurrent term of imprisonment for twenty years for voluntary manslaughter. The verdict on the other count of felony murder was vacatedby operation of law, Malcolm v. State,
The girlfriend and one of the walkers knew Grimes and identified him by name. The other walker did not know Grimes, but she described the attacker as a man wearing dark clothing.
Grimes also contends that he was erroneously sentenced pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (a), which — at the time of both his crime and his sentencing — required certain recidivists to “be sentenced to undergo the longest period of time prescribed for the punishment of the subsequent offense ofwhich he or she stands convicted.” OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) (2005). But in this case, Grimes was convicted of murder, and the only sentence that the trial court could have imposed at that time was imprisonment for life, considering that the State did not seek the death penalty. Accordingly, he would have received the same sentence, regardless of whether OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) applied. Any error with respect to OCGA § 17-10-7 (a), therefore, was harmless.
In any event, the trial court could not have sentenced Grimes at that time to life without parole for murder pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (c) because subsection (c) then applied only to fourth or subsequent felony convictions “other than [for] a capital felony.” See Funderburk v. State,