Hurd v. District of Columbia
864 F.3d 671
| D.C. Cir. | 2017Background
- In 2006 Hurd was sentenced to 42 months in D.C. Superior Court; he began serving in federal custody but was released by the Bureau of Prisons in June 2007 after ~13 months.
- Hurd reasonably believed the release was a lawful sentence reduction and served three years of supervised release in D.C., reporting to and being monitored by federal/parole authorities through July 2010.
- In September 2011 Hurd pled guilty to misdemeanor marijuana possession and was serving a three-weekend jail sentence; after the second weekend (Oct. 2, 2011) the D.C. Department of Corrections refused to release him and told him he had ~27 months remaining on his 2006 sentence.
- Hurd received no prior notice or hearing before re‑incarceration and challenged the detention by habeas petition in D.C. Superior Court; the Superior Court denied relief from the bench in July 2012 after refusing an evidentiary proffer; the D.C. Court of Appeals later dismissed his habeas appeal as moot after Hurd was released.
- Hurd then sued the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of procedural and substantive due process; the district court dismissed both claims (substantive claim dismissed as precluded by the Superior Court habeas ruling; procedural claim dismissed for failure to allege a liberty interest).
- The D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded: it held the unreviewed Superior Court habeas ruling lacked preclusive effect and that Hurd plausibly alleged a procedural due process liberty interest; the court also ruled the district court improperly relied on extra-pleading material when disposing of the substantive due process claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the D.C. Superior Court’s habeas ruling precludes Hurd’s § 1983 substantive due process claim | Hurd: the habeas ruling was unreviewed on appeal and could not have afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate; damages were unavailable in habeas so claim preclusion is improper | D.C.: Superior Court decided the claim on the merits and that decision is preclusive | Court: No preclusion — unreviewed habeas bench ruling lacks full-and-fair-litigaton effect and Hurd could not have sought damages in habeas |
| Whether Hurd had a protected liberty interest triggering procedural due process before re‑incarceration | Hurd: after release and completion of supervised release, he reasonably believed his sentence was served and had a liberty interest requiring at least notice/hearing before re‑incarceration | D.C.: a mistakenly released prisoner has no legitimate entitlement to freedom and thus no right to a pre‑deprivation hearing | Court: Hurd plausibly alleged a liberty interest; longstanding precedents (Morrissey, etc.) support that some persons living openly have due process rights before re‑confinement |
| Whether Hurd’s substantive due process claim was adequately pleaded | Hurd: the complaint alleges facts (length of release, government culpability, lack of notice, consequences) supporting a Merritt-style substantive due process claim | D.C.: Hurd failed to show he had successfully reintegrated; government exhibits show repeated drug positives and arrests that defeat the claim | Court: District court erred by considering outside materials without converting the 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 summary judgment motion; remand required for proper fact development |
| Whether the district court could consider exhibits from the habeas proceeding on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion | Hurd: the district court should have ignored outside materials or converted the motion and given parties notice and opportunity for discovery | D.C.: the documents were judicially noticeable as court records from the habeas case | Court: Judicial notice cannot be used to accept disputed facts for their truth; Rule 12(d) required conversion or exclusion of extra‑pleading materials; the court improperly relied on them |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Merritt, 478 F. Supp. 804 (D.D.C. 1979) (framework for substantive‑due‑process challenges to re‑incarceration after mistaken early release)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolees have a liberty interest entitling them to procedural protections before revocation)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (release pending habeas may moot habeas but does not necessarily foreclose a § 1983 damages claim)
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas is the proper route for release; damages not available in habeas)
- Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (limits of habeas and availability of other remedies for prisoners)
- United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (vacatur of lower‑court judgment is the usual remedy when a case becomes moot on appeal)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (limits on bringing § 1983 damages claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (substantive due process requires conduct that shocks the conscience)